Petition for review denied and cross-application for enforcement granted by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER joined. Judge SHEDD wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Anheuser-Busch Incorporated (“Busch”) petitions this Court for review of a Decision and' Order entered against it by the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”). Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Dec. 19, 2001) (the “Or[270] der”).1 By its Order, the Board affirmed an earlier decision of an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”), who concluded that Busch, on four occasions, had violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”).2 The Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its Order. As explained below, we deny the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
I.
Busch operates twelve breweries in the United States, including a brewery in Baldwinsville, New York (the “Baldwins-ville brewery”). At the Baldwinsville brewery, certain of Busch’s employees are represented by the Brewery Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 1149 (collectively, the “Teamsters”). In 1998 and 1999, the Teamsters and brewery management engaged in contract negotiations on a new collective bargaining agreement, leading to several controversial incidents at the Bald-winsville brewery. As a result of these incidents, the Teamsters filed a series of charges with the Board, asserting that Busch had committed a host of unfair labor practices. Ultimately, on December 2, 1999, the charges were consolidated into a complaint against Busch (the “Complaint”), issued by the Board’s Regional Director for the New York area.3
In order to assess the Teamsters’s allegations, the ALJ conducted a hearing in Syracuse, New York, from March 8 through 10, 2000. On July 7, 2000, the ALJ issued his decision, making findings of fact and conclusions of law, and preparing a recommended order (the “ALJ Decision”).4 The ALJ concluded that Busch had committed four unfair labor practices involving three employees who worked at the Baldwinsville brewery, specifically, Patrick Lamirande, Joseph Rim-ualdo, and Brian Meany. After the ALJ Decision was filed with the Board, Busch filed exceptions to it. On review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it adopted his recommended order.5 Order at 1. As noted above, Busch has petitioned for our review of the Order, and the Board has cross-applied for its enforcement. We [271] possess jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
II.
A. Incidents Involving Patrick Lamirande
On December 15, 1998, Teamsters member Patrick Lamirande, a production operator at the Baldwinsville brewery, allegedly obstructed an independent contractor doing work for Busch (the “Contractor Incident”). At approximately 11:15 the following morning, Mark Burlin-game and Art Lux, members of the brewery’s management, approached Lamirande and began questioning him about the incident. Lamirande promptly requested the presence and assistance of Dan Finn, a shop steward in Lamirande’s department, who was already aware of the facts underlying the Contractor Incident.6 Assuming Finn was at lunch, Burlingame declined this request, calling instead for Fred Vo-gel, another shop steward in Lamirande’s department. Vogel arrived at the site of Lamirande’s questioning within fifteen minutes, and after speaking privately with Lamirande, Vogel renewed the request for Finn’s presence. Burlingame denied this request, stating that Lamirande should respond to the allegations immediately. La-mirande declined to discuss the matter without Finn, and Burlingame sent him home for the day.
The next morning, December 17, 1998, Lamirande was directed to Burlingame’s office for a meeting with management. Upon reporting to the office, he met with Vogel, Burlingame, Lux, Howard Ormsby (a Teamsters business agent), and Ken Silva (a brewery assistant manager). Ormsby, speaking on Lamirande’s behalf, requested that Finn be allowed to attend the meeting and represent Lamirande, but Silva insisted that Finn’s presence was unnecessary. Lamirande was questioned without Finn, and Burlingame thereafter informed Lamirande that he would be disciplined for the Contractor Incident. As a result of these events, the Teamsters filed a charge with the Board, alleging that Busch had committed two unfair labor practices in refusing Lamirande’s requests (on December 16 and 17) to be represented by Finn.
In assessing the Teamsters’s allegations, the ALJ ruled that, under the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 95 S.Ct. 959, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975), and pursuant to the Board’s related precedents, “an employee has the right to specify the representative he or she wants, and the employer is obligated to supply that representative absent some extenuating circumstances.” ALJ Decision at 6. Pursuant to this principle, the ALJ concluded that, although Finn may have been eating lunch when Burlingame initially wanted to question Lamirande, Finn was nevertheless “available” as a representative. Id. Finn had previously circumscribed his lunch breaks in order to represent employees. In any event, Finn would have completed his lunch break within fifteen minutes of Lamirande’s initial request. By its Order, the Board agreed with the ALJ’s ruling that Busch had committed two unfair labor practices in denying La-mirande’s requests to be represented by a particular shop steward. Order at 1.
B. Incidents Involving Joseph Rimualdo
In 1987, Joseph Rimualdo, a member of the Teamsters, began working in the packaging, bottling, and shipping department [272] of the Baldwinsville brewery. In 1998, he became a shop steward, and he soon learned of certain safety issues in two other departments of the brewery. In January of 1999, he filed six grievances related to those safety issues. Upon being informed of these grievances, Fred Singler, the manager of Rimualdo’s department, met with Rimualdo and the managers of the two departments involved in the safety grievances, Lux and Nick Alivero. In this meeting, Singler asserted that Rimualdo had failed to follow the proper procedures for addressing the safety issues. Rimual-do admitted that this assertion was accurate, and the meeting adjourned. Four days later, upon seeing Rimualdo drinking a Labatt’s Blue beer in a tavern near the brewery, Lux said, “This is two strikes. You got one for filing safety grievances and you got one for drinking Labatt’s Blue.” ALJ Decision at 11. As a result of this incident, the Teamsters charged Busch with an unfair labor practice, asserting that Lux had threatened Rimualdo for filing safety grievances, an activity protected by the Act.
Before a hearing was conducted on this charge, Rimualdo was involved in another incident at the brewery. On August 25, 1999, Rimualdo, with a group of fellow employees, was hand stamping dates on packages of beer. On that occasion, Rim-ualdo accidentally got ink on his hands. Lux approached the group and, according to Rimualdo, said, “You got to be careful what you say and what you do around this guy, he’s bad news.” Lux then stated to Rimualdo: “You got to be pretty good with having ink on your fingers.” Id. at 12. The latter comment, according to Rimual-do, referred to Rimualdo’s recent arrest and fingerprinting in a domestic incident involving his ex-wife. Lux told him, “You made it very tough for me, filing those charges with the [Board], We’ll see in September.” Id. Rimualdo claimed that, after these statements, Lux threatened to get even with him in some way.7 Based on this incident (the “Stamping Incident”), the Teamsters, on September 8, 1999, charged Busch with another unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Busch had “interfered with, restrained and coerced Rimualdo in the right to engage in protected, concerted activity by threatening and disciplining him for filing a charge with the [Board].”8
As to Lux’s comments at the tavern, the ALJ found that they were based on Rim-ualdo’s apparent disloyalty in drinking a competitor’s beer, rejecting the Teamsters’s assertion that Busch had threatened Rimualdo because he had filed safety grievances. ALJ Decision at 11. The ALJ thus concluded that Lux’s comments to Rimualdo at the tavern did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Id. On the Stamping Incident, however, the ALJ found that Lux had threatened Rimualdo because of the Teamsters’s pending charge before the Board, and he thus concluded that Busch had committed an unfair labor practice. Id. at 12. By its Order, the [273] Board agreed with the ALJ’s determinations. Order at 1.
C. Incidents Involving Brian Meany
On February 11, 1999, Teamsters member Brian Meany, an employee in the brewing department of the Baldwinsville brewery, attended a mandatory company communications meeting conducted by Michael Harding, a senior executive from Busch’s headquarters in St. Louis. At the outset of Harding’s presentation, the brewery’s employees were advised that the meeting was for the purpose of discussing Busch’s financial performance and that there would be no discussion of collective bargaining or “contract issues.” Following his presentation, Harding entertained questions from employees. At that time, Meany criticized Busch for its treatment of workers at the Baldwinsville brewery. At one point, Meany read a list of symptoms of an abused spouse, drawing an analogy to Busch’s treatment of its employees. During Meany’s commentary, Harding urged Meany to keep his comments brief, but Meany ignored this request.
When Meany reported to work the next day, February 12, 1999, he was advised to find a shop steward and report to Brew-master Sammartino’s office for a meeting with Sammartino and Human Resources Manager Larry Harmon. At the meeting, Sammartino criticized Meany for disrupting the communications meeting, suggesting that, if Meany behaved that way again, he would be removed from the Baldwins-ville brewery and disciplined. Sammartino then said, “I want you to know that the work you do on the floor here does not outweigh the things you do in communications meetings. If you speak again at a communications meeting, you will be fired.” ALJ Decision at 8. After Meany requested that this restriction be placed in writing, Harmon said, “You know what, you will be fired. Then the [Teamsters] will go through the grievance procedure and what will happen will happen.” Id.
As a result of this incident, the Teamsters charged that Busch had interfered with Meany’s right to engage in a protected activity by threatening him for voicing his opinions on collective bargaining issues. As to this charge, the ALJ agreed with the Complaint, concluding that Busch management threatened Meany in reaction to a protected activity and that Busch had thus engaged in an unfair labor practice. Id. at 8-9. The Board also affirmed this conclusion, agreeing that Busch had committed an unfair labor practice in its treatment of Meany. Order at 1.
III.
In considering a petition for review, we are obliged to uphold the Board’s legal interpretations if they are “rational and consistent” with the Act. Sam’s Club, a Div. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 173 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, if the Board’s resolution is a “defensible construction of the statute,” it is entitled to deference, because the “function of [effectuating] national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the [Board], subject to limited judicial review.” Arrow Auto. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 237 (4th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding legal issues, however, the Board should apply its principles consistently. Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir.2002). And when the Supreme Court has already interpreted a statutory provision, the Board’s interpretation and application of the statute will be judged in relation to the Court’s rulings. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37, 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992). Find[274] ings of fact made by an.ALJ and affirmed by the Board are conclusive, so long as they are “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). And we have characterized substantial evidence as being “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Or., 36 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV.
We now turn to Busch’s contentions that the Board erred in deciding that Busch had committed unfair labor practices in its treatment of Lamirande, Rimualdo, and Meany.9 First, we assess Busch’s position regarding Lamirande’s right to a particular union representative. Second, we consider Busch’s contentions with regard to the charge involving Rimualdo. Finally, we examine its challenges regarding Meany’s activities at the communications meeting.
A.
Busch first challenges the rule articulated by the Board that, absent extenuating circumstances, an employee subjected to an employer’s investigation has the right to specify the union representative of his choice (the “Representation Rule”).10 Busch challenges the Representation Rule on three primary bases. First, it contends that the Rule is inconsistent with the Act. Second, it maintains that, even if it is consistent with the Act, the Rule is contrary to the Board’s own precedents. Finally, and relatedly, Busch insists that the Rule cannot be applied to this case because of the principle barring retroactive application of the Board’s rules.
1.
To begin with, Busch insists that the Representation Rule is inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of the Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Weingarten. According to Busch, the Representation Rule interferes with an employer’s legitimate interests in disciplining its workers. Finally, it contends that the statutory basis of Weingarten (i.e., that union representation safeguards the collective interests of the bargaining unit) is inapplicable here.
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court held that an employee has a right to union representation at any investigatory interview threatening disciplinary action. 420 U.S. at 253, 95 S.Ct. 959. An employer thus commits an unfair labor practice in denying an employee’s request for such representation. Id. Here, the Board decided that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten and the Board’s [275] experiences in resolving Weingarten-type disputes, an employee is entitled, absent extenuating circumstances, to the union representative of his choice. As explained below, we see the Representation Rule as a reasonable interpretation and application of the Act.
First, the Act — as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Weingarten — generally contemplates that an employee will have his choice as to union representation. Indeed, § 1 of the Act provides that the Act’s purpose is to protect “the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added). In Weingarten, the Court emphasized that the right to union representation “plainly effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act,” which is to enable workers to seek mutual aid and protection without undue interference by their employers. 420 U.S. at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959. The choice of a representative plainly furthers the ability of workers to seek such aid and protection.11
Second, the Act attempts to rectify the inherent power imbalance of the workplace, and an employee’s ability to choose his own union representative serves this goal. When an employee requests union representation in an investigatory interview, the employee is seeking assistance to deal with a “confrontation with his employer.” Id. at 260, 95 S.Ct. 959. In such a confrontation, the employee is generally at some disadvantage, and the recognition of his right to choose his representative serves, to some extent, to mitigate this inequality. As the Court stated in Wein-garten, “[Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate.” Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is thus reasonable that, absent extenuating circumstances, an employee should be entitled to designate the union representative who will assist him during his employer’s investigatory interview.12
In this situation, the union had designated two shop stewards in Lamirande’s department to serve as employee representatives. When Lamirande initially requested representation by Finn,13 “no rep[276] resentative was present” at the site of the proposed interview. ALJ Decision at 6. Indeed, Vogel was then in another part of the brewery and had to be summoned via radio. Id. at 3. Finn was at lunch, but on previous occasions he had circumscribed his lunch breaks in order to represent employees. Additionally, he would have completed his lunch break within fifteen minutes of the outset of the interview. Id. at 6. The ALJ concluded that the fact Finn was on his lunch break at the time of the initial request did not render him “less ‘available’ than Vogel” to represent Lami-rande.14 Id. In these circumstances, and in keeping with applicable legal principles, the ALJ did not err in deciding that Busch should have given Lamirande access to the representative of his choice.15
2.
Busch next contends that the Representation Rule is inconsistent with Board precedent. See Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir.2002) (holding that Board must apply its principles consistently). In assessing this challenge to the Board’s ruling, we note that the Court in Weingarten rejected a similar contention regarding the Board’s consistency in adhering to precedent. There, the employer pointed to several Board decisions, which had held that a union representative was not required to be present at an investigatory interview. The Court decided that, because an administrative rule normally “involves an evolutionary process,” the Board was entitled to [277] modify its rule over time. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265, 95 S.Ct. 959. The Court observed that it would “misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking” to hold “that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national labor law.” Id. at 265-66, 95 S.Ct. 959.
We agree with Busch that certain of the Board’s earlier decisions arguably support the contention that an employee is not entitled to the union representative'of his choice. Specifically, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977), the Board decided that an employer had not committed an unfair labor practice by refusing an employee’s request to be represented by a particular shop steward. In that case, the employee requested representation by a vacationing union representative. The Board decided that, because of the unavailability of the requested representative, the employer had not committed an unfair labor practice in declining to wait for the requested representative to return from vacation. In so concluding, the Board stressed the admonition in Weingarten that the right to choose representation should not interfere with an employer’s legitimate business interests, such as conducting investigatory interviews without undue delay.
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1981), the Board concluded that an employee did not have the right to choose a particular union representative. In that situation, the employer operated two facilities, separated by twenty minutes of driving time. During an interview at one facility, an employee requested a union representative from the other facility, even though the requested representative did not usually represent employees at the interview location. The employer refused this request, instead calling for the representative the union had designated for the facility where the interview was to occur. Given those circumstances, the Board concluded that the employer did not violate the Act by refusing the employee’s request. Id. at 1144.
Although the Board’s Coca-Cola and Pacific Gas decisions indicate that employees are not entitled to choose a representative, the Board, in more recent decisions, has refined its rule regarding union representation. For example, in GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1989), the Board was faced with a situation where the requested union representative was available. In those circumstances, the Board ruled that the employer had violated the Act in denying an employee his chosen representative. Id. at 1042 (finding that the employer’s “refusal to permit [an employee] to exercise his right to select a union representative in accordance with the Weingarten doctrine ... violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act”). Thus, by 1989, the Board had firmly indicated that, so long as the requested union representative is reasonably available, an employer should accommodate an employee’s request for a particular representative. See also Consolidation Coal Co., Robinson Run Mine No. 95, 307 N.L.R.B. 976 (1992) (ruling that employer committed unfair labor practice in denying employee’s request when union representative was available and ready to proceed).
Then, in New Jersey Bell, 308 N.L.R.B. 277 (1992), the Board again addressed this issue. There, a union attempted to provide an employee with a particular representative, but the employer ignored the union’s choice and picked another representative. The employer contended that, pursuant to Weingarten, Pacific Gas, and Cocar-Cola, it was not obligated to provide the employee with the representative selected by the union. The ALJ in New Jersey Bell rejected this [278] contention, observing that the Board’s decisions in Pacific Gas and Coca-Cola stood only for the proposition that an employer need not postpone its investigatory interview in order to accommodate an employee’s request.16 The ALJ concluded that the employer was obliged to demonstrate a significant reason for denying the union’s request for a particular representative. Because the union’s chosen representative was, in the words of the ALJ, “just as available” as the representative selected by the employer, the employer had violated the Act. The ALJ believed that, unless special circumstances exist, an employer has no interest in selecting the representative. On review, the Board adopted a forerunner of the Representation Rule, concluding that: “when two union officials are equally available to serve as a Weingarten representative ... the decision as to who will serve is properly decided by the union officials, unless the employer can establish special circumstances.”17 Id.
Thus, by 1992, the Board had taken a firm position that, absent special circumstances (i.e., the requested union representative is unavailable), the choice as to who will represent an employee during an investigatory interview resides with the union and the employee, not the employer.18 Beginning in 1977 with its Cocar-Cola decision, the Board has simply “modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating experience,” as authorized and approved by the Court in Weingarten. In such circumstances, we are constrained to conclude that the Representation Rule is consistent with Board precedent.
3.
Busch also asserts that the Representation Rule cannot be applied to this case because it would be a retroactive application of the Rule. See ARA Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that Board cannot retroactively apply new rules). At the time of its Coca-Cola and Pacific Gas decisions, the Board had not decided that an employee is entitled to the union representative of his choice. Since then, however, the Board has refined its approach to union representation, developing its present position over the course of many years and several decisions. In light of these developments, the Representation Rule does not signify a substitution of new law for old law. See ARA Serv., Inc., 71 F.3d at 135 (“[Only w]hen a Board decision creates a new rule ... by overruling past precedents relied upon by the parties [is] the propriety of its retroactive application called into ques[279] tion.”). In sum, we conclude that the Board appropriately found Busch to have committed unfair labor practices by failing to accommodate Lamirande’s requests for a particular representative.19
B.
On the Board’s disposition of the charges relating to Rimualdo, Busch challenges the Order in two respects. First, it contends that the Board violated its due process rights by finding an unfair labor practice that was not alleged in the Complaint. Second, it maintains that the ALJ’s finding regarding Lux’s threat to Rimualdo is not supported by substantial evidence. We assess these contentions in turn.
1.
In their initial charge, the Teamsters alleged that Busch “interfered with, restrained and coerced Rimualdo in the right to engage in protected, concerted activity by threatening and disciplining him for filing a charge with the [Board].” The Complaint, by contrast, alleged that, on August 25, 1999, Busch (through its agent Lux) “threatened an employee with unspecified reprisals because the employee had given testimony to the Board during a prior investigation.” After the hearing, the ALJ found that Busch had threatened Rimualdo for causing the Teamsters to file an unfair labor practice charge in connection with the two strikes incident. The ALJ’s conclusion tracks the language of the initial charge that the Teamsters filed with the Board (and served on Busch) rather than the allegation of the Complaint. Busch asserts that, in these circumstances, it was denied due process because the ALJ’s finding had no foundation in the Complaint.
In similar circumstances, we rejected an employer’s challenge — based on a due process contention — that the Board had found an unfair labor practice not alleged in the complaint. In Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Division v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 1138, 1136 n. 3 (4th Cir.1982), the Board’s General Counsel charged that an employer had threatened its employee with a loss of benefits if she voted in favor of a union. After hearing and considering evidence, the ALJ and the Board concluded that the employer had actually enticed the employee with a promise of benefits if she voted against the union. The employer objected to this finding, asserting that it was at variance with the complaint. We disagreed, concluding that the employer had ample notice that an unfair labor practice was alleged with respect to the specific conversation between the employer and the employee. Thus, the employer had received due process in the Board proceeding even though the ALJ’s finding was phrased differently from the allegation of the complaint. Id. (citing NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d 781, 790 (4th Cir.1975)).
The principle established in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher is controlling here. Busch was on notice that Lux’s comments to Rimualdo during the Stamping Incident formed the gravamen of the unfair labor practice charge set forth in the Complaint. Indeed, four separate witnesses testified about the Stamping Incident, and the content and context of Lux’s comments to Rimualdo were fully litigated. As in Stan-[280] dardr-Coosa-Thatcher, the ALJ and the Board were entitled to articulate then-findings in a manner that comported with the evidence. Standard-Coosar-Thatcher, 691 F.2d at 1133 n. 3. In these circumstances, Busch received ample notice that it was being charged with an unfair labor practice because of Lux’s statements on August 25, 1999, in connection with the Stamping Incident. Thus, Busch received all the process it was due.
2.
Busch next contends that the record fails to support the ALJ’s finding that Lux threatened Rimualdo for engaging in protected activity. Under § 8(a)(1), the filing of “grievances and Board charges are protected activities under the Act.” Equitable Gas Co., Div. of Equitable Res., Inc. v. NLRB, 966 F.2d 861, 866 (4th Cir.1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 and NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836, 104 S.Ct. 1505, 79 L.Ed.2d 839, (1984)). An employer thus “violates § 8(a)(1) by threatening reprisals for engaging in such protected activity.” Id. (citing NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 906 F.2d 482, 486 (10th Cir.1990)). Here, the ALJ decided that Lux was threatening Rimualdo because of the pending charges before the Board. In so concluding, the ALJ simply credited Rimualdo’s and Hart’s versions of the Stamping Incident, rejecting the conflicting evidence offered by Busch. When an administrative record is fraught with conflicting testimony, we are obliged to defer to the Board’s resolution of such conflicts. See NLRB v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 717 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir.1983). We are thus constrained to conclude that the ALJ’s finding — i.e., that Lux threatened Rimualdo for engaging in protected activity — is supported by substantial evidence.
C.
Finally, Busch raises two challenges to the Board’s conclusion that it committed an unfair labor practice with respect to Brian Meany. First, it contests the ALJ’s finding that Meany engaged in protected activity during the communications meeting. Second, it maintains that the Order and remedial notice are overly broad. We assess each of these contentions in turn.
1.
On the evidentiary issue, the record amply supports the ALJ’s finding that Meany was engaged in protected conduct during the communications meeting. ALJ Decision at 8-9. When an employee makes comments or asks questions of his employer concerning working conditions, he is unquestionably engaging in protected activity. See Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986). An employee, however, can lose the Act’s protections if his “conduct is so egregious as to take it outside the protection of the Act, or of such a character as to render the employee unfit for further service.” Id. In support of its contention on this issue, Busch relies primarily on the Board’s decision in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 169 (2000). There, the employer instructed his employees to hold questions until the end of a company presentation, but an employee disobeyed the instruction and continuously interrupted the presentation. In its decision, the Board concluded that the employee’s conduct was not protected by the Act.
This case presents a factual setting that differs materially from Eagle-Picher. The communications meetings sponsored by Busch were mandatory for all employees. At the end of each meeting, Busch allowed its employees to ask questions. As the ALJ concluded, an employer should reasonably expect unfavorable questions or [281] statements in such situations. ALJ Decision at 8-9. In the communications meeting, Meany did not interrupt Harding’s presentation. Indeed, he waited until Harding recognized him for a question before discussing issues concerning employee morale. The record thus supports the Board’s conclusions that Meany’s comments were not inappropriate, much less egregious, and that he was engaged in protected activity. Order at 1.
2.
Busch also asserts that the remedy crafted by the Board is overbroad, in that it is not properly tailored to fit the unfair labor practice it was intended to redress. See Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir.1994). By its Order, the Board required the posting of a notice advising Baldwinsville brewery workers that Busch was prohibited from threatening to “discharge an employee if he or she engages in a concerted protected activity, including engaging in such activity when speaking at corporate communications meetings.” Order at 1. It is elementary that the Board possesses broad discretion in crafting its orders, Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 258, and there is no requirement that such an order be tailored so as to preclude only the unlawful conduct arising from a particular incident or employee. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 568, 70 S.Ct. 833, 94 L.Ed. 1067 (1950). In these circumstances, and in light of these principles, the terms of the Order are not over-broad.
V.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we deny Busch’s petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED AND CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED.