Adams v. United States

27 Fed. Cl. 5, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 611, 1992 WL 333330
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedOctober 30, 1992
DocketNo. 90-162C
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 27 Fed. Cl. 5 (Adams v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 5, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 611, 1992 WL 333330 (uscfc 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

MOODY R. TIDWELL, III, Judge.

This case is before the court on the parties’ eross-motions for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the cross-motions in part and denies in part.

FACTS

This is a consolidated action by approximately 5400 individuals in seven federal agencies seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1992) (FLSA). Plaintiffs are criminal investigators in the GS-1811 series in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Secret Service, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Plaintiffs covered by this order are variously described as GS-1811-9 (GS-9) through GS-1811-13 (GS-13) criminal investigators in official position descriptions (PDs).1 The court does not dispose of INS or FWS plaintiffs’ claims, as they were not the subject of these cross-motions. The parties have agreed in the joint stipulation of facts that the official agency PDs describe the major duties of plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs spend at least 51% of their work time performing criminal investigation work. In the case of Secret Service plaintiffs, the parties stipulate that plaintiffs spend at least 51% of their time performing either criminal investigation work, protective duties, a combination of both, or related duties. For simplicity, the court will refer to all these duties as investigative duties.

Plaintiffs contend that their positions have been erroneously classified as administrative and therefore exempt from the overtime provisions of FLSA, and seek damages flowing from this alleged misclassification. Although plaintiffs do not specifically request reclassification as non-exempt employees, the court will include this [10]*10relief as part of damages, should it find for plaintiffs on the issue of liability. Defendant, through its respective agencies, asserts that plaintiffs are properly classified as administrative employees and are therefore exempt from FLSA’s overtime provisions.

JURISDICTION

Defendant has challenged the court’s jurisdiction to hear this case. Defendant argues that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that they are covered under FLSA and therefore fall within the court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. Defendant argues that the United States has only waived sovereign immunity to the extent that FLSA confers upon plaintiffs a substantive right to receive money. Defendant further claims that because FLSA only confers a substantive right to receive money on those persons covered, plaintiffs first must prove they are not exempt from FLSA in order for this court’s jurisdiction to attach. In essence, defendant argues that plaintiffs must prove the substance of their case before they may be heard by this court.

Defendant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, as this court recently noted: “[t]he FLSA exemption status is not committed to agency determination; jurisdiction in cases brought to recover lost overtime wages under the FLSA is a de novo proceeding under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).” Amshey v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 582, 590 (1992). Thus a declaration by an agency that an employee is exempt from the overtime provisions of FLSA is not binding on this court and is afforded no weight. Second, “[t]he FLSA in effect establishes a presumption for a nonexempt status. The employer clearly has the burden of establishing a claimed exemption.” Id. at 590; see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). This court must therefore assume that plaintiffs are covered by the overtime provisions of FLSA unless defendant proves otherwise. Thus, to establish this court’s jurisdiction, it is sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiffs are employed by agencies to which FLSA is applicable, and that they have worked overtime hours which would be compensable if plaintiffs are not exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. The court finds that plaintiffs have met this burden. This court also noted recently that “there is a distinction between the right to be heard to make a claim under a statute and the right to relief under the circumstances. A shortcoming in the latter proof ‘does not constitute an objection to jurisdiction.’ ” Adam v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 782, 785 (1992) (citing United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 446, 8 L.Ed. 1001 (1834)). Thus, the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) is properly invoked.

DISCUSSION

This case is before the court on defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment and plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1987) (citing Armco, Inc. v. Cyclops Corp., 791 F.2d 147, 149 (Fed.Cir.1986)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed, and inferences drawn, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed.Cir.1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed.Cir.1983).

The parties have stipulated to the position descriptions of each plaintiff affected by this order. Courts have in the past relied on such descriptions in reviewing FLSA exemption determinations. Amshey, slip op. at 28; Campbell v. United States Air Force, 755 F.Supp. 893, 894-95 (E.D.Cal.1990), vacated on other grounds, Campbell v. United States Air Force, 972 F.2d 1352 (Fed.Cir.1992).

[11]*11The court now turns to the application of FLSA to plaintiffs’ claims. Part I of the court’s opinion describes the four part test set out in the regulations that is used to determine whether plaintiffs are exempt from FLSA overtime provisions. Part II of the opinion applies the test to the various position descriptions that are the subject of the cross-motions.

1. Interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ferrell v. Gwinnett County Board of Education
481 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Georgia, 2007)
Grandits v. United States
66 Fed. Cl. 519 (Federal Claims, 2005)
Adams v. United States
65 Fed. Cl. 195 (Federal Claims, 2005)
Christofferson v. United States
64 Fed. Cl. 316 (Federal Claims, 2005)
Adams v. United States
391 F.3d 1212 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
Berg v. United States
49 Fed. Cl. 459 (Federal Claims, 2001)
Aamold v. United States
39 Fed. Cl. 735 (Federal Claims, 1997)
Adams v. Bowsher
946 F. Supp. 37 (District of Columbia, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
27 Fed. Cl. 5, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 611, 1992 WL 333330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-united-states-uscfc-1992.