25CA1807 Marriage of Griffis 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1807 Mesa County District Court No. 13DR724 Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Larry Griffis,
Appellant,
and
Janette Griffis n/k/a Janette Romero,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Cordell Law, LLP, Keri E. McCallister, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Larry E. Griffis (father) appeals the district court’s order
modifying in part and adopting in part a magistrate’s ruling on his
request to change parenting time and child support.1 We affirm the
portion of the order concerning child support. We reverse the
portion of the order concerning parenting time and remand the
issue to the district court for further proceedings.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
¶2 The court dissolved the marriage between father and Janette
Griffis, now known as Janette Romero (mother), and ordered
mother to pay child support related to their three children — Jo.G,
Ja.G, and E.G.
¶3 In 2020, the magistrate modified the child support order,
requiring mother to pay $910 per month. The magistrate found
that Ja.G. was emancipated and excluded from the child support
determination. The magistrate also determined that although
Jo.G., who lived exclusively with mother, had reached the age of
emancipation, she was disabled due to her rheumatoid arthritis and
1 The district court also adopted the magistrate’s decision to modify
decision-making responsibility. Father does not appeal that portion of the order.
1 her parents had a continuing duty to support her. See § 14-10-
115(13)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. The magistrate included Jo.G. in the
child support determination but found that, at that time, her part-
time income alleviated father’s obligation to pay child support
related to her.
¶4 In 2023, father filed a motion to modify parenting time and
child support. He asked the court to allocate him majority
parenting time with E.G. (the remaining minor child) and to allow
mother to exercise parenting time two weekends per month. He
also argued that the court should find that Jo.G. was emancipated
for child support purposes because she was no longer disabled and
could adequately care for herself.
¶5 The magistrate denied father’s proposed parenting time
modification, finding that he had not established the “threshold
requirement of endangerment.” The magistrate also rejected
father’s argument that Jo.G. was emancipated. The magistrate
found that Jo.G.’s health had declined during the previous year and
that father had failed to demonstrate that she was no longer
physically disabled. The magistrate further determined that father’s
income had substantially increased since 2020, warranting a
2 modification of child support. The magistrate adopted father’s
proposed child support calculation and ordered mother to pay $820
per month for E.G. The magistrate did not address child support
for Jo.G.
¶6 Father and mother both petitioned for district court review of
the magistrate’s order. Father challenged the magistrate’s denial of
his request to modify parenting time, while mother argued that the
magistrate erred by not including Jo.G. when he modified child
support.
¶7 The district court adopted the portion of the magistrate’s order
concerning parenting time. However, the court found that the
magistrate erred by not including Jo.G. in the child support order.
The court modified the magistrate’s order; calculated the child
support obligation for Jo.G.; and ordered father to pay mother $767
per month for Jo.G. (which was an obligation independent from the
$820 per month mother paid for E.G.).
II. Standard of Review
¶8 Our review of a district court’s order on a petition for review of
a magistrate’s ruling is effectively a second layer of appellate review.
See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105,
3 ¶ 11. We review de novo whether the magistrate and the court
applied the correct legal standard. Id. We also review de novo their
conclusions of law, and we accept the magistrate’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
III. Parenting Time Concerning E.G.
¶9 Father contends that the magistrate misapplied the law when
denying his motion to modify parenting time. He argues that the
magistrate needed to consider only the best interests of E.G. but
improperly required him to establish endangerment under section
14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025. We agree.
A. Legal Standards
¶ 10 We review a court’s order modifying parenting time for an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592
(Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies
the law, or when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45.
¶ 11 Generally, a court may modify a parenting time order
whenever the modification would serve the child’s best interests.
§ 14-10-129(1)(a)(I); see also § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (best
interests factors).
4 ¶ 12 However, when a parent seeks a substantial modification of
parenting time that also changes the parent with whom the child
resides a majority of the time, a heightened standard applies. § 14-
10-129(2). Under this heightened standard, the court must retain
the prior parenting time order unless, as relevant here, it finds that
the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical
health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development.
§ 14-10-129(2)(d).
¶ 13 Relatedly, a court shall not restrict parenting time rights
unless it finds that parenting time endangers the child. § 14-10-
129(1)(b)(I).
B. Analysis
¶ 14 Father, relying on the recommendations of the child and
family investigator, asked the magistrate to allocate him primary
parenting time with E.G. and limit mother’s parenting time to two
weekends per month. The magistrate characterized father’s request
as seeking a “substantial modification” of the existing equal
parenting time schedule. The magistrate then determined that “the
additional requirements of [section] 14-10-129(2)” and the
requirements of In re Marriage of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1250-51
5 (Colo. App. 2004), required father to demonstrate “endangerment to
qualify for the requested modification.” The magistrate found that
father failed to establish this “threshold requirement” and denied
his motion.
¶ 15 The district court adopted the magistrate’s ruling, concluding
that the “magistrate properly analyzed whether this substantial
change [of parenting time] was appropriate under [section] 14-10-
129(2).”
¶ 16 Contrary to the magistrate’s and the district court’s
conclusion, section 14-10-129(2) does not apply to father’s motion
to modify. That section requires not only a substantial change to
the parenting time schedule but also a “change[] [to] the party with
whom the child resides a majority of the time.” Id. A modification
of an equal allocation of parenting time does not change the parent
with whom the child resides a majority of the time because under
an equal parenting time schedule, the child does not reside a
majority of time with either parent. See In re Marriage of Newell,
192 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. App. 2008); In re Marriage of Stewart, 43
P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002). Accordingly, when parents share
equal parenting responsibilities, a modification of that arrangement
6 is governed by the best interests standard, not the endangerment
standard set forth by section 14-10-129(2)(d). Stewart, 43 P.3d at
742; see also In re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 649 (Colo.
App. 2006) (acknowledging that modifying an equal allocation of
parenting time closely resembles an initial allocation of parenting
time because both decisions arise from situations in which the
parents share the legal and physical care of the child).
¶ 17 Nor do we agree that West supports application of the
endangerment standard under the circumstances here. In West, 94
P.3d at 1250, a division of this court considered whether a district
court’s order modifying parenting time amounted to a restriction
under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) and required the court to find
endangerment. The division held that when deciding whether to
apply the best interests standard or the endangerment standard, a
court “inquir[es] into both the quantitative and the qualitative
aspects of the proposed change to parenting time, as well as the
reason or reasons advanced for the change.” Id. at 1251. The
division determined that an order, which reduced the father’s
summer parenting time from eight to six weeks, was “neither a
qualitative change in the nature of father’s parenting time,” nor a
7 change based on the children’s safety. Id. It then determined that
the “purely quantitative change . . . of relatively limited magnitude”
was not a restriction and concluded that the district court correctly
applied the best interests standard. Id.
¶ 18 Here, like West, father’s proposed modification did not seek a
qualitative change to mother’s parenting time. See id. (recognizing
that a qualitative change to parenting time means a change in the
nature of a parent’s parenting time, such as supervised visitation).
Even though father raised concerns about mother’s parenting time
with E.G., he did not seek to deny or restrict her parenting time or
obstruct her relationship with E.G.
¶ 19 Father thus sought only a quantitative change to the
parenting schedule, arguing that E.G. would benefit from more time
with him. And in West, the division determined that the purely
quantitative modification was not a restriction. See id. While that
modification was “of relatively limited magnitude,” West did not say
whether a more substantial quantitative change would constitute a
restriction. Id. Rather, the division observed that most cases
concerning a parenting time restriction “involve outright denial of
visitation or require supervised visitation.” Id.
8 ¶ 20 But to the extent the language in West may suggest that a
quantitative reduction to parenting time, if substantial enough,
could constitute a restriction, we are not convinced that the
magistrate properly made that determination here. The magistrate
merely made the conclusory finding that the request was a
“substantial modification” that triggered West. The magistrate gave
no explanation for why father’s proposal, which would have allowed
mother to still exercise, at least, seventy-two overnight visits per
year, rose to the level of a restriction. Moreover, the district court
determined that although the magistrate may have looked to West,
the magistrate analyzed father’s proposed modification under
section 14-10-129(2), not as a restriction under section 14-10-
¶ 21 In any event, In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32 (cert.
granted in part July 21, 2025), recently held that “a restriction on a
parent’s parenting time rights means an order imposing a
qualitative control over the manner, location, or environment in
which the parent engages in parenting time.” The Dale division
further concluded that “a purely quantitative reduction in a parent’s
9 parenting time is not a restriction on that parent’s parenting time
rights.” Id.
¶ 22 Mother attempts to save the denial of father’s motion by
arguing that the magistrate also made findings under the best
interests standard. However, to the extent that the magistrate
addressed E.G.’s best interests, the analysis related solely to
reducing the number of parenting time exchanges, which the
magistrate determined warranted modifying the schedule to a week-
on/week-off schedule during the school year. Nothing in the order
indicates that the magistrate considered the best interests standard
or made findings concerning the best interest factors when
analyzing father’s proposed modification.
¶ 23 The magistrate thus misapplied the law by applying the
endangerment standard to father’s motion to modify parenting time.
We therefore reverse the portion of the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate’s denial of this motion. We remand the
motion to the district court for reconsideration under the best
interests standard. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I).
On remand, the court must consider the parties’ and E.G.’s current
circumstances and provide the parties with an opportunity to
10 present evidence concerning such circumstances. In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27.
IV. Child Support Concerning Jo.G.
¶ 24 Father next argues both the magistrate’s finding regarding
Jo.G.’s disability and the district court’s inclusion of Jo.G. for child
support should be reversed. We disagree.
A. Legal Standard
¶ 25 The court may modify child support when, based on the facts
and circumstances, there is a showing of substantial and
continuing changed circumstances. § 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025;
In re Marriage of Gross, 2016 COA 36, ¶ 15. We will not disturb a
court’s child support determination absent a showing that the court
abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12.
B. The Magistrate’s Disability Finding
¶ 26 Father contends that the magistrate applied the “incorrect
legal standard” in finding that Jo.G. was disabled. He argues that
(1) the original disability finding in 2020 was based solely on Jo.G.’s
rheumatoid arthritis; (2) her rheumatoid arthritis is now in
remission; and (3) the magistrate could not rely on any other
medical condition Jo.G. developed after the age of emancipation.
11 Mother responds that father did not preserve this argument. We
agree and decline to review this unpreserved contention.
¶ 27 “Our judicial system depends upon the orderly presentation
and preservation of issues.” Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v.
Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18. To preserve
arguments for appellate review when the party appeals a district
court’s order reviewing a magistrate’s ruling, the party must present
the particular issue in a petition for review and provide the district
court with an opportunity to rule on the issue. People in Interest of
K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006); see also Valentine v.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1188 n.4 (Colo. App.
2011) (“We review only the specific arguments a party pursued
before the district court.”). We will not address an argument not
raised in or decided by the district court. See Melat, Pressman &
Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403.
¶ 28 In his petition for district court review, father challenged only
the denial of his motion to modify parental responsibilities. He did
not argue that the magistrate erred by finding that Jo.G. was
disabled, let alone contend that the magistrate misapplied the law
12 when doing so. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148
P.3d at 403.
¶ 29 Still, father claims that he preserved this issue by (1) generally
arguing to the magistrate that Jo.G. was not disabled, did not meet
the criteria for state or federal disability, and could support herself;
and (2) responding to mother’s petition for district court review by
asserting that Jo.G. could work and generate an income. But
father’s general arguments regarding Jo.G.’s continued disability
did not preserve all potential avenues for relief on appeal. See
Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1188 n.4. Indeed, in the district court,
father never raised the specific legal issue he now asserts in his
appellate briefing.
¶ 30 Because father failed to preserve the issue, we will not address
his argument that the magistrate misapplied the law in determining
Jo.G.’s disability. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148
C. The District Court’s Authority to Address Child Support Related to Jo.G.
¶ 31 Father also contends that the district court “exceeded its
authority in addressing issues not placed before it in the
13 [m]agistrate’s [d]ecision regarding [Jo.G.’s] support order.” He
argues that the district court “inappropriately inserted its own
findings and opinion into the order without regard to whether this
actually conflicted with the [m]agistrate’s intent.” Father explains
that the magistrate made no findings related to Jo.G. when
addressing child support and that the magistrate gave no indication
he intended to modify the portion of the prior child support order
concerning Jo.G. We are not persuaded.
¶ 32 At the hearing on father’s motion to modify child support,
mother argued that Jo.G. was not emancipated and should be
included in the child support calculation. The magistrate agreed
with mother that Jo.G. was not emancipated. However, despite
finding that father’s substantially increased income warranted
modifying the prior child support order, the magistrate did not
further address child support concerning Jo.G.
¶ 33 In her petition for review, mother argued that the magistrate
erred by failing to include Jo.G. in the child support order. The
district court agreed, explaining that the magistrate found, with
record support, that Jo.G. was not emancipated due to her
disability and that the magistrate’s failure to address Jo.G. in the
14 child support order was inconsistent with that finding. The court
recognized that, under the previous child support order, father was
not obligated to pay child support for Jo.G. because she could work
and earned a modest income. But the court went on to find that
there was no evidence that Jo.G. was presently earning an income,
and it modified the magistrate’s child support order to reflect that
circumstance.
¶ 34 A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision shall adopt,
reject, or modify the magistrate’s order. C.R.M. 7(a)(10) (2025).2 In
deciding the proper disposition, the district court “shall consider
the petition for review on the basis of the petition and briefs filed,
together with such review of the record,” and it may conduct further
proceedings as necessary. C.R.M. 7(a)(8); In re Marriage of Matheny,
2024 COA 81, ¶ 20.
¶ 35 The district court acted within this authority to modify the
magistrate’s child support order. A parent’s obligation to support a
child continues beyond the age of emancipation if the child is
mentally and physically disabled. See § 14-10-115(13)(a)(II); Koltay
2 Since the entry of the orders on appeal, Colorado Magistrate Rule
7 was amended. See C.R.M. 7(k) (2026).
15 v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo. 1983). The court reviewed
the record and concluded that, given the magistrate’s finding that
Jo.G. was not emancipated, Jo.G. needed to be included in the
modified child support order and the magistrate erred by not doing
so. See C.R.M. 7(a)(8), (9). The court then made additional findings
based on the available record and modified the magistrate’s ruling
to correct the error. See id.; Matheny, ¶ 20.
¶ 36 We therefore reject father’s contention that the court exceeded
its authority by including Jo.G. in the child support order.3
V. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 37 Mother requests an award of attorney fees on appeal, arguing
that father’s contentions concerning child support were
3 Father does not contest the district court’s or magistrate’s
calculations on the amount of each parties’ child support obligation or the use of two independent support orders. Nor did mother cross-appeal the modified child support ruling. We therefore express no opinion on the amount of the parties’ child support obligation or the propriety of the child support calculations under section 14-10-115(8), C.R.S. 2025. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Colorado Sun, 2026 CO 18, ¶ 52 (recognizing that “our adversarial system of adjudication ‘is designed around the premise’ that where, as here, parties are represented by competent counsel, they ‘know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’” (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020))).
16 substantially groundless and frivolous. See C.A.R. 38(b) (“If the
appellate court determines that an appeal . . . is frivolous, it may
award damages it deems appropriate, including attorney fees . . . .”).
We deny her request. See Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO
77, ¶ 70 (noting that an award of attorney fees for a frivolous appeal
should be reserved for “clear and unequivocal” cases involving
“egregious conduct” (citation omitted)).
VI. Disposition
¶ 38 We reverse the portion of the order denying father’s request to
modify parenting time and remand this issue to the district court
for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. We otherwise
affirm.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.