Justice SCOTT
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to review Ervin v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 P.2d 246 (Colo.App.1994).1 Petitioner Amoco Oil Company (Amoco) appeals the court of appeals’ decision to affirm a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of respondents, sixteen current or former Amoco brand retail service station dealers doing business in Colorado (collectively referred to as “dealers”). The court of appeals held that Amoco breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and tortiously interfered with prospective business relationships. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the court of appeals with directions that it return the case to the trial court with instructions that damages be recalculated.
I
Amoco, a Maryland corporation, is a nationwide manufacturer, transporter, and marketer of petroleum products. Amoco distributes its products through a dual distribution system. As a landlord, Amoco leases service station facilities to independent service station dealers in various states, including Colorado. Amoco sells its products to these independent dealers who then resell the same to the public. Amoco also sells its products directly to the public through its own company operated stations.
Amoco entered into written lease and dealer supply agreements (agreements) with various dealers in the state of Colorado. The lease agreements provided that “[ljessee shall pay to Lessor as rent for the Premises, the sum of [a designated amount] per month during the term of this Lease unless a variable monthly rental is indicated below....” Under these agreements, Amoco leased both service station facilities and real property to each dealer. Both the lease and supply agreements had terms of one to three years; contained integration, cancellation, and merger clauses; and included specific dollar amounts of rent. Pursuant to the agreements, Amoco internally calculated the amount of rent it would collect from each dealer for its service station properties. Since 1985, Amoco has used its Investment Value Report program (IVR) to determine its Colorado rental goals. Using the IVR program, Amoco calculates the amount of rent based on the asset value of each service station.
Prior to adopting asset based rental valuations, Amoco calculated the rent amount based on the sale of gasoline at a particular station (gallonage rent program). Under the gallonage rent program, dealers paid a specific rental amount for every gallon of gasoline sold. However, Amoco decided the gal-lonage rent program provided a disincentive to sell more gasoline because a dealer’s rent [496]*496would increase with higher sales. In part to correct this disincentive, Amoco instituted an asset based calculation to determine rent payments under the agreements. In essence, Amoco sought to move fixed costs from the gasoline operation to the value of the real estate for each dealership. Following this philosophy, Amoco eventually promulgated the IVR program.
Under the IVR program, Amoco first determines the market value of the land, which is appraised at its highest and best use. Second, Amoco establishes a value for capital improvements. Capital improvements include buildings, machinery, equipment, furniture, and fixtures. Amoco adds together the original dollar amounts (i.e., investment value) paid for the improvements, regardless of when the money was spent. Next, the market value of the land and the value attributed to capital improvements are added together to determine the investment base. Amoco charges eight percent of the investment base to calculate a dealer’s capital charge. Finally, Amoco adds other fees to the eight percent capital charge.
Each year the previous three years worth of maintenance costs are totalled and averaged. The annual average becomes the maintenance portion of the rent for the next fiscal year. Amoco also adds a charge for real estate and personal property taxes paid on a particular location. In addition to these figures, on full facility operations, Amoco applies a uniform charge for each automotive service bay despite the inclusion of buildings, equipment, machinery, and fixtures in the capital improvements portion of rent calculations. The dealers contend they are being double charged on the service bays because the capital improvement component covered that cost. Amoco adds the capital charge, average maintenance cost, taxes, and service bay charges to calculate the rent for a particular location.2
On June 20,1988, the dealers initiated suit against Amoco, alleging breach of the agreements and tortious interference with prospective business relations. The dealers’ complaint contained seven claims, four of which were dismissed prior to trial. The remaining three counts were submitted to [497]*497the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealers for over $2.5 million in damages, prejudgment interest, and costs for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and tortious interference with prospective business relations. Amoco appealed the judgment entered on the jury verdict.3
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Ervin v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 P.2d 246 (Colo.App.1994). It concluded that the record supported a finding that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached. Id at 250. The court of appeals also held that the dealers established a prima facie case of tortious interference, and the trial court properly submitted that claim to the jury. Id at 258. Amoco appealed.
II
Breach of Contract Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The dealers claimed that Amoco breached its contractual obligations under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by abusing its power, acting outside the scope of its discretion, and usurping the benefits of the agreements. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Amoco reserved discretion to make certain decisions, including establishing the purchase price for motor fuel, station rentals, station hours, and credit arrangements. The dealers asserted that Amoco’s use of the IVR Program for the internal calculation of rents resulted in redundant service bay charges. They claimed that, by charging twice for service bays, Amoco abused its discretion. This abuse resulted in a breach of Amoco’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Although the agreements were fully integrated, the trial court admitted parol evidence on the issue of breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jury was instructed to enforce the agreements according to the reasonable expectations of the parties and determine rental overcharges for service bays based on the IVR method employed by Amoco. The jury found that Amoco breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, rendered a verdict in favor of the dealers, and awarded the dealers a total of $987,125 in “rental damages.”
On appeal, Amoco contended that the trial court’s introduction of parol evidence in this case was improper because the lease agreements were unambiguous and fully integrated. See Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, Inc., 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750 (1978). Amoco argued that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to rewrite unambiguous and fully integrated lease agreements in three respects: (1) dealers were relieved of their obligation to pay rents and Amoco was precluded from collecting rents; (2) the rental amount was rewritten entirely;4 and (3) the paragraph barring both implied covenants and modifications absent written agreement of both parties was deleted.5
[498]*498The court of appeals rejected Amoco’s arguments, holding that although “payment [by the dealers] of the actual fixed monthly rental amount is non-discretionary,” Amoco retained discretionary authority to modify the rent charges. Ervin, 885 P.2d at 251. This authority, granted by contract, is circumscribed by the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 250-51. The court of appeals concluded that the dealers were being charged twice for service bay charges in the rental calculation, and a jury could conclude that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached. Id. at 251.
A
Colorado, like the majority of jurisdictions, recognizes that every contract contains an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. § 4-1-203, 2 C.R.S. (1992) (“Every contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”); see, e.g., Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Colo.App.1994); Friedman v. Colorado Nat’l Bank, 825 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Colo.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo.1993); Ruff v. Yuma County Transp. Co., 690 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Colo.App.1984); see also Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 717 (10th Cir.1985) (explaining that the franchisor-franchisee relationship is one that requires the parties to deal with one another in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner); see generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981); 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Cor-bin on Contracts § 561, at 278 n. 2 (1960); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369, 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton I].
The good faith performance doctrine is generally used to effectuate the intentions of the parties or to honor their reasonable expectations. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nissen, 851 P.2d 165, 168 (Colo.1993); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 989 (Colo.1986); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 Iowa L.Rev. 497, 499 (1984) [hereinafter Burton II]. Good faith performance of a contract involves “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.” Wells Fargo, 872 P.2d at 1363 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981)). The application of the reasonable expectations doctrine often “fails to give effect to some hornbook rules governing the construction of contracts,” including “the precept that contracts which are free from ambiguity are to be enforced as written_” Davis, 712 P.2d at 990 & n. 7. Nonetheless, adherence to this principle promotes “the central policy underlying contract law, that of construing contracts so as to effectuate the parties’ intentions. ...” Id. at 991; see also State Farm, 851 P.2d at 166-67; Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo.1992).
The duty of good faith and fair' dealing applies when one party has discretionary authority to determine certain terms of the contract, such as quantity, price, or time. Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S.Ct. 506, 107 L.Ed.2d 508 (1989); Burton II, supra, at 501. The covenant may be relied upon only when the manner of performance under a specific contract term allows for discretion on the part of either party. See Hubbard Chevrolet Co., 873 F.2d at 877. However, it will not contradict terms or conditions for which a party has bargained. Id.
The concept of discretion in performance “refers to one party’s power after contract formation to set or control the terms of performance.” Burton II, supra, at 501. Discretion occurs when the parties, at formation, defer a decision regarding performance terms of the contract. Id. Generally, the good faith performance doctrine may be used to protect a “weaker” party from a “stronger” party. Weakness and strength in this context, however, do not refer to the relative bargaining power of the parties. One com-mentor explained:
Good faith performance cases typically involve arm’s-length transactions, often between sophisticated business persons. The relative strength of the party exercising [499]*499discretion typically arises from an agreement of the parties to confer control of a contract term on that party. The dependent party then is left to the good faith of the party in control.
Burton I, supra, at 383-84.
Under the agreements, Amoco retained discretion to modify the monthly rental amount. The dealers depended upon the good faith of Amoco in setting the rental terms. Although the parties established specific rental figures at contract formation, they also decided to allow Amoco to modify rental terms. By allowing Amoco to adjust the rental terms the parties, in effect, left these future provisions open. The open rental terms required the dealers to depend upon Amoeo’s good faith. The general rule implying the covenant in every contract, combined with the specific discretion regarding rental terms, created a duty of good faith and fair dealing for Amoco.
Whether a party acted in good faith is a question of fact which must be determined on a ease by case basis. Testimony at trial revealed that, in addition to being charged eight percent of the value of the land and capital assets, the dealers were charged an additional amount for the service bays. The record also reflects that Amoco was aware of the double charging. However, during and after contract negotiations, Amoco never disclosed the implications of its IVR calculations. Evidence shows that the additional charge was not disclosed to the dealers until 1988. That evidence also suggests that the dealers never agreed to be charged twice for any goods or services under the lease agreements. The dealers were justified in expecting that, in determining the appropriate rent, Amoco would not charge double for any one element of the calculation. That is, although the dealers left the rental calculation to Amoco’s discretion, they presumably would not have signed the agreements had they known Amoco would charge a duplicate amount for service bays.
The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court informed the jury that “Colorado law provides that each contract has an implied covenant that parties shall act in good faith and deal fairly.” The trial court further instructed the jury “that the law requires each party to a contract to act in such a manner that each party will attain their reasonable expectations under the contract.” The evidence at trial supported the jury’s finding that, by duplicate charging, Amoco did not perform the contracts in accordance with the dealers’ reasonable expectations. Considering its acknowledgment of franchisor-franchisee interdependence, the jury could have concluded that Amoco breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On review, we will not disturb a properly instructed jury’s findings of fact.
B
Amoco asserts that the good faith covenant cannot be implied because the agreements stated that there were no implied covenants. The court of appeals disagreed with Amoco, holding that because an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied at law in every contract, the provision precluding implied covenants did not prevent recovery in this ease. We agree.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties. The merger and integration clauses do not permit Amoco to breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by duplicate charging. The reasonable expectations of the parties remain vital considerations in every contract. See Simon, 842 P.2d at 240. The record supports the jury’s conclusion that Amoco breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Ill
Economic Pressure
Amoco contends that the court of appeals erred by creating the new tort of “economic pressure.” According to Amoco, a supplier’s lawful retail price competition with its independent distributors does not subject that supplier to liability in tort. We agree.
[500]*500In the case before us, the dealers alleged that Amoco increased the costs to the dealers and sold products to its company operated stations at deflated prices. The dealers alleged that Amoco acted with the intent to move customers from dealers’ stores to company operated stations. The jury awarded eight dealers $921,844 in emotional distress damages for tortious interference with prospective business relationships.
Amoco appealed, contending that the dealers had not made out a prima facie case of tortious interference. The court of appeals held that although “competition and an economic interest of seeking to acquire business are not usually improper interference ... economic pressure may be.” Ervin, 885 P.2d at 254 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. c (1979)). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Amoco’s defenses of legal justification and absolute privilege as to the tortious interference claim. See id. at 254-55. Amoco now argues that the court of appeals erroneously adopted a new tort of “economic pressure” for legal price competition.
Colorado recognizes the tort of intentional interference with a prospective business relation. Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo.App.1981). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979) provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
Tortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract. Dolton, 642 P.2d at 23. Comment e of section 766B notes:
The expression, prospective contractual relation, is not used in this Section in a strict, technical sense. It is not necessary that the prospective relation be expected to be reduced to a formal, binding contract. It may include prospective quasi-contraetual or other restitutionary rights or even the voluntary conferring of commercial benefits in recognition of a moral obligation.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B cmt. c (1979).
When a customer utilizes a dealer’s products or services, the relation is transactional and is not “reduced to a formal, binding contract.” Rather, by purchasing products or services from a particular service station, a customer confers an economic benefit upon the dealer, but does not establish a multi-transactional, continuing contractual relationship. The benefits that flow to the dealer constitute “quasi-contractual or other restitutionary rights.” The relationship between potential customer and dealer complies with the definition of prospective contractual relation used in section 766B.
Section 767 of the Restatement sets forth seven factors used to determine whether there has been an improper interference with contractual relations. Id. § 767; see Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo.1984). Section 767 provides:
In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct,
(b) the actor’s motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
[501]*501Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979). Comment a explains that the interference must be both intentional and improper. Id. § 767 cmt. a. The comment further explains that the weight carried by these factors may vary considerably, and the determination of whether the interference is improper may also vary. Id. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of section 767.
Comment c of section 767 discusses a variety of behavior which may establish that the nature of the actor’s conduct is improper and, as a consequence, actionable. Comment c provides:
Economic pressure. Economic pressure of various types is a common means of inducing persons not to deal with another, as when A refuses to deal with B if B enters into or continues a relation -with C, or when A increases his prices to B or induces D not to deal with B on the same condition.... The question whether this pressure is proper is answered in the light of the circumstances in which it is exerted, the object sought to be accomplished by the actor, the degree of coercion involved, the extent of the harm that it threatens, the effect upon the neutral parties drawn into the situation, the effects upon competition, and the general reasonableness and appropriateness of this pressure as a means of accomplishing the actor’s objective.
Under the Restatement, “economic pressure” is one method of inducing a person not to deal with another. “Economic pressure” does not exist as an independent tort. Rather, it constitutes one potential element that might affect the evaluation of the first factor of section 767. The court of appeals used the term “economic pressure” to signify Amoeo’s improper interference with potential contractual relations. However, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the existence of economic pressure alone requires a conclusion that Amoco committed a tortious interference with the dealers’ prospective contractual relations.
Amoco maintains that it engaged in legitimate business competition, and its behavior did not constitute improper conduct under section 767. Amoco correctly notes that the specific language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 supplants the generalizations of section 767. Id. § 767 cmt. a; see also Memorial Gardens, Inc., 690 P.2d at 210 n. 7 (“These general considerations ... [of section 767] are supplanted by the specific applications of the rule to competitors found in section 768 of the Restatement.”). Section 768 provides:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other.
(2) The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of a third person does not prevent his causing a breach of an existing contract with the other from being an improper interference if the contract is not terminable at will.
Section 768 “differentiates between interference with an existing contract ... and interference with a prospective contractual relation.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 cmt. a (1979) (citations omitted); see also Memorial Gardens, Inc., 690 P.2d at 211 (“The Restatement provides less protection for contracts terminable at will because an interference with a contract terminable at will is an interference with a future expectancy, not a legal right.”). If the conditions of subsection (a) through (d) are met, competition does not constitute improper interference with a prospective contractual relation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 cmt. a (1979). The comment states that “[i]f one party is seeking to acquire a prospective [502]*502contractual relation, the other can seek to acquire it too.” Id.
A defendant will be liable for tor-tious interference with a plaintiffs prospective contractual relations if a defendant intentionally and improperly interferes with such relationships. Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618, 622 (10th Cir.1995). However, a plaintiff may not sue a competitor, qua competitor, for intentional interference with a prospective business relation. Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Colo.1984).
Comment e delineates the “predatory means discussed in § 767, Comment c, physical violence, fraud, civil suits and criminal prosecutions” as “wrongful means” under section 768. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 cmt. e (1979); see also William H. Prosser, et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1013 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing various competitive means a defendant may employ without incurring liability). However, an “actor may use persuasion and he [or she] may exert limited economic pressure” without engaging in wrongful means. The rule stated in section 768 “rests on the belief that competition is a necessary or desirable incident of free enterprise.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 cmt. e (1979). Nowhere do the dealers allege, much less present evidence of, Amoco’s use of physical violence, fraud, or civil or criminal prosecution to compete with the dealers within the dual distribution scheme.6
Amoco engaged in permissible competition. It had a dual distribution system in place, whereby it sold products through independent dealers and company operated stations. The leases were for a term of one to three years, and were terminable by the dealers at any time and by Amoco upon breach of the agreement by the dealers or upon other specified grounds. The IVR method of calculating rent payments by the dealers was itself developed because the pri- or system created what Amoco believed was a disincentive to the dealers to sell more products and Amoco intended to encourage the dealers to sell its products. Amoco entered into the lease agreements with the dealers from a business perspective, intending to make money.
Amoco’s competitive efforts were not wrongful. Amoco’s purpose was to increase its own profits from all stations, not to interfere intentionally and improperly with the dealers’ relationships with their customers.
Amoeo’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not translate into liability for tortious interference. These concepts represent separate legal constructs and are intended to remedy different wrongs. Breach of one does not necessarily constitute violation of the other. In this case, double charging, although a breach of the covenant, is not, without more than the dealers have established, a wrongful means under section 768(b).
Competition necessarily assumes, and is predicated upon, economic pressure. The record does not contain evidence that Amoco intended to finance its company operated stations with the profits it made from double [503]*503charging the dealers. Also, the record does not support a finding that Amoco intended to put the dealers out of business. However, even assuming that some such inferences were available to the jury, we conclude that Amoeo’s actions did not constitute wrongful means under section 768(b). Because the record does not support the jury’s findings, we reverse the court of appeals.
IV
Petroleum Marketing Practice Act Preemption
Amoco next contends that the holding of the court of appeals decision relating to the breach of good faith and fair dealing directly conflicts with the preemptive provisions of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2806 (1988) (PMPA). We disagree.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law may preempt state legislation7 governing the same subject matter. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Virginia Gasoline Marketers & Automotive Repair Ass’n, Inc., 34 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1097, 130 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1995); Banner Advertising, Inc. v. People ex rel. State, 868 P.2d 1077, 1080 (1994). Preemption occurs if Congress expressly states its intent to preclude state regulation of a subject. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 368, 106 S.Ct. at 1898; Mobil Oil Corp., 34 F.3d at 224; Banner Advertising, Inc., 868 P.2d at 1080. In the absence of express congressional intent, “state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law ... or if federal law ... thoroughly occupies a legislative field....” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Banner Advertising, Inc., 868 P.2d at 1080. Aso, federal provisions must be construed “in 'light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; see also Banner Advertising, Inc., 868 P.2d at 1080-81.
The PMPA’s primary purpose is to provide a uniform body of law and “to protect petroleum franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory terminations and nonrenew-als.” Mobil Oil Corp., 34 F.3d at 223 (citing S.Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 874.) The PMPA provides:
To the extent that any provision of this subchapter applies to the termination (or the furnishing of notification with respect thereto) of any franchise, or to the nonre-newal (or the furnishing of notification with respect thereto) of any franchise relationship, no State or any political subdivision thereof may adopt, enforce, or continue in effect any provision of any law or regulation (including any remedy or penalty applicable to any violation thereof) with respect to termination (or the furnishing of notification with respect thereto) of any such franchise or to the nonrenewal (or the furnishing of notification with respect thereto) of any such franchise relationship unless such provision of such law or regulation is the same as the applicable provision of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 2806(a) (1988). By its express language, the statute preempts only those [504]*504state laws that apply to franchise terminations or nonrenewals. Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 305 (2d Cir.1986); see also Simmons v. Mobil Oil Corp., 29 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir.1994) (“Those ... state law claims that do not implicate ... [a] termination or nonrenewal of the franchise ... are not preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a).”).
Congress did not intend “to preempt all state regulation through passage of the PMPA.” Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 435 (1st Cir.1986); see also Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 304 (“The PMPA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts all state law relating to any aspect of the termination or non-renewal of petroleum franchises.”); Ted’s Tire Service, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F.Supp. 163, 165 (D.Conn.1979) (“The ... [PMPA] does not preempt all state laws regulating petroleum franchises.... ”). The framers of the PMPA intended “to create a uniform system of franchise termination, not a uniform system of contract law.” O’Shea v. Amoco Oil Co., 886 F.2d 584, 593 (3d Cir.1989).
The dealers’ claims are not preempted in the present ease because they do not implicate Amoco’s termination or nonrenewal of the franchises. See Simmons, 29 F.3d at 512. The dealers challenge substantive provisions of the contracts and Amoco’s pricing conduct, which occurred during the term of the contracts. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-80, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2372-74, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (distinguishing postformation conduct from behavior during initial formation of contract). Allowing the dealers to pursue their state law claims does not create substantive rights that would not exist under the PMPA. See Mobil Oil Corp., 34 F.3d at 224-25.
The statutory language and the presumption against preemption prevent us from finding a state-federal conflict because of a “fortuitous and attenuated application” of the PMPA. See Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass’n of Petroleum Retailers, 484 F.Supp. 1008, 1018 (N.D.Ga.1979), aff'd sub nom. Exxon v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981); see also Mobil Oil Corp., 34 F.3d at 228 (Ervin, C. J., dissenting) (“Unlike the majority, I expressly do not think that the statute intended to void any state law provision that indirectly affects the termination or non-renewal of the [franchise] relationship....”); Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 305 (“It would be contrary to the Congressional purpose for this court to read the statute expansively, beyond the intended limits of the PMPA, and to find a conflict between state and federal law resulting in the preemption of a state statute in areas that Congress left to the control of the states.”). Although Amoco’s practices had an attenuated affect on the dealers’ ability to remain viable business entities, they did not directly impact the termination or nonrenewal of the franchises. Because the dealers’ state law claims address substantive provisions and behavior that did not involve termination or nonrenewal, they are not preempted by the PMPA.
V
Conflict with Antitrust Laws
Because we reverse the court of appeals’ holding regarding tortious interference with prospective business relations, we need not address this issue.
VI
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the court of appeals with directions that it return the case to the trial court with instructions that damages be recalculated.
VOLLACK, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and MULLARKEY, J., joins in the concurrence and dissent.
ERICKSON, J., does not participate.