RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2159-24
ANGELA FOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, ANGELINA FINNEGAN, DR. ROBERT S. SUTTER, and JEANNE GLADIS,
Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________
Argued May 7, 2026 ‒ Decided July 22, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0047-22.
Juan C. Fernandez argued the cause for appellant (Fernandez Garcia, LLC, attorneys; Cynthia V. Fitzgerald and Juan C. Fernandez, on the briefs). Kajal J. Patel argued the cause for respondents (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Kajal J. Patel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Angela Fox began employment as a teacher for the Parsippany-
Troy Hills Township School District (District) in 2011 and earned tenure in
2014. She claims, during the 2017-2018 school year, all the "violent" and
"special needs" fifth grade students were assigned to her classroom. Due to
anxiety and stress, plaintiff then took consecutive leaves of absence during the
2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years. After defendant Parsippany-Troy Hills
Board of Education (Board) filed sworn tenure charges against her, plaintiff
resigned.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants the Board, Principal
Angelina Finnegan, Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources Dr. Robert
S. Sutter, and Human Resources Manager Jeanne Gladis (collectively, Board
defendants), alleging hostile work environment, disability discrimination,
retaliation, aiding and abetting under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and respondeat superior claims.
She appeals from the February 7, 2025 order granting summary judgment to the
Board defendants. We affirm.
A-2159-24 2 I.
A. The 2017-2018 School Year
We derive the relevant facts from the summary judgment motion record,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party.
See Memudu v. Gonzalez, 475 N.J. Super. 15, 18-19 (App. Div. 2023). During
the 2017-2018 school year, plaintiff was assigned a classroom with several
students requiring behavioral and special education support. The classroom also
included two co-teachers: a special education teacher for reading and writing,
and another for mathematics. Additionally, a paraprofessional was present to
assist a student with autism.
Plaintiff testified that she experienced stress and anxiety due to the
behavior of three students with special needs in her classroom. Her performance
evaluations were generally positive and did not note any concerns about her
handling of student behavior. None of the students with special needs exhibited
aggressive behavior toward plaintiff or threatened her. During his deposition,
Dr. Sutter testified that he was not aware of any issue between plaintiff and any
student, or of plaintiff experiencing emotional distress related to a student.
Plaintiff claimed the school did not provide adequate support.
Specifically, her request for a code word to discreetly summon help was denied
A-2159-24 3 by Finnegan, who explained that she could call from the classroom to request
assistance if needed. Plaintiff also claimed adverse interactions with Finnegan:
not being included in grade-level meetings, lack of engagement, and a
"dismissive" demeanor during the year.
Plaintiff claimed that she experienced anxiety and panic attacks. She was
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by a licensed clinical
social worker, but no specific medication was recommended. On July 31, 2018,
plaintiff emailed Finnegan, Gladis, and Dr. Sutter to request a four-month leave
of absence for the 2018-2019 school year.
A series of emails was exchanged between plaintiff and the District.
Gladis promptly emailed plaintiff the "Certification of Health Care Provider for
Employee's Serious Health Condition" form in accordance with the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, to be completed by her
treating provider. Plaintiff then revised her leave request to cover the entire
school year.
Dr. Sutter responded that the District would meet with employees to
discuss and plan leave options, including the use of the employee's accumulated
sick leave and unpaid FMLA leave. He testified all communication in August
2018 was by email because plaintiff declined to meet him in person. Another
A-2159-24 4 request was made for the certification so plaintiff's leave of absence could be
processed. Plaintiff was also informed that her twelve-week FMLA medical
leave would begin on August 30, her accumulated sick days would be exhausted
on September 17, and she would be placed on unpaid leave starting September
18.
Later that same afternoon, Dr. Sutter sent another email to plaintiff stating
her medical leave required Board approval and that no medical documents or
written request had been received. He advised plaintiff that she was entitled to
twelve weeks of FMLA leave, but any additional leave under the Parsippany-
Troy Hills Education Association agreement required a separate request, distinct
from maternity and childcare leave.
Plaintiff submitted a completed certification on August 29, signed by an
advanced practice nurse. It stated: she was treated on August 28; her symptoms
had begun a year earlier and worsened in June 2018; and she was five weeks
pregnant and receiving treatment. The leave request cited "severe anxiety and
mood symptoms due to work stressors," which rendered her unable to teach from
August 30, 2018, to June 30, 2019. The nurse recommended a leave of absence
to "focus on managing and improving symptoms" and "decrease [the] risk to
A-2159-24 5 pregnancy." Plaintiff subsequently requested leave for the entire school year
without submitting any supporting documentation.
B. The 2018-2019 School Year
The District tentatively placed plaintiff on FMLA leave from August 20
to November 26, 2018 pending receipt of medical documentation. Dr. Sutter
requested documentation from her provider and stated she was expected to
return to work after her FMLA leave was exhausted. At that time, the District
determined it would not recommend an extension beyond November 26, and
plaintiff may be required to undergo a fit-for-duty examination before her return.
On September 13, the Board approved plaintiff's FMLA leave from
August 30 to September 17, using her accumulated sick leave, followed by
unpaid medical leave from September 18 to November 21. The District also
advised plaintiff that she was required to pay her healthcare contributions while
on FMLA leave and during any additional leave.
On November 1, 2018, Dr. Sutter informed plaintiff that he had
recommended to the superintendent that she undergo a fit-for-duty examination
by a psychologist or psychiatrist and the Board would vote on this
recommendation at its November 15 meeting. The Board approved the fit-for-
duty examination and granted plaintiff a leave of absence from August 30 to
A-2159-24 6 October 1, 2018, using her accumulated sick leave, personal days, family illness
days, followed by an unpaid medical leave of absence from October 2 to
November 21. After plaintiff exhausted her FMLA leave, the Board approved
additional unpaid leave from November 26 to December 7.
On December 4, 2018, plaintiff underwent the fit-for-duty examination
with Dr. Mario Finkelstein, reporting Finnegan was "very intimidating," "very
condescending" and "very difficult to work with . . . during her last school year."
She also reported she had a "very difficult student who acted out in class" and,
despite meeting with Finnegan, she did not receive assistance. Plaintiff claimed,
after this meeting, her subsequent interactions with Finnegan were not pleasant.
Dr. Finkelstein diagnosed plaintiff with "[u]nspecified anxiety disorder[,]
unspecified trauma-stressor related disorder[,] rule out anxiety disorder due to a
medical condition[—]pregnancy[,] [and] occupational problems" based on a
review of the records and evaluation. He opined plaintiff was unable to return
to teaching at that time and stated it was "unlikely" she could return before the
end of the school year. Dr. Finkelstein also noted plaintiff was five months
pregnant, and the psychiatric nurse practitioner was concerned about her anxiety
level and its potential impact on her pregnancy.
A-2159-24 7 Plaintiff was on leave from December 4, 2018, to June 2019, but again did
not provide any medical documentation. The Board extended plaintiff's unpaid
leave through the end of the 2018-2019 school year, contingent upon her
providing periodic updates on her medical treatment and ability to return to
work. As a result, Dr. Sutter informed plaintiff that she was expected to return
for the 2019-2020 school year, and the District might require another fit-for-
duty examination before her return.
C. The 2019-2020 School Year
On July 11, 2019, Dr. Sutter instructed plaintiff to provide documentation
from her treating therapist regarding her ability to return to work for the 2019-
2020 school year, and the failure to submit this report by July 19 would be
considered job abandonment. She was also informed that a fit-for-duty
examination would be required if she was not cleared to return.
On July 18, plaintiff informed Dr. Sutter she was still undergoing
treatment and consented to another examination but provided no medical
documentation. In response, Dr. Sutter reminded her that her approved medical
leave was contingent on providing periodic updates and confirmed she would
need another examination due to the lack of documentation. Plaintiff
A-2159-24 8 acknowledged she had no reports to provide, had not been cleared to return to
work, and again consented to the examination.
The second fit-for-duty examination was conducted in August 2019. In
his August 29, 2019 report, Dr. Finkelstein noted plaintiff claimed readiness to
return to work but he raised concerns because she had stopped treatment and
medication in April 2019, she did not provide her treatment records, and he was
unable to verify her care. He cited her vulnerability to postpartum depression
and anxiety and the impact of a new principal. Dr. Finkelstein concluded she
was not fit to return, and the Board extended her unpaid leave from August 28
to December 20.
Dr. Sutter met with plaintiff on September 23 and offered her the
opportunity to have union representation present, but she declined, stating she
did not feel "comfortable." According to his testimony and a confirmatory
letter, plaintiff was informed she had not been cleared to return, had not
followed Dr. Finkelstein's prior recommendations, and needed to provide
medical documentation. Plaintiff was also advised that her continued absence
was "disruptive to the classroom and the school's operation," requiring a long-
term substitute teacher on short notice.
A-2159-24 9 Plaintiff was also informed, due to her lack of compliance and clearance,
the Board might pursue tenure charges based on incapacity—her inability to
teach—and conduct unbecoming—her failure to comply with the conditions of
her prior leave. Dr. Sutter again directed plaintiff to follow Dr. Finkelstein's
recommendations, comply with the District's directives, and submit
documentation.
On December 11, 2019, Dr. Finkelstein conducted a third fit-for-duty
examination. In a telephone conversation with plaintiff's psychotherapist, he
was advised she had stopped treatment in early 2019. However, plaintiff
reported that she had been receiving weekly treatment since October 2019. Her
psychiatrist revealed plaintiff was "very anxious" about returning to work. Dr.
Finkelstein's report did not recommend that plaintiff return to work. He
recommended plaintiff continue her psychiatric and psychotherapy treatment
and be reassessed after six months of verifiable treatment.
Although plaintiff did not provide medical documentation from August
through December 2019, the Board placed her on unpaid administrative leave
from January 2 through June 30, 2020. On January 10, Dr. Sutter met with
plaintiff to address her continued noncompliance and reiterated she was not
A-2159-24 10 cleared to return to work. He again informed plaintiff of the option to resign,
noting the Board might file tenure charges against her.
That afternoon, plaintiff emailed Dr. Sutter stating: "[I]t is my
understanding that the Board is no longer interested in my recovery. As you
stated, my options are either resign or face tenure charges. Given those two
options, I ask that all further communications go through my attorney, . . . ."
Plaintiff relied on a January 20, 2020 psychiatric report by Dr. William
Head for her workers' compensation claim, alleging her PTSD from the 2017-
2018 school year was caused by Finnegan and her fifth-grade students. She
reported worsening panic attacks since June 2018 and stated Dr. Finkelstein
had not cleared her to return. Dr. Head found plaintiff may have an underlying
anxiety condition unrelated to work, and opined she was temporarily disabled
from teaching, but recommended she "try" to return in spring 2020.
On July 30, 2020, the Board filed sworn tenure charges against plaintiff,
citing incapacity, unbecoming conduct, insubordination, and other just cause
for termination. Plaintiff denied the allegations in her response. She resigned
effective October 29, 2020, citing incapacity due to work-related PTSD.
On January 10, 2022, plaintiff initiated suit against the Board defendants
alleging LAD violations and common law claims. The Board defendants
A-2159-24 11 moved for summary judgment arguing plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case for each claim. In an order accompanied by a statement of reasons, the
court granted the Board defendants' motion, dismissing plaintiff's complaint in
its entirety.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the motion court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Board defendants, claiming she established prima facie cases
of hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation. She contends the
court improperly resolved factual disputes, disregarded evidence, and
improperly rejected her hostile work environment continuum theory, disability
discrimination, respondeat superior, and aiding and abetting claims.
We review the motion court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024). We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to
determine whether no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244
N.J. 567, 582 (2021). Thus, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted . . . 'against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
A-2159-24 12 burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not defer
to the trial court's legal analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v.
Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018).
A. Hostile Work Environment Claims
Plaintiff renews her argument that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment beginning when the District assigned all the "violent" and "special
needs" fifth grade students to her classroom without any support. She contends
this continued after her PTSD diagnosis, requiring ongoing medical treatment
and leave. She claims the motion court erred in finding she did not establish a
valid hostile work environment claim. The court found plaintiff failed to show
severe or pervasive conduct or a connection to her protected status, and her
discussion with Dr. Sutter was intended to help her to decide whether to resign
or face possible tenure charges.
It is well established the LAD prohibits an employer from discriminating
in conditions of employment that creates a hostile work environment. N.J.S.A.
10:5-12(a); Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 9 (2021). To assert a prima
facie claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show "the complained-
of conduct: (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's [protected
A-2159-24 13 status;] and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable
[person] believe that (4) the conditions of employment [have been] altered and
the work environment is hostile or abusive." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v.
Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 17 (2017) (quoting Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132
N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993)). When determining whether the alleged conduct was
severe or pervasive, "courts must consider the cumulative effect of the various
incidents, bearing in mind 'that each successive episode has its predecessors,
that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work
environment created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes.'" Rios, 247
N.J. at 11 (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 607).
Plaintiff's arguments are unconvincing. Even accepting her claim that all
the "violent" and "special needs" fifth grade students were assigned to her
classroom, there is no evidence their placement was related to her protected
status. Nor has she demonstrated that the students' assignment or Finnegan's
conduct was severe or pervasive. The record lacks competent evidence that
these actions would cause a reasonable person to believe she worked in a hostile
environment.
Plaintiff also claims this hostile work environment persisted during her
leaves of absence, arguing Dr. Sutter disregarded her medical condition by
A-2159-24 14 "threatening" her with tenure charges and intimidating her into resigning.
However, the record does not support this claim. Despite repeated reminders
that her approved leaves were contingent on medical updates, plaintiff failed to
provide the required documentation. Her noncompliance led to three fit-for-
duty examinations. Nonetheless, the Board approved her various leaves.
Moreover, the contact between the District and plaintiff was about her
leaves and the fit-for-duty examinations. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to
have union representation during meetings with Dr. Sutter but declined to do so.
See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -43; see also Teamsters Loc. 97 v. State, 434 N.J.
Super. 393 (App. Div. 2014). No genuine issue of material fact exists to support
plaintiff's claim for a hostile work environment.
Plaintiff alternatively asserts a hostile work environment claim under a
continuum theory, alleging it began with the assignment of students to her
classroom in 2017 and continued through the filing of tenure charges in 2020
while she was on leave. She claims this violated District policy, although she
cites no specific Board policy or regulation, and argues the court failed to
consider the cumulative effect of the Boards' actions, contending this issue
should be decided by a jury.
A-2159-24 15 Under the continuing violation doctrine, "a plaintiff may pursue a claim
for discriminatory conduct if [they] can demonstrate that each asserted act by a
defendant is part of a pattern and at least one of those acts occurred within the
statutory limitations period." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174
N.J. 1, 6-7 (2002) (citing West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754-55 (3d Cir.
1995)). To establish a continuing violation based on a series of discriminatory
acts, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) at least one allegedly discriminatory act
occurred within the filing period and (2) the discrimination is 'more than the
occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination' and is
instead a continuing pattern of discrimination." Bolinger v. Bell Atl., 330 N.J.
Super. 300, 307 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Harel v. Rutgers, State Univ., 5 F.
Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.N.J. 1998)).
The alleged adverse actions—such as student placement and the reminder
for periodic updates in response to plaintiff's leave requests or the fit-for-duty
examinations—are discrete acts and are not bound by a pattern of continuing
discrimination. See Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 566 (2010). Even when
aggregated, none of the alleged hostile acts prior to January 2020 rise to the
level of a hostile work environment. See Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204
N.J. 219, 229 (2010). Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to
A-2159-24 16 plaintiff, we conclude the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to her
hostile work environment claim.
Since plaintiff has not made a prima facie case against the Board, we do
not disturb the dismissal of her claims for respondeat superior and aiding and
abetting a hostile work environment against the individual defendants. See
Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008).
B. Disability Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff renews her failure to accommodate argument, claiming the
District refused to accommodate her treatment schedule and violated its own
policy. However, the motion court found the District's accommodations were
reasonable and in good faith, and that no genuine dispute of fact required
submission to a jury.
"The LAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a
disability." Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 524 (2021) (quoting
Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006)). "'[O]ur courts have
uniformly held that the [LAD] . . . requires an employer to reasonably
accommodate an employee's' disability." Ibid. (second alteration in original)
(quoting Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 499 (2017)).
A-2159-24 17 "[T]o establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD," an
employee must prove they "(1) 'qualif[y] as an individual with a disability, or []
is perceived as having a disability . . . '; (2) ['are] qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, or w[ere] performing those essential functions,
either with or without reasonable accommodations'; and (3) 'that [the employer]
"failed to reasonably accommodate [their] disabilities."'" Richter, 246 N.J. at
526 (second alteration in original) (quoting Royster, 227 N.J. at 500).
The record demonstrates plaintiff does not satisfy the first and second
elements. Despite her assertions to the contrary, she has not been capable of
teaching since 2018, as evidenced by Dr. Finkelstein's three reports. See Viscik
v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 16-18 (2002).
As to the third element, we reject plaintiff's argument that the District
failed to accommodate her treatment schedule. The record shows plaintiff
provided no medical documentation beyond the initial certification, and the
Board engaged in the interactive process, granting various leaves from 2018 to
2020. Accordingly, the Board did not engage in any discriminatory conduct, as
plaintiff's health issues prevented her from teaching. See Delvecchio v. Twp. of
Bridgewater, 224 N.J. 559, 572 (2016) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1).
A-2159-24 18 C. Retaliation
The LAD prohibits retaliation against any person for seeking legal advice
regarding rights under the act. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). To establish a prima facie
retaliation claim, the plaintiff must present evidence of each of its elements:
"(1) they [are] engaged in a protected activity known by the employer; (2)
thereafter their employer unlawfully retaliated against them; and (3) their
participation in the protected activity caused the retaliation." Rios v.
Meadowlands Hosp. Med. Ctr., 463 N.J. Super. 280, 287 (App. Div. 2020)
(quoting Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 125 (2008)).
Plaintiff must show defendants unlawfully retaliated against her for
retaining counsel and committed the adverse employment action of "threatened"
tenure charges. In making this claim, she relies solely on her claim that Dr.
Sutter was displeased with her attorney's involvement, barred her attorney from
meetings, and threatened tenure charges if she did not resign. The motion court
found no causal link between the protected activity and any adverse employment
action, concluding the tenure charges were unrelated to the protected activity.
We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's unsupported claim of retaliation
regarding her retaining an attorney. "'[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions
by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' summary judgment motions."
A-2159-24 19 Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 529 (App. Div. 2019)
(quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)). There was no
communication between plaintiff, defendants, and her attorney that put
defendants on notice plaintiff engaged in this protected activity; therefore,
plaintiff has not met the first two elements.
Plaintiff does not establish the third element, adverse employment action,
despite claiming she was forced to resign after the Board filed tenure charges.
Merely discussing possible tenure charges is not an adverse action. Beasley v.
Passaic Cnty., 377 N.J. Super. 585, 609-10 (App. Div. 2005) ("'Retaliatory
action does not encompass action taken to effectuate the discharge, suspension
or demotion.'") (quoting Keelan v. Bell Commc'ns Rsch., 289 N.J. 531, 539 (App
Div. 1996)). The Board reasonably filed tenure charges due to plaintiff's
indefinite leave and lack of documentation. After a de novo review, we conclude
the Board had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason and undue hardship, as
plaintiff's prolonged absence from the classroom disrupted students' learning,
compromised instructional continuity, and required reliance on substitute
teachers. See N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J.
Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996). We affirm summary judgment in defendants'
favor and the dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim under the LAD.
A-2159-24 20 We discern no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff's hostile work
environment, disability discrimination, and retaliation claims. Plaintiff failed to
present evidence establishing a prima facie case for each alleged LAD violation.
Accordingly, we need not address the burden-shifting framework outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), and adopted
by our Supreme Court in Viscik, 173 N.J. at 13-15.
To the extent we have not discussed any of plaintiff's remaining
arguments, we deem them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2159-24 21