OPINION
Opinion By
Justice FITZGERALD.
Dana Michelle Aldrich appeals her convictions for impersonating a public servant. Appellant pleaded guilty to the indictments and true to the enhancement allegations without an agreement as to punishment. The trial court accepted her pleas of guilty and true and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. Appellant brings two issues on appeal asserting: (1) “the court abused its discretion (unknowingly) in not rejecting appellant’s plea of guilty” (appellant’s parentheses); and (2) she did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We resolve appellant’s issues against her and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
[464]*464BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged in two indictments on separate incidents of impersonating a public servant. In cause number 05-00-00109-CR, the indictment alleged that appellant impersonated a police officer “by demanding Arlene Galvan open the door so that [appellant] could arrest said occupants.” In cause number 05-00-00110-CR, the indictment alleged that appellant impersonated a police officer by “demanding Cole Gillean to turn around and be arrested.” Each indictment contained a second paragraph alleging a prior conviction for burglary of a habitation.
At a hearing on December 15, 1999, after being admonished by the trial court,1 appellant entered guilty pleas to both indictments and pleas of true to the enhancement allegations. The trial court admitted into evidence without objection documents entitled “Waiver of Jury, Felony Plea of Guilty/Nolo Contendere/Indictment/Information” containing confessions in which appellant stated: “I do further admit and judicially confess that I am the person named in the charging instrument and that I understand the charge contained therein and I am GUILTY of the offense of impersonating an officer exactly as alleged in the charging instrument ... and I confess that I did unlawfully commit the said offense in Dallas County, Texas on the 30th day of Oct., 1999.”
The evidence of the underlying facts of the offenses presented at the plea hearing included the confessions incorporating the indictments and the following dialogue between appellant and the trial court:
The Court: What the police and the prosecutor claim happened is that you went over to a motel in Mesquite and claimed to be a police officer so the clerk would let you in to one of the rooms, and that’s true; is that correct?
[Appellant]: Yes, sir. I had already been in the room.
The Court: Right. But you wanted to get back in the room and you thought if you claimed to be a police officer they’d let you back in the room without asking a bunch of questions?
[Appellant]: Yes, sir.
The trial court, after being personally assured three times by appellant that no one forced her, threatened her, or promised her anything to get her to plead guilty, accepted appellant’s pleas of guilty and true in each case. Following the introduction of the State’s evidence, the trial court stated “I’ll find all that is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I’ll find the evidence sufficient to find you guilty, find the enhancement paragraph is true. I will set sentencing” for January 6, 2000.
The punishment hearing took place on January 6, 2000 before a different judge.2 Appellant testified at the hearing she wanted to plead guilty and did not want to contest her guilt before either a jury or a judge. Appellant wanted the trial court to assess punishment. She acknowledged that she could receive up to twenty years’ imprisonment, but she requested probation so she could help her ailing grandmother. After appellant testified that she could live up to the terms of probation, her attorney asked her if she had anything else she [465]*465wanted to say to the trial court. Appellant responded as follows:
[Appellant]: Well, to everything that happened that day that I said I was a peace officer, I am guilty of saying that. I did say that I was a peace officer but I did not have a badge, no gun, no uniform, nor did I tell them at any time to turn around and place their hands behind their back. From reading the indictment, that’s what it said. I did not say that.
I went to the manager’s office and told her to call the police because they wanted to do something else which I didn’t want to do. So when she called the police, I had left from the motel and they arrested me at a different place that I was visiting some friends at.
So when the police officer[s] arrested me, I asked what I was being arrested for, and they said impersonating a peace officer. And I tried to explain to them the day they arrested me that I didn’t do it just to be getting anything out of it. I did it to save myself because the guys were trying to rape me.
So, that’s about all I have to say. And I guess the manager had misunderstood me because I talk fast when I get scared. I talk fast, anyway. So when I get scared, I even talk faster. So when I was trying to explain it to her, I took her out in the parking lot of the motel and pointed out the room where the guys were standing the day everything happened.
The Court: You’ve already pled guilty. I can’t find you not guilty.
[Appellant]: No, I’m guilty of saying it.
The Court: I’m just trying to decide what I should do to you.
[Appellant]: I’m guilty of saying it.
Appellant testified about her criminal history, which showed she originally received deferred adjudication with five years’ probation on the burglary charge. Appellant stated she violated her probation within a year by committing credit card abuse and evading arrest, for which she was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and served eighteen months in the penitentiary.
Appellant also presented the testimony of her employer, Harold Helm, who supervised appellant’s training as a boxer in his amateur program. In response to the trial court’s questions, Helm testified to what appellant had told him about how the incidents occurred:
The Court: You understand what she pled guilty to was impersonating a police officer?
[Helm]: Yes. When I asked her why she did that—
The Court: Yeah.
[Helm]: — she told me about what she tried to explain to you. I think she had some communication skill problems in communicating. But she told me that some guys were trying to do something she didn’t want done.
I asked her, “Why did you do this? My gosh.” And she explained that to me. And I said, well, it sounded like something she did out of necessity, you know, on the thing.
But she went ahead and pled the way she did so she understands how the laws work and she didn’t have a trial, but she did tell me that or related that. And I said, “you shouldn’t get yourself in those situations no more.” She thought she was doing the right thing at that time.
The Court: Did she tell you why she was at that motel?
[466]*466[Helm]: They were supposed to have a party there. She was invited to a party. She found out she was the only party. She asked where the other girls were. They weren’t there so she just wanted to go. They wouldn’t let her go. That’s when she said that. Then she went down and asked the manager to call the police and she took her outside and pointed out the room. That’s what she explained to me. And I said, “Oh, my gosh almighty, what a mess you got into.”
After the parties rested in the punishment phase, the State requested that the trial court sentence appellant to the penitentiary, and appellant requested probation. After considering her criminal history, the trial court stated she would be sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Appellant protested that her family depended on her being able to help them, and she told the court, “I promise to fulfill anything that I need to, but I don’t deserve to go back to TDC because I just said those words.” The trial court told her, “Well, your credibility is just not very good, you know, when you go around telling people you’re a police officer and you are not.” Appellant again protested her sentence saying, “Sir, I didn’t know what else to say, sir, at the time.”
On appeal, appellant asserts that her statements at the punishment hearing and Helm’s testimony of her explanation to him raised the defense of necessity. In her two issues, appellant asserts the trial court or her counsel should have acted in response to the raising of this defense.
APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEAS
The Arlene Galvan Indictment in Cause No. 05-00-00109-CR
The indictment alleges appellant demanded “Arlene Galvan open the door so that [appellant] could arrest said occupants.” Thus, the indictment alleges appellant sought Galvan’s assistance to enter the room. However, appellant’s purported “necessity defense” sought to prove she was seeking to escape from people in a room. Thus, appellant’s evidence in support of her purported “necessity defense” is not conceivably consistent with or related to the allegations in this indictment and does not make “evident the innocence of the accused or ... reasonably and fairly raise[ ] an issue as to such fact.” Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). This Court concludes appellant’s contention regarding her purported “necessity defense” does not apply in cause number 05-00-00109-CR. We conclude appellant’s points of error are inapplicable to her conviction in cause number 05-00-00109-CR and affirm this conviction.
The Cole Gillean Indictment in Cause No. 05-00-00110-CR
In her first issue, appellant contends: “The court (unknowingly) abused its discretion in not rejecting appellant’s plea of guilty” (appellant’s parentheses). Appellant asserts the trial court should have either found her not guilty or set aside her plea of guilty based on her evidence that “she impersonated a police officer to extricate herself from a sexual assault situation,” which raised the necessity defense.
Appellant cites Payne v. State, 790 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), for the proposition that the trial court erred in not withdrawing appellant’s guilty plea. In Payne, the defendant introduced evidence of his innocence and timely requested that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.3 See id. at 651. This Court [467]*467held the trial court erred in not permitting the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, but we held the error was harmless based on two opinions from the court of criminal appeals. See id. The court of criminal appeals distinguished the cases we cited from the facts of the case then before us, held the error in not permitting the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea was not harmless, and reversed our decision. See id. at 652.
Payne is distinguishable because the defendant in that case timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea, while in this case appellant never moved to withdraw her pleas and only now argues that the trial court erred by not sua sponte rejecting her pleas. Further, the defendant in Payne presented evidence of his innocence “[p]ri- or to the close of evidence,” while appellant presented the evidence she asserts raises the necessity defense after the trial court had entered findings of guilt in each case, found the enhancement paragraphs' true, and passed the cases for sentencing. See id. (discussing Wilson v. State, 515 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), a case “procedurally identical” to Payne). Contrary to appellant’s assertion, Payne does not hold that a trial court abuses its discretion by not setting aside a defendant’s guilty plea when, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court admits new evidence raising a “defense.”
Appellant acknowledges the rule applicable in this case is expressed in Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). The trial court is not required to withdraw a defendant’s plea of guilty sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty when a defendant enters a plea of guilty before the trial court after waiving a jury, even if evidence is presented that either makes the defendant’s innocence evident or reasonably and fairly raises an issue as to his guilt. See id. at 682. The Moon decision reasoned that it is the trial court’s duty to consider the evidence submitted and, as the trier of facts, the court may find the defendant guilty of the crime charged or a lesser offense or it may acquit the defendant. Thus, no valid purpose would be served to require a trial court to withdraw a guilty plea. See Moon, 572 S.W.2d at 682; Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd); Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.).
Necessity is a statutory defense of justification. The defense of necessity is available for criminal conduct only if (1) the defendant reasonably believes his conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; (2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweighs the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise appear. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 9.22 (Vernon 1994).
The rationale of this defense is that “even though he has done the act the crime requires and has the mental state [468]*468which the crime requires, his conduct which violates the literal language of the criminal law is justified because he has thereby avoided a harm of greater magnitude.” Arnwine v. State, 20 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (quoting Alford v. State, 866 S.W.2d 619, 624 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)). The defendant must establish he reasonably believed his conduct was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm. See Maldonado v. State, 902 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.).
To raise the defense of necessity, a defendant must admit violating the statute under which he is charged. Only if the defendant admits committing the offense may he offer necessity as a justification. See Young v. State, 991 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Darty v. State, 994 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). In McGanty v. State, 5 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex.App.—San Antonio1999, no pet.), the indictment charged the defendant with the improper conduct of “striking Woodard with the hand of defendant,” but the defendant never admitted to hitting Woodard in the face. Because the defendant failed to admit to the offense, the evidence failed to raise the defense of necessity. The court emphasized that “one cannot establish that an act is justified without first identifying, or admitting to the commission of the act.” McGarity, 5 S.W.3d at 227; see also Shugart v. State, 32 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref'd) (“in order to warrant a plea of justification based on necessity, the defendant must specifically admit to the offense”).
In this case, although appellant admitted saying she was a peace officer, she denied having a badge, gun, or uniform or telling “them at any time to turn around and place their hands behind their back.” However, the indictment did not allege that appellant told the men she was a peace officer; it alleged she committed the offense of impersonating a peace officer by demanding Cole Gillean “to turn around and be arrested.” By denying she told the men “to turn around and place their hands behind their back,” appellant denied the allegations of the indictment. Therefore, because appellant’s testimony not only does not admit, but specifically denies, committing the offense as alleged in the indictment, she did not raise the defense of necessity. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not rejecting appellant’s pleas of guilty.4
The record also shows that at all times during the proceedings, appellant persisted in her plea of guilty, even after her brief statement to the trial court, urging only that the trial court grant her leniency by placing her on community supervision. Appellant did not request permission to change or withdraw her plea of guilty, move the court to find her not guilty, suggest she should be convicted of a lesser included offense, or lodge any objection whatever to the proceedings. Appellant expressly encouraged the trial court to proceed with a finding of guilt. Throughout the entire proceedings, appellant urged the trial court to proceed with a finding of guilt and grant community supervision in both cases. We are not inclined to permit appellant to benefit from inviting the trial court to take the very actions complained of on this appeal. See [469]*469Capistran v. State, 759 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.CrimApp.1982) (op. on reh’g). Under these circumstances, we find appellant waived error, if any. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Williams v. State, 10 S.W.3d 788, 789 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref'd).
Accordingly, we resolve appellant’s first issue against her.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In her second issue, appellant contends she did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed under both the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established an authoritative federal constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel and for ascertaining when such ineffectiveness is prejudicial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted the Strickland standard for judging claims under the Texas Constitution. See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
The Strickland-Hernandez standard establishes a two-part test to be used in considering ineffectiveness claims. First, an appellant must show that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the reasonably effective counsel guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. Second, an appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 55. The alleged deficiencies of counsel must be supported by the record. Johnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 626-27 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). This standard applies at both the guilt and punishment phases of trial. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
We are given further aid in judging the first prong of the Strickland-Hernandez test:
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 55. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential; a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Thus, an appellant faces the onerous burden of overcoming a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Small v. State, 692 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd).
We do not inquire into defense counsel’s trial strategy unless no possible basis exists in strategy or tactics for trial counsel’s actions. See Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). When the record contains no [470]*470evidence of the reasoning behind trial counsel’s actions, we cannot conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). A silent record does not require an appellate court to speculate on the reason for trial counsel’s decisions. See id. at 771. Our speculation on the reasons for trial counsel’s actions is “not material.” Id. Without trial counsel’s explanation of the reasons for the action or inaction alleged as error, an appellant will have difficulty overcoming the strong presumption that counsel’s decisions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). With these standards in mind, we examine the acts and omissions that appellant alleges were not the result of reasonable professional judgment.
Appellant argues that her counsel was ineffective because “she failed to put on the record any indication that she had advised the Appellant that she (the appellant) enjoyed the defense of necessity and was consciously waiving it. Nor did defense counsel indicate that she (defense counsel) knew that necessity was available to appellant as a defense” (appellant’s parentheses). Appellant’s argument is contrary to the burden of showing that counsel was ineffective. The standard of review requires the record to show: (1) counsel’s advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) but for counsel’s errors, appellant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Flores v. State, 18 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex.App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the record must affirmatively show that counsel was ineffective. Appellant’s argument is that the record fails to show counsel was effective. Counsel had no duty to present evidence of all the possible defenses appellant could have asserted or to present evidence of an affirmative waiver by appellant of those defenses. In addition, we reject appellant’s argument based upon our resolution of her first issue.
Appellant also asserts counsel was ineffective because she “failed to advise the court that appellant had not previously been found guilty.” Appellant does not explain why such advice was necessary or how the failure to give that advice affected the outcome of the case. If appellant means that she had the right to withdraw her plea because the trial court had not found her guilty, then appellant is incorrect. As we stated in Scott, “There is no requirement that there be a finding of guilt before a case is considered to have been taken under advisement.” Scott v. State, 860 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.). As soon as the cases were “under advisement,” appellant had no right to withdraw her plea. Appellant has not shown her counsel was ineffective.
Appellant states in her brief under this issue, “Indeed, the record shows gives [sic] no indication that the plea is voluntary. It does not show that appellant knew she had the defense of necessity and consciously waived such defense, although it affirmatively shows that factually she believed that she did what she did out of necessity.” Appellant’s argument that the record does not show she knew of and consciously waived an applicable defense does not properly assert that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered her plea involuntary.5
[471]*471 Furthermore, nothing in the record shows appellant was not fully advised by her counsel of all potential defenses, including necessity, and that appellant still chose to plead guilty. Nor does the record show that appellant’s decision to plead guilty was based on the advice of her counsel. Appellant never complained during the hearings about being found guilty; her only complaint was to the trial court’s conclusion that she was not a worthy candidate for community supervision and that she should be sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Appellant was admonished orally and in writing about the consequences of her plea. Appellant’s receipt of the statutory admonishments is prima facie proof that her plea was voluntary. See Cantu v. State, 988 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). The fact that a properly admonished defendant receives penitentiary time instead of community supervision does not render a guilty plea involuntary. See Malley v. State, 9 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref'd). We conclude appellant has not shown she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. We resolve appellant’s second issue against her.
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
RICHTER, J. dissenting