§ 31-275 — Definitions.

Connecticut § 31-275

• Jurisdiction: Connecticut
• Title 31: Labor
• Ch. 568: Workers' Compensation Act

Text

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise provides: (1) “Arising out of and in the course of his employment” means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while the employee has been engaged in the line of the employee's duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer's premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer's business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer, provided: (A) (i) For a police officer or firefighter, “in the course of his employment” encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode to duty, such individual's duty, and the return to such individual's place of abode after duty; (ii) For an employee of the Department of Correction, (I) when responding to a direct order to appear at such employee's assignment under circumstances in which nonessential employees are excused from working, or (II) following two or more mandatory overtime work shifts on consecutive days, “in the course of his employment” encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode directly to duty, such individual's duty, and the return directly to such individual's place of abode after duty; (iii) For a telecommunicator, as defined in section 28-30 , (I) when a telecommunicator is subject to emergency calls while off duty by the terms of such telecommunicator's employment, (II) when responding to a direct order to appear at such telecommunicator's work assignment under circumstances in which nonessential employees are excused from working, or (III) following two or more mandatory overtime work shifts on consecutive days, “in the course of his employment” encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode directly to duty, such individual's duty, and the return directly to such individual's place of abode after duty; (iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph, the dependents of any deceased employee of the Department of Correction who was injured in the course of his employment, as defined in this subparagraph, on or after July 1, 2000, and who died not later than July 15, 2000, shall be paid compensation on account of the death, in accordance with the provisions of section 31-306 , retroactively to the date of the employee's death. The cost of the payment shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier which shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer may require; (B) A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment unless causally traceable to the employment other than through weakened resistance or lowered vitality; (C) In the case of an accidental injury, a disability or a death due to the use of alcohol or narcotic drugs shall not be construed to be a compensable injury; (D) For aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based; (E) A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment if the injury is sustained: (i) At the employee's place of abode, and (ii) while the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work unless such act or acts are undertaken at the express direction or request of the employer; (F) For purposes of subparagraph (C) of this subdivision, “narcotic drugs” means all controlled substances, as designated by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection pursuant to subsection (c) of section 21a-243 , but does not include drugs prescribed in the course of medical treatment or in a program of research operated under the direction of a physician or pharmacologist. For purposes of subparagraph (E) of this subdivision, “place of abode” includes the inside of the residential structure, the garage, the common hallways, stairways, driveways, walkways and the yard; (G) The Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this section and shall define the terms “a preliminary act”, “acts in preparation for work”, “departure from place of abode directly to duty” and “return directly to place of abode after duty” on or before January 1, 2006. (2) “Commission” means the Workers' Compensation Commission. (3) “Administrative law judge” means the administrative law judge who has jurisdiction in the matter referred to in the context. (4) “Compensation” means benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited to, indemnity, medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service required under section 31-294d and any type of payment for disability, whether for total or partial disability of a permanent or temporary nature, death benefit, funeral expense, payments made under the provisions of section 31-284b , 31-293a or 31-310 , or any adjustment in benefits or payments required by this chapter. (5) “Date of the injury” means, for an occupational disease, the date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of such disease. (6) “Dependent” means a member of the injured employee's family or next of kin who was wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of the employee at the time of the injury. (7) “Dependent in fact” means a person determined to be a dependent of an injured employee, in any case where there is no presumptive dependent, in accordance with the facts existing at the date of the injury. (8) “Disfigurement” means impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person that renders the person unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, or deforms the person in some manner, or otherwise causes a detrimental change in the external form of the person. (9) (A) “Employee” means any person who: (i) Has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state; (ii) Is a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subdivision (10) of this section; (iii) Is elected to serve as a member of the General Assembly of this state; (iv) Is a salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department; (v) Is a volunteer police officer, whether the officer is designated as special or auxiliary, upon vote of the legislative body of the town, city or borough in which the officer serves; (vi) Is an elected or appointed official or agent of any town, city or borough in the state, upon vote of the proper authority of the town, city or borough, including the elected or appointed official or agent, irrespective of the manner in which he or she is appointed or employed. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting any existing rights as to pensions which such persons or their dependents had on July 1, 1927, or as preventing any existing custom of paying the full salary of any such person during disability due to injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment; (vii) Is a member of the armed forces of the state while in the performance of military duty, whether paid or unpaid for such military duty, in accordance with the provisions of section 27-17 , 27-18 or 27-61 ; or (viii) Is elected to serve as a probate judge for a probate district established in section 45a-2 . (B) “Employee” shall not be construed to include: (i) Any person to whom articles or material are given to be treated in any way on premises not under the control or management of the person who gave them out; (ii) One whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business; (iii) A member of the employer's family dwelling in his house; but, if, in any contract of insurance, the wages or salary of a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house is included in the payroll on which the premium is based, then that person shall, if he sustains an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, be deemed an employee and compensated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; (iv) Any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week; (v) An employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded from coverage under this chapter by notice in writing to his employer and to the administrative law judge; or (vi) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or a business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty per cent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in this state. (10) “Employer” means any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint stock association, the state and any public corporation within the state using the services of one or more employees for pay, or the legal representative of any such employer, but all contracts of employment between an employer employing persons excluded from the definition of employee and any such employee shall be conclusively presumed to include the following mutual agreements between employer and employee: (A) That the employer may accept and become bound by the provisions of this chapter by immediately complying with section 31-284 ; (B) that, if the employer accepts the provisions of this chapter, the employee shall then be deemed to accept and be bound by such provisions unless the employer neglects or refuses to furnish immediately to the employee, on his or her written request, evidence of compliance with section 31-284 in the form of a certificate from the administrative law judge, the Insurance Commissioner or the insurer, as the case may be; (C) that the employee may, at any time, withdraw his or her acceptance of, and become released from, the provisions of this chapter by giving written or printed notice of his or her withdrawal to the chairperson and to the employer, and the withdrawal shall take effect immediately from the time of its service on the chairperson and the employer; and (D) that the employer may withdraw his or her acceptance and the acceptance of the employee by filing a written or printed notice of his or her withdrawal with the chairperson and with the employee, and the withdrawal shall take effect immediately from the time of its service on the chairperson and the employee. The notices of acceptance and withdrawal to be given by an employer employing persons excluded from the definition of employee and the notice of withdrawal to be given by the employee, as provided in this subdivision, shall be served upon the chairperson, employer or employee, in accordance with section 31-321 . In determining the number of employees employed by an individual, the employees of a partnership of which he is a member shall not be included. A person who is the sole proprietor of a business may accept the provisions of this chapter by notifying the chairperson, in writing, of his or her intent to do so. If such person accepts the provisions of this chapter he shall be considered to be an employer and shall insure his or her full liability in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 31-284 . Such person may withdraw his or her acceptance by giving notice of his or her withdrawal, in writing, to the chairperson. Any person who is a partner in a business shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter and shall insure his or her full liability in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 31-284 , unless the partnership elects to be excluded from the provisions of this chapter by notice, in writing and by signed agreement of each partner, to the chairperson. (11) “Full-time student” means any student enrolled for at least seventy-five per cent of a full-time student load at a postsecondary educational institution which has been approved by a state-recognized or federally-recognized accrediting agency or body. “Full-time student load” means the number of credit hours, quarter credits or academic units required for a degree from such institution, divided by the number of academic terms needed to complete the degree. (12) “Medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service”, when requested by an injured employee and approved by the administrative law judge, includes treatment by prayer or spiritual means through the application or use of the principles, tenets or teachings of any established church without the use of any drug or material remedy, provided sanitary and quarantine regulations are complied with, and provided all those ministering to the injured employee are bona fide members of such church. (13) “Member” includes all parts of the human body referred to in subsection (b) of section 31-308 . (14) “Nursing” means the practice of nursing as defined in subsection (a) of section 20-87a , and “nurse” means a person engaged in such practice. (15) “Occupational disease” includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment. (16) (A) “Personal injury” or “injury” includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee's employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease. (B) “Personal injury” or “injury” shall not be construed to include: (i) An injury to an employee that results from the employee's voluntary participation in any activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational, including, but not limited to, athletic events, parties and picnics, whether or not the employer pays some or all of the cost of such activity; (ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment (I) arises from a physical injury or occupational disease, (II) in the case of a police officer of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, an organized local police department or a municipal constabulary, arises from such police officer's use of deadly force or subjection to deadly force in the line of duty, regardless of whether such police officer is physically injured, provided such police officer is the subject of an attempt by another person to cause such police officer serious physical injury or death through the use of deadly force, and such police officer reasonably believes such police officer to be the subject of such an attempt, or (III) in the case of an eligible individual as defined in section 31-294k , is a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress injury as defined in section 31-294k that meets all the requirements of section 31-294k . As used in this clause, “in the line of duty” means any action that a police officer is obligated or authorized by law, rule, regulation or written condition of employment service to perform, or for which the police officer or firefighter is compensated by the public entity such officer serves; (iii) A mental or emotional impairment that results from a personnel action, including, but not limited to, a transfer, promotion, demotion or termination; or (iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (B)(i) of this subdivision, “personal injury” or “injury” includes injuries to employees of local or regional boards of education resulting from participation in a school-sponsored activity but does not include any injury incurred while going to or from such activity. As used in this clause, “school-sponsored activity” means any activity sponsored, recognized or authorized by a board of education and includes activities conducted on or off school property and “participation” means acting as a chaperone, advisor, supervisor or instructor at the request of an administrator with supervisory authority over the employee. (17) “Physician” includes any person licensed and authorized to practice a healing art, as defined in section 20-1 , and licensed under the provisions of chapters 370, 372 and 373 to practice in this state. (18) “Podiatrist” means any practitioner of podiatry, as defined in section 20-50 , and duly licensed under the provisions of chapter 375 to practice in this state. (19) “Presumptive dependents” means the following persons who are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (A) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his injury or from whom she receives support regularly; (B) a husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her injury or from whom he receives support regularly; (C) any child under the age of eighteen, or over the age of eighteen but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, at the time of the injury of the parent; (D) any unmarried child who has attained the age of eighteen but has not attained the age of twenty-two and who is a full-time student, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, provided, any child who has attained the age of twenty-two while a full-time student but has not completed the requirements for, or received, a degree from a postsecondary educational institution shall be deemed not to have attained the age of twenty-two until the first day of the first month following the end of the quarter or semester in which he is enrolled at the time, or if he is not enrolled in a quarter or semester system, until the first day of the first month following the completion of the course in which he is enrolled or until the first day of the third month beginning after such time, whichever occurs first. (20) “Previous disability” means an employee's preexisting condition caused by the total or partial loss of, or loss of use of, one hand, one arm, one foot or one eye resulting from accidental injury, disease or congenital causes, or other permanent physical impairment. (21) “Scar” means the mark left on the skin after the healing of a wound or sore, or any mark, damage or lasting effect resulting from past injury. (22) “Second disability” means a disability arising out of a second injury. (23) “Second injury” means an injury, incurred by accident, repetitive trauma, repetitive acts or disease arising out of and in the course of employment, to an employee with a previous disability. See Sec. 31-294h re extent of benefits for mental or emotional impairment of police officers.

Legislative History

(1949 Rev., S. 7416; 1949, S. 3037d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-139; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 289; 556, S. 1; 696, S. 1; 806, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 281, S. 2; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 78-324, S. 3; P.A. 79-113; 79-540, S. 1; P.A. 80-124, S. 1; 80-284, S. 1; 80-414, S. 1; 80-482, S. 201, 348; 80-483, S. 95, 186; P.A. 82-398, S. 1; P.A. 84-320, S. 1, 6; P.A. 85-420, S. 1, 4; P.A. 88-184, S. 1, 3; 88-364, S. 50, 123; P.A. 91-32, S. 1, 41; 91-339, S. 1; P.A. 92-31, S. 1, 7; P.A. 93-228, S. 1, 35; P.A. 95-79, S. 117, 189; 95-262, S. 2, 3; P.A. 96-180, S. 104, 166; P.A. 97-205, S. 1; P.A. 99-102, S. 41; P.A. 01-208, S. 2, 3; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 146(c); P.A. 04-189, S. 1; P.A. 05-208, S. 4; 05-230, S. 1; 05-236, S. 2; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; 11-128, S. 2; P.A. 12-126, S. 1; P.A. 13-25, S. 4; P.A. 19-17, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-107, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 1; P.A. 23-80, S. 1.) History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act redefined “commission” as seven rather than five commissioners, added exception in definition of “dependent” and redefined “employer” as those employing one or more rather than two or more persons; 1969 acts redefined “arising out of and in the course of his employment” to include special provision re policemen and firemen, redefined “physician” to include those practicing a healing art and duly licensed rather than those practicing as chiropractors, added definition of “podiatrist”, redefined “occupational disease” to include diseases resulting from exposure to or contact with radioactive materials and specified “regularly” employed in Subdiv. (d) of definition of “employer”; 1972 act included persons elected as members of the general assembly in definition of “employee”; P.A. 77-614 made insurance department a division within the department of business regulation with insurance commissioner as its head, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-324 included volunteer police officers in definition of “employee”; P.A. 79-113 divided section into Subsecs. and redefined “employee” and “employer” to include provisions re persons who are sole proprietors or partners in a business; P.A. 79-540 redefined “commission” to raise number of commissioners to eight and defined “compensation review division”; P.A. 80-124 substituted “causally” for “casually” in Subsec. (8); P.A. 80-284 inserted new Subsec. (13) defining “full-time student” and renumbered former Subsec. (13) accordingly; P.A. 80-414 redefined “commission” and “compensation review division” to reflect increase in number of commissioners to nine; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance department and deleted reference to abolished department of business regulation; P.A. 80-483 made technical correction; P.A. 82-398 defined “income”, including within it all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment; P.A. 84-320 amended Subsecs. (2) and (3) to increase the number of commissioners to ten; P.A. 85-420 amended Subdivs. (2) and (3) to increase the number of commissioners to eleven; P.A. 88-184 redefined “commission” and “compensation review division” to reflect an increase in number of commissioners to thirteen; P.A. 88-364 made a technical change in Subsec. (5); P.A. 91-32 replaced existing definitions with Subdivs. (1) to (22), inclusive; P.A. 91-339 redefined “commission” in Subsec. (2), deleted definition of “compensation review division” in former Subsec. (5), deleted reference to Sec. 31-308b from renumbered Subsec. (6), added new Subsec. (8) defining “disfigurement” and added new Subsec. (21) defining “scar”, renumbering as necessary; P.A. 92-31 redefined “compensation” to delete dependency allowances; P.A. 93-228 redefined “arising out of and in the course of his employment”, “employee”, “employer” and “personal injury” in Subdivs. (1), (9), (10) and (16), respectively, added definition of “narcotic drugs” in Subdiv. (1), and deleted definitions of “significant disfigurement” and “significant scar” in Subdivs. (8) and (21), respectively, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-79 redefined “employer” in Subdiv. (10) to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 95-262 amended Subdiv. (1) to redefine “arising out of and in the course of his employment” to exclude as a personal injury, any injury sustained at the employee's place of abode while the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work unless at the express direction or request of the employer, to define “place of abode” and to require the Workers' Compensation Commission to adopt regulations and to define “a preliminary act” and “acts in preparation for work”, effective July 6, 1995 (Revisor's note: The phrase “the Workers Compensation Commissioner shall adopt regulations” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “the Workers Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations” to correct an apparent clerical error in the reference to “Commissioner”); P.A. 96-180 amended Subdivs. (9) and (10) to make technical changes, effective June 3, 1996; P.A. 97-205 amended Subdiv. (16)(B) to define “personal injury” and “school-sponsored activity”; P.A. 99-102 amended Subdiv. (17) by deleting obsolete reference to chapter 371; P.A. 01-208 amended Subdiv. (1) by making technical changes throughout, designating existing Subpara. (A) as Subpara. (A)(i), adding Subpara. (A)(ii) re dependents of certain deceased employees of the Department of Correction and designating portions of existing Subpara. (E) as Subparas. (F) and (G), effective July 13, 2001; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 replaced Commissioner of Consumer Protection with Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-189 repealed Sec. 146 of June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, thereby reversing the merger of the Departments of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective June 1, 2004; P.A. 05-208 amended Subdiv. (16)(B)(ii) to exempt mental or emotional impairment of police officer arising from use of or subjection to deadly force from general mental or emotional impairment exclusion from definition of “personal injury” or “injury” and made technical changes throughout Subdiv. (16); P.A. 05-230 amended Subdiv. (1)(A) by adding new clause (ii) defining “in the course of his employment” for employees of Department of Correction, redesignating existing clause (ii) as clause (iii) and making a conforming change therein, and amended Subdiv. (1)(G) by requiring Workers' Compensation Commission to define “departure from place of abode directly to duty” and “return directly to place of abode after duty” by regulation on or before January 1, 2006; P.A. 05-236 amended Subdiv. (9)(A) by making technical changes in clause (vi) and adding clause (vii) to redefine “employee” to include members of the National Guard or other armed forces of the state called to active duty by Governor while performing active duty service, effective July 1, 2005; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subdiv. (16)(B)(ii), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 11-128 added Subdiv. (9)(A)(viii) to redefine “employee” to include a person elected to serve as probate judge for a probate district established in Sec. 45a-2, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-126 amended Subdiv. (16) to redefine “personal injury” or “injury”, effective June 15, 2012, and applicable to any claim filed after that date; P.A. 13-25 amended Subdiv. (9)(A)(vii) to change “officer or enlisted person” to “member”, delete reference to National Guard and replace provision re called to active duty by Governor with provision re performance of military duty, whether paid or unpaid; P.A. 19-17 amended Subdiv. (16) by redefining “personal injury” or “injury”, effective July 1, 2019; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “Commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Administrative law judge” in Subdiv. (3) and “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subdivs. (3), (9)(B)(v), (10) and (12), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-107 redefined “personal injury” in Subdiv. (16), effective June 30, 2021; P.A. 22-89 amended Subdiv. (10) to change references to “administrative law judge” to “chairperson”, to delete “either by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail”, to add reference to Sec. 31-321, and made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022; P.A. 23-80 added new Subdiv. (1)(A)(iii) defining “in the course of his employment” re telecommunicators, redesignated former Subdiv. (1)(A)(iii) as Subdiv. (1)(A)(iv) and made a technical change in Subdiv. (1)(A)(ii). Dependent: Dependency is a question of fact. 89 C. 152; 95 C. 165; Id., 674. Father without income is dependent on minor though his earnings did not exceed the cost of his support. 90 C. 258; 105 C. 423. Cited. 91 C. 231; 106 C. 235; 130 C. 658; 131 C. 202; 132 C. 171. Adult son able to support his family is not a dependent of his father. 92 C. 458. Employee's mistress is not a dependent but illegitimate children are. 93 C. 423. Wife living with husband is presumably supported by him and not dependent of 11-year-old son. 95 C. 166. Father who adds son's wages to invested capital is not dependent. Id., 676. Sister held dependent who relied on decedent's earnings though his contributions were voluntary and not enforceable. 96 C. 303. Sister held dependent though not living with decedent. 97 C. 113. Employee: A sheriff is not an employee of the state though it pays him a salary; contract of employment implied. 89 C. 684. Employee distinguished from independent contractor. 90 C. 447; 95 C. 421; 96 C. 636; 105 C. 545; 107 C. 146. Musicians for a dance on defendant's premises engaged from an orchestra leader held defendant's employees. 92 C. 407. Newspaper reporter is an employee. 94 C. 159. Formerly policemen and firemen were not employees. Id., 403. One doing personal service to a corporation officer in hope of a tip not an employee of either the corporation or the officer. Id., 490. Consideration of whether or not one illegally employed is within the act. 95 C. 166. Employee distinguished from city officer. 96 C. 560. Firemen and policemen included in 1921. 102 C. 340. Tree warden is officer in supervisory duties and employee when performing manual labor. Id., 573. Burden is on claimant to show that he is employee. 105 C. 551. “Employer” includes one working for another in return for prior assistance from the other. 102 C. 474. “Outworker” does not include treasurer taking clerical work home to complete. 105 C. 520. “Personal injury” is a localized abnormal condition of the body directly and contemporaneously caused by accident. 91 C. 162. Erysipelas caused by frost bite due to employment is compensable. 90 C. 131. Also sunstroke from heat of the work. 93 C. 153; Id., 315. Under 1919 act, the injury need not be located at a definite time and place. 98 C. 652. A weakened condition making him susceptible to disease and injury. Id; 102 C. 10. Weakened resistance is injury only if incapacitating disease results; 1921 act broadly interpreted as to resulting diseases. 103 C. 98; Id., 707; 104 C. 718. These decisions seem to be overthrown by 1927 amendment; “occupational disease” was not compensable in original act. 90 C. 349; 91 C. 158. “Arising out of and in the course of his employment”: The definition given in present act overthrows expressions in some of the earlier cases; first defined. 90 C. 120. Causal connection must exist between the employment and the injury. Id., 119; Id., 309; 92 C. 387. Sufficient if employment creates condition from which the injury arose. 93 C. 587; 100 C. 392. This definition developed. 92 C. 276; 93 C. 315; 104 C. 712; 105 C. 517; Id., 698. That employee does work for his employer not strictly required does not put him out of the “course of his employment”; injuries held compensable received while returning to work after temporary stoppage. 92 C. 84. Resting on the premises waiting for his turn of work. Id., 277. Being transported to work by employer. Id., 91; 93 C. 85; 103 C. 564; 107 C. 505; 108 C. 630. Driving his own car on employer's business. 98 C. 548. When injury received on the highway is compensable. 105 C. 518; 107 C. 168. Foreman employed on the highway stepping across the road to speak to a friend. 93 C. 52. Stopping at a company store on the way home. Id., 59. Lightning stroke while park laborer was under a tree for shelter. 94 C. 12. Employer's pistol fired by a curious office boy. Id., 264. Stones thrown at employer's glass which employee was trying to protect. Id., 381. Following usual path over railroad tracks. 95 C. 412. Fall from scaffold where he worked though due to vertigo. 97 C. 46. Crossing tracks to get food for employer's dog. 98 C. 289. Traveling salesman injured in hotel fire. Id., 758. Injury by an insane fellow workman on the premises. 100 C. 377. Policeman going along the highway to police station. 102 C. 342. Hotel manager driving thief away from refrigerator. 103 C. 761. Insanity and suicide resulting from close application to library work. 107 C. 60. Compensation refused in the following cases: fighting with a fellow employee. 92 C. 386. Employee, sent by defendant to a doctor, took short cut across railroad tracks and was killed. 96 C. 343. Taking own route home from work though the company paid traveling expenses. Id., 355; 105 C. 518. Injury caused by smoking against orders in toilet. 104 C. 334. Injury from playful push by a visitor. 105 C. 397. Sleeping by permission in employer's barn. Id., 701. Doing work for oneself on employer's machine during the rest hour. 107 C. 517. Washing car sometimes used in employer's business. Id., 646. Scarlet fever contracted while in hospital for treatment of compensable injury. 108 C. 148. Claim to compensation must be based on more than speculation and conjecture. 146 C. 505. When an activity may be an incident of employment. 147 C. 267. “Aggravation of a preexisting disease” may be a personal injury. 90 C. 544. This term defined. 97 C. 552. Apportionment of the award is not made in case of death. 103 C. 705. Mere susceptibility is not a preexisting disease and “injury” means compensable injury. Id., 726. Syphilis “lighted up” by fall was compensable. 104 C. 365. Tuberculosis aggravated by employee doing any work, but not by the particular employment, not compensable. Id., 711. Aliter, when it is directly caused by the employment. Id., 726; 105 C. 656. Action denied when excitement aroused in a corporation manager by the result of a prosecution in court “lighted up” angina pectoris. 108 C. 493. Causal connection between factory conditions and grippe held too uncertain. 106 C. 365. Employer has burden of proof that preexisting disease contributed to the disability. 103 C. 731; 107 C. 66. Preexisting disease due to former employment by defendant is no mitigation. 107 C. 67. Cited. 110 C. 227; 112 C. 462; 114 C. 30; Id., 136; 125 C. 189; 127 C. 395. Minor illegally employed is covered. 131 C. 157. Employee or independent contractor. 121 C. 127; 123 C. 320; 124 C. 433; 126 C. 379. Trade or business and causal defined. 118 C. 367; 119 C. 224; 129 C. 44. Part or process of trade or business, but injury did not occur in, on or about premises under control of respondent. 125 C. 109. Statute does not require that time be fixed by stopwatch or the place by a mathematical point. 119 C. 44. What constitutes occupational disease. 118 C. 29; 128 C. 499. Tuberculosis not an occupational disease. 121 C. 664. Distinction between employee and independent contractor. 124 C. 433. Status of F.E.R.A. employee. 123 C. 504. Status of relief worker. 126 C. 265. Child employed in violation of law entitled to compensation. 111 C. 229. Meaning of “accidental injury”. 128 C. 608; 131 C. 572; 132 C. 118; Id., 479. Unusual susceptibility of linotypist. 128 C. 499. Employee killed on property not under control of employer. 130 C. 1; 131 C. 244. Previous condition of employee immaterial. 123 C. 192; 129 C. 532. Injury must arise out of employment and be causally traceable to it. 109 C. 378; Id., 473; 115 C. 446; 116 C. 297; 119 C. 1; Id., 170; Id., 248; Id., 694; 122 C. 343; overruled in part, see 339 C. 402; 123 C. 327; 124 C. 355; 129 C. 240; Id., 669; 130 C. 11; 133 C. 78; Id., 614. When bodily injury arises through weakened resistance, entitled to compensation. 110 C. 248; 129 C. 532. Injury from (pneumonia) weakened resistance does not entitle to compensation. 111 C. 188. Meaning of “through weakened resistance and lowered vitality”. 116 C. 186. Litigation neurosis not compensable. Id., 229. Apportionment for aggravation applied to death cases. 114 C. 389; 121 C. 71. Apportionment for aggravation of disease applies only to occupational disease. 130 C. 401. Deviation from employment. 132 C. 606. Domestic away from employer's house. 131 C. 334; Id., 341. Situation in which employee sought gasoline rations for the mutual benefit of employer and employee. 132 C. 563. Transportation provided by employer. 125 C. 238. Construction of “aggravation of preexisting syphilitic disease”. 122 C. 353. Where premises were under defendant's control, plaintiff held to be a subagent and employee. 134 C. 462. Plaintiffs injured by horseplay held not compensable. Id., 672. Commissioner's conclusion that claimant was employee of police department sustained. 136 C. 361. An employer may by his dealing with an employee annex to the actual performance of the work, as an incident of the employment, the going to or departure from work. 137 C. 134. Cited. Id., 486. If one employee assaults another to gratify his feeling of anger, the resulting injury does not arise out of the employment. Id., 626. Definitions of independent contractor restated. 138 C. 317. Plaintiff not on payroll, but paid by quantity, who used his own equipment and occasionally bought supplies for which he was reimbursed, was employee and not independent contractor, since defendant had general control of work. 148 C. 624. An employee seeking workmen's compensation has burden of proving that he sustained an injury, not merely in the course of his employment, but arising out of, that is, caused by, his employment. 150 C. 328. Cited. 154 C. 1, 4. Causal connection between employee's disability and his work must be established for him to be entitled to compensation. Id., 48, 52. Findings of fact by hearing commissioner that claimant was injured while using elevator in premises he was cleaning which he had expressly been forbidden to use would not be disturbed and conclusion claimant was not injured in course of his employment sustained. 155 C. 214. Benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act are payable only to claimants who have been dependents of employee whose injury or death is basis of award. 156 C. 245. “Employer” is one customarily using services of two or more employees and employee who was temporarily sole employee is still to be kept covered under act. Id., 276. Volunteer firemen are not included in definition of employee in statute. 159 C. 53. Cited. 162 C. 148; 163 C. 221; 165 C. 338, 340. “Injury”, as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, includes an injury to employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or acts incident to such employment. 168 C. 413. Cited. 175 C. 392; Id., 424; 178 C. 371; Id., 664; 179 C. 501; Id., 662; 182 C. 24; 186 C. 623; 187 C. 53; 196 C. 91; 204 C. 104; 207 C. 420; 208 C. 589; 213 C. 54; 214 C. 394; Id., 552; 221 C. 29; 223 C. 336; 226 C. 508; 227 C. 333; Id., 930; 229 C. 587; 231 C. 287; 237 C. 490; 239 C. 19; Id., 676; 242 C. 570. Injury sustained by discharged employee while retrieving personal belongings compensable as injury sustained in the course of employment. 244 C. 502. In accord with prior cases, determination of whether injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for commissioner; the “right to control” test cannot coexist with the “relative nature of work” test; court affirmed use of “right to control” test. 245 C. 613. Aggravation of preexisting psychiatric condition due to work-related physical injury may be a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury constituting an impairment arising from a compensable work-related physical injury. 258 C. 137. When read in conjunction with Sec. 31-293a, statute plainly states that emotional distress not arising from physical injury is not compensable through workers' compensation. 265 C. 21. Question of whether injuries resulted from incident that occurred in course of employment is a separate and distinct question from whether injuries arose out of employment; if supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, commissioner's inference that injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. 267 C. 583. In-home health care worker comes within traveling employee exception to “coming and going rule”, and injury sustained during travel from her home to home of patient is injury “arising out of and in the course of his employment”. 274 C. 219. Compensation review board improperly concluded that workers' compensation commissioner lacked jurisdiction over claim because the injury occurred on navigable waters of the United States and, therefore, federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim under Art. III, Sec. 2 and Art. I, Sec. 8 of U.S. Constitution and Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 USC section 901 et seq.; state has concurrent jurisdiction with federal government over claims involving injuries incurred on navigable waters when the employer and employee are locally based, the employment contract is performed within the state and partly on land, the injury took place on state's territorial waters and the employer was required under the state act to secure compensation for any land-based injuries incurred by employee. 283 C. 1. Apportionment or proportional reduction of benefits appropriate when respondent employer is able to prove that disability has resulted from combination of two concurrently developing disease processes, one that is nonoccupational and the other that is occupational in nature, and conditions of claimant's occupation have no influence on development of nonoccupational disease. 284 C. 479. Savage v. St. Aeden's Church , 122 C. 343, is overruled insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of his or her employment, the employee is injured due to idiopathic fall onto level floor. In addition, any previous suggestion that an injury is not compensable unless caused by a hazard unique or distinctive to the employment is disavowed. 339 C. 402. Cited. 3 CA 16; Id., 370; 5 CA 369; 18 CA 614; 21 CA 610; 24 CA 234; 25 CA 599; 27 CA 800; 28 CA 226; 32 CA 595; 38 CA 1; 41 CA 430; 42 CA 803; 44 CA 397. Based on facts presented, plaintiff's injury was compensable when sustained during a basketball game organized by supervisors during working hours. 91 CA 345. Injured personal care assistant who worked 25.75 hours per week not employee because did not work 26 hours per work as required by Subdiv. (9) definition of employee. 108 CA 581. The term “employer” does not include the U.S. Postal Service because the federal government has not expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act. 111 CA 821; judgment affirmed, see 296 C. 426. Plaintiff's asthma was an occupational disease because his employment was more likely to cause this disease than would other kinds of employment carried on under same conditions. 115 CA 702. Police officer's injuries while driving his children to day care before his shift were compensable because police officers are “portal-to-portal” employees and he was traveling his usual route to work when collision occurred. 157 CA 822. Although the definition of “occupational disease” may be derived from workers' compensation law, it does not follow that the term applies only to workers' compensation claims brought against one's own employer; clauses in asbestos liability insurance contracts that exclude coverage for occupational disease do not bar coverage only for occupational disease claims brought by a policyholder's own employees, but also apply to complainants who developed occupational disease while using the policyholder's products in the course of working for another employer. 171 CA 61; judgment affirmed, see 333 C. 343. Although the personal infirmity that caused plaintiff to fall backward and hit her head on the ground at her place of employment did not arise out of her employment, the resultant injuries that were caused by her head hitting the ground at her workplace did arise out of her employment. 182 CA 224; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 402. When the life expectancy of the decedent is less than the term covered by the award. 2 CS 30. Compensation is allowed only when the preexisting disease is aggravated by the injury; it does not include the situation where the injury is made more serious because of the preexisting disease. 6 CS 256. Plaintiff injured while being transported to place of employment by employer on day before her salary began was within the course of her employment. Id., 288. Heart condition is not necessarily inconsistent with the occurrence of an accident within the concept of statute. 7 CS 5. One who reported to a municipal station after each snowfall for employment in snow removal work was not an employee under act until he was hired. 12 CS 313. Cited. 13 CS 417. Enlargement of plaintiff's heart not a “personal injury”. 14 CS 131. Cited. 15 CS 324. Distinction drawn between “special hazards” test and “arising out of and in the course of his employment”. 20 CS 202. Injury sustained as result of playing basketball at company club held not to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. 24 CS 262. Cited. 37 CS 836; 38 CS 324; 39 CS 408. Former Subsec. (b): “Employment of casual nature” defined. 90 C. 451; 92 C. 407; 105 C. 594; 107 C. 363. Police duty is not, though on theater assignment. 102 C. 342. Washing windows in defendant's factory is not. 107 C. 192. This exception not to be construed strictly against employee. Id., 364. Former Subsec. (c): Employee of partnership not barred because the son lived in the house of a partner. 91 C. 380. Subdiv. (1): Compensation for aggravation of plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder is not limited by apportionment provisions of Subpara. (D). 259 C. 29. The term “place of abode”, as used in Subpara. (A), does not include the public street. 324 C. 14. Special policeman appointed pursuant to Sec. 29-18 is not a policeman for purposes of Subpara. (A) if he has limited authority to arrest or to carry weapons, was not issued a state vehicle, was not entitled to travel pay, and lacked training required of police officers. 60 CA 707. Subpara. (C): Intoxication of the employee, as cause of injury, is not a jurisdictional fact requiring the claimant to prove the lack thereof, but an affirmative defense to be proved by the employer. 136 CA 258. Although police officers enjoy “portal to portal” coverage under act, officer's slip and fall on patch of ice in his driveway did not occur in the course of employment. 143 CA 313. Because defendant concedes that plaintiff's preexisting condition was not occupational, defendant is not entitled to apportionment of plaintiff's disability to aggravation of preexisting condition attributable to work injury under Subpara. (D). 164 CA 41. Subdiv. (5): Cited. 193 C. 59; 203 C. 34. Subpara. (D): Work in construction of barn on premises of private residence not in excess of 26 hours a week is excluded from provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. 219 C. 674. Cited. 228 C. 401. Subdiv. (9): Cited. 225 C. 165. Term “employee” encompasses illegal alien, thus claim for work-related injury by illegal alien was within jurisdictional confines of Workers' Compensation Act. 244 C. 781. In order to be “regularly employed” pursuant to Subpara. (B)(iv), a person must work more than 26 hours per week during majority of the 52 weeks preceding date of his or her injury. 265 C. 816. Subpara. (A): Member of a single-member limited liability company may be an “employee” of the company if the member performed services for the company and was subject to the hazards of the company's business. 331 C. 289. Cited. 29 CA 249. The 52 week period used in 265 Conn. 816 is not a reasonable time period to determine if claimant was regularly employed by respondent, and commissioner properly examined the 11 week period of employment to determine what the usual practice was between respondent and claimant. 180 CA 355. Subdiv. (10): Joint venture between two nonprofit organizations may be an employer under Workers' Compensation Act. 252 C. 641. “Public corporation” signifies corporations organized for a public purpose such as municipalities and counties and “within the state” means those that are organized and existing pursuant to the laws of this state, therefore U.S. Postal Service is not an employer for purposes of section and Workers' Compensation Act. 296 C. 426. A single-member limited liability company is not required to elect to accept the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act in order for its member to be covered, rather, the member may be covered automatically as an employer. 331 C. 289. Subdiv. (16): Subpara. (A): Exposures to two potentially fatal infectious diseases are compensable injuries under the act. 241 C. 692. Subpara. (B)(ii): Although plaintiff police officer suffered an occupational disease pursuant to Subdiv. (15), his post-traumatic stress disorder is excluded from coverage under this Subdiv. because it did not arise from a physical injury. 250 C. 65. Legislative intent of Subdiv. states that mental anguish resulting from sexual assault would be compensable under workers' compensation. 252 C. 215. Pursuant to Subpara. (A), three types of injuries fall within definition of “personal injury” and are covered by the act: Accidental injuries, repetitive trauma injuries and occupational diseases. Id., 596. When aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition is direct consequence of a work-related physical injury, aggravation of the psychiatric condition is, itself, a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury to constitute “mental or emotional impairment” that “arises from” compensable work-related physical injury under Subpara. (B)(ii). 259 C. 29. Subpara. (B): Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. Id., 729. Cited. 45 CA 707. Decedent's stress-related fatal heart attack was a compensable personal injury and thus recovery of death benefits was not precluded by terms of statutory provision. 96 CA 207. The social-recreational exception was intended to eliminate coverage under act for injuries that occurred while employee was engaged in voluntary sporting activities or in an act for his or her relaxation or enjoyment on employer's premises, such as power walking, even when there was employer approval or acquiescence. 112 CA 492. Term “arises from” in Subpara. (B)(ii) requires a causal relationship between a physical injury or occupational disease and a claimed mental impairment in order for the mental impairment to be compensable under act. 123 CA 372. Subdiv. (19): Cited. 226 C. 569. Entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits for a presumptive dependent of a deceased employee vests when the deceased employee reaches maximum medical improvement and does not require that the employee make an affirmative request for such benefits. 299 C. 185.