[18]*18Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,1 provides that “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” The questions presented in this case are: (1) Does the scope of “contracts” within § 301 (a) include the agreement at bar, claimed to be not a “collective bargaining contract” but a “strike settlement agreement”? (2) If otherwise includible, is the “strike settlement agreement” cognizable under § 301 (a), although the petitioners, the labor-organization parties to the agreement, acknowledged that they were not entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives of the employees of the respondents?
The opinions below appear to rest upon alternative holdings, answering in the negative each of these questions. The District Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, 179 F. Supp. 564, was affirmed in a brief per curiam by the Court of Appeals, saying: “The contract here involved is not a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization representing its employees. We think that the trial court was correct in reaching the conclusion that collective bargaining contracts between a union and an employer are the only contracts intended to be actionable in a United States District Court under the provisions of section 301 (a).” 286 F. 2d 235. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions to the enforce[19]*19ment of the national labor policy as expressed in § 301 (a). 366 U. S. 917. We hold that the lower courts erred and remand the cause for trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
The petitioners, local unions of the Retail Clerks International Association, brought this action on the sole jurisdictional basis of § 301 (a) and (b), seeking to compel respondents’ compliance with two allegedly binding arbitration awards. Respondents are two department stores in Toledo, Ohio, covered by the Labor Management Relations Act. For some years prior to 1967, petitioners had been the collective bargaining representatives of respondents’ employees and had been parties to collective bargaining agreements with respondents. In November 1957, negotiations for renewal contracts ended in impasse. A strike ensued against one of the respondents, Lasalle’s, and continued until December 24, 1958; the dispute with the other respondent, Lion Dry Goods, continued during the whole of those 13 months although no strike occurred. On December 24, 1958, the parties ended their dispute with the aid of the Toledo Labor-Management-Citizens’ Committee (hereinafter, L-M-C), a local mediation and arbitration body.3 Negotiations [20]*20by means of L-M-C mediation had produced a “Statement of Understanding” 4 satisfactory to all parties.
The Statement contained such key points of settlement as the unions’ acknowledgment that they were not then [21]*21entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives, and would not seek such recognition unless and until certified as so entitled in single store unit elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, and Lasalle’s agree[22]*22ment to reinstate striking employees without discrimination. Both stores also agreed to continue in effect detailed wage and hour schedules and provisions as to working conditions and other benefits, incorporated as exhibits to the Statement. All terms of employment had been in force prior to December 24,1958, except an agreement by the stores to provide and pay fully for specified insurance coverage. The stores wrote the L-M-C delivering the Statement, calling it “the basis on which the heretofore existing dispute between [the Locals] and our compan [ies] is to be fully and finally resolved,” and specifying that “The conditions to be performed and met by us are, of course, subject to and conditioned upon the receipt by your organization of guarantees from the respective [23]*23labor organizations to make the principles enumerated [in the Statement] completely effective.” A few days later the Locals wrote the L-M-C that “we herewith agree to the conditions and guarantees of the Statement of Understanding.” The conditions to be performed by each side were performed and the dispute was terminated. In a few months, however, new grievances arose, including the two that generated this case. First. The unions claimed under the Statement the right of access to the employees’ cafeteria in order to communicate with employees during their non-working time. The stores claimed that Statement ¶ 6 gave no right of access to the employees’ cafeterias, for those are not “areas of the store which are open to customers.” 5 Second. Two Lasalle’s employees, salesladies in the men’s furnishings department, had been fully reinstated except that the saleslady formerly assigned to sell men’s shirts was assigned to sell men’s sweaters, and the other saleslady, who had been selling sweaters, now was assigned to sell shirts. The Locals submitted these matters to the L-M-C under the procedure of Statement ¶ 7; the stores and the Locals participated fully in the ensuing arbitration proceedings; and the award went to the Locals on both grievances. The stores’ refusal to accede to those awards prompted this suit.
The District Court viewed as crucial the question whether the Statement given by the stores to the L-M-C and then concurred in by the Locals, constituted “such a contract as is contemplated by Section 301 (a).” 179 F. Supp., at 567. Although the opinion is somewhat ambiguous, we read it as holding that there was a contract between the Locals and the stores but that only certain kinds of contracts are within the purview of § 301 (a) and [24]*24this was not one of them.6 We interpret the District Court as holding that to be within § 301 (a), contracts must be “collective bargaining contracts, or agreements arrived at through collective bargaining,” ibid.; and fur[25]*25ther, must be with a union that is the recognized majority representative of the employees. The court found that the Statement of Understanding met neither test.7 The Court of Appeals’ brief affirmance, supra, fails to make clear whether it agreed with both of those limitations on §301 (a), or with only one and if so which one.
It is argued that Congress limited § 301 (a) jurisdiction to contracts that are “collective bargaining contracts,” meaning, so runs the argument, only agreements concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment concluded in direct negotiations between employers and unions entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives of employees.
The words of § 301 (a) require no such narrow construction as is suggested; rather, they negate it. First. The Section says “contracts” though Congress knew well the phrase “collective bargaining contracts,” see, e. g., § 8 (d), § 9 (a), § 201 (c), § 203 (d), § 204 (a)(2), § 211 (a).
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[18]*18Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,1 provides that “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” The questions presented in this case are: (1) Does the scope of “contracts” within § 301 (a) include the agreement at bar, claimed to be not a “collective bargaining contract” but a “strike settlement agreement”? (2) If otherwise includible, is the “strike settlement agreement” cognizable under § 301 (a), although the petitioners, the labor-organization parties to the agreement, acknowledged that they were not entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives of the employees of the respondents?
The opinions below appear to rest upon alternative holdings, answering in the negative each of these questions. The District Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, 179 F. Supp. 564, was affirmed in a brief per curiam by the Court of Appeals, saying: “The contract here involved is not a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization representing its employees. We think that the trial court was correct in reaching the conclusion that collective bargaining contracts between a union and an employer are the only contracts intended to be actionable in a United States District Court under the provisions of section 301 (a).” 286 F. 2d 235. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions to the enforce[19]*19ment of the national labor policy as expressed in § 301 (a). 366 U. S. 917. We hold that the lower courts erred and remand the cause for trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
The petitioners, local unions of the Retail Clerks International Association, brought this action on the sole jurisdictional basis of § 301 (a) and (b), seeking to compel respondents’ compliance with two allegedly binding arbitration awards. Respondents are two department stores in Toledo, Ohio, covered by the Labor Management Relations Act. For some years prior to 1967, petitioners had been the collective bargaining representatives of respondents’ employees and had been parties to collective bargaining agreements with respondents. In November 1957, negotiations for renewal contracts ended in impasse. A strike ensued against one of the respondents, Lasalle’s, and continued until December 24, 1958; the dispute with the other respondent, Lion Dry Goods, continued during the whole of those 13 months although no strike occurred. On December 24, 1958, the parties ended their dispute with the aid of the Toledo Labor-Management-Citizens’ Committee (hereinafter, L-M-C), a local mediation and arbitration body.3 Negotiations [20]*20by means of L-M-C mediation had produced a “Statement of Understanding” 4 satisfactory to all parties.
The Statement contained such key points of settlement as the unions’ acknowledgment that they were not then [21]*21entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives, and would not seek such recognition unless and until certified as so entitled in single store unit elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, and Lasalle’s agree[22]*22ment to reinstate striking employees without discrimination. Both stores also agreed to continue in effect detailed wage and hour schedules and provisions as to working conditions and other benefits, incorporated as exhibits to the Statement. All terms of employment had been in force prior to December 24,1958, except an agreement by the stores to provide and pay fully for specified insurance coverage. The stores wrote the L-M-C delivering the Statement, calling it “the basis on which the heretofore existing dispute between [the Locals] and our compan [ies] is to be fully and finally resolved,” and specifying that “The conditions to be performed and met by us are, of course, subject to and conditioned upon the receipt by your organization of guarantees from the respective [23]*23labor organizations to make the principles enumerated [in the Statement] completely effective.” A few days later the Locals wrote the L-M-C that “we herewith agree to the conditions and guarantees of the Statement of Understanding.” The conditions to be performed by each side were performed and the dispute was terminated. In a few months, however, new grievances arose, including the two that generated this case. First. The unions claimed under the Statement the right of access to the employees’ cafeteria in order to communicate with employees during their non-working time. The stores claimed that Statement ¶ 6 gave no right of access to the employees’ cafeterias, for those are not “areas of the store which are open to customers.” 5 Second. Two Lasalle’s employees, salesladies in the men’s furnishings department, had been fully reinstated except that the saleslady formerly assigned to sell men’s shirts was assigned to sell men’s sweaters, and the other saleslady, who had been selling sweaters, now was assigned to sell shirts. The Locals submitted these matters to the L-M-C under the procedure of Statement ¶ 7; the stores and the Locals participated fully in the ensuing arbitration proceedings; and the award went to the Locals on both grievances. The stores’ refusal to accede to those awards prompted this suit.
The District Court viewed as crucial the question whether the Statement given by the stores to the L-M-C and then concurred in by the Locals, constituted “such a contract as is contemplated by Section 301 (a).” 179 F. Supp., at 567. Although the opinion is somewhat ambiguous, we read it as holding that there was a contract between the Locals and the stores but that only certain kinds of contracts are within the purview of § 301 (a) and [24]*24this was not one of them.6 We interpret the District Court as holding that to be within § 301 (a), contracts must be “collective bargaining contracts, or agreements arrived at through collective bargaining,” ibid.; and fur[25]*25ther, must be with a union that is the recognized majority representative of the employees. The court found that the Statement of Understanding met neither test.7 The Court of Appeals’ brief affirmance, supra, fails to make clear whether it agreed with both of those limitations on §301 (a), or with only one and if so which one.
It is argued that Congress limited § 301 (a) jurisdiction to contracts that are “collective bargaining contracts,” meaning, so runs the argument, only agreements concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment concluded in direct negotiations between employers and unions entitled to recognition as exclusive representatives of employees.
The words of § 301 (a) require no such narrow construction as is suggested; rather, they negate it. First. The Section says “contracts” though Congress knew well the phrase “collective bargaining contracts,” see, e. g., § 8 (d), § 9 (a), § 201 (c), § 203 (d), § 204 (a)(2), § 211 (a). Had Congress contemplated a restrictive differentiation, we may assume that it would not have eschewed “collective bargaining contracts” unwittingly. Moreover, Congress provided in § 211 (a) : “For the guidance and information of interested representatives of employers, employees, and the general public, the Bureau of Labor Statistics . . . shall maintain a file of copies of all available collective bargaining agreements and other available agreements and actions thereunder settling or adjusting labor disputes.” 8 Whatever the proper construction of that Section, insofar as it reflects upon [26]*26§ 301 (a) at all, it supports the inference that “contracts” does include more than “collective bargaining agreements,” at least as respondents would define them. Second. If “contracts” means only collective bargaining contracts, the subsequent words “or between any such labor organizations” are superfluous, for if there is a collective bargaining agreement between unions it follows that as to that agreement, one union is the employer and the other represents employees. See Office Employes Union v. Labor Board, 353 U. S. 313. Congress was not indulging in surplusage: A federal forum was provided for actions on other labor contracts besides collective bargaining contracts. See, e. g., United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F. 2d 743 (no-raiding agreement). But, it is urged, though Congress meant that labor organizations could sue one another in federal courts on other contracts between themselves, suits between employers and unions were still limited to actions on collective bargaining contracts: The provision for suits between labor organizations was inserted in Conference.9 Differing House and Senate bills were reconciled in Conference. The House bill spoke of suits involving a violation of “an agreement between an employer and a labor organization or other representative of employees . . . .” The Senate bill read “contracts concluded as the result of collective bargaining between an employer and a labor organization . . . .”10 It is urged that the Conference compromise upon the word “contracts” reflects a desire to use one word to cover both suits between employers and unions, and suits between unions. But it seems obvious that had Congress intended any limiting differentiation, this would have been accomplished by retaining the Senate bill’s phrasing for agreements between employers and [27]*27unions and then providing specifically for the application of the statute to “contracts between any such labor organizations.” Third. A 1959 enactment, § 8 (f),11 explicitly contemplates contracts that would not fit respondents’ concept of “collective bargaining agreements.” It authorizes contracting with unions that represent persons not yet even hired by the employer. Such a contract might cover only hiring procedures and not wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Nothing supports the improbable congressional intent that the federal courts be closed to such contracts.
We find, then, from a reading of the words of § 301 (a), both in isolation and in connection with the statute as a whole, no basis for denying jurisdiction of the action based upon the alleged violation of the “strike settlement agreement.”
Furthermore, the statute’s purpose would be defeated by excluding such contracts from “contracts” cognizable under § 301 (a). See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502. If this kind of strike settlement were not enforceable under § 301 (a), responsible and stable labor relations would suffer, and the attainment of the labor policy objective of minimizing disruption of interstate commerce would be made more difficult. It is no answer that in a particular case the agreement might be enforceable in state courts: a main goal of § 301 was precisely to end “checkerboard jurisdiction,” Seymour v. Schneckloth, 368 U. S. 351, at 358. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra.
Lastly, legislative history refutes the argument that Congress intended to omit agreements of the kind in suit from “contracts” falling within the purview of § 301 (a).12
[28]*28We need not decide whether or not this strike settlement agreement is a “collective bargaining agreement” to hold, as we do, that it is a “contract” for purposes of § 301 (a). “Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined from the connection in which it appears.” J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332, 334, It is enough that this is clearly an agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them. It came into being as a means satisfactory to both sides for terminating a protracted strike and labor dispute. Its terms affect the working conditions of the employees of both respondents. It effected the end of picketing and resort by the labor organizations to other economic weapons, and restored strikers to their jobs. It resolved a controversy arising out of, and importantly and directly affecting, the employment relationship. Plainly it falls within § 301 (a). “[Fjederal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and . . . industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 455.
Only a few words are necessary to dispose of respondents’ second contention, that even if this agreement were otherwise within § 301 (a), petitioners’ disclaimer of entitlement to recognition as exclusive representatives puts them out of court. This issue does not touch upon whether minority unions may demand that employers enter into particular kinds of contracts or the circumstances under which employers may accord recognition to [29]*29unions as exclusive bargaining agents. The question is only whether “labor organization representing employees” in § 301 (a) has a meaning different from “labor organization which represents employees” in § 301 (b). In United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S. 299, we rejected the argument that § 301 (b) was limited to majority representatives. Neither the words, purpose, nor history of the statute suggests any reason for a different construction of the virtually identical words of subsection (a). Nor can “labor organization representing employees” in § 301 (a) be read as differing from “any such labor organizations” in that subsection’s very next phrase, and plainly, in suits between labor organizations, their right to recognition as exclusive representatives vis-a-vis employers has no relevance whatever.
“Members only” contracts have long been recognized. See, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197. Had Congress thought that there was any merit in limiting federal jurisdiction to suits on contracts with exclusive bargaining agents, we might have expected Congress explicitly so to provide, for example, by enacting that § 301 (a) should be read with § 9 (a). Compare §8 (a)(3), §8 (a)(5), §8 (b)(3), §8 (b)(4), §8(d). Moreover, § 8 (f), the 1959 amendment considered supra, p. 27, contemplates contracting with unions that would not represent a majority. Lastly, if the federal courts’ jurisdiction under § 301 (a) required a preliminary determination of the representative status of the labor organization involved, potential conflict with the National Labor Relations Board would be increased, cf. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 18; Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F. 2d 183, and litigation would be much hindered.
We conclude that the petitioners’ action for alleged violation of the strike settlement agreement was cog[30]*30nizable by the District Court under §301 (a). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.