§ 203 — Method of computing periods of limitation generally

New York § 203

• Jurisdiction: New York
• Law CVP: Civil Practice Law & Rules
• Art. 2: Limitations of Time

Text

§ 203. Method of computing periods of limitation generally. (a)\nAccrual of cause of action and interposition of claim. The time within\nwhich an action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly\nprescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued\nto the time the claim is interposed.\n (b) Claim in complaint where action commenced by service. In an action\nwhich is commenced by service, a claim asserted in the complaint is\ninterposed against the defendant or a co-defendant united in interest\nwith such defendant when:\n 1. the summons is served upon the defendant; or\n 2. first publication of the summons against the defendant is made\npursuant to an order, and publication is subsequently completed; or\n 3. an order for a provisional remedy other than attachment is granted,\nif, within thirty days thereafter, the summons is served upon the\ndefendant or first publication of the summons against the defendant is\nmade pursuant to an order and publication is subsequently completed, or,\nwhere the defendant dies within thirty days after the order is granted\nand before the summons is served upon the defendant or publication is\ncompleted, if the summons is served upon the defendant's executor or\nadministrator within sixty days after letters are issued; for this\npurpose seizure of a chattel in an action to recover a chattel is a\nprovisional remedy; or\n 4. an order of attachment is granted, if the summons is served in\naccordance with the provisions of section 6213; or\n 5. the summons is delivered to the sheriff of that county outside the\ncity of New York or is filed with the clerk of that county within the\ncity of New York in which the defendant resides, is employed or is doing\nbusiness, or if none of the foregoing is known to the plaintiff after\nreasonable inquiry, then of the county in which the defendant is known\nto have last resided, been employed or been engaged in business, or in\nwhich the cause of action arose; or if the defendant is a corporation,\nof a county in which it may be served or in which the cause of action\narose; provided that:\n (i) the summons is served upon the defendant within sixty days after\nthe period of limitation would have expired but for this provision; or\n (ii) first publication of the summons against the defendant is made\npursuant to an order within sixty days after the period of limitation\nwould have expired but for this provision and publication is\nsubsequently completed; or\n (iii) the summons is served upon the defendant's executor or\nadministrator within sixty days after letters are issued, where the\ndefendant dies within sixty days after the period of limitation would\nhave expired but for this provision and before the summons is served\nupon the defendant or publication is completed.\n 6. in an action to be commenced in a court not of record, the summons\nis delivered for service upon the defendant to any officer authorized to\nserve it in a county, city or town in which the defendant resides, is\nemployed or is doing business, or if none of the foregoing be known to\nthe plaintiff after reasonable inquiry, then in a county, city or town\nin which defendant is known to have last resided, been employed or been\nengaged in business, or, where the defendant is a corporation, in a\ncounty, city or town in which it may be served, if the summons is served\nupon the defendant within sixty days after the period of limitation\nwould have expired but for this provision; or, where the defendant dies\nwithin sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but\nfor this provision and before the summons is served upon the defendant,\nif the summons is served upon his executor or administrator within sixty\ndays after letters are issued.\n (c) Claim in complaint where action commenced by filing. In an action\nwhich is commenced by filing, a claim asserted in the complaint is\ninterposed against the defendant or a co-defendant united in interest\nwith such defendant when the action is commenced.\n (d) Defense or counterclaim. A defense or counterclaim is interposed\nwhen a pleading containing it is served. A defense or counterclaim is\nnot barred if it was not barred at the time the claims asserted in the\ncomplaint were interposed, except that if the defense or counterclaim\narose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or\noccurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends, it is\nnot barred to the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding\nthat it was barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were\ninterposed.\n (e) Effect upon defense or counterclaim of termination of action\nbecause of death or by dismissal or voluntary discontinuance. Where a\ndefendant has served an answer containing a defense or counterclaim and\nthe action is terminated because of the plaintiff's death or by\ndismissal or voluntary discontinuance, the time which elapsed between\nthe commencement and termination of the action is not a part of the time\nwithin which an action must be commenced to recover upon the claim in\nthe defense or counterclaim or the time within which the defense or\ncounterclaim may be interposed in another action brought by the\nplaintiff or his successor in interest.\n (f) Claim in amended pleading. A claim asserted in an amended pleading\nis deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original\npleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give\nnotice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or\noccurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.\n (g) 1. Time computed from actual or imputed discovery of facts. Except\nas provided in article two of the uniform commercial code or in section\ntwo hundred fourteen-a of this chapter, where the time within which an\naction must be commenced is computed from the time when facts were\ndiscovered or from the time when facts could with reasonable diligence\nhave been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must be\ncommenced within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or\nwithin the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause\nof action accrued, whichever is longer.\n 2. Notwithstanding paragraph one of this subdivision, in an action or\nclaim for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, where the action or\nclaim is based upon the alleged negligent failure to diagnose cancer or\na malignant tumor, whether by act or omission, for the purposes of\nsections fifty-e and fifty-i of the general municipal law, section ten\nof the court of claims act, and the provisions of any other law\npertaining to the commencement of an action or special proceeding, or to\nthe serving of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to\ncommencement of an action or special proceeding within a specified time\nperiod, the time in which to commence an action or special proceeding or\nto serve a notice of claim shall not begin to run until the later of\neither (i) when the person knows or reasonably should have known of such\nalleged negligent act or omission and knows or reasonably should have\nknown that such alleged negligent act or omission has caused injury,\nprovided, that such action shall be commenced no later than seven years\nfrom such alleged negligent act or omission, or (ii) the date of the\nlast treatment where there is continuous treatment for such injury,\nillness or condition.\n (h) Claim and action upon certain instruments. Once a cause of action\nupon an instrument described in subdivision four of section two hundred\nthirteen of this article has accrued, no party may, in form or effect,\nunilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual\nthereof, or otherwise purport to effect a unilateral extension of the\nlimitations period prescribed by law to commence an action and to\ninterpose the claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute.\n