ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
AKIN, Justice.
The panel opinion is withdrawn and the following is the opinion of the court sitting en banc.
Defendant appeals from his conviction for forgery. Punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, was assessed at life imprisonment. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to allow him the opportunity to elect that the jury assess punishment and that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. We hold that we must presume that the trial judge ruled correctly in denying defendant the right to have the jury assess punishment because the record is silent as to whether he filed his election to have the jury assess punishment before he pleaded to the indictment before the jury. We also hold that Tex. Code Crim.Pro. art. 40.09(7) (Vernon Supp. 1982) authorizes the judge to hold a hearing to make the record speak the truth. Accordingly, we affirm.
The record reflects that the entire trial was held on May 19, 1981. Additionally, the transcript contains a motion, file marked May 19, 1981, in which the defendant requested that the jury assess punishment. The record does not, however, show whether this request was filed before or after pleading to the indictment in open court. During jury deliberations on guilt or innocence, the trial judge made the following statement:
All right. We are about to receive the jury verdict at this time. Now, of course, if the verdict is not guilty that ends the trial; however, if there is a guilty verdict in this case, the election to go to the jury was filed on May 19, 1981. In this trial, the plea to the indictment was May 18, 1981. For it to be a jury question, with regard to the issue of punishment — if that is to be the case, it will have to be done with the permission of the State of Texas.
The State refused to agree to having the jury assess punishment and the trial court set defendant’s punishment at life imprisonment. After appeal had been perfected to this court, a hearing was held by the trial judge at the request of the State to determine whether defendant’s motion had been timely filed. The prosecutor testified that defendant’s motion was filed after both sides had rested, and the judge observed that the election was filed after the testimony had been completed. The trial judge found at the conclusion of the hearing that defendant’s motion was filed after he had pleaded to the indictment before the jury and, thus, was untimely. Accordingly, a supplemental statement of facts was filed reflecting this proceeding.
Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to assess [548]*548punishment because his motion to have the jury assess punishment was timely filed. We do not agree. The trial judge later held a hearing to determine the truth with respect to the question of whether the motion was filed after the defendant had pleaded to the indictment. This hearing showed that the motion was filed too late. Our question then is whether the judge could validly conduct such a hearing after the case had been appealed. We hold that he could.
Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 40.09(7) (Vernon 1979) provides in part:
If the trial court deems that a supplemental record or any other modification of the record be necessary to make the record speak the truth, for any reason, with or without objections from the state or the defendant, and whether on the court’s own motion or the motion of either party or by order of the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant shall be notified . . . [Emphasis added.]
By specifically providing that the record may be supplemented by order of the court of appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals, section 7 clearly contemplates that the record may be supplemented after an appeal has been filed. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held that the trial court has the jurisdiction to conduct such hearings even after an appeal has been perfected. See Schroeder v. State, 543 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Guzman v. State, 521 S.W.2d 267, 271-73 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). See also Resnick v. State, 574 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Perkins v. State, 505 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The precise question presented is whether the provisions of article 40.09(7) authorize the trial judge to “cause the record to speak the truth” only to correct an erroneous record, as the dissent would hold, or whether article 40.09(7) also authorizes the court to supply an omission where the record is silent. We hold that article 40.-09(7) permits the trial judge to hold a hearing to make the record speak the truth either where the record is incorrect as to what transpired at trial or where the record is silent as to the truth of what occurred at trial. As we read article 40.09(7), we find no language that precludes this holding or supports the narrow construction of the dissent. In view of the trial judge’s finding after this hearing that defendant’s motion though filed on May 19, was filed after the defendant pleaded to the indictment, the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s motion to have the jury assess punishment was correct, even though the judge had erroneously thought at the time of trial that the plea before the jury was on May 18,1981, rather than on May 19.
Furthermore, we do not read Tex. Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 44.11 (Vernon Supp.1982) as a limitation on the trial judge’s jurisdiction to make the record speak the truth under article 40.09(7). Instead, article 44.11 merely precludes the trial judge from changing his judgment after the appellate record has been filed in the court of appeals and does not pertain to “making the record speak the truth” as authorized under article 40.09(7). Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 44.11 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
Upon the appellate record being filed in the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals, all further proceedings in the trial court, except as to bond as provided in Article 44.04, shall be suspended and arrested until the mandate of the appellate court is received by the trial court. In cases where the record or any portion thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substituted in the trial court and when so substituted the record may be prepared and transmitted to the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals as in other cases.
Nothing in this statute precludes a hearing under article 40.09(7). To hold as the dissent would have us do, would render meaningless that part of article 40.09(7) which provides that either the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals may order a hearing to make the record speak the truth. Obviously, the appellate record has been filed before either appellate court could or[549]*549der a hearing under article 40.09(7). Thus, the dissent’s construction of these statutes fails to give effect to the clear language of article 40.09(7).
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ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
AKIN, Justice.
The panel opinion is withdrawn and the following is the opinion of the court sitting en banc.
Defendant appeals from his conviction for forgery. Punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, was assessed at life imprisonment. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to allow him the opportunity to elect that the jury assess punishment and that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. We hold that we must presume that the trial judge ruled correctly in denying defendant the right to have the jury assess punishment because the record is silent as to whether he filed his election to have the jury assess punishment before he pleaded to the indictment before the jury. We also hold that Tex. Code Crim.Pro. art. 40.09(7) (Vernon Supp. 1982) authorizes the judge to hold a hearing to make the record speak the truth. Accordingly, we affirm.
The record reflects that the entire trial was held on May 19, 1981. Additionally, the transcript contains a motion, file marked May 19, 1981, in which the defendant requested that the jury assess punishment. The record does not, however, show whether this request was filed before or after pleading to the indictment in open court. During jury deliberations on guilt or innocence, the trial judge made the following statement:
All right. We are about to receive the jury verdict at this time. Now, of course, if the verdict is not guilty that ends the trial; however, if there is a guilty verdict in this case, the election to go to the jury was filed on May 19, 1981. In this trial, the plea to the indictment was May 18, 1981. For it to be a jury question, with regard to the issue of punishment — if that is to be the case, it will have to be done with the permission of the State of Texas.
The State refused to agree to having the jury assess punishment and the trial court set defendant’s punishment at life imprisonment. After appeal had been perfected to this court, a hearing was held by the trial judge at the request of the State to determine whether defendant’s motion had been timely filed. The prosecutor testified that defendant’s motion was filed after both sides had rested, and the judge observed that the election was filed after the testimony had been completed. The trial judge found at the conclusion of the hearing that defendant’s motion was filed after he had pleaded to the indictment before the jury and, thus, was untimely. Accordingly, a supplemental statement of facts was filed reflecting this proceeding.
Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to assess [548]*548punishment because his motion to have the jury assess punishment was timely filed. We do not agree. The trial judge later held a hearing to determine the truth with respect to the question of whether the motion was filed after the defendant had pleaded to the indictment. This hearing showed that the motion was filed too late. Our question then is whether the judge could validly conduct such a hearing after the case had been appealed. We hold that he could.
Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 40.09(7) (Vernon 1979) provides in part:
If the trial court deems that a supplemental record or any other modification of the record be necessary to make the record speak the truth, for any reason, with or without objections from the state or the defendant, and whether on the court’s own motion or the motion of either party or by order of the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant shall be notified . . . [Emphasis added.]
By specifically providing that the record may be supplemented by order of the court of appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals, section 7 clearly contemplates that the record may be supplemented after an appeal has been filed. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held that the trial court has the jurisdiction to conduct such hearings even after an appeal has been perfected. See Schroeder v. State, 543 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Guzman v. State, 521 S.W.2d 267, 271-73 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). See also Resnick v. State, 574 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Perkins v. State, 505 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The precise question presented is whether the provisions of article 40.09(7) authorize the trial judge to “cause the record to speak the truth” only to correct an erroneous record, as the dissent would hold, or whether article 40.09(7) also authorizes the court to supply an omission where the record is silent. We hold that article 40.-09(7) permits the trial judge to hold a hearing to make the record speak the truth either where the record is incorrect as to what transpired at trial or where the record is silent as to the truth of what occurred at trial. As we read article 40.09(7), we find no language that precludes this holding or supports the narrow construction of the dissent. In view of the trial judge’s finding after this hearing that defendant’s motion though filed on May 19, was filed after the defendant pleaded to the indictment, the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s motion to have the jury assess punishment was correct, even though the judge had erroneously thought at the time of trial that the plea before the jury was on May 18,1981, rather than on May 19.
Furthermore, we do not read Tex. Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 44.11 (Vernon Supp.1982) as a limitation on the trial judge’s jurisdiction to make the record speak the truth under article 40.09(7). Instead, article 44.11 merely precludes the trial judge from changing his judgment after the appellate record has been filed in the court of appeals and does not pertain to “making the record speak the truth” as authorized under article 40.09(7). Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 44.11 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
Upon the appellate record being filed in the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals, all further proceedings in the trial court, except as to bond as provided in Article 44.04, shall be suspended and arrested until the mandate of the appellate court is received by the trial court. In cases where the record or any portion thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substituted in the trial court and when so substituted the record may be prepared and transmitted to the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals as in other cases.
Nothing in this statute precludes a hearing under article 40.09(7). To hold as the dissent would have us do, would render meaningless that part of article 40.09(7) which provides that either the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals may order a hearing to make the record speak the truth. Obviously, the appellate record has been filed before either appellate court could or[549]*549der a hearing under article 40.09(7). Thus, the dissent’s construction of these statutes fails to give effect to the clear language of article 40.09(7).
Apart from the reason above stated, we affirm because if we disregard the subsequent hearing and finding, and take the record as silent as to the exact time of filing the motion, we must presume in support of the trial judge’s ruling that the motion was filed after pleading to the indictment in open court before the jury. Where procedural requirements do not affirmatively appear in the record to have been violated, a presumption of regularity of the trial judge’s ruling must prevail. Green v. State, 510 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This rule has been stated in different language in McCloud v. State, 527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and in other cases to the effect that the appellate court should indulge a presumption of regularity in proceedings and in “documents.” McCloud at 887. We do not read, however, McCloud to enunciate a different rule, as does the dissent. As we read McCloud, the court in that case indulged a presumption that objections to the charge in that case had been filed timely because the “judge specifically denied the appellant’s objections.” That court reasoned that the judge would not have ruled upon the objections had they not been timely filed. Thus, McCloud is consistent with the rule that the trial judge’s actions are correct unless the contrary appears in the record. See Hackey v. State, 500 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (absent an objection, appellate court will presume that defendant agreed that trial judge should assess punishment); Garza v. State, 479 S.W.2d 294, 296-97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (where record silent, appellate court will presume that the State acquiesced in judge assessing punishment). See also Davis v. State, 507 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (presumed that proper number jurors empaneled); Bishop v. State, 507 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (indictment presumed filed after commission of alleged offense); Lewis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (procedural requirements on convictions in enhancement counts presumed); Haas v. State, 498 S.W.2d 206 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (exercise of discretion in allowing witness who violated rule to testify presumed properly exercised).
Defendant contends also that the State failed to establish the allegations of the indictment. We do not agree. The indictment, charging defendant with forgery pursuant to Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.-21(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 1974), alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant:
did intentionally and knowingly with intent to defraud and harm another, pass to Rufus Ward Jr. a forged writing knowing such writing to be forged, and such writing had been so made that it purported to be the act of W.J. Luscinskas who did not authorize the act. . ..
At trial, the State introduced the check which was drawn on the printed checks of Dealer Printing Corporation. The check was made out to Donald R. Jones and was signed “W.J. Luscinskas.” The general manager of Dealer testified that the corporation was owned by Mr. Craft and that he was the only person authorized to sign checks. The State also introduced the testimony of a William Joseph Luscinskas, who testified that he had never heard of Dealer Printing Corp., Mr. Craft, nor defendant and that he did not authorize anyone to sign the check. Finally, Rufus Ward Jr. testified that he saw defendant endorse the check, that defendant presented the check with his driver’s license to him for payment, and that when he attempted to verify the check, defendant fled.
Defendant argues that the State had to prove by handwriting analysis or by an independent witness either that the State’s witness, William Joseph Luscinskas, was the only W.J. Luscinskas that could have authorized the signature or that defendant had in fact signed the signature of W.J. Luscinskas to the check. Defendant insists that the State failed to prove either of these. We hold, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction. The general manager of Dealer Printing testified that only Mr. Craft was [550]*550authorized to sign Dealer Printing’s checks and he did not authorize W.J. Luscinskas to sign any of the checks. Consequently, neither the State’s witness nor any other W.J. Luscinskas would have had authority to sign a Dealer Printing check. The State’s evidence was thus sufficient to support a conviction for forgery. See McNeese v. State, 596 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Landry v. State, 583 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Affirmed.
GUITTARD, C.J., and ROBERTSON, CARVER, SPARLING, FISH and GUIL-LOT, JJ., join in this opinion.