Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News v. Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for theColorado Department of Human Services

2023 COA 101, 542 P.3d 1190

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 2, 2023
• Docket: 21CA1608-PD
• Status: Published

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY November 2, 2023

2023COA101

No. 21CA1608, Colorado Sun v. Brubaker — Public Records — Colorado Open Records Act; Children’s Code — Dependency and Neglect Records and Information — Reports of Child Abuse or Neglect — Identifying Information

In this case brought under the Colorado Open Records Act,

§§ 24-70-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2023, several media organizations

sought records showing the total number of child abuse reports

received over a three-year period from certain residential care

facilities. The records custodian for the Colorado Department of

Human Services (DHS) denied the requests, citing a provision of the

Children’s Code that prohibits disclosure of child abuse reports as

well as “the name and address of any child, family, or informant or

any other identifying information contained in such reports.” § 19-

1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. According to DHS, disclosure of the

requested aggregated information would necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant contained in a child abuse report

because the requests were linked to specific addresses — the

addresses of the residential care facilities.

The question on appeal is whether section 19-1-307(1)(a)

prohibits, under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address

contained in a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits

disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes

“identifying information”— that is, information that could lead to

the identification of a particular child, family, or informant. After

considering the statutory language, the legislative history, and the

consequences of adopting either party’s construction, the majority

concludes that the statute prohibits the disclosure of an address

only if it constitutes identifying information. Accordingly, the

division reverses the judgment and remands the case to the district

court for a determination of whether the address in this case

constitutes identifying information.

The dissent concludes that under the plain language of section

19-1-307(1)(a), the address of a child, family, or informant

contained in a child abuse report is always confidential and can

never be disclosed. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2023COA101

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1608 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CV31379 Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge

Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Gomez, J., concurs Pawar, J., dissents

Announced November 2, 2023

Law Office of Steven D. Zansberg, LLC, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ann H. Pogue, Second Assistant Attorney General, Bianca E. Miyata, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 This case involves a dispute under the Colorado Open Records

Act (CORA), §§ 24-70-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2023. Plaintiffs, Colorado

Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News (the media

organizations), requested records under CORA from defendant,

Amanda Brubaker, the records custodian for the Colorado

Department of Human Services (DHS),1 showing the total number of

child abuse reports received over a three-year period from certain

residential child care facilities in Colorado. DHS denied the

requests, citing a provision of the Colorado Children’s Code that

prohibits disclosure, subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions,

of child abuse reports as well as “the name and address of any

child, family, or informant or any other identifying information

contained in such reports.” § 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023.

According to DHS, disclosure of the aggregated information would

necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant contained in a

child abuse report, as the requests were linked to specific addresses

— the address of each residential care facility.

1 For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the defendant as the Department

of Human Services (DHS), not Amanda Brubaker, as Brubaker was acting on behalf of DHS.

1 ¶2 On judicial review of DHS’s denial, the district court entered

judgment in favor of DHS, and the media organizations appeal.

¶3 The question is whether section 19-1-307(1)(a) prohibits,

under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address contained in

a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits disclosure of

an address only when the address constitutes “identifying

information” — that is, information that could lead to the

identification of a particular child, family, or informant.

¶4 We conclude that the statute is ambiguous. To break the

impasse, we turn to the legislative history of section 19-1-307(1)(a)

and the possible consequences of adopting either construction. In

our view, the evolution of the statutory provision at issue

demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to keep

confidential only information that could reveal a person’s or family’s

identity, and the possible consequences of adopting either

interpretation reinforce this conclusion. We therefore adopt the

media organizations’ interpretation of the statute.

¶5 As a result, we reverse the district court’s judgment and

remand the case for further proceedings.

2 I. Factual Background2

¶6 Residential child care facilities (RCCFs) are licensed by DHS to

“provide twenty-four-hour group care and treatment” for children,

§ 26-6-903(29), C.R.S. 2023, most of whom have “serious

emotional, behavioral and/or developmental disorders,” Off. of

Colo.’s Child Prot. Ombudsman (CPO), Investigation Report: CPO

Case ID 2017-2736, at 3 (Aug. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/8RSS-

RDKE (CPO Report).

¶7 In 2017, DHS revoked the license of an RCCF in Pueblo amidst

allegations that staff members had abused and neglected the child

residents. Id. The CPO investigated the circumstances

surrounding the facility’s closure and issued the CPO Report. The

CPO Report documented the total number of child abuse and

neglect reports received by the county human services department

in the year preceding the closure, as well as the number and

percentage of reports “screened out” by the county (i.e., reports that

2 In recounting the background, we, like the district court, accept

all factual allegations in the complaint as true and may consider, along with the complaint, any documents attached to it or incorporated by reference. See Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011).

3 are not assigned to a caseworker for further assessment). Id. at 10-

11.

¶8 In March 2021, while DHS was allegedly scrutinizing its

practices, a second RCCF closed. The CPO disclosed the number of

complaints received by county human services officials about the

RCCF in the preceding year.

¶9 Shortly thereafter, the media organizations sent the following

requests to DHS for records concerning other RCCFs:

• “[A]ny documents that show how many calls have been

made to the child abuse hotline3 from Mount Saint

Vincent (RCCF) and Cleo Wallace (RCCF) from

1/1/2018 to 3/26/2021.”

• “The number of hotline calls/abuse and neglect

reports/runaways reports from Tennyson Center,

Mount St. Vincent, and Cleo Wallace to local child

welfare authorities in the last three years, and how

many were screened in.”

3 Reports of suspected child abuse or neglect may be made directly

to the county department of human services or local law enforcement or through the child abuse reporting hotline system. See §§ 19-3-307(1), 26-5-111, C.R.S. 2023.

4 DHS denied the requests “pursuant to CRS 19-1-307(1)(a).” It

explained that the responsive records would effectively disclose the

address “of the child or informant associated with the hotline calls.”

Instead, DHS offered to provide the media organizations with the

aggregated number of child abuse hotline calls, including the

number that were “screened in” (i.e., reports that were referred to a

caseworker for further assessment), from all three RCCFs during

the relevant period.

¶ 10 The media organizations sued DHS pursuant to section 24-72-

204(5), C.R.S. 2023, seeking an order compelling it to produce the

requested records. DHS moved to dismiss the complaint on the

ground that an address is identifying information that must be kept

confidential. The district court granted the motion, concluding that

“the Defendant has properly withheld [the requested] information.”

II. Statutory Background

A. CORA

¶ 11 “With the passage of CORA, the General Assembly declared it

to be the public policy of Colorado that ‘all public records shall be

open for inspection by any person, at reasonable times,’ except as

otherwise provided by law.” Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d

5 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011) (quoting § 24-72-201, C.R.S. 2023).

“Public records” are “all writings made, maintained, or kept by the

state [or] any agency . . . for use in the exercise of functions

required or authorized by law or administrative rule or involving the

receipt or expenditure of public funds.” § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2023.

¶ 12 DHS does not dispute that child abuse reports are “public

records.” See § 19-1-302(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023 (“The general assembly

declares that information obtained by public agencies in the course

of performing their duties under this title [of the Children’s Code] is

considered public information under [CORA].”). Still, while the

general purpose of CORA is to provide open government through

disclosure of public records, its purpose is not to disclose

information that falls under an exception in the statute. See

Mountain-Plains Inv. Corp. v. Parker Jordan Metro. Dist., 2013 COA

123, ¶ 35. In light of the strong presumption in favor of disclosure,

exceptions to disclosure are narrowly construed, and the record

custodian bears the burden to prove that an exception applies. See

Shook v. Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2015 COA 84, ¶ 6.

6 ¶ 13 One exception to the rule requiring disclosure is where

“inspection would be contrary to any state statute.” § 24-72-

204(1)(a). DHS relied on this exception in denying the media

organizations’ requests, contending that section 19-1-307(1)(a)

prohibited disclosure of the requested information.

B. Section 19-1-307(1)(a)

¶ 14 Section 19-1-307(1)(a) provides as follows:

Identifying information — confidential. Except as otherwise provided in this section and section 19-1-303, reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying information contained in such reports shall be confidential and shall not be public information.

¶ 15 The earliest iteration of the statute was enacted as part of the

Colorado Child Protection Act of 1975 (the 1975 Act) and broadly

prohibited disclosure of information in child abuse reports:

Records confidential. (1) It is unlawful for any person or agency to solicit, encourage disclosure of, or disclose the contents of any record or report made under this article.

Ch. 177, sec. 1, § 19-10-115, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 654.

¶ 16 Shortly after passage of the 1975 Act, a lawsuit by journalists

required a district court to determine whether the strict

7 confidentiality imposed by the statute ran afoul of Colorado’s Public

Meetings Law (PML), section 29-9-101, C.R.S. 1975 (repealed 1991).

See Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 234-35, 556 P.2d 82, 84

(1976).

¶ 17 The district court determined that the PML and the records

statute could be harmonized by distinguishing “between

information which could lead to identification of the child, parents

or informant” and “information in the reports which is

‘nonconfidential.’” Id. at 237, 556 P.2d at 86. Nonconfidential

information could be discussed at public meetings, the district

court ruled, while “identifying information” could only be discussed

in nonpublic executive sessions. Id.

¶ 18 A division of the court of appeals rejected the district court’s

reasoning. It concluded that the statute prohibited disclosure of

the “entire contents” of a child abuse report and, therefore, the

distinction between identifying information and nonconfidential

information had no statutory basis. Id.

¶ 19 Within a year, the legislature amended the statute. The new

act (the 1977 Act) included an amended legislative declaration (with

the amended language marked in capital letters):

8 Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby declares that the complete reporting of child abuse is a matter of public concern and that in enacting this article it is the intent of the general assembly to protect the best interests of children of this state and to offer protective services in order to prevent any further harm to a child suffering from abuse. IT IS ALSO THE INTENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT CHILD PROTECTION TEAMS PUBLICLY DISCUSS PUBLIC AGENCIES’ RESPONSES TO CHILD-ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTS SO THAT THE PUBLIC AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY BE BETTER INFORMED CONCERNING THE OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

Ch. 246, sec. 1, § 19-10-102, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1020.

¶ 20 The 1977 Act also included an amended records provision.

Section 19-10-115 (the predecessor to section 19-1-307(1)(a)) had

previously prohibited disclosure, subject to certain exceptions, of

any information in child abuse reports; now it generally prohibited

disclosure of “reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and

address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying

information contained in such reports,” id. at sec. 8, § 19-10-115,

1977 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1023 — the current language of section

19-1-307(a)(1).

9 III. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 21 The media organizations contend that the district court erred

by dismissing their complaint. They say that section 19-1-307(1)(a)

does not prohibit DHS from producing the requested records

because they would not reveal “identifying information.”

A. Standard of Review

¶ 22 We review de novo whether the district court properly

dismissed a complaint for failure to state a claim. See Nieto v.

Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 11.

¶ 23 Questions of statutory interpretation are also subject to de

novo review. See id. at ¶ 12. In interpreting a statute, our primary

goal is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.

See Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18. To accomplish this, we

look first to the statute’s plain language, reading words and phrases

in context and construing them according to rules of grammar and

common usage. Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC v. R.G.

Brinkmann Co., 2017 COA 31, ¶ 17. If the meaning of the statute is

clear from the language alone, our analysis is complete, and we

apply the statute as written. See OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 2017 CO 104, ¶ 16. But if the plain language of the

10 statute is “reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations,” then

it is ambiguous, Elder, ¶ 18. In that case, we may use other

interpretative aids to discern the legislature’s intent, including

consideration of the legislative history and the title of the statute, as

well as “the consequences of a particular construction,” Broomfield

Senior Living Owner, ¶ 17.

B. The Language of Section 19-1-307(1)(a)

¶ 24 As noted, the statute prohibits disclosure of “reports of child

abuse or neglect,” as well as “the name and address of any child,

family, or informant or any other identifying information contained

in such reports.” § 19-1-307(1)(a). The parties agree that the

statute distinguishes between the “reports of child abuse or neglect”

themselves, which are confidential, and certain information

contained within “such reports,” only some of which is confidential.

See Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 2022)

(interpreting this provision). But the parties dispute what

information contained in reports of child abuse or neglect is

confidential. The dispute focuses on the meaning of the phrase “the

name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other

identifying information.”

11 ¶ 25 As a matter of grammar, this phrase can be understood as a

series — “a group of successive coordinate sentence elements joined

together,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/D8C4-

Y69 — consisting of the terms “name,” “address,” and “any other

¶ 26 DHS argues that each term in the series constitutes

confidential “identifying information.” It says that the phrase “or

any other” operates as a “catch all” for additional types of

information that are not specifically enumerated. In other words,

while “name and address” always qualify as “identifying

information,” that list is not exhaustive and other terms might also

qualify. This is a reasonable reading of the provision. See, e.g., Ali

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-19 (2008) (statute that

precludes lawsuits against “any officer of customs or excise or any

other law enforcement officer” precludes a suit against the

enumerated officers and every other kind of law enforcement officer,

even ones not acting in a customs or excise capacity (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2680(c))); Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Ray, 145 P.3d 661,

664 (Colo. 2006) (where “wages” was defined as “board, rent,

housing, lodging, or any other similar advantages,” the phrase “‘or

12 any other similar advantages’ provided a flexible means for

including employment benefits not otherwise specified in the ‘wages’

definition” (quoting § 8-47-101(2), C.R.S. 1988)).

¶ 27 But there is another reasonable reading of the provision.

Under the media organizations’ construction, only addresses that

constitute “identifying information” are confidential. The

legislature’s choice to use the conjunctive “and” to connect “name

and address” rather than the disjunctive “or” may signal that it did

not intend for any address on its own to be confidential, but only

addresses that are also disclosed with associated names. See West

v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1040 (Colo. 2006) (“Use of the word ‘or’

in a statute is presumed to be disjunctive.”).

¶ 28 And the phrase “or any other identifying information,” even if a

“catchall” of sorts, may limit and modify the other enumerated

terms — here, “name and address.” Various courts, including our

supreme court, have endorsed this rule of syntax. See United

States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Mortg.

Brokerage Co. v. Mills, 100 Colo. 267, 269, 67 P.2d 68, 69 (1937).

Under the rule, which the Williams-Davis court described as a “sort

13 of reverse ejusdem generis,”4 the general catchall term, “or any

other,” “reflects back on the more specific rather than the other way

around.” Id. at 509. So, “the phrase ‘A, B, or any other C’ indicates

that A is a subset of C.” Id.

¶ 29 At issue in Williams-Davis was a statute that defines when a

person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 508.

To fall under the statute, the person must, among other things, act

“in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom

such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory

position, or any other position of management.” Id. (emphasis

omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)). The court concluded (as the

Ninth Circuit had previously) that the phrase “any other position of

management” limited the preceding enumerated terms such that an

4 “The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a general

word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed.” Mounkes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 251 P.3d 485, 488 (Colo. App. 2010) (where statute allowed for disqualification of benefits based on the “intentional falsification of expense accounts, inventories, or other records or reports,” “other records and reports” had to be interpreted to comprise records and reports of the same type as expense accounts and inventories (quoting § 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII), C.R.S. 2023))).

14 “organizer” “must exercise some sort of managerial responsibility.”

Id.

¶ 30 Our supreme court used this same rule of syntax to interpret

an “or any other” phrase in Mortgage Brokerage Co., 100 Colo. 267,

67 P.2d 68. In that case, an employee was required by the terms of

a bond to reimburse his employer for losses caused by the employee

“through larceny, theft, embezzlement, forgery, misappropriation,

wrongful abstraction, willful misapplication, or any other act of

fraud or dishonesty.” Id. at 268, 67 P.2d at 68. The court

interpreted the phrase “or any other act of fraud or dishonesty” to

modify or limit the enumerated terms. Thus, while the employee

might have committed “wrongful abstraction” or “willful

misapplication,” he could not be liable unless he acted fraudulently

or dishonestly, as “it [was] clear that [those terms] were to be

construed to indicate or denote acts of fraud or dishonesty.” Id. at

269, 67 P.2d at 69; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.E.2d

111, 112-13 (Va. 2007) (statute prohibiting, in relevant part, driving

while “under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-

administered intoxicant or drug” did not proscribe driving under the

15 influence of a narcotic drug that was not self-administered (quoting

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (West 2023))).

¶ 31 Thus, using this rule of syntax, the phrase “any other

identifying information” can be read as modifying or limiting the

enumerated terms “name” and “address,” such that disclosure of an

address is prohibited only when it constitutes “identifying

information.”

¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, so we

turn to other interpretive aids to ascertain the legislature’s intent.

C. The Legislative History of Section 19-1-307(1)(a) and the Consequences of Adopting Either Construction

¶ 33 As we have explained, the initial iteration of the statute

prohibited disclosure of the entire contents of a child abuse report.

But after Gillies, the legislature amended the statute. The

amendment indicates the “legislature’s desire to narrow the statute

to cover only the reports themselves and identifying information

therein.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1126.

¶ 34 More specifically, the amended statutory language tracked the

distinction the district court drew in Gillies between confidential

“identifying” information and nonconfidential information. See 38

16 Colo. App. at 235-36, 556 P.2d at 85. In our view, by tracking that

distinction, the legislature likely intended to also adopt the district

court’s dividing line: confidential information is “any information

which would identify the child, parents or informant,” and all other

information is nonconfidential. Id. at 236, 556 P.2d at 85.

¶ 35 And in 1996 the legislature amended the title of the provision

— from “Confidentiality of records” in the 1977 Act to “Identifying

information — confidential.” Ch. 230, sec. 6, § 19-1-307(1)(a), 1996

Colo. Sess. Law 1166. This amendment underscores the

legislature’s focus on maintaining confidentiality of identifying

information only.

¶ 36 In light of this history, reading the statute to make any

“address of any child, family, or informant” confidential —

regardless of whether disclosure of the address would, in fact,

reveal the identity of a specific child, family, or informant — makes

less sense than construing the language in accordance with the

district court’s reasoning in Gillies.

¶ 37 An examination of the possible consequences of adopting one

interpretation over the other further suggests that the media

organizations’ interpretation more accurately reflects the General

17 Assembly’s intent. See § 2-4-203(1)(e), C.R.S. 2023 (noting that in

construing an ambiguous statute, we may consider “[t]he

consequences of a particular construction”).

¶ 38 DHS’s construction would require that some nonidentifying

information is kept confidential, a result we cannot square with the

legislative history or even with other sections of the Children’s

Code, which themselves authorize the public disclosure of

information from child abuse reports, so long as the information

does not “identify individuals.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1136. Indeed,

DHS’s interpretation would prohibit the disclosure of the

information in the CPO Report and potentially subject the CPO to

prosecution. See § 19-1-307(1)(c) (violation of section 19-1-

307(1)(a) is a petty offense, punishable by a fine).

¶ 39 DHS’s construction may also raise difficult constitutional

problems. In Peck, the question presented was whether section 19-

1-307(1)(c) and (4), which penalize the disclosure of information

from child abuse records and reports, violate the First Amendment.

See Peck, 43 F.4th at 1121-22. Because section 19-1-307(1)(c)

punishes disclosures listed in subsection (1)(a) of that statute, the

Tenth Circuit first determined that subsection (1)(a) “reach[es] only

18 identifying disclosures,” meaning that subsection (1)(c) does not

“inhibit . . . disclos[ure] [of] non-identifying information.” Id. at

1126. The plaintiff did not seek to disclose identifying information,

however, so the court declined to reach the issue of subsection

(1)(c)’s constitutionality. Id. But subsection (4) penalizes the

disclosure of any data or information in a child abuse record or

report, including nonidentifying information. Id. at 1127. The

court concluded that subsection is unconstitutional because it is

not narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest in

protecting children, as the government could achieve that purpose

by proscribing the disclosure only of identifying information. Id. at

1135-37.

¶ 40 This reasoning suggests DHS’s interpretation — which could

prohibit the disclosure even of some nonidentifying information

(that is, information that would not identify a particular child,

family, or informant) — could be an unconstitutional restriction on

free speech. By contrast, adopting the media organizations’

interpretation avoids this possible constitutional infirmity. See

People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, ¶ 22 (noting that “statutory terms

should be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional

19 infirmities” (quoting People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240

(Colo. 1994))).

¶ 41 In sum, we conclude that the legislature intended to prohibit

disclosure of only information that would identify a particular child,

family, or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect report.

¶ 42 Like the Tenth Circuit, we acknowledge that “separating

identifying information from non-identifying information w[ill] often

be a difficult task.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1135. But as the Peck court

pointed out, “[i]f Child Protection Teams” — and, we would add, the

CPO — “are capable of distinguishing between identifying and non-

identifying information, then so too” are others at DHS. Id. at 1136.

¶ 43 Finally, we note that the only CORA exception presented in

this appeal was section 19-1-307(1)(a). We express no opinion on

whether other exceptions might give DHS discretion to withhold

records otherwise disclosable under section 19-1-307(1)(a),

particularly in a close case.

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the

district court must determine whether, in light of our opinion, the

20 requested records would disclose “identifying information” of a

child, family, or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect

report.

JUDGE GOMEZ concurs.

JUDGE PAWAR dissents.

21 JUDGE PAWAR, dissenting.

¶ 45 According to the majority, section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023,

is ambiguous because there are two reasonable ways to read it. I

think there is only one. In my view, the only reasonable reading is

that names and addresses in child abuse reports are always

confidential and protected from disclosure. I would therefore affirm

the district court’s ruling based on the plain language of the statute

without resorting to additional aids of statutory interpretation.

¶ 46 As the majority explains, our primary goal when interpreting

statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s

intent. See Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18. We do this by first

examining the language of the statute. Id. We give the words and

phrases the General Assembly chose their plain and ordinary

meanings. Id. And we read those words and phrases in the context

of the entire statutory scheme, giving “consistent, harmonious, and

sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id.

¶ 47 We look beyond the plain language of the statute only if that

language is ambiguous — that is, only if the language is susceptible

of multiple reasonable interpretations. Id. An alternate

22 interpretation is unreasonable and therefore creates no ambiguity if

it “would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.

¶ 48 Section 19-1-307(1)(a) protects from disclosure child abuse

reports and “the name and address of any child, family, or

informant or any other identifying information contained in such

reports.” The majority concludes that it is reasonable to read this

language in two different ways to determine the rule for disclosing

names or addresses in child abuse reports. First, the statute can

be read to always protect names or addresses in child abuse

reports from disclosure. Second, the majority employs a “sort of

reverse ejusdem” rule of syntax, United States v. Williams-Davis, 90

F.3d 490, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1996), to read the statute as protecting

names or addresses from disclosure only if they constitute

identifying information.

¶ 49 Even accepting the second interpretation as grammatically

reasonable, I conclude it is unreasonable in substance. The

suggestion that the General Assembly intended to protect the

names and addresses of children in child abuse reports only in

certain circumstances is absurd and illogical. The majority’s

alternate interpretation would mean that a child abuse victim’s (or

23 the family’s or informant’s) name or address would be subject to

disclosure unless the records custodian, or a court, determines that

such information is identifying. This is unreasonable. The only

reasonable interpretation is that the names and addresses of

children, families, or informants in child abuse reports are always

confidential, as is any additional information that is identifying.5

¶ 50 The media organizations seek information linking reports of

child abuse to particular addresses. This is information that is

always protected under the only reasonable interpretation of section

19-1-307(1)(a). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary

conclusion and would affirm the district court’s order.

5 Because I conclude that names and addresses of children,

families, and informants in child abuse reports are always identifying information for purposes of section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023, I need not address the majority’s constitutional concerns about names and addresses that might not be identifying.