Allmaras v. University Mechanical & Engineering Contractors, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BROCK ALLMARAS, individually and Case No.: 24-cv-02021-GPC-SBC on behalf of others similarly situated, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 MOTION TO REMAND AND UNIVERSITY MECHANICAL & 15 (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS, INC. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 16 and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, PLEADINGS 17 Defendant. [ECF Nos. 11 & 15] 18

19 20 On October 29, 2024, this case was removed to federal court. ECF No. 1. On 21 November 22, 2024, Plaintiff Brock Allmaras filed a motion for leave to amend the 22 Complaint, ECF No. 10, and filed a motion to remand the case to state court. ECF No. 23 11. Then, on December 19, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the 24 pleadings (“MJOP”). ECF No. 15. Defendant then opposed the motion to remand on the 25 same grounds upon which it moved for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 18. 26 Considering the overlapping legal issues, Plaintiff filed a consolidated brief both replying 27 1 to Defendant’s opposition to the motion to remand and opposing the motion for judgment 2 on the pleadings. ECF No. 24. Defendant then filed a reply brief as to the motion for 3 judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 25. 4 Because the motion to remand and MJOP involve legal issues which overlap 5 significantly, the Court considers the motions at the same time. The Court finds the 6 motions suitable for decision on the papers. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES 7 Plaintiff’s motion to remand and GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 8 pleadings. 9 BACKGROUND 10 I. Factual Background1 11 On October 7, 2024, Plaintiff Brock Allmaras filed a complaint against University 12 Mechanical & Engineering Contractors, Inc. pursuant to the California Private Attorneys 13 General Act (“PAGA”) on behalf of himself and “[a]ll current and former non-exempt 14 employees who worked for Defendants in California at any time from one year prior to 15 the postmark date of the initial PAGA notice through date of trial.” ECF No. 27 (“FAC”) 16 ¶ 45. On October 29, 2024, Defendant removed this case to federal court. ECF No. 1. 17 On February 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed the FAC. FAC. 18 19

20 1 On February 6, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the Complaint. ECF No. 21 26. On the same day, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 27 (“FAC”). The 22 FAC removes Plaintiff’s claim for violations of Labor Code §§ 204, 204b, and 210. See id. ¶ 56 (absence). This claim previously gave the Court subject matter jurisdiction in Allmaras v. Univ. Mech. 23 & Eng’g Contractors, Inc. (“Allmaras I”), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2024 WL 4860804, at *8-9 & *10 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024). In anticipation of the removal of this claim, the parties’ briefing on the 24 motion to remand and MJOP discussed other potential grounds for jurisdiction and dismissal. See ECF No. 11 & 15. Because the filing of the FAC does not change the arguments made in the parties’ briefs, 25 the Court will consider the FAC to be the operative complaint for purposes of the motion to remand and 26 MJOP.

27 1 Plaintiff’s various claims hinge on the general allegation that Defendant required 2 “Plaintiff and the aggrieved employees to complete work while off-the-clock, without 3 compensation.” Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff was allegedly expected to arrive to work 30 minutes 4 early and begin working, and Defendant allegedly prohibited Plaintiff from logging this 5 time on his timecard. Id. ¶ 24. Further, Plaintiff was allegedly expected to respond to 6 messages and phone calls regarding work-related matters while off-the-clock and was not 7 allowed to log this time on this timecard, either. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff also allegedly 8 “routinely experienced missed, late, short, and interrupted meal periods due to pressure 9 from Defendants to get their projects completed as soon as possible,” Id. ¶ 29, and due to 10 pressure to work through his rest periods, Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff allegedly incurred work- 11 related costs without reimbursement, Id. ¶ 36, such as “expenses incurred from cell phone 12 usage required for the job or from obtaining tools that were required for the job,” Id. ¶ 38. 13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed the following violations: (1) minimum 14 wage violations (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 & 1197-98); (2) unpaid overtime (Id. ¶¶ 510, 15 1194, & 1198); (3) unpaid paid sick leave (Id. §§ 256-248.7); (4) unpaid meal period 16 premium wages (Id. §§ 226.7, 512, & 1198); (5) unpaid rest period premium wages (Id. 17 §§ 226.7, 516, & 1198); (6) untimely payment of wages upon separation of employment 18 (Id. ¶¶ 201-03 & 256); (7) non-compliant wage statements (Id. §§ 226 & 226.3); (8) 19 failure to reimburse employee expenses (Id. §§ 2802 & 2804); (9) failure to provide 20 employee records (Id. §§ 226, 432, 1174, & 1198.5); and (10) failure to maintain accurate 21 records (Id. § 1174). FAC ¶ 55. 22 II. Procedural Background 23 Plaintiff previously brought a putative class action against Defendant for the same 24 underlying claims for which he now seeks PAGA penalties. Allmaras v. Univ. Mech. & 25 Eng’g Contractors, Inc. (“Allmaras I”), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2024 WL 4860804 (S.D. Cal. 26 Nov. 20, 2024). There, this Court held one of the claims—the claim for untimely 27 1 payment of wages pursuant to Labor Code § 204—to be preempted under the § 301 of the 2 Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Id. at *8-9. Thus, the Court had 3 jurisdiction over the untimely payment of wages claim and exercised supplemental 4 jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Id. at *10 n.4. 5 In Allmaras I, the Court ultimately dismissed all claims without leave to amend. 6 Id. at *13. The untimely payment of wages claim was dismissed as preempted under 7 federal labor-contract law. Id. at *9-10. The remaining claims were not preempted but 8 were instead dismissed because they were subject to the applicable collective bargaining 9 agreement’s (“CBA”) arbitration provisions. Id. at 10-12. 10 The Court stayed the instant case pending the disposition of the motion to dismiss 11 in Allmaras I. ECF No. 9. After the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss in 12 Allmaras I, the parties proceeded by filing several motions, including the two that are 13 now before the Court. See ECF Nos. 10, 11, & 15. 14 REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 15 In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendant requests judicial notice of 16 two agreements entered into between Defendant and Plaintiff’s union. See ECF No. 15-3 17 (RJN); see also ECF No. 15-1 (agreements). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a 18 Court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because 19 they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 20 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 21 Courts routinely take judicial notice of CBAs, especially when reference to the 22 CBA is required to resolve issues of preemption. See, e.g., Hall v. Live Nation 23 Worldwide, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (taking judicial notice of 24 CBA that formed the basis for defendant’s argument that certain claims were preempted 25 by the LMRA); see Lujano v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 3d 988, 995 (C.D. 26 Cal. 2024) (“the court takes judicial notice of the CBA because courts regularly take 27 1 judicial notice of collective bargaining agreements on a motion to dismiss when the 2 documents are not subject to reasonable dispute”) (internal citation and quotation marks 3 omitted). The memoranda of understanding (“MOUs”) at issue here can accurately be 4 characterized as collective bargaining agreements. See Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. 5 Dutra Grp., 279 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a collective bargaining agreement is 6 not limited solely to the specific provisions of the basic labor contract formally executed 7 by the parties, but it may also include, among other things, written side agreements and 8 oral understandings entered into by the parties to the collective bargaining relationship”), 9 overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 10 Accordingly, the MOUs are the proper subjects of judicial notice. 11 Plaintiff opposes judicial notice on two grounds. First, he raises concerns about 12 the fact that the Defendant did not request judicial notice of these documents at the 13 motion to dismiss stage of Allmaras I. ECF No. 24 at 10. Second, Plaintiff complains 14 that one of the MOUs was “created on the eve of a litigation filing to try and gut this 15 case.” Id. (referencing ECF No. 15-1 at 7-8). But these concerns do not bear on the 16 question of judicial notice, and Plaintiff cites no case law to the contrary. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the 18 MOUs. 19 MOTION TO REMAND 20 I. Legal Standard 21 A defendant may remove a civil action brought in state court if the action “might 22 have been brought originally in federal court.” Smith v. Mail Boxes, Etc., 191 F. Supp. 23 2d 1155, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441). “Absent diversity of 24 citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required” to remove an action. Caterpillar 25 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Generally, “a cause of action arises under 26 federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” 27 1 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). However, when “Congress clearly 2 manifested an intent to convert state law claims into federal-question claims,” the state 3 law claims are completely preempted and the state law claims “will be deemed to arise 4 under federal law for jurisdiction purposes.” Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 5 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1993). 6 Section 301 of the LMRA states: “Suits for violation of contracts between an 7 employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting 8 commerce … may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction 9 of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 is essentially “a congressional mandate 10 to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address 11 disputes arising out of labor contracts.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 12 209 (1985). “[T]he preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any 13 state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 14 organization.’” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. 15 Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). Thus, claims that are preempted by § 301 necessarily arise 16 under federal law, and federal courts have jurisdiction over them. Kobold v. Good 17 Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). 18 The Ninth Circuit has applied a two-step test to determine whether a claim is 19 preempted by § 301. Mellon v. Universal City Studios, LLC, 625 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1013 20 (C.D. Cal. 2022). First, the court asks “whether a particular right inheres in state law or, 21 instead, is grounded in a CBA.” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th 22 Cir. 2007). “If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, 23 and [the] analysis ends there.” Id. at 1059. Second, the court asks “whether a state law 24 right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 25 (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394). The key question here is “whether the claim can be 26 27 1 resolved by ‘looking to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” Id. (internal citations omitted). If 2 the former, the claim is not preempted; if the latter, the claim is preempted. Id. 3 II. Discussion 4 Plaintiff brings a single cause of action for civil penalties under the Private 5 Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). See FAC ¶¶ 44-57. Notably, the FAC removes 6 allegations of untimely payment of wages during employment under Labor Code §§ 204, 7 204b, and 210. See FAC ¶ 56 (absence). In Allmaras I, this Court held that the claim for 8 untimely payment of wages under Labor Code § 204 was the only claim that was 9 preempted under LMRA § 301. Allmaras I, 2024 WL 4860804, at *8-9. Plaintiff argues 10 that, because the Court found that all remaining claims were not preempted under § 301, 11 the Court now lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 11-1 at 2. 12 Defendant argues that the Court has jurisdiction irrespective of whether the FAC 13 includes a claim for untimely payment of wages during employment. First, Defendant 14 argues that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration provisions of the PAGA 15 waiver that the parties are subject to, irrespective of whether § 301 preemption applies. 16 ECF No. 18 at 11. Next, Defendant argues that the Court has jurisdiction to determine 17 whether a Labor Code exemption applies. Id. at 13-16. Last, Defendant argues that, to 18 the extent Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is based on alleged overtime, meal break, and paid sick 19 leave violations, these underlying claims are preempted by § 301. Id. at 16-18. 20 A. Jurisdiction To Enforce CBA’s Arbitration Provisions 21 Section 301 preemption “is designed to ensure ‘specific performance of promises 22 to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements.” Columbia Exp. 23 Terminal, LLC v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 23 F.4th 836, 842 (9th Cir. 2022) 24 (quoting Textile Workers of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957)). 25 “Therefore, mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures contained in a collective 26 bargaining agreement must be exhausted before bringing a lawsuit under Section 301 of 27 1 the LMRA.” Europa Auto Imports, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 2 Workers Loc. Lodge 190, No. 22-cv-1987-GPC(BGS), 2024 WL 499475, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 3 Feb. 8, 2024) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) and Carr 4 v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 904 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990)). 5 Defendant argues that these principles provide the Court with jurisdiction 6 “independent of whether Section 301 preemption applies.” ECF No. 18 at 11. The Court 7 disagrees. Instead, when the Court is faced with claims that are preempted by § 301, it 8 must enforce any promises to arbitrate grievances found in the CBA before it examines 9 the merits of the lawsuit. But first, the Court must have federal question jurisdiction 10 based on § 301 preemption. This is in line with the “central tenet of federal labor- 11 contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility 12 to interpret the labor contract in the first instance.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220. 13 In support of its argument, Defendant briefly cites Melena v. ASRC Indus. Servs., 14 LLC, 2022 WL 423493, *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2022), where the Court granted 15 summary judgment because a Labor Code exemption applied and therefore barred the 16 Plaintiff’s PAGA action. Because the PAGA claim was barred, the Melena court did not 17 reach the question of § 301 preemption. Id. at *8. Defendant contends that Melena 18 supports the argument that a Court has jurisdiction to enforce arbitration irrespective of 19 whether there is § 301 preemption. But Melena involved the disposition of claims on 20 summary judgment; there was no dispute as to the court’s jurisdiction. The Court thus is 21 not persuaded by Melena. 22 Defendant also cites Allmaras I, 2024 WL 4860804, at *10-13, where this Court 23 ordered arbitration of claims that were not preempted under § 301. But there, the Court 24 found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over all claims before it ordered arbitration. 25 Id. Specifically, the Court found that the claim for untimely payment of wages under 26 Labor Code § 204 was preempted by LMRA § 301, id. at *8-10, and subsequently took 27 1 supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, id. at *10 n.4. Thus, it was § 301 2 preemption that raised a federal question in Allmaras I, not the need to enforce the CBA’s 3 arbitration provisions. 4 Accordingly, the Court finds that it is § 301 preemption—not the mere existence of 5 a CBA with arbitration provisions—that raises a federal question. The Court thus does 6 not have jurisdiction to enforce CBA’s arbitration provisions independent of § 301 7 preemption. 8 B. Jurisdiction Under LMRA § 301 9 Defendant contends that a Labor Code exemption applies, and thus the PAGA 10 action is preempted under LMRA § 301. ECF No. 18 at 13-16. If a Labor Code 11 exemption in fact applies to bar the PAGA cause of action, then the right exists solely as 12 a result of the CBA, and the claim is preempted. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059; see also 13 Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that a Labor 14 Code claim is preempted under § 301 where the applicable CBA meets the requirements 15 of a Labor Code exemption). 16 Defendant argues that the Labor Code § 2699.6 exemption applies here. ECF No. 17 18 at 13. Generally, “an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable.” 18 Iskanian v. CLA Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 383 (2014), overruled in 19 part on other grounds by Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639 (2022). 20 But “the Legislature carved out an exception to the rule prohibiting contractual waivers 21 of PAGA suits by enacting a PAGA statute that applies to the construction industry.” 22 Oswald v. Murray Plumbing & Heating Corp., 82 Cal. App. 5th 938, 943 (2022). Labor 23 Code § 2699.6(a) exempts construction workers from PAGA if they are covered by a 24 CBA “that expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of 25 employees, premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and for the employee to 26 receive a regular hourly pay rate of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum 27 1 wage rate,” and the CBA “(1) has a grievance and arbitration procedure to redress Labor 2 Code violations; (2) clearly waives PAGA; and (3) authorizes the arbitrator to award all 3 remedies available under the Labor Code.” Oswald, 82 Cal. App. 5th at 941. 4 There is no dispute that Plaintiff is employed in the construction industry. See 5 ECF No. 1-2 at 12-14 (CBA description of scope of work). There is also no dispute that 6 the applicable CBA expressly provides for the wages, hours, and working conditions of 7 the employees, see id. at 39-43, along with premium wage rates for overtime hours, id. at 8 41. Further, the CBA has arbitration provisions to redress Labor Code violations, id. at 9 51-55; ECF No. 15-1 at 5,2 waives PAGA, ECF No. 15-1 at 5, and authorizes the 10 arbitrator to award all remedies available under the Labor Code, id. Therefore, the only 11 issue in dispute is whether an applicable CBA provides for the employee to receive an 12 hourly pay rate of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage. ECF No. 13 18 at 14-16; ECF No. 25 at 4-7. 14 To this end, the Court notes that Defendant and Plaintiff’s labor union entered into 15 a retroactive memorandum of understanding regarding covered employees’ rate of pay 16 (“Wage MOU”) on December 16, 2024—over two months after this case was originally 17 filed in state court, ECF No. 1 at 9. See ECF No. 15-1 at 8. The Wage MOU seeks to 18 clarify the PAGA MOU and expressly states that it is retroactive to April 8, 2021.3 Id. 19 The Wage MOU “covers all individuals who are or were employed by UMEC and 20 represented by District Council 16 and its affiliated local unions” (“Covered 21 Employees”). Id. The Wage MOU states that “beginning on, and retroactive to, [April 8, 22 2021], all Covered Employees should have earned a base rate of pay of at least 130% of 23 24 25 2 As will be explored in more detail below, the memorandum of understanding which waives PAGA can 26 appropriately be considered a “CBA.” See supra at 11-12. 3 This is the same date that the parties entered into the PAGA MOU. ECF No. 15-1 at 5-6. 27 1 the then-current California state minimum wage, plus 1 cent.”4 Id. The question before 2 the Court is whether the Wage MOU is a valid retroactive agreement, and whether Labor 3 Code § 2699.6’s requirements are met as a result of the Wage MOU. 4 The Court first notes that both the PAGA MOU and Wage MOU are collective 5 bargaining agreements within the meaning of Labor Code § 2699.6 and LMRA § 301. 6 “[A] collective bargaining agreement is not limited solely to the specific provisions of the 7 basic labor contract formally executed by the parties, but it may also include, among 8 other things, written side agreements and oral understandings entered into by the parties 9 to the collective bargaining relationship.” Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Grp., 10 279 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 11 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). “Notably, Section 301 has been broadly construed to include 12 not only collective bargaining agreements, but also other ‘agreement[s] between 13 employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between 14 them.’” Graves v. IBT Loc. 572, 2011 WL 3625711, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2011) 15 (quoting Inlandboatmen's Union, 279 F.3d at 1078 n. 3 (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n, 16 Loc. Unions Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962))). Here, the 17 parties entered into a written side agreement to retroactively increase the Covered 18 Employees’ pay. This supplemental agreement between the employer and union is 19 significant to the maintenance of labor peace and their overall relationship. Accordingly, 20 the Wage MOU is a collective bargaining agreement. 21 22 23 24 4 The Wage MOU further states that it “supersedes any lesser wage rate set forth in the Master 25 Agreement.” ECF No. 15-1 at 8. Further, to the extent that the Defendant did not meet the agreed-upon wage rates at any point dating back to April 8, 2021, the Wage MOU states that Defendant “will make 26 retroactive payments to Covered Employees who are entitled to additional wages as clarified in this MOU.” 27 1 Plaintiff, however, disputes whether the parties can retroactively bring their 2 agreement within the coverage of Labor Code § 2699.6’s exemption. Plaintiff, relying on 3 the plain text of the statute, argues that the Wage MOU was not “in effect” when the 4 Covered Employees “performed work” during the relevant time. ECF No. 24 at 5. For 5 instance, Plaintiff performed work from July 2023 to April 2024, FAC ¶ 15, and the 6 Wage MOU was not entered into until December 16, 2024, ECF No. 15-1 at 8. Thus, 7 Plaintiff asserts that the CBA in effect at the time the work was performed did not meet 8 Labor Code § 2699.6’s requirements. ECF No. 24 at 5. Plaintiff further argues that he 9 did not “receive” the required pay rate during the relevant period; rather, he was paid less 10 than 130% of the state minimum wage. Id. at 5-6.5 11 But Plaintiff misunderstands the effect of the retroactive agreement at issue. To 12 the extent Plaintiff lodges an argument that the Wage MOU is an invalid or “illusory” 13 attempt to increase the wage rate and bring the Covered Employees within Labor Code § 14 2699.6, he is incorrect. “Employers and unions . . . can enter into a valid CBA that 15 retroactively covers the bargaining period.” Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., 146 F. 16 Supp. 3d 1187, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases). Thus, if “the CBA provides for 17 retroactive effect of the CBA,” it can cover a plaintiff’s employment period, even if it 18 was entered into after the employment ended. O'Conner v. Hilton Hawaiian Village, 763 19 F. Supp. 1544, 1548 (D. Haw. 1990) (because the relevant CBA “provide[d] for 20 retroactive effect,” it “cover[ed] the time in which O'Conner worked at Hilton”); see also 21

22 5 Plaintiff further argues that he did not “receive” the required pay rate during the relevant period; rather, 23 he was paid less than 130% of the state minimum wage. ECF No. 24 at 5-6. To make this point, 24 Plaintiff attaches his wage statement for the pay period of July 31, 2023 through August 6, 2023. See ECF No. 24-2. Plaintiff does not request judicial notice of this wage statement, and in fact asserts that 25 the paystub would not be proper to consider in deciding Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because it is outside the four corners of the Complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s 26 argument and proffered wage statement are not relevant or necessary to the disposition of the issues presented, and thus will not consider them in making this decision. 27 1 Univ. of Haw. Pro. Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) 2 (accepting retroactive application of CBA where the CBA explicitly stated that it was 3 retroactive); see also Gutierrez v. Anning-Johnson Co., 2023 WL 3852675, at *12 (C.D. 4 Cal. June 6, 2023) (“an arbitration agreement may be applied retroactively to transactions 5 which occurred prior to execution of the arbitration agreement”) (quoting Franco v. 6 Greystone Ridge Condominium, 39 Cal. App. 5th 221, 230 (2019)) (cleaned up). 7 The court’s decision in Hall is instructive here. There, the court dealt with a CBA 8 that was negotiated after the plaintiff’s employment ended, but which stated that it 9 applied retroactively to cover the plaintiff’s employment period. 146 F. Supp. 3d at 10 1199. The court ultimately held “that the 2015 CBA applied retroactively and governed 11 plaintiff’s employment.” Here, the Wage MOU explicitly states that its effective date is 12 April 8, 2021, and that “UMEC and District Council 16 expressly agree that this MOU is 13 retroactive to the Effective Date.” ECF No. 15-1 at 8. Because the CBA provides for 14 such retroactive effect, it effectively governs Plaintiff’s employment during the relevant 15 period. Hall, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1199; see also Shanley v. Tracy Logistics LLC, --- F. 16 Supp. 3d ----, 2024 WL 4647638, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2024) (“Defendants’ 17 submission of a signed collective bargaining agreement with an effective starting date of 18 June 1, 2021, is sufficient to meet their burden of showing that Plaintiff was covered by a 19 qualifying collective bargaining agreement”). 20 Both parties refer to Oswald v. Murray Plumbing & Heating Corp., a California 21 Court of Appeal case involving an MOU that retroactively required arbitration of PAGA 22 claims. 82 Cal. App. 5th at 944. There, the court notably held that “[a] contracting party 23 may agree to an arbitration clause that applies retroactively to a pending lawsuit, 24 affecting claims that arose while the plaintiff worked for the defendant but before the 25 arbitration clause was signed, if the clause explicitly applies to all claims relating to the 26 employment.” Id. In this sense, Oswald supports Defendant’s argument. But Plaintiff 27 1 notes that the court later stated, “We concluded that the original arbitration provisions 2 satisfied section 2699.6 and barred Oswald’s suit. The clear terms of the MOU, modeled 3 on the language of section 2699.6, reinforce our conclusion.” Id. at 945. Plaintiff 4 essentially contends that this statement cabined Oswald’s holding, and that the instant 5 case is distinguishable because the original CBA does not satisfy § 2699.6. But the court 6 only made this concluding statement to note its original conclusion, as the retroactive 7 MOU at issue was only brought to its attention on the eve of oral argument. See id. The 8 court’s concluding statement in Oswald thus does not change its holding that the 9 retroactive MOU was valid and applicable. Oswald thus further supports Defendant’s 10 argument that the Wage MOU at issue here applies retroactively to the PAGA period. 11 The Court finds that the CBA at issue provides “for the employee to receive a 12 regular hourly pay rate of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage 13 rate.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.6(a). The CBA meets all the requirements of the § 2699.6 14 exemption. Accordingly, § 2699.6 does not apply to Plaintiff, and his right to recover 15 exists solely as a result of the CBA. LMRA § 301 therefore preempts Plaintiff’s PAGA 16 claim. 17 III. Conclusion 18 Because Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is preempted by LMRA § 301, the Court has 19 subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint. See Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (“a civil 20 complaint raising claims preempted by § 301 raises a federal question that can be 21 removed to a federal court”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED. 22 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 23 Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the same grounds on which it 24 opposed Plaintiff’s motion to remand. See ECF No. 15. Specifically, Defendant argues 25 that because the Labor Code § 2699.6 exemption applies, Plaintiff’s claim is precluded, 26 and instead must be arbitrated. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff argues that judgment on the 27 1 pleadings is an improper vehicle for compelling arbitration and asks the Court to instead 2 stay proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. ECF No. 24 at 4. 3 I. Legal Standard 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) allows parties to move 5 for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to 6 delay trial[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard for determining a Rule 12(c) motion 7 for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 8 dismiss. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053 & n.4 9 (9th Cir. 2011). On a Rule 12(c) motion, “the allegations of the non-moving party must 10 be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are 11 assumed to be false.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 12 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party 13 clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be 14 resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. A court must not 15 consider matters beyond the pleadings as such a proceeding must be treated as a motion 16 for summary judgment. Id. “However, a court may consider facts that are contained in 17 materials of which the court may take judicial notice when considering a motion 18 for judgment on the pleadings.” Crosby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 19 1345 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 20 n. 18 (9th Cir.1999)).6 21 II. Discussion 22 Once a state law claim has been found to be preempted under § 301, “that claim 23 must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor- 24 25 6 Plaintiff argues briefly that the Court’s decision will go “beyond the pleadings” to resolve the motion 26 for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 24 at 9. However, because the Court has properly taken judicial notice of the additional documents it is considering, Plaintiff’s argument fails. 27 1 contract law.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2 2016) (quoting Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)). An employee 3 can maintain a preempted claim “if she can demonstrate that her remedies under the . . . 4 CBA were exhausted . . . or that her union breached its duty of fair representation in 5 failing to do so.” Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1036; see also id. at 1034. 6 Here, Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is preempted under § 301. Thus, the claim is 7 precluded, and instead, the parties have an agreement to arbitrate violations that would 8 typically arise under PAGA. See ECF No. 15-1 at 8. The PAGA MOU states that “the 9 Parties hereby expressly and unambiguously waive the provisions of the California 10 Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).” Id. Further, the PAGA MOU states that 11 violations that would be redressable under PAGA “shall be resolved exclusively through 12 the Grievance-Arbitration procedure contained in this Memorandum . . . and shall not be 13 brought in a court of law[.]” Id. These provisions clearly constitute a waiver of any 14 PAGA claims and an agreement to arbitrate the violations Plaintiff complains of here. 15 However, as to the underlying violations, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he exhausted 16 his remedies under the CBA, nor does he argue that the union breached its duty of fair 17 representation in failing to pursue his arbitrable claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is subject 18 to dismissal as preempted by federal labor-contract law. See Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1034. 19 Notwithstanding the preclusion of the PAGA claim, Plaintiff asks the Court to stay 20 the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration rather than grant judgment on the 21 pleadings. See ECF No. 24 at 4. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites Smith v. 22 Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 (2024). There, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a district 23 court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay 24 pending arbitration, § 3 of the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)] compels the court to 25 stay the proceeding.” Id. at 478. In such situations, “the court does not have discretion to 26 dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” Id. at 475-76. 27 1 But Smith does not apply here, where the Plaintiff’s sole claim has been waived 2 and is entirely precluded under the CBA. The court’s decision in Walton v. C. Overaa & 3 Co., 2024 WL 4495809 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2024), which was decided after Smith, is 4 instructive here. There, the plaintiff brought a number of wage-and-hour claims, along 5 with a separate PAGA claim. Walton, 2024 WL 4495809, at *1. The court first found 6 that the applicable CBA governed all of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at *4. Separately, the 7 court found that the CBA also contained a valid PAGA waiver under Labor Code § 8 2699.6, “which bars the plaintiff’s PAGA claim.” Id. Because the plaintiff’s PAGA 9 claim was barred, the court “grant[ed] the motion for judgment on the PAGA claim.” Id. 10 The court then compelled arbitration of the remaining wage-and-hour claims and stayed 11 the case pending arbitration of the remaining claims, pursuant to Smith. Id. 12 Similarly, here, the Court is faced with a PAGA claim which is expressly waived 13 and barred by the applicable CBA. Because the PAGA claim is precluded, Plaintiff 14 plainly fails to state any claim for relief. And, unlike in Walton, there are no remaining 15 wage-and-hour claims that are subject to arbitration and which the Court should stay. 16 Because the sole claim is barred, and there are no remaining claims subject to arbitration, 17 a stay is not warranted here. See Allmaras I, 2024 WL 4860804, at *9-12 (dismissing 18 claim that was preempted under § 301 while ordering arbitration of the remaining claims 19 that were not preempted under § 301). Accordingly, Defendant has “establishe[d] on the 20 face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is 21 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550. 22 III. Conclusion 23 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 24 pleadings. 25 26 27 1 CONCLUSION 2 The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand, ECF No. 11, and GRANTS 3 || Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, ECF No. 15. ’ 4 || The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: February 11, 2025 < (Qraaho Cx LE 8 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 9 United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 7 While Plaintiff does not request leave to amend, the Court notes that it has “discretion to grant Rule 23 12(c) motions with leave to amend. This is particularly true where any amendment would be futile.” 94 || Crosby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Here, Plaintiffs claim is barred by the CBA, and thus “any attempt to allege additional facts would be futile.” Gray v. 25 || Marathon Petrol. Logistics Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 129144, at *6 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (denying leave to amend where alleging additional facts would be futile because the claims were statutorily barred 26 || under the CBA’s language and preempted by the LMRA). Thus, the Court will not provide Plaintiff leave to amend. 27 18 28 24-cv-02021-GPC-SBC