Miracle, Ryan Scott v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 5, 2012
Docket05-11-00978-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Miracle, Ryan Scott v. State (Miracle, Ryan Scott v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miracle, Ryan Scott v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed November 5, 2012.

In The nizrt rif i\ppeati Fifth Jitrirt nf Jixai tt attw5 No. 05-i 1-00978-CR No. 05-1 1-00979-CR No. 05-1 1-00981-CR

RYAN SCOTT MIRAC[E, Appellant ‘J.

TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appeilee

On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court Rockw all County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 2-11-85, 2-11-86, and 2-11-88

OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers

Appellant Ryan Scott Miracle, one of several accomplices, was charged with three counts

of aggravated robbery. Appellant entered an open plea of guilty in all three cases and was sentenced

by the trial court to concurrent sentences of eight years in prison in each case. In one issue on appeal

appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and

affirm.

Appellant argues that his guilty pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily because

(1) the indictments allege the use of a “BB gun” and “BB Shotgun,” which are not deadly weapons;

and (2) he only furnished the vehicle used in the robberies and “did not himself use or exhibit any weapon.” Stated differently, appellant argues that his pleas to the charges of aggravated robbery

were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he “did not use or exhibit any weapon at all

[and] the weapon used by others was not a firearm or deadly.” In a related argument, appellant also

complains that the trial court’s admonishment “failed to correctly state the law” because without the

deadly weapon findings appellant could have been found guilty of the lesser included offense of

robbery and “straight probation would have become a punishment option.”

To the extent that appellant is complaining about a substantive defect in the indictment, he

has waived this complaint by not raising it before his guilty plea. See Tux. CODE CRIM, PRoc. ANN.

art. 1.14(b) (West 2005) (“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form

or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits

commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may

not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.”); Jack v. State, 871

S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“[A] nonnegotiated guilty plea waives all

nonjurisdictional defects occurring prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).

And to the extent that appellant is complaining about the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the deadly weapon findings, we conclude that appellant’s judicial confessions are sufficient

to support the findings. The indictments alleged that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon

during commission of the aggravated robberies. Appellant pleaded guilty and judicially confessed

to committing “each and every allegation” contained in the indictments. Appellant’s judicial

confessions, alone, are sufficient to support the deadly weapon findings contained in the written

judgments. See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g) (“It

is well settled that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon

a guilty plea and to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15.” (internal citations omitted)); see also

Alexander v. State, 868 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.) (“If a defendant pleads

—2— guilty to an indictment that includes an allegation that lie used a dead! weapon, the trial court may

make a deadly weapon finding.”).

Finally, with respect to appellant’s argument that his pleas were involuntary, we note that

appellant did not complain to the trial court about the voluntariness of his guilty pleas either befbre

or after his sentencing. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, a party must first complain

to the trial court and obtain a ruling in order to preserve most complaints for appellate review. See

Tix. R. API. P. 33.1 . The court of criminal appeals and this Court have held that the rule 33. 1

requirement of preservation of error applies to complaints about the voluntariness of a guilty plea.

See Mendez v. State, 13$ S,W.3d 334, 339,350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d

460. 468-69 (Tex. App.-—Dallas 2001), aj/’d, 104 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We

conclude that appellant has not preserved his complaint about the voluntariness of his guilty pleas

for appellate review, But even if appellant had preserved this issue for appellate review, we would

resolve it against him. There is no evidence in the record that appellant’s guilty pleas were not made

knowingly and voluntarily. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court admonished

appellant as to the range of punishment for the first-degree felony of aggravated robbery, and that

appellant fully understood the proceedings, including the trial court’s admonishments and the effects

of his guilty pleas.

CONCLUSION

We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Do Not Publish TEx. R. App. P.47 1 10978F.U05 nurt nf ;pprah FiftIi Diitrirt nf ixai tt Lt11ai

JUDGMENT RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE, Appellant Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court of Rockwafl County, Texas. No. 05-i 1-00978-CR V. (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-85). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald participatmg.

Based Ofl the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMEI).

Judgment entered November 5, 2012.

1 E LIABETH LANG-MI S / JUSICE 0 niirt tif _pit1 iift1i 1i;trirt nf rxa at Ja1{a

JUDGMENT RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE. Appellant Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court of Rockwall County, Texas. No. 05- 11-00979-CR V. (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-86). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

/ I /

kfZA13ETH LANGM1E 9 ’1 JUSTTCE (!tnirt nf ijiahi fiffJi Oitrjrt nf Lcxai tt Ja1Ia JUDGMENT RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE, Appellant Appeal from the 43 9th Judicial District Court of Rockwal I County, Texas. No. 05-Il -009$ I-CR V. (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-88). Opinion delivered by .Justice Lang—Miers. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial Court IS AFFIRN’IED.

/2 1 - 1 ‘ /‘ 1 /f ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS JUS’IICL

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Related

Jack v. State
871 S.W.2d 741 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Dinnery v. State
592 S.W.2d 343 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1980)
Aldrich v. State
104 S.W.3d 890 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Alexander v. State
868 S.W.2d 356 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Aldrich v. State
53 S.W.3d 460 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)

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