2026 CO 18
Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services, Petitioner:
v.
Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News. Respondents:
No. 23SC927
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
March 30, 2026
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 21CA1608
Judgment
Reversed
2
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Jennifer L. Carty, Senior Assistant Attorney General Joseph
G. Michaels, Assistant Solicitor General Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents: Zansberg Beylkin LLC Steven D.
Zansberg Michael Beylkin Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Denver Human Services: Amy J.
Packer Denver, Colorado
3
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, and JUSTICE BLANCO
joined. JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE
MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE HOOD, concurs in the judgment
only.
4
OPINION
SAMOUR
JUSTICE
5
¶1
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, one of
the most influential jurists in American history,
passionately defended people's privacy, going so far as
to call an individual's "right to be let alone"
both "the most comprehensive of rights" and
"the right most valued by civilized men."
Olmstead v. United States, U7 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Samuel D. Warren
&Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193-220 (1890). Yet he also staunchly
spoke out about the importance of transparency, famously
observing that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can
Do, in Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use
It 92, 92 (1914). That these two compelling interests
are inherently virtuous is beyond question. But enforcing
them simultaneously is sometimes easier said than done.
¶2
Today, we deal with media requests to the Colorado Department
of Human Services ("CDHS") for information related
to reports of child abuse or neglect made from state-funded
residential child care facilities ("RCCFs"). The
parties' dispute pits an individual's interest in
keeping identifying information private (an interest CDHS
seeks to defend) against the public's interest in
transparency from government agencies (an interest the media
seeks to foster). But we're not called upon to discern
how to breathe life into each one of these vital interests
without
6
treading on the other. No, our General Assembly took on that
task already: It struck a delicate balance between the two
dueling interests many years ago. Our mission today is to
resolve the parties' disagreement by ascertaining and
effectuating the legislature's intent in achieving that
equilibrium.
¶3
In this case, Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a
KUSA-TV/9News, (collectively the "Media
Organizations") requested, pursuant to the Colorado Open
Records Act ("CORA"), §§ 24-72-200.1 to
-205.5, C.R.S. (2025), the total number of reports of child
abuse or neglect made to local child welfare authorities from
each of three RCCFs over a three-year period, as well as the
number of those reports at each facility that were screened
for investigation.[1] CDHS responded that, pursuant to section
19-l-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025) ("subsection (1)(a)")
of the Colorado Children's Code Records and Information
Act ("Children's Records Act"), it was
precluded from disclosing the information sought by the Media
Organizations.[2] In particular, CDHS contended that
providing the requested information for each of the three
specific RCCFs would
7
disclose the "address of any child, family, or
informant" contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect, or, alternatively, would confirm that such
a report originated from an RCCF's specific address.
¶4
We ultimately conclude that CDHS must disclose the six
cardinal numbers requested by the Media Organizations.
Because the division remanded the case to the district court
for factual findings instead of ordering the disclosure of
the six requested cardinal numbers, we reverse the
division's judgment. We remand the case to the division
with instructions to return it to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶5
In the proceedings below, the district court perceived no
ambiguity in subsection (1)(a) and agreed with C DHS's
plain-meaning interpretation. It ruled that subsection (1)(a)
barred CDHS from providing the information requested. But a
divided division of the court of appeals saw it differently.
Colo. Sun v. Brubaker, 2023 COA 101, ¶ 5, 542
P.3d 1190, 1191. Finding the parties' divergent
interpretations of subsection (1)(a) equally reasonable, the
division cut the Gordian knot by resorting to other tools of
statutory interpretation. Id. at ¶ 32, 542 P.3d
at 1195. Specifically, the division considered subsection
(1)(a)'s legislative history and the consequences of
endorsing each party's construction. M. at ¶¶
33-43, 542 P.3d at 1195-96. The division then concluded that
not all addresses of children, families, or informants
contained in reports of child abuse
8
or neglect are protected under subsection (1)(a); rather,
reasoned the division, an address is exempt from disclosure
pursuant to that statutory provision only when it constitutes
identifying information. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41,
542 P.3d at 1196. Stated differently, according to the
division, some addresses do not qualify as "identifying
information" and thus fall outside the scope of
subsection (1)(a).
¶6
In light of its interpretation, the division remanded the
case to the district court for factual findings on whether
the requested information "would disclose
'identifying information' of a child, family, or
informant associated with a child abuse or neglect
report." Id. at ¶ 44, 542 P.3d at 1197.
That is, the division directed the district court on remand
to discern whether the addresses of the three RCCFs under the
magnifying glass constitute "identifying
information" pursuant to subsection (1)(a). Id.
Rather than proceed with the remand, however, CDHS petitioned
our court for certiorari review. We granted its
petition.[3]
¶7
In analyzing subsection (1)(a), we first ask whether it is
ambiguous. Because we conclude it is not, we do not reach the
second issue raised by CDHS's petition.
9
Instead, we proceed to consider whether CDHS has met its
burden of showing that the plain meaning of the language in
subsection (1)(a) precludes disclosure of the information
sought by the Media Organizations' CORA requests. We
determine that it has not.
¶8
The Media Organizations asked CDHS for six cardinal
numbers: the total number of reports of child abuse or
neglect made to local child welfare authorities from each of
the three specified RCCFs over a three-year period; and the
number of those reports at each facility that were screened
for investigation. Because CDHS has failed to satisfy its
burden of demonstrating that the cardinal numbers requested
constitute a "report[] of child abuse or neglect,"
or the "name," "address," or "any
other identifying information" of a child, family, or
informant contained in such a report, it must disclose those
cardinal numbers to the Media Organizations. §
19-1-307(1)(a).
I.
Relevant Provisions of CORA and the Children's Records
Act
¶9
Before reciting the case's facts and procedural history,
we hit the pause button to discuss the relevant provisions of
CORA and the Children's Records Act. This background
information will help place the rest of our opinion in
context.
¶10
When it enacted CORA, our General Assembly appeared to heed
Justice Brandeis's pearls of wisdom, choosing sunlight as
Colorado's disinfectant and electric light as
Colorado's police officer. The legislature declared that
this state's
10
public policy is that public records are generally open for
inspection at reasonable times. § 24-72-201, C.R.S.
(2025). The term "[p]ublic records" in CORA
encompasses "all writings made, maintained, or kept by
the state [or] any agency . . . for use in the exercise of
functions required or authorized by law or administrative
rule or involving the receipt or expenditure of public
funds." § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025).
Further, "information obtained by public agencies in the
course of performing their duties" under the
Children's Records Act "is considered public
information" by CORA. See §
19-1-302(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025). It follows that reports of
child abuse or neglect under the Children's Records Act
generally qualify as "public records" that must be
accessible to the public pursuant to CORA. Indeed, on this
much, the parties agree.
¶11
Of course, rules often paint with broad strokes, and
exceptions add the subtle detail. Any exceptions here,
however, must be construed narrowly in light of the strong
presumption in favor of disclosure. Shook v. Pitkin Cnty.
Comm'rs, 2015 COA 84, ¶ 6, 411 P.3d 158, 160.
And a records custodian asserting an exception bears the
burden of establishing the applicability of that exception.
Id.
¶12
One of the exceptions to disclosure under CORA is an
"inspection [that] would be contrary to any state
statute." § 24-72-204(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025). CDHS
relied on the exception in section 24-72-204(1) (a) in
denying the Media
11
Organizations' CORA requests. The "state
statute" identified by CDHS as being contrary to the
Media Organizations' CORA requests was subsection (1)(a)
of the Children's Records Act. See §
19-l-307(1)(a). Thus, subsection (1)(a) takes center stage in
this opinion.
¶13
Subsection (1)(a), titled "Identifying information -
confidential," states in pertinent part that
"reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and
address of any child, family, or informant, or any other
identifying information contained in such reports shall be
confidential and shall not be public information." This
version of subsection (1)(a) has been on the books since
1977, though it hasn't always resided at its current
address. See Ch. 246, sec. 8, §
19-10-115(1)(a), 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1020,1023. It is the
scope of this provision that is at the nub of this matter.
¶14
Our legislature enacted subsection (1)(a) to preclude the
public disclosure of reports of child abuse or neglect and
certain information contained in such reports. The primary
purpose of this confidentiality provision was to
"balance the best interests of children" and the
"privacy interests of children and their families"
against the "need to share information among service
agencies and schools" and "to protect the safety of
schools and the public at large." Id. at 1122
(quoting § 19-1-302(2)); see § 19-10-115,
8 C.R.S. (1973 & Supp. 1975).
12
¶15
With this background in mind, we turn to the case's facts
and procedural history. We then proceed to analyze the merits
of the contentions advanced by the parties.
IL
Facts and Procedural History
¶16
CDHS is responsible for regulating private operators of RCCFs
across the state. RCCFs are tasked with providing
twenty-four-hour treatment and care for children who
experience serious emotional, behavioral, or developmental
disorders, many of whom are victims of child abuse or
neglect. CDHS has the sole authority to initiate appropriate
sanctions, including closure, when RCCFs fail to comply with
the standards prescribed by Colorado law.
¶17
But CDHS also has oversight of our state's abused and
neglected children. As relevant here, CDHS is responsible for
Colorado's child-abuse hotline, which is publicly
advertised as a "place for reporting known or suspected
child abuse or neglect." § 26-5-111(2)(a), C.R.S.
(2025). Operators of RCCFs have a statutory duty to report
known or suspected child abuse or neglect. When RCCF
operators do so through the hotline, the hotline routes the
complainant to the specific CDHS office responsible for
addressing reports of child abuse or neglect in the county
involved. Consequently, every call made to the hotline is
reviewed by the county's CDHS office. Upon the completion
of such review, the complaint is either "screen[ed]
in," meaning it is assigned to a caseworker for further
investigation, or "screen[ed]
13
out," meaning it is not assigned to a caseworker for
further investigation. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 12 Colo.
Code Regs. 2509-2:7.103-103.10 (2025).
¶18
In 2017, CDHS revoked the license of one of the state's
RCCFs, the El Pueblo Boys and Girls Ranch, in the wake of
allegations that the staff there had abused or neglected some
of the resident children. The Office of the Colorado Child
Protection Ombudsman ("Ombudsman") then launched an
investigation into the circumstances leading to the
facility's closure and issued a report with findings
("CPO Report"). The CPO Report concluded that there
was no "adequate system" in place to
"effectively and efficiently monitor the care being
provided to some of the state's most vulnerable
children." Off. of Colo.'s Child Prot. Ombudsman,
Investigation Report CPO Case ID: 2017-2736, at 3
(Aug. 12, 2019), https:// coloradocpo.org/
wp-content/uploads/2025/04/El-Pueblo-Boys-and
-Girls-Ranch-Main-Report-Remediated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KM62-MFYN]. In fact, the CPO Report
documented nearly 250 accounts of suspected institutional
abuse or neglect at the El Pueblo Boys and Girls Ranch that
had been made in the year prior to its closure. Alarmingly,
the CPO Report noted that a majority of these matters were
screened out without further investigation by Pueblo's
CDHS office.
¶19
A few years after the closure of the El Pueblo Boys and Girls
Ranch, a second RCCF, the Tennyson Center, closed its
residential program in Denver. The Ombudsman later revealed
that Denver County officials had received more than
14
100 complaints regarding the facility in the prior year
alone, and that, disturbingly, only eight of those (less than
10 percent) were screened in and assigned for further
investigation. See Jennifer Brown, Denver's
Tennyson Center to Close Its Residential Program After
Runaways, Overdoses and Child's Death, Colo. Sun
(Mar. 23, 2021), https:/1 coloradosun.com / 2021/03/23/ tenny
son-center-residential-program [https://perma.cc/VQ3N-2BBL],
¶20 In the two months following the closure of the
Tennyson Center's residential program, the Media
Organizations submitted formal requests under CORA for the
following information:
• "[A]ny documents that show how many
calls have been made to the child abuse hotline from Mount
Saint Vincent (RCCF) and Cleo Wallace (RCCF) from 1/1/2018 to
3/26/2021."
• "The number of hotline calls/abuse and
neglect reports/runaways reports from the Tennyson Center,
Mount Saint Vincent[,] and Cleo Wallace to local child
welfare authorities in the last three years, and how
many were screened in."
(Emphases added).
¶21
CDHS denied the Media Organizations' CORA requests,
explaining that subsection (1)(a) prohibits the disclosure of
the address of any child, family, or informant contained in
reports of child abuse or neglect. When asked by the Media
Organizations to reconsider, CDHS stood its ground, reasoning
that although the requests did not actually ask for an
address, the name of a particular RCCF was sufficient to
identify that RCCF's address, which, in CDHS's view,
15
meant that the responsive information would effectively
disclose the address of any child, family, or informant
associated with a report of child abuse or neglect made from
that facility. Nevertheless, CDHS offered to share with the
Media Organizations the aggregate number of reports
of child abuse or neglect made from all three facilities
combined during the specified three-year timeframe, along
with the aggregate number of those reports combined
that were screened in and escalated for further
investigation.
¶22
After turning down CDHS's offer, the Media Organizations
brought a lawsuit in district court under CORA seeking a
court order to compel CDHS to produce the requested
per-facility information. CDHS moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, arguing that the plain meaning of
subsection (1)(a)'s text barred the disclosures requested
by the Media Organizations. The district court agreed with
CDHS and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the
responsive information would violate subsection (1)(a) by
"necessarily identifying]" the addresses of
reported incidents. Notably, however, the district court
acknowledged that, at least from a practical standpoint, the
literal act of "linking specific [reports] with a
specific case, child or informant" might be
"difficult" or "even impossible."
¶23
The Media Organizations appealed, and a division of the court
of appeals reversed in a split decision. Brubaker,
¶ 5, 542 P.3d at 1191. The division homed
16
in on the core of the parties' dispute: the meaning of
the statutory clause "the name and address of any child,
family, or informant or any other identifying
information" contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect. Id. at ¶ 24, 542 P.3d at 1194. Because
the division determined that this language was susceptible to
two reasonable interpretations (those advanced by the
parties), it concluded that subsection (1)(a) was ambiguous.
Id. at ¶ 27, 542 P.3d at 1194.
¶24
The division explained that under CDHS's reading, each
term in the clause's series would "constitute[]
confidential 'identifying information'": Names
would be categorically confidential, addresses would be
categorically confidential, and "any other identifying
information" would operate as a catchall phrase
encompassing additional types of identifying
information not "specifically enumerated" (i.e.,
identifying information other than names or addresses).
Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, 542 P.3d at 1194.
Conversely, observed the division, under the Media
Organizations' reading, although subsection (1)(a)'s
prohibition would apply to all identifying information
contained in reports of child abuse or neglect, it would not
apply to all names or addresses of children, families, or
informants contained in such reports -only if those names or
addresses constitute identifying information would they be
barred from disclosure. Id. at ¶ 27542 P.3d at
1194.
¶25
Elaborating on the Media Organizations' construction, the
division explained that it was rooted in a "sort-of
reverse ejusdem generis" canon, the
17
much less popular cousin of "ejusdem
generis."[4] Id. at ¶ 28, 542 P.3d at
1195. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
coined the term "reverse ejusdem generis" in 1996
in United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 509
(D.C. Cir. 1996). See Brubaker, ¶ 28, 542 P.3d
at 1194-95. Pursuant to this somewhat obscure rule of syntax,
in the hypothetical phrase "A, B, or any other C,"
the general C would not be controlled by the types of
specific items enumerated in A and B; just the opposite: A
and B would be subsets of, and would be controlled by, C.
Id. Thus, only the As and Bs that are also Cs would
be covered.[5]
18
¶26
In subsection (1)(a), then, rather than deem the phrase
"any other identifying information" to be
controlled and defined by the specific terms that precede it
- "name and address" - it would control and define
those specific terms by modifying them. Brubaker,
¶ 31,542 P.3d at 1195. Differently put, although the
phrase, "any other identifying information," §
19-l-307(1)(a), would still serve as a catchall of sorts, it
would "reflect[] back on the more specific, rather than
the other way around." Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d
at 509. Using this construction, only identifying
names and identifying addresses of a child, family,
or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect
would qualify as confidential. See id.
¶27
In finding ambiguity in subsection (1)(a), the division also
pointed to the legislature's use of the conjunctive
"and" instead of the disjunctive or
between "name" and "address" in the
phrase, "the name and address of any child, family, or
informant." § 19-1-307(1)(a); Brubaker,
¶ 27, 542 P.3d at 1194. The division surmised that this
drafting choice possibly signaled that the legislature
"did not intend for any address on its own to be
confidential, but only addresses that are also disclosed with
associated names" and thus constitute "identifying
information." Id.
¶28
Having landed in the ambiguity camp, the division sought to
break the logjam by turning to two other tools of statutory
construction-namely, subsection (1)(a)'s legislative
history and the consequences of the competing
19
interpretations offered by the parties. As it relates to the
latter tool, the division drew insight from the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th
1116,1126 (10th Cir. 2022). Brubaker, ¶ 39, 542
P.3d at 1196. In Peck, the court reasoned that, to
avert constitutional infirmity, subsection (1)(a) and its
associated penalty provisions could be construed to reach
only "identifying disclosures." 43 F.4th at 1126.
Steered by Peck, the division feared that CDHS's
broader reading of subsection (1)(a) would require the
confidentiality of certain nonidentifying information, which
would run headlong into the First Amendment.
Brubaker, ¶¶ 39-40, 542 P.3d at 1196. The
division sidestepped this potential constitutional concern by
adopting the Media Organizations' position that
subsection (1)(a) prohibits only the disclosure of
identifying names and addresses. Id.; see
Peck, 43 F.4th at 1121-22.
¶29
In the end, the division held, as pertinent here, that rather
than forbid in "all circumstances" the
disclosure of the address of any child, family, or informant
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect, the
legislature intended to proscribe such a disclosure only when
the address constitutes identifying information (i.e., only
when the address "identif[ies] a particular child,
family, or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect
report"). Brubaker, ¶¶ 3, 41, 542
P.3d at 1191, 1196 (emphasis added). Thus, the division
instructed the district court on remand to determine whether,
under this
20
interpretation of subsection (1)(a), the requested
disclosures would reveal "identifying information"
of a child, family, or informant contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect. Id. at ¶ 44, 542 P.3d
at 1197. Put another way, the division directed the district
court to decide whether the addresses of the three RCCFs in
the crosshairs are identifying addresses pursuant to
subsection (1)(a). Id.
¶30
Judge Pawar wrote separately in dissent. She opined that
there is only one reasonable reading of subsection (1)(a):
The statute always protects from disclosure the name, the
address, and any other identifying information of any child,
family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect. Id. at ¶ 49, 542 P.3d at 1197 (Pawar,
J., dissenting). Given what she perceived as the lack of
ambiguity in the language of subsection (1)(a), she would not
have resorted to additional aids of statutory construction.
Id. And, effectuating the plain meaning of
subsection (1)(a)'s language, she would have affirmed the
district court's ruling in favor of CDHS because, in her
view, the information sought by the Media Organizations
"link[ed] reports of child abuse to [the three
RCCFs'] particular addresses." Id. at
¶ 50, 542 P.3d at 1197.
¶31
CDHS timely knocked on our certiorari door. And we opened the
door and entered the fray.
21
III.
Analysis
¶32
As usual, the launching pad for our analysis is the standard
of review. After identifying that standard, we examine the
language of subsection (1)(a) and conclude that it is
unambiguous. Consequently, we accord the statutory words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning without consulting
other tools of construction. We then apply our interpretation
of subsection (1)(a) to this case. Although our statutory
construction squares with CDHS's and Judge Pawar's,
we ultimately run counter to their conclusion that CDHS met
its burden of showing that subsection (1)(a) prohibits
disclosing the six cardinal numbers requested by the Media
Organizations.
A.
Standard of Review
¶33
We review de novo questions of law, including those involving
statutory interpretation. Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33,
¶ 20, 349 P.3d 248, 253. In construing a statute, we aim
to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.
See Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089
(Colo. 2011); see also Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO
88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698. Our first step in
discerning the legislature's intent is to give statutory
language its plain and ordinary meaning. Elder,
¶ 18, 477 P.3d at 698. To do so, we read such language
in context and in accordance with the rules of grammar.
Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19, 364 P.3d
193,196.
22
¶34
We are required to avoid interpretations that result in
superfluous or meaningless words or that lead to
"illogical or absurd results." In re People in
Ini. of A.T.C., 2023 CO 19, ¶ 16, 528 P.3d 168,
171; see also Archuleta v. Roane, 2024 CO 74, ¶
9, 560 P.3d 399, 402. If the language of a statute is clear
and we're able to decipher the legislative intent with
reasonable certainty, we may not resort to other tools of
statutory interpretation. Denver Post Corp., 255
P.3d at 1089.
B.
Subsection (1)(a) Is Unambiguous, so We Accord Its Words and
Phrases Their Plain and Ordinary Meaning
¶35
As a refresher, here is the statutory clause that sits at the
crossroads of the parties' positions:
Except as otherwise provided in this section and section
19-1-303, [C.R.S. (2025)], reports of child abuse or neglect
and the name and address of any child, family, or informant
or any other identifying information contained in such
reports shall be confidential and shall not be public
information.
§ 19-1-307(1)(a). Thus, in subsection (1)(a), our
General Assembly chose to protect as confidential: (1)
reports of child abuse or neglect; (2) the name of any child,
family, or informant contained in such reports; (3) the
address of any child, family, or informant contained in such
reports; and (4) any other identifying information contained
in such reports. The first category prohibits the disclosure
of reports of child abuse or neglect (in their entirety),
while the remaining three categories prohibit the disclosure
of certain information contained within those reports.
23
¶36
Starting with the first category, there is nothing ambiguous
about "reports of child abuse or neglect." Nor is
there any ambiguity in the next two categories: the
"name" of a "child, family, or informant"
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect; or the
"address" of a "child, family, or
informant" contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect. It follows that, in response to a CORA request, CDHS
may not disclose a report of child abuse or neglect
or the name or the address of a child,
family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect.
¶37
We recognize that subsection (1)(a) refers to "the name
and address" of a "child, family, or
informant" contained in a child abuse or neglect report.
(Emphasis added). But we don't perceive the
legislature's use of the conjunctive "and,"
instead of the disjunctive or, between
"name" and "address" to have the meaning
attributed to it by the division. The legislature clearly
intended to extend the protective mantle of subsection (1)(a)
to both the "name" and the "address" of a
child, family, or informant contained in a child abuse or
neglect report. It would have been nonsensical for the
legislature to use "or" instead of "and"
there because then only the name or the address, but not
both, would have been protected: "[T]he name or
address of any child, family, or informant . . . contained in
[child abuse or neglect] reports shall be confidential."
¶38
Nor are we persuaded by the division's floated
supposition that the legislature may have employed the
conjunctive "and" in "the name and
address"
24
to confer confidential status on an address only when paired
with a name. Had that been the legislature's intent, it
presumably would have explicitly stated so.
¶39
That leaves the final category, "any other identifying
information." The parties agree, as do we, that the
plain and ordinary meaning of "identifying
information" in this context is information that -alone
or in conjunction with other information -is likely to either
reveal or enable revealing the identity of a specific person.
See generally Identify, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identify
[https://perma.cc/43FS-HF7C] (defining "identify"
in part as "to ascertain the identity of someone or
something that is unfamiliar or unknown"). And, by using
"any other" in front of "identifying
information," the legislature conveyed that it
considered both the name and the address of a child, family,
or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect
to be "identifying information." This makes sense:
A name, whether alone or in conjunction with other
information, is likely to either reveal or enable revealing
the identity of a specific person. The same is true for an
address.
¶40
Viewed through the prism of the core principle requiring us
to accord statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,
"any other identifying information" functions as a
catchall category for identifying information. Put simply, in
addition to bringing within the shield of confidentiality
both the name
25
and the address of a child, family, or informant contained in
a report of child abuse or neglect, the legislature extended
the protective veil to all other identifying information
contained in such a report.
¶41
Under the division's approach, however, "any other
identifying information" functions to limit the
prohibition against disclosing either the "name" or
the "address" of any child, family, or informant
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect. According to
the division, such a name or address may be disclosed under
subsection (1)(a) if it is not identifying in nature. In
other words, the division posited that only identifying
names (i.e., names that qualify as identifying
information) and identifying addresses (i.e.,
addresses that qualify as identifying information) are
protected by subsection (1)(a). Brubaker, ¶ 41,
542 P.3d at 1196. But, as mentioned, this interpretation
rests on the uncelebrated footing of reverse ejusdem generis,
a more niche canon than its mainstream kin.
¶42
Besides, under the undisputed definition of "identifying
information," we see no daylight between a name and an
identifying name or between an address and an identifying
address. After all, applying the agreed-upon plain and
ordinary meaning of "identifying information,"
every name is "identifying information," and so is
every address. Whether it's a name or an address, it is
information that, alone or in conjunction with other
information, is likely to either reveal or enable revealing
the identity of a specific person. And, like Judge Pawar,
26
we think it dubious to suggest that the legislature meant to
protect the names and addresses of children mentioned in
reports of child abuse or neglect only in certain
circumstances. Id. at ¶ 47, 542 P.3d at 1197
(Pawar, J., dissenting). Regardless, if the legislature
intended to draw a distinction between a name and an
identifying name or between an address and an identifying
address, and to shield from disclosure only identifying names
and identifying addresses, it presumably would have expressly
said so.[6]
¶43
In sum, the division's interpretation is unreasonable,
which means that subsection (1)(a) is not susceptible to two
reasonable interpretations and is unambiguous. Because
we're able to effectuate the legislature's intent by
interpreting the unambiguous language of subsection (1)(a),
attributing to each word its plain and ordinary meaning, we
must "look no further." Carrera v. People,
2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729. "In such a
situation, the plain meaning rule" -the chief rule of
statutory interpretation- "is both the first and the
last canon and nothing more is required of the judicial
inquiry." Id. Thus, our statutory construction
is "at an end," Crandall v. City &Cnty. of
Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo. 2010),
27
and all that remains is the application of our reading of
subsection (1)(a) to decide whether CDHS has met its burden
of demonstrating that it is prohibited from disclosing the
six cardinal numbers requested by the Media Organizations.
C. CDHS
Has Failed to Show That Subsection (1)(a) Prohibits the
Disclosure of the Six Cardinal Numbers Requested by the Media
Organizations
¶44
Our interpretation of subsection (1)(a) using the
plain-meaning rule jibes with CDHS's. But the final
reckoning is whether CDHS has satisfied its burden of showing
that subsection (1)(a) precludes the disclosure of the
information requested by the Media Organizations. We conclude
that it has not.
¶45
As noted, the Media Organizations requested six cardinal
numbers: the total number of reports of child abuse or
neglect made to local child welfare authorities from each of
three RCCFs over a three-year period; and the number of those
reports at each facility that were screened in for
investigation. CDHS argues that disclosing the numbers
requested would effectively make public the address
of any child, family, or informant contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect that originated from the Tennyson
Center, Mount Saint Vincent, or Cleo Wallace. We're
unpersuaded.
¶46
How can the requested disclosures make public what is already
public? That's no more possible than making public the
information found in a book
28
already sitting on a library shelf. Unsurprisingly, nobody in
this case asserts that the three RCCFs' addresses are
secret or otherwise confidential. They aren't. These are
public facilities with publicly accessible addresses. It
would strain logic to pretend that the addresses of these
RCCFs aren't already public.
¶47
Still, counters CDHS, the requested cardinal numbers would
necessarily confirm that a report of child abuse or
neglect originated from a particular RCCF and thus from that
RCCF's address - and by extension, from the address of a
child, family, or informant contained in such a
report.[7] But subsection (1)(a)'s prohibition of
the disclosure of an address contained in a report
of child abuse or neglect does not bar the
confirmation of an already public address contained
in such a report.
¶48
Expanding the scope of subsection (1)(a) as CDHS urges would
stretch that statutory provision beyond its breaking point
and would lead to absurd results. See Educhildren ELC v.
Cnty. of Douglas Bd. of Equalization, 2023 CO 29, ¶
27, 531 P.3d 986, 993 (cautioning that courts must avoid
statutory constructions "that would yield illogical or
absurd results"); Archuleta, ¶ 9, 560 P.3d
at 402 (same). Indeed, CDHS's approach would hinder, if
not altogether eliminate,
29
oversight of state-funded residential facilities for
children. All information, including a cardinal number, in
any way related to a report of child abuse or neglect
originating from an RCCF would presumably be out of bounds
because it would confirm that such a report was made
from the particular RCCF's address. We are aware of no
evidence, and CDHS presents none, that this is what the
legislature intended. To the contrary, our legislature has
told us loud and clear that Colorado favors transparency,
Roane, ¶ 10, 560 P.3d at 402, and we have
therefore "narrowly construed" any "exceptions
to the broad, general policy of [CORA]" demanding
openness, Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33] v. W. Servs.,
Inc., 751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988). Remember: Colorado
is a sunlight state.
¶49
Significantly, while CDHS declined to provide the six numbers
requested by the Media Organizations, it did offer to
disclose the aggregate number of child abuse or
neglect reports made from all three facilities combined over
the specified three-year period, as well as the aggregate
number of those reports combined that were screened in
for further investigation. CDHS undoubtedly did so because it
determined that the disclosure of the two aggregate numbers
would not constitute the disclosure of the address of any
child, family, or informant contained in a report of child
abuse or neglect - lest we presume that CDHS deliberately
agreed to violate subsection (1)(a). We have a difficult time
understanding why providing a per-facility breakdown of the
same two numbers should lead to a different
30
outcome. In other words, if the aggregate numbers do not
violate the prohibition in subsection (1)(a) against the
disclosure of the address of any child, family, or informant
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect, why do the
per-facility numbers? Even taking CDHS's last-resort
argument at face value, we're left to wonder why the
per-facility numbers illegally "confirm" addresses
covered by subsection (1)(a) but the aggregate numbers do
not. During oral arguments, CDHS could not adequately answer
these questions or otherwise provide any satisfactory
justification for distinguishing between the aggregate
numbers it offered to disclose and the per-facility numbers
it adamantly refuses to produce.
¶50
But what about the part of subsection (1)(a) that protects
"other identifying information"? Even if, as
we've determined, the disclosure of the cardinal numbers
requested does not constitute the disclosure of an address,
could they nevertheless constitute the disclosure of
"other identifying information"? CDHS, the
burden-bearing party, does not argue that they could, and we
decline to overegg the pudding.
¶51
Before us, CDHS's opposition to the Media
Organizations' requests is limited to its assertions that
disclosing the cardinal numbers in question would disclose,
or alternatively confirm, the addresses of the three RCCFs
and, by extension, the addresses of children, families, or
informants contained in reports of child abuse or neglect.
And we have nixed those contentions already. Any
31
argument by CDHS related to "other identifying
information" is advanced solely in the context of
refuting the interpretation of subsection (1) (a) championed
by the Media Organizations and approved by the division.
Recall that, under the Media Organizations and the
division's approach, an agency in receipt of a CORA
request must determine whether the disclosure (or even
confirmation) of an address would constitute the
disclosure of "identifying information". We,
however, have now disavowed that construction. It follows
that whether a cardinal number may ever constitute "any
other identifying information" is a tomorrow problem
that we have no occasion to pass judgment on today.
¶52
To be clear, our restraint isn't borne out of a desire to
avoid borrowing trouble. Rather, it is animated by the party
presentation principle That principle holds parties
responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls
upon courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any
matters raised United States v
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) In general,
our adversarial system of adjudication "is designed
around the premise" that where, as here, parties are
represented by competent counsel, they "know what is
best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts
and argument entitling them to relief" Id. at
375-76 (quoting Castro v United States, 540 U.S.
375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)). To put it more eloquently, courts may not
"sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right";
rather, they
32
must function as "passive instruments of
government," wait for cases to come to them, and decide
only questions raised by the parties. United States v.
Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298,1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). Adhering to
the party presentation principle, as we must, we cabin our
analysis to the arguments advanced by CDHS in attempting to
meet its burden of proof.
IV.
Conclusion
¶53
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that CDHS must
disclose the six cardinal numbers requested by the Media
Organizations. Because the division remanded the case to the
district court for factual findings instead of ordering the
disclosure of the six requested cardinal numbers, we reverse
the division's judgment. We remand the case to the
division with instructions to return it to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On
remand, the district court should address the Media
Organizations' request for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to section 24-72-204(5) (b), C.R.S. (2025).
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ and
JUSTICE HOOD, concurs in the judgment only.
33
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ and
JUSTICE HOOD, concurring in the judgment only.
¶54
I agree with the majority that section 19-l-307(1)(a), C.R.S.
(2025), ("subsection (1)(a)") of the Colorado
Children's Code, Records and Information Act is not
ambiguous. Maj. op. ¶ 32. The statute always
protects certain confidential information from disclosure:
the name, the address, and any other identifying information
of any child, family, or informant contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect. § 19-1-307(1)(a).
¶55
I write separately because the majority's conclusion -
that subsection (1)(a) requires a records custodian under the
circumstances here to nonetheless disclose an address
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect if someone
has already publicly disclosed it, see Maj. op.
¶ 47 -is inconsistent with the explicit language in the
statute and totally at odds with the protection it affords
children, families, and informants. See §
19-l-307(1)(a). But that is not the only issue with the
majority's opinion: Its conclusions regarding addresses
that are "already public[,]" Maj. op. ¶ 46, is
problematic; and its interpretation of subsection (1)(a) is
unreasonable, produces illogical and absurd results, and will
likely harm victims, families, and informants. What's
more, even though the record reveals no public disclosures
regarding reports of abuse or neglect concerning these two
facilities, the majority nonetheless requires the Colorado
Department of Human Services
34
("CDHS") to confirm the existence of such reports.
See id. at ¶¶ 45-47 49 That disclosure is
unquestionably prohibited by subsection (1)(a).
¶56
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court
of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
That is why I respectfully concur in the judgment only.
I.
Subsection (1)(a) Always Protects Reports of Child Abuse or
Neglect and the Name and Address of Any Child, Family, or
Informant, or Other Identifying Information From Disclosure.
¶57
As I have indicated, there are, in my view, multiple flaws in
the majority's reasoning. To begin, it ignores the plain
meaning of subsection (1)(a). It recognizes, correctly, that
subsection (1)(a) protects as confidential the address of any
child, family, or informant contained in a report of child
abuse or neglect and bars the disclosure of this information.
Id. at ¶ 35. But then it declares that these
addresses aren't confidential after all if you can look
them up online, thus wiping out a substantial portion of the
protections afforded by the statute in one fell swoop.
See id. at ¶ 47. Finally, it concludes that
CDHS has failed to meet its burden under the Colorado Open
Records Act ("CORA"), §§ 24-72-100.1 to
§ 24-72.4-106, C.R.S. (2025), and must disclose the
requested records, because the cardinal numbers requested by
Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News
(collectively the "Media Organizations"),
"do[] not constitute the disclosure of an address."
Maj. op. ¶¶ 8, 50.
35
¶58
While the majority's concerns regarding CORA's
purposes and the need for transparency by government agencies
(an interest the media seeks to foster) are understandable,
see id. at ¶¶ 1-2, the majority's
reasoning cannot be squared with subsection (1)(a).
See § 19-l-307(1)(a). As Judge Pawar explained,
the cardinal numbers requested by the Media Organizations
necessarily confirm that a report of child abuse or
neglect originated from the address of a child, family, or
informant contained in such a report. Colo. Sun v.
Brubaker, 2023 COA 101, ¶¶ 45-50, 542 P.3d
1190,1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting).
¶59
In concluding otherwise, the majority reads words into the
statute that simply do not exist and ignores the words that
do. Specifically, it disregards the language in subsection
(1)(a) that explicitly states that this information
"shall be confidential and shall not be public
information." § 19-1-307(1)(a). It also disregards
its own acknowledgment that every address is identifying
information and that it is "dubious to suggest that the
legislature meant to protect" sensitive information
"mentioned in reports of child abuse or neglect only
in certain circumstances." Maj. op. ¶ 42
(emphasis added).
¶60
The majority's interpretation is problematic because, as
we so often observe, proper statutory interpretation requires
that we "respect the legislature's choice of
language." Educ. reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colo. Springs
Sch. Dist. 11, 2024 CO 29, ¶ 32, 548 P.3d 669, 675.
We "must avoid constructions that would render any
36
words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd
results." Id. Additionally, we must refrain
from rewriting a statute to remedy "practical
challenges." People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75,
¶ 38, 498 P.3d 142, 154. The proper remedy for such
practical challenges "is legislative action, not
judicial fiat." Id.
¶61
By its very terms, subsection (1)(a) prohibits the disclosure
of "reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and
address of any child, family, or informant or any other
identifying information contained in such reports."
§ 19-l-307(1)(a). Nothing about this language supports
the majority's notions regarding addresses that are
"already public" or cardinal numbers. Maj. op.
¶¶ 8, 47. But see § 19-1-307(1)(a).
Critically, the statute bars the disclosure of information
that could be used to identify a child, family, or
informant, not just disclosures that would identify
a child, family, or informant. See §
19-l-307(1)(a). This is hardly surprising as the point of the
statute, as noted, is to always protect this
information from disclosure to the public. Id.
¶62
This is the only reasonable interpretation of the statute as
a records custodian has no way of knowing what other
information a requestor already has (or that they may be able
to obtain in the future) which means the records custodian
has no way of knowing if they might be providing the first or
the last puzzle piece that will allow a requestor to identify
a specific child, family, or informant. Requiring the
disclosures that the majority does here risks making the
37
custodian complicit in revealing, or enabling the revealing,
of the identity of a victim, family, or informant.
¶63
Plus, if the legislature wanted to carve out an exception to
subsection (1)(a) for addresses that were already public, it
could have done so. E.g., Maj. op. ¶ 42
(acknowledging that "if the legislature intended to draw
a distinction . . . between an address and an identifying
address, and to shield from disclosure only identifying . . .
addresses, it presumably would have expressly said so").
IL
The Majority is Requiring CDHS to Confirm the Existence of
Confidential Reports.
¶64
The majority nonetheless declares that the addresses of the
Tennyson Center, Mount Saint Vincent, and Cleo Wallace are
all "already public." Id. at ¶ 46.
This is so, it explains, because "[t]hese are public
facilities with publicly accessible addresses[,]" which
I take to mean you can easily look them up online.
Id. But if that's the standard, what address
isn't already public? Any way you slice it, the
majority's opinion will leave public health departments
across Colorado struggling to understand what they must
disclose, potentially exposing them to awards of attorney
fees under CORA - no matter their best efforts.
¶65
More troubling still, the majority does not point to any
published report in the record, by the Ombudsman or
otherwise, regarding Mount Saint Vincent or Cleo Wallace.
Unlike the Ombudsman's disclosures regarding El Pueblo
Boys and Girls Ranch and the Tennyson Center, there are no
public disclosures regarding
38
reports of child abuse or neglect originating from these
facilities. This is why the majority is mistaken that the
Media Organizations' CORA request is only about cardinal
numbers.
¶66
By requiring CDHS to disclose the cardinal numbers of hotline
calls, abuse and neglect reports, and runaway reports, the
majority is requiring CDHS to confirm the existence of such
reports. Put differently, the majority is requiring CDHS to
disclose confidential information to the Media Organizations
about child abuse and neglect reports even though
the disclosure of that information is unquestionably
prohibited by subsection (1)(a). See §
19-l-307(1)(a).
III.
The Majority's Opinion May Cause Countless Tomorrow
Problems.
¶67
Additionally, the majority's interpretation is
unreasonable and produces absurd and illogical results.
Moreover, it has the potential to cause great harm to
victims, families, and informants. The majority claims that
questions about the reach of its holding regarding cardinal
numbers are "a tomorrow problem." Maj. op. ¶
51. This might be accurate as it relates to our court, but
not so for the public health departments, media outlets, and
trial courts that will have to discern just what the majority
opinion means.
¶68
Questions will inevitably arise about how far the
majority's rationale extends. If it is applied to victims
of abuse or neglect, those victims may lose their protection
under the statute if their names have already been made
public, so long
39
as the CORA request purports to be limited to the cardinal
number of reports regarding the victim. See id. at
¶¶ 45-47, 49. Releasing information about the
number of times a victim's name appears in reports of
abuse or neglect hardly aligns with the General
Assembly's intent to protect victims. See §
19-1-302(1)(a), (2), C.R.S. (2025).
¶69
Similarly, if the majority's approach is extended to
informants, it may cause informants, especially those who are
not subject to Colorado's mandatory reporting scheme,
see § 19-3-304(2), C.R.S. (2025), to hesitate
to report abuse and neglect. Concerned neighbors and family
members may be reluctant to become involved if they can so
readily lose their anonymity in reporting. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987)
("Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be
more willing to come forward if they know that their
identities will be protected."); Watso v. Colo.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 307, 308-09
(Colo. 1992) (describing that safeguards, such as
confidentiality, under the Child Protection Act protect
children and promote "alacrity in reporting" child
abuse).
¶70
And if all it takes for an informant to lose some of the
protections of subsection (1)(a) is a public address and a
CORA request asking for a cardinal number, as here, will
mandatory reporters, like employees at schools, childcare
40
centers, and hospitals serving children, also lose some of
their protections under the statute? It is hard to imagine
that this is what the legislature had in mind.
¶71
Simply put, in addition to being unreasonable and producing
absurd and illogical results, the majority's opinion has
the potential to cause victims great harm and to create
countless "tomorrow problem[s,]" Maj. op. ¶
51, raising significant questions about what protections for
vulnerable populations will remain in its wake. Educ.
reEnvisioned, ¶ 32, 548 P.3d at 675 (explaining
that, in interpreting a statute, "we must avoid
constructions that would . . . lead to illogical or absurd
results").
IV.
Conclusion
¶72
In sum, the majority fails to follow the plain language and
obvious intent of subsection (1)(a). Its reasoning regarding
public addresses is similarly strained, and its
interpretation of subsection (1)(a) is unreasonable, produces
illogical and absurd results, and will likely harm victims,
families, and informants.
¶73
Worse still, the majority overlooks the fact that there are
no published reports by the Ombudsman, or anyone for that
matter, concerning Mount Saint Vincent or Cleo Wallace,
meaning that if reports of child abuse or neglect
originated from these facilities, there has been no public
disclosure of those facts. Consequently, by requiring CDHS to
disclose the cardinal numbers of hotline calls, abuse and
neglect reports, and runaway reports for Mount Saint Vincent
and
41
Cleo Wallace, the majority is requiring CDHS to confirm the
existence of such reports. This
disclosure is unquestionably prohibited by subsection (1)(a).
¶74
For all these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district
court. Because the majority's holding also calls for
reversal of the division below, I concur in the judgment
only.
---------
Notes:
[1] The Media Organizations' requests
referred to reports of child abuse or neglect, as well as
to calls to the child abuse hotline and reports of
runaways. Because child-abuse hotline calls and reports
of runaways fall under the umbrella of reports of child abuse
or neglect, we, like the parties, generally refer to reports
of child abuse or neglect when discussing the Media
Organizations' requests.
[2] Subsection (1)(a) prohibits the
disclosure of "reports of child abuse or neglect and the
name and address of any child, family, or informant or any
other identifying information contained in such
reports."
[3] We agreed to review the following two
issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of
law in concluding that section 19-l-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2023),
is ambiguous.
2. Whether, if the court of appeals correctly
concluded that section 19-1-307(1) (a) is ambiguous, it erred
in concluding the legislative history and Peck v.
McCann, 43 F.4th [1116] (10th Cir. 2022), support its
interpretation of the statute.
[4] "Ejusdem generis," Latin for
"of the same kind," Jay Wexler, Fun With
Reverse Ejusdem Generis, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1,1 (2020),
is a canon of statutory construction that instructs that
"a 'general or collective term' at the end of a
list of specific items" is typically
"'controlled and defined by reference to' the
specific classes . . . that precede it," Fischer v.
United States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (omission in
original) (quoting Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596
U.S. 450,458 (2022)). Pursuant to this canon, general words
or phrases following a list of specific articles are
interpreted to include only items of the same kind
as those specifically listed. See People v. Sims,
2020 COA 78, ¶ 23, 474 P.3d 189,194. For example,
"the phrase 'other foods' in a provision
covering 'apples, bananas, grapes, oranges, and other
foods' would likely refer only to fruits that are not
apples, bananas, grapes, or oranges." Wexler,
supra, at 1. So, in this case, the canon would
require "any other identifying information" to
refer to identifying information that is not names or
addresses. Here, however, the division used a
reverse version of this canon.
[5] Unlike the canon of ejusdem generis,
which "has a long and storied history in the law, has
been used by judges in countless cases, and has been the
subject of a large body of scholarly commentary over the
years," its mirror-image canon (i.e., its reverse
version) "is far less well known and understood,"
"didn't even have a name until the mid-1990s,"
and had "been the subject of absolutely no scholarly
commentary at all" before November 2020. Wexler,
supra, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
[6] We disagree with the division that the
interpretation we embrace today will require certain
nonidentifying information to be kept confidential. As
we've made clear now, either a name or an address will
always constitute identifying information. Thus,
there is no risk of keeping confidential any nonidentifying
information, and the constitutional concerns raised by the
Tenth Circuit in Peck, while valid, are simply
inapposite here. 43 F.4th at 1125-26.
[7] Judge Pawar likewise concluded, in
summary fashion, that the cardinal numbers requested would
"link[] reports of child abuse to [the RCCF's]
particular addresses." Brubaker, ¶ 50, 542
P.3d at 1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting).
---------