25CA1108 Parental Resp Conc JLM 04-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1108 Weld County District Court No. 19DR1035 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning J.L.M. and J.J.L.M., Children,
and Concerning Kyrsten Anne Jellico,
Appellant,
and
Brandan Miller,
Appellee.
ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE TOW Román, C.J., and Yun, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026
Kyrsten Anne Jellico, Pro Se
Cordell Law, LLP, Keri E. McCallister, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this post-decree parental responsibilities proceeding
involving Kyrsten Anne Jellico (mother), Brandan Miller (father),
and their two children, J.L.M. and J.J.L.M., mother appeals the
district court’s orders modifying the summer parenting time
schedule and denying her request to modify the decision-making
allocation. We affirm both orders.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father have two children together. In September
2022, when the district court entered permanent orders allocating
parental responsibilities, the children were seven and almost four
years old. The permanent orders adopted an agreement regarding
parenting time and decision-making that the parties had placed on
the record several months earlier.1 Under that agreement, the
children would live primarily with mother in Nebraska, while father
would have parenting time two weekends per month — one in
Colorado and one in Nebraska. As for summer parenting time,
father began with four weeks spread over the summer but then
1 After the agreement was read into the record, the parties litigated
its enforceability for several months. The district court eventually concluded it was enforceable and adopted it as the permanent orders in the case.
1 shifted to a two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off schedule in 2023. The
parties also agreed to share joint decision-making responsibility.
¶3 In March 2025, father moved to modify summer parenting
time so that the children would live with him for the summer except
for the two weeks before the start of the next school year. Mother
countered with a motion to reduce father’s summer parenting time.
She also filed a motion to modify decision-making responsibility,
requesting sole decision-making authority. In conjunction with that
motion, mother requested the appointment of a child and family
investigator (CFI).
¶4 At a status conference held a few weeks before the hearing, the
district court declined to appoint a CFI for the parenting time
motions but held the request in abeyance for other purposes. The
court also indicated that the upcoming hearing would be limited to
the parenting time issues, and not the motion to modify decision-
making responsibility.
¶5 During the evidentiary hearing, mother renewed her earlier
request — held in abeyance until the hearing — that the court
conduct an in camera interview with the children. The court
declined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied
2 mother’s request for a CFI to address decision-making
responsibility and set the matter for an oral ruling the following
week on the parenting time modification.
¶6 During its oral ruling, the court made findings on the record
and announced a new summer parenting plan: one schedule for the
summer of 2025 and another for the summers thereafter. The
court later reduced the parenting time schedule to writing without
reiterating its findings; instead, the written order simply says, “For
the reasons stated verbally on the record[,] . . . the court modifies
parenting time as follows” before laying out the new schedule.
¶7 That same day, the court entered another written order
denying mother’s motion to modify decision-making responsibility,
noting, “[T]here is nothing in the motion that alleges facts have
arisen since the prior order for joint decision making that were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior order and there is no
evidence that the status quo endangers the children.” As a result,
it did “not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve
disputed questions of fact or law or reach a fair resolution of the
issues raised.”
¶8 Mother appeals both orders.
3 II. The Appellate Record
¶9 As a threshold issue, we address the state of the appellate
record. Mother did not initially designate the transcripts of the
pretrial hearing, the evidentiary hearing, or the court’s oral ruling.
Two weeks after filing her opening brief, however, mother moved to
supplement the record with those transcripts, representing that she
had previously been unable to obtain them “due to financial
limitations” but had “since arranged to obtain these transcripts.”
This court granted the motion.
¶ 10 Shortly thereafter, mother filed two more motions: one stating
that she would file a “Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings” in
accordance with C.A.R. 10(e) “due to financial hardship and the
prohibitive cost of obtaining certified transcripts,” and the other
purporting to provide a unilateral summary of the three hearings in
lieu of the transcripts. This court denied both requests, noting that
C.A.R. 10(e) requires the parties to agree to such statements of
evidence and the district court to approve that agreement. In light
of mother’s representations about her inability to obtain the
transcripts, this court also vacated the earlier order granting the
request to supplement the record. Notwithstanding that ruling, the
4 district court provided a supplemental record containing the pretrial
hearing transcript — the only transcript mother was able to pay for,
according to the district court appeals clerk.
¶ 11 Thus, the appellate record contains the pretrial hearing
transcript but no others.2
¶ 12 As the appellant, mother is responsible for providing an
adequate record for us to review, including “transcripts of all
proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues on
appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3). We recognize that the unavailability of
free transcripts can create real difficulty for some appellants in civil
cases. But C.A.R. 10 provides a mechanism to address those
difficulties. Unfortunately, mother’s efforts to provide the record in
an alternative form did not comply with that rule. And when the
appellant fails to provide transcripts, “the reviewing court must
presume that the record supports the judgment.” In re Marriage of
Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13.
2 Technically, the transcript of the December 2021 hearing at which
the parties read their initial agreement into the record is also part of the appellate record, as it was filed as an exhibit to a motion during the pre-permanent-orders litigation. But that transcript is not relevant to this appeal except to the extent it contains the orders the parties later sought to modify.
5 III. Mother’s Appellate Claims
¶ 13 We turn, then, to mother’s challenges to the order modifying
summer parenting time and the denial of her request to modify
decision-making responsibility.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 “The trial court has broad discretion when modifying an
existing parenting time order, taking into consideration the child’s
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25CA1108 Parental Resp Conc JLM 04-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1108 Weld County District Court No. 19DR1035 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning J.L.M. and J.J.L.M., Children,
and Concerning Kyrsten Anne Jellico,
Appellant,
and
Brandan Miller,
Appellee.
ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE TOW Román, C.J., and Yun, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026
Kyrsten Anne Jellico, Pro Se
Cordell Law, LLP, Keri E. McCallister, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this post-decree parental responsibilities proceeding
involving Kyrsten Anne Jellico (mother), Brandan Miller (father),
and their two children, J.L.M. and J.J.L.M., mother appeals the
district court’s orders modifying the summer parenting time
schedule and denying her request to modify the decision-making
allocation. We affirm both orders.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father have two children together. In September
2022, when the district court entered permanent orders allocating
parental responsibilities, the children were seven and almost four
years old. The permanent orders adopted an agreement regarding
parenting time and decision-making that the parties had placed on
the record several months earlier.1 Under that agreement, the
children would live primarily with mother in Nebraska, while father
would have parenting time two weekends per month — one in
Colorado and one in Nebraska. As for summer parenting time,
father began with four weeks spread over the summer but then
1 After the agreement was read into the record, the parties litigated
its enforceability for several months. The district court eventually concluded it was enforceable and adopted it as the permanent orders in the case.
1 shifted to a two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off schedule in 2023. The
parties also agreed to share joint decision-making responsibility.
¶3 In March 2025, father moved to modify summer parenting
time so that the children would live with him for the summer except
for the two weeks before the start of the next school year. Mother
countered with a motion to reduce father’s summer parenting time.
She also filed a motion to modify decision-making responsibility,
requesting sole decision-making authority. In conjunction with that
motion, mother requested the appointment of a child and family
investigator (CFI).
¶4 At a status conference held a few weeks before the hearing, the
district court declined to appoint a CFI for the parenting time
motions but held the request in abeyance for other purposes. The
court also indicated that the upcoming hearing would be limited to
the parenting time issues, and not the motion to modify decision-
making responsibility.
¶5 During the evidentiary hearing, mother renewed her earlier
request — held in abeyance until the hearing — that the court
conduct an in camera interview with the children. The court
declined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied
2 mother’s request for a CFI to address decision-making
responsibility and set the matter for an oral ruling the following
week on the parenting time modification.
¶6 During its oral ruling, the court made findings on the record
and announced a new summer parenting plan: one schedule for the
summer of 2025 and another for the summers thereafter. The
court later reduced the parenting time schedule to writing without
reiterating its findings; instead, the written order simply says, “For
the reasons stated verbally on the record[,] . . . the court modifies
parenting time as follows” before laying out the new schedule.
¶7 That same day, the court entered another written order
denying mother’s motion to modify decision-making responsibility,
noting, “[T]here is nothing in the motion that alleges facts have
arisen since the prior order for joint decision making that were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior order and there is no
evidence that the status quo endangers the children.” As a result,
it did “not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve
disputed questions of fact or law or reach a fair resolution of the
issues raised.”
¶8 Mother appeals both orders.
3 II. The Appellate Record
¶9 As a threshold issue, we address the state of the appellate
record. Mother did not initially designate the transcripts of the
pretrial hearing, the evidentiary hearing, or the court’s oral ruling.
Two weeks after filing her opening brief, however, mother moved to
supplement the record with those transcripts, representing that she
had previously been unable to obtain them “due to financial
limitations” but had “since arranged to obtain these transcripts.”
This court granted the motion.
¶ 10 Shortly thereafter, mother filed two more motions: one stating
that she would file a “Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings” in
accordance with C.A.R. 10(e) “due to financial hardship and the
prohibitive cost of obtaining certified transcripts,” and the other
purporting to provide a unilateral summary of the three hearings in
lieu of the transcripts. This court denied both requests, noting that
C.A.R. 10(e) requires the parties to agree to such statements of
evidence and the district court to approve that agreement. In light
of mother’s representations about her inability to obtain the
transcripts, this court also vacated the earlier order granting the
request to supplement the record. Notwithstanding that ruling, the
4 district court provided a supplemental record containing the pretrial
hearing transcript — the only transcript mother was able to pay for,
according to the district court appeals clerk.
¶ 11 Thus, the appellate record contains the pretrial hearing
transcript but no others.2
¶ 12 As the appellant, mother is responsible for providing an
adequate record for us to review, including “transcripts of all
proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues on
appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3). We recognize that the unavailability of
free transcripts can create real difficulty for some appellants in civil
cases. But C.A.R. 10 provides a mechanism to address those
difficulties. Unfortunately, mother’s efforts to provide the record in
an alternative form did not comply with that rule. And when the
appellant fails to provide transcripts, “the reviewing court must
presume that the record supports the judgment.” In re Marriage of
Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13.
2 Technically, the transcript of the December 2021 hearing at which
the parties read their initial agreement into the record is also part of the appellate record, as it was filed as an exhibit to a motion during the pre-permanent-orders litigation. But that transcript is not relevant to this appeal except to the extent it contains the orders the parties later sought to modify.
5 III. Mother’s Appellate Claims
¶ 13 We turn, then, to mother’s challenges to the order modifying
summer parenting time and the denial of her request to modify
decision-making responsibility.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 “The trial court has broad discretion when modifying an
existing parenting time order, taking into consideration the child’s
best interests and the policy of encouraging parent-child
relationships.” In re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo.
App. 2010). The same standard applies to modifications of
decision-making responsibility. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d
326, 335 (Colo. App. 2007). We will therefore disturb such an order
only if the court abused that discretion, meaning its decision
misapplied the law or was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8.
B. Modification of Summer Parenting Time
¶ 15 Mother makes several arguments as to why, in her view, the
modification of summer parenting time is not in the children’s best
interests. In support, she frequently cites matters outside the
appellate record, which we cannot consider. More fundamentally,
6 as noted, the absence of the transcripts requires us to presume that
the record supports the district court’s decision. See Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 16 In short, while mother clearly disagrees with the district
court’s decision, she points to nothing in the appellate record that
demonstrates that the decision was manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Nor has she shown that the court
misapplied the law. And she directs us to nothing in the record
that would overcome the presumption that the missing transcripts
support the district court’s decision. We thus discern no error.
C. Denial of the Motion to Modify Decision-Making
¶ 17 Mother contends that, notwithstanding the district court’s
unequivocal statement at the pretrial hearing that it would not
address the motion to modify decision-making at the evidentiary
hearing, the court nevertheless denied the motion at the same time
it issued its written order modifying the summer parenting time
schedule. And, mother argues, the court did so “without a
reasoned evidentiary basis.” Thus, mother contends, the district
court abused its discretion by ruling on the motion despite limiting
the hearing to the parenting time issues.
7 ¶ 18 Mother misapprehends the basis for the district court’s order.
The court denied the motion not on the basis of the evidentiary
hearing, but on the face of the motion itself — specifically, because
the motion failed to allege facts arising after the prior order, or
unknown to the court at the time of that order, sufficient to meet
the threshold for modifying decision-making. See § 14-10-131(2),
C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 19 To the extent mother addresses the legal sufficiency of her
motion, she argues that modification is permitted “where one parent
consistently defers decision-making to the other or where mutual
decision-making has failed.” She is partially correct. The statute
does not permit modification simply because joint decision-making
“has failed,” but section 14-10-131(2)(b.7) does permit modification
where one parent has consistently consented to the other party
exercising sole decision-making.
¶ 20 Nevertheless, mother’s appellate briefing does not identify any
specific allegations in her motion showing that she sufficiently
alleged that father consistently consented to her exercising sole
decision-making. She does not even challenge the district court’s
determination that the motion was legally insufficient to warrant a
8 hearing. Instead, mother devotes her entire argument on this issue
to the merits of her request for the modification.
¶ 21 Under what is known as the party presentation principle, we
rely on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and, as neutral
arbiters of the matters raised, refrain from making arguments for
the parties. Brubaker v. Colo. Sun, 2026 CO 18, ¶ 52. And while
we “must interpret pro se . . . motions liberally, liberal construction
does not include inventing arguments not made by the pro se
party.” Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21.
¶ 22 Mother has not demonstrated that the district court abused its
discretion. Thus, we will not disturb the order denying her motion
to modify decision-making responsibility.
IV. Father’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 23 Father requests an award of his appellate attorney fees,
asserting that mother’s appeal was frivolous as filed with respect to
the order modifying the summer parenting time schedule and
frivolous as argued with respect to the order denying modification of
¶ 24 “A party who is appearing without an attorney . . . shall not be
assessed attorney fees . . . unless the court finds that the party
9 clearly knew or reasonably should have known that the party’s
action or defense, or any part of the action or defense, was
substantially frivolous . . . .” § 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 2025. Even
assuming mother’s arguments were frivolous, father has not shown
that she knew or should have known that her appeal was frivolous.
We therefore deny his request for appellate attorney fees.
V. Disposition
¶ 25 The orders are affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE YUN concur.