Young v. SSA

2011 DNH 140

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 15, 2011
• Docket: CV-10-417-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Young v. SSA CV-10-417-JL 9/15/11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gloria Ann Young v. Civil No. lO-cv-417-JL Opinion No. 2011 DNH 140

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This is an appeal from the denial of a claimant's

application for Social Security Disability Benefits. See 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The claimant, Gloria Ann Young, contends that

the administrative law judge ("ALU") incorrectly found that

although Young suffered from diabetes and obesity. Admin. R. 9;1

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a),(c), she retained the residual

functional capacity2 ("RFC") to perform light work. Admin. R. 11;

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), and that she remained capable of

performing her past work as a companion, day care assistant, and

'The court will reference the administrative record ("Admin. R.") to the extent that it recites facts contained in or directly guotes documents from the record. C f . Lalime v. Astrue, No. 08- cv-196-PB, 2009 WL 995575, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 14, 2009) .

2"Residual Functional Capacity" is defined as "an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an eguivalent work schedule." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). teacher's assistant. Admin. R. 15; see 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Young contends that the ALJ erred in

formulating her RFC because he:

(1) improperly found that Young's depression was not a severe impairment. Admin. R. 10; Cl. Br. 2-11,

(2) improperly assessed her credibility, rendering his RFC determination flawed, see Admin. R. 12; Cl. Br. 12; see generally SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996),

(3) improperly assigned greater weight to the opinions of non-examining physicians, and did not grant controlling weight to her treating physician's functional capacity assessment, see generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527(d); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996), and

(4) did not properly consider the impact of her obesity on her ability to work. See generally SSR 02-lp, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002).

The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ's findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and moves for an order

affirming his decision.3 This court has subject-matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal guestion) and 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) (Social Security).

After a review of the administrative record, the court

concludes that the ALJ properly determined Young's impairments

3The Decision Review Board, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 405.401, did not complete its review of the ALJ's denial in a timely fashion. Admin. R. 1, rendering the ALJ's order a final decision of the Commissioner appealable to this court. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.415.

2 and RFC, and therefore grants the Commissioner's motion and

denies Young's motion.

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

The court's review under Section 405(g) is "limited to

determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards

and found facts upon the proper guantum of evidence." Nguyen v.

Chafer, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); see Simmons v. Astrue,

736 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399 (D.N.H. 2010). If the ALJ's factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

they are conclusive, even if the Court does not agree with the

ALJ's decision and other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.

See Tsarelka v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 842 F.2d 529, 535

(1st Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adeguate to support a

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(guotations omitted). The ALJ is responsible for determining

issues of credibility, resolving conflicting evidence, and

drawing inferences from the evidence in the record. See

Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222

(1st Cir. 1981); Pires v. Astrue, 553 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.

Mass. 2008) ("resolution of conflicts in the evidence or

guestions of credibility is outside the court's purview, and thus

3 where the record supports more than one outcome, the ALJ'sview

prevails"). The ALJ's findings are not conclusive, however, if

they were "derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or

judging matters entrusted to experts." Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 35.

If the ALJ made a legal or factual error, the decision may be

reversed and remanded to consider new, material evidence, or to

apply the correct legal standard. Manso-Pizarro v. Sec'y of

Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1996); see 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to this court's local rules, the parties filed a

Joint Statement of Material Facts (document number 11), which is

part of the record reviewed by the court. See LR 9.1(d). This

court will briefly recount the key facts and otherwise

incorporates the parties' joint statement by reference.

Young filed an application for Disability Insurance

Benefits in April 2008 claiming she became disabled in August

20044 due to depression, diabetes,5 high cholesterol, and high

4Young's onset date was later amended to April 2007. Admin. R. 23 .

5Diabetes is "a chronic syndrome of impaired carbohydrate, protein, and fat metabolism owing to insufficient secretion of insulin or to target tissue insulin resistance. It occurs in two

4 blood pressure. See Admin. R. 106-10. Her application for

benefits was denied in November 2008,6 see id. at 46, 48, because

it was determined that although Young suffered from diabetes, it

"is under good control," and likewise her high blood pressure "is

treated with medication" and there was no evidence that her

cholesterol problems caused any heart disease. See id. at 48.

The SSA also determined that although Young had shown symptoms of

anxiety and depression, based on a recent psychiatric evaluation.

Young was still capable of performing her prior work as a daycare

assistant "despite any impairment." Id. Young appealed that

decision to the ALJ, id. at 54-56; see generally 20 C.F.R. §

405.301, who, after a hearing in March 2010, concluded that Young

was capable of returning to her prior work and thus not entitled

to benefits. Admin. R. 7-15; see generally 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520 (a) (4) (iv) .

major forms: type 1 d. mellitus and type 2 d. mellitus, which differ in etiology, pathology, genetics, age of onset, and treatment." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 513 (31st ed. 2007) (emphasis in original).

6It appears from the record that the SSA initially concluded in October 2008 that Young was disabled, see id. at 47, 148-152, but that determination was revised after an internal review of Young's medical records. See id. at 148 ("Report of Contact" dated 10/17/08), 149-51 ("Reguest for Corrective Action" dated 11/10/08), 152 ("Report of Contact" dated 11/18/08).

5 The ALJ did determine that Young was physically severely

impaired due to diabetes and obesity. Admin. R. 9; see generally

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(11). He specifically found, however,

that Young's "medically determinable mental impairment of

depression did not cause more than minimal limitation in the

claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities and

was therefore nonsevere." Admin. R. 10. The ALJ denied benefits

because he concluded that despite her impairments. Young had the

RFC "to perform light work7 . . . except she has the ability to

occasionally climb, crouch, crawl, bend, stoop, and kneel. She

will have a slightly higher . . . number than usual interruptions

to pace and will work at a slightly slower pace, but this would

not be to the point of unreasonable for the job setting." Admin.

R. 11; see generally, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4) (iv). The ALJ

concluded that given this RFC, Young was able to perform her past

work as "a companion, daycare assistant, and teacher's

assistant," and was therefore not disabled. Admin. R. 15; see

generally, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

7Light work is defined as "lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with freguent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it reguires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls." 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1567 (b) .

6 The ALJ's RFC analysis necessarily required consideration of

medical evidence regarding the limiting effects of Young's

anxiety and depression and the functional challenges arising from

her diabetes and obesity. See generally, Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d

at 17. Young testified that she had been battling depression

since 1997, Admin. R. 26, was diagnosed with diabetes, id., see

also id. at 219-37 (hospital notes from emergency admission for

diabetes), and was obese, weighing over 320 pounds at the time of

the hearing. Id. at 31. Prior to the hearing, a number of

physical and mental functional evaluations from six different

physicians were submitted to the ALJ for consideration. There

were substantial conflicts in these evaluations: one was revised

by its author, and each was based on varying pieces of evidence.

The ALJ was required to weigh this opinion evidence in

formulating Young's RFC, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Part

III-C, infra., as such, each evaluation will be summarized at the

outset.

Young was sent by the SSA to Dr. M. Lorene Snipes, Ph.D.,

for a psychological evaluation in September 2008. Admin. R. 273.

Dr. Snipes diagnosed Young with a major depressive disorder,

single episode, and a panic disorder without agoraphobia. Id. at

27 6. Dr. Snipes concluded that Young could understand simple

oral and written instructions, cope with the social demands of a

7 work environment, and manage her daily living and personal

financial affairs. Dr. Snipes determined, however, that Young

could not concentrate and complete certain work related tasks and

would be unable to adjust to most common work situations. Id. at

275-76. Her conclusion that Young had concentration issues was

based on an apparent inability to spell her own name backwards.

Id. at 275.

There were, however, some concrete factual errors in Dr.

Snipes' report. Dr. Snipes described Young as "African-

American," id. at 273, yet Young testified that she is not, id.

at 38, and her attorney stated that this notation by Dr. Snipes

"didn't make sense to me." Id. The ALJ then observed, " [m]y

guess is whoever did [the evaluation] wrote the wrong person,"

and Young's attorney replied, "I think so." Id. at 39. Further,

Dr. Snipes described Young as being "of average height and

weight." Id. at 274. Medical records from a few months earlier,

however, showed that Young weighed 2 94 pounds and had a Body Mass

Index ("BMI") of 48.8 Admin. R. 360. There was never any

8BMI is a measurement based on a subject's height and weight and is used to roughly determine a patient's body fat. A BMI over 30 indicates that the patient is obese and at high risk for obesity related diseases. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Healthy Weight (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/healthy weight.

8 allegation nor record evidence that Young sustained massive

weight loss any time that year.

Young's medical records were subseguently evaluated by Dr.

Craig Stenslie, Ph.D. on October 14, 2008. See id. at 286-88,

305-17. Dr. Stenslie completed both a Psychiatric Review, id. at

305-317, and a Mental RFC Assessment. Id. at 286-88. He did not

examine Young, and instead reviewed Young's medical records. Dr.

Stenslie noted that although there were medical records showing

treatment for depression in 2000-2002, there was "nothing more

recent of any substance." Id. at 288. He concluded, however,

that Young's allegations of disabling depression "are deemed

essentially credible" and that she "is not able to maintain

attention consistently for two hours and is not able consistently

to deal adeguately with change even in a low stress environment."

Id. Dr. Stenslie found that Young had "marked" limitations in

maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. Id. at 315.

Dr. Stenslie made these observations based primarily on Dr.

Snipes's consultative evaluation, noting, "Dr. Snipes' opinions

are given significant weight and appear to be based adeguately in

the data." Id. at 288.

Dr. Burton Nault, M.D. completed a physical residual

functional capacity assessment on October 2008 based on Young's

medical records. He noted that although none of her treating

9 physicians had completed such physical RFC review, in his

opinion. Young was physically capable of performing light work.

Id. at 290-97. His analysis was brief, but was based on medical

records indicating that Young's diabetes was "under better

control," tests showed "no acute cardiopulmonary process," and

Young's self reported ability to "[do] light housework, cook[]

simple meals, and drive[]. [Young] states she can walk about one

block at a time." Id. at 297. He did note, however, that

Young's DIB benefits would be "[allowed] as of 6/1/08 for issues

not addressed in this RFC," presumably Young's mental

limitations. Id.

Psychiatrist Dr. G.R. Ibarra completed a "Medical

Consultant's Review of Psychiatric Review Technigue Form" on

October 29, 2008, critiguing Dr. Stenslie's and Dr. Snipes'

psychiatric assessment of Young's mental functional capacity.

Id. at 298-302. Dr. Ibarra disagreed with their opinion of

Young's concentration, persistence, and pace, and the level of

her decompensation due to depression and anxiety. Dr. Ibarra was

highly critical of their reports, noting that medical records

concerning Young's depression showed "a depression that readily

responded to treatment." Id. at 301. Dr. Ibarra stated that

"[t]he idea that [Young] would not be able to work because her

10 concentration is impaired . . . is not tenable." Id. In

particular. Dr. Ibarra noted that Young managed a

very complex medical regime; to follow this medical regime will be taxing to anybody's attention, concentration and persistence. [Young] is taking 10 different medications with irregular schedules. She needs to measure her glucose and calculate medication adjustments accordingly. This demonstrates [an] ability to follow complex written instructions. She reads as one of her past-times and states . . . she is able to sustain attention for 30 [minutes], well within the average. She reads as a [hobby], an ungrateful task if there is faulty attention and concentration.

Id. Dr. Ibarra concluded that "[i]t is not correct that her

daily routine is unstructured." Id.

Dr. Stenslie subseguently revised his opinion and completed

a new Psychiatric Review form and Mental RFC assessment on

November 18, 2008.9 Admin. R. 324-40. In his revised analysis.

Dr. Stenslie found only mild or moderate limitations,10 and he

concluded that Young "is able to complete a normal workday and

workweek with a slightly higher than usual number of

interruptions to pace and a bit more slowly than usual . . . ."

9The parties agree that this apparent change of heart came after Dr. Stenslie reviewed Dr. Ibarra's critigue. Joint Statement of Material Facts (document no. 11) at 12.

10He concluded that Young displayed a mild limitation in daily living and moderate limitations in social functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, pace, and an ability to maintain a regular schedule. Admin. R. 334, 338-39.

11 Id. at 340. Dr. Stenslie's opinion of Dr. Snipes' review changed

dramatically, however, as he reported:

Dr. Snipes finds intact memory but opines significant impairment of attention and concentration . . . although other tests of sensorium functioning11 are intact - rendering [Dr. Snipes] later conclusion that [Young] is not able to attend to task[s] adeguately to be erroneous and not based on the evidence. . . . [M]uch of Dr. Snipes report is not based adeguately in the actual data and several of her conclusions . . . are refuted on the basis of the actual data. The claimant's allegations are deemed only partially credible . . . .

Id.

Dr. Nault's physical functional capacity evaluation was also

subjected to peer review. On October 30, 2008, Dr. Michael Peril

reviewed Dr. Nault's assessment and disagreed with Dr. Nault's

analysis of Young's exertional and postural limitations. Id. at

319-21. Dr. Peril opined that none of Young's impairments were

severe, as her records revealed no "end organ damage" or cardiac

disease. Dr. Peril noted that although Young's BMI was high,

"there is no x-ray or physical evidence of any joint or spine

problems due to her obesity." Id. at 321.

Finally, on March 9, 2010, well after Young's claim had been

denied and a few weeks before her hearing before the ALJ, Dr.

""Sensorium" relates to "the condition of a subject relative to the subject's consciousness or mental clarity." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1718 (31st ed. 2007) .

12 William Windier, M.D., completed an assessment of Young's

physical functional capabilities. Id. at 418-423. Dr. Windier

concluded that Young was unable to work at all, could lift less

that 10 pounds occasionally and freguently, could stand and walk

less than 2 hours per day, sit for less than 2 hours per day,

given, inter alia, back, ankle, and knee pain, obesity, decreased

sensation in her feet, and ankle swelling. Id. Dr. Windier also

noted "chronic significant depression . . . [and] panic attacks

. . . highly limit her. . . . Morbid obesity [and] likely

restrictive lung disease . . . severely limits [Young's] general

physical capacity." Id. at 423.

The ALJ, after specifically reviewing the objective medical

evidence,12 considered each of these opinions and assigned

varying weight to each. Id. at 13-14; see generally 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527 (c)(2), (d). The A1J gave "great" or "significant"

weight to Dr. Stenslie's revised evaluation and the evaluation of

12In particular, the ALJ noted that although there was medical record evidence of a few episodic (and in part unrelated to diabetic neuropathy or obesity) reports of numbness in her feet and back pain, her diabetes was noted to be "well- controlled." The A1J noted multiple observations by providers that Young had a "normal gait and station." Depression was reported only occasionally, and daily fatigue was reported to be "due to a poor sleeping pattern." Id. at 12-13. The ALJ thus observed that the limitations described by Young "are not substantiated by similar complaints at office visits. As recently as August 2009 [Young] reported no concerns at an office visit." Id. at 13.

13 Dr. Ibarra, because he concluded that their opinions were

supported by and consistent with the evidence of record. Admin.

R. 13-14. Dr. Nault's opinion was only given some weight; the

ALJ did not adopt Dr. Nault's indication that the claim should be

allowed because of Young's mental health issues "because it was

rendered prior to Dr. Stenslie's revised opinion after his

further review of the evidence." Id. at 13. Dr. Peril's opinion

was only given some weight because the ALJ concluded that Young's

"obesity and diabetes mellitus do rise to the level of severe

impairment, as demonstrated by the medical record." Id. at 14.

Dr. Windier's opinion was given "little weight." The ALJ

stated that "[t]he record does not reflect complaints

commensurate with [Dr. Windier's assessed] limitations. Further,

although he is a treating physician, his opinion is not supported

by his own treatment notes." Id.

Finally, Dr. Snipes's opinion was given "no weight." The

A1J observed that there were some glaring factual errors in the

evaluation and noted the same logical criticisms as Dr. Ibarra.

The ALJ concluded that "Dr. Snipes' opinion is not entirely

consistent with the record or her own notes . . . ." Id.

The A1J therefore concluded that Young's

impairments do not preclude performance of a range of work at the light exertional level with limitations

14 . . . . [Young] relies heavily upon allegations of physical limitations and fatigue. These complaints are not well-documented in the medical records. She manages to live on her own, prepares her own meals, and performs self-care adeguately. Her diabetes is well- controlled with no mention of any neuropathy, save for one isolated mention. She does suffer from body aches and pains, along with weight gain and obesity; these do not, however, prevent her from performing her activities of daily living and are similarly consistent with [a light exertional] residual functional capacity.

Id. at 13. The ALJ ruled, based on the testimony of a vocational

expert, that Young was capable of performing her prior work as a

day care assistant, companion, and teacher's assistant, and was

therefore not disabled. Id. at 15. After the Decision Review

Board failed to review the matter in a timely basis, see

generally, 20 C.F.R. § 405.415, this appeal followed.

III. ANALYSIS

A five-step process is used to evaluate an application for

social security benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The

applicant bears the burden through the first four steps to show

that she is disabled.13 Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608

13Specifically, the claimant must show that: (1) she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) she has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or eguals a specific impairment listed in the Social Security regulations; or (4) the impairment prevents or prevented her from performing past relevant work. The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

15 (1st Cir. 2001). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the

burden of showing that a claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform other work that may exist in the national

economy. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4) (v); Heggarty

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1991) . The ALJ's

conclusions at steps four and five are informed by his assessment

of a claimant's RFC, which is a description of the kind of work

that the claimant is able to perform despite her impairments. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1545.

A. Mental impairments

Young first asserts that the ALJ erred when he concluded at

Step 2 that her mental impairments were not severe. Cl. Brief 2.

At Step 2, an ALJ determines the "medical severity of [a

claimant's] impairment(s)" and will deny any claim if an

impairment, or set of impairments is not "severe." 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Impairments are deemed "severe" if they

"significantly limit[] [the] physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities." Id. § 404.1520(c).

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A).

16 The regulations describe the method an ALJ uses to assess a

claimed mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (a) . In

determining that a claimant suffers from a mental impairment, an

ALJ must make a specific finding as to the degree of limitation

in each of four functional areas. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3);

see generally Negron v. Astrue, No. 09-1685(JAF), 2010 WL

1728331, at *3 (D.P.R. April 27, 2010). The ALJ rates the degree

of limitation in: (1) activities of daily living, (2) social

functioning, (3) concentration, persistence, or pace, and (4)

episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If the

ALJ rates the limitation in the first three areas as none or

mild, and in the fourth area as none, the ALJ will likely

conclude that the impairment is not severe. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a(d)(1). "The claimant bears the burden of proof at Step

2, although it is a de minimis burden, designed to do no more

than screen out groundless claims." LaBonte v. Astrue, No. 09-

358-P-S, 2010 WL 2024895, at *2 (D. Me. May 18, 2010) .

Young asserts that "[a]s demonstrated by [Young's] testimony

. . . her depression, anxiety and panic attacks have more than a

mild effect on [Young's] ability to adeguately engage in [the]

activities of daily living." Cl. Br. 8. The ALJ found only a

mild impact on her daily living, because "[t]he claimant

testified that she lives alone, prepares simple meals, and

17 completes household chores." Admin. R. 10. Young's claim of

error, therefore, appears to be comprised primarily of the

argument that the ALJ erred because he failed to infer more than

a mild limitation from the record. The ALJ is responsible for

resolving conflicts in the evidence, and as such, his conclusions

will be upheld if supported by the record. C f . Rodriguez, 647

F.2d at 222 (ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts and

drawing inferences from the evidence in the record). The ALJ

could properly conclude that her mental impairments had only a

mild effect on daily life. The ALJ is directed to evaluate the

four functional areas and "rate the degree of [a claimant's]

functional limitation based on the extent to which [the

claimant's] impairment(s) interfere with [his or her] ability to

function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a

sustained basis." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c) (2) . Although Young

desires the ALJ to judge her anxiety and depression as presenting

more than a mild limitation, the ALJ could reasonably conclude

that because she was able to complete self care, manage finances,

cook simple meals, live independently, and balance her daily

medications, her ability to manage daily life was not severely

impaired. Indeed, Dr. Stenslie, in both his reports, concluded

18 that she had only a mild limitation in her daily activities.14

Admin. R. 315, 334. Finally, numerous objective medical records

noted an absence of mental health issues, with Young denying any

"problems with depression or anxiety." Id. at 359; see also id.

at 350, 368.

Additionally, Young contends that the ALJ had a duty to re­

contact Dr. Snipes because of the inconsistencies in her report.

Neither the regulations nor the facts of this case reguired the

ALJ to re-contact Dr. Snipes. The re-contact reguirement is

triggered "[w]hen the evidence we receive from your treating

physician or psychologist or other medical source is inadeguate

for us to determine whether you are disabled." 20 C.F.R. §

404.1512(e). If, however, there is sufficient record evidence

to resolve the claim, the ALJ is under no obligation to re­

contact a medical source. Anderson v. Astrue, 682 F. Supp. 2d,

89, 96 (D. Mass. 2010); see, e.g., Shaw v. Sec'y of Health &

Human Servs., 25 F.3d 1037 (table decision). No. 93-2173, 1994 WL

251000, at *5 (1st Cir. June 9, 1994) (finding that ALJ did not

err in failing to re-contact claimant's treating physician when

14Even Dr. Snipes, noting activities in line with Young's function report, see Admin. R. at 275; see also id. at 138-45 (self report), opined that "Ms. Young currently lives alone and is able to independently complete adaptive daily living skills." Id. at 275.

19 the record supplied an adequate evidentiary basis for his

decision); c f . Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007)

(noting that the re-contacting of a treating physician is

required if the evidence is inadequate to determine disability).

In this case, there was ample other evidence on which the ALJ

could base his decision, and thus the re-contact requirement was

not triggered.15 Accordingly, no error occurred at Step 2.16

15Young asserts that the ALJ erred because although he assigned great weight to the evaluation of Dr. Ibarra (concluding that Young's mental impairments provided only moderate limitations and were not disabling), the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Ibarra's implicit Step 2 opinion that her mental limitations were severe. Cl. Br. 10. An ALJ must rely to some degree on evaluations from a physician or another expert. This does not mean, however, "that there must always be some super-evaluator, a single physician who gives the factfinder an overview of the entire case." Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 1987). That premise "is unsupported by the statutory scheme, . . . case law, or by common sense, for that matter." Id. Rather, "an ALJ is entitled to piece together the relevant medical facts from the findings and opinions of multiple physicians." Mulkerron v. Astrue, No. 09-10998-RGS, 2010 WL 2790463, at *9 (D. Mass. July 15, 2010) (quotations omitted). Here, there was ample record support for the ALJ's severity and RFC findings, and as such, there is no error.

16Young initially did not argue that failure to find her mental impairments severe somehow compromised the ALJ's determination of her RFC. C f . Delafontaine v. Astrue, No. 1:10- cv-027, 2011 WL 53084, at *7-*8 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2011). The record shows that the ALJ did consider Young's mental impairments when fashioning an RFC, and indeed placed limitations on her ability to perform light work. Admin. R. 11, 13-14; see generally, SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2), (all impairments, both severe and non-severe are considered in assessing a claimant's RFC). C f . Lalime, 2009 WL 995575, at *8 (no error in not listing obesity as an

20 B. Credibility determination - daily activities

Young next asserts that "the findings made by the ALJ

regarding [Young's] performance of household chores is incorrect

and unsupported by the evidence," Cl. Br. 12-15, and therefore

impairment when it was specifically considered in the RFC assessment); see generally, Portorreal v. Astrue, No. CA 07- 296ML, 2008 WL 4681636, at *3-*4 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2008).

The parties, in dueling reply briefs, skirmished over whether the ALJ's decision not to find Young's mental impairments "severe" constituted harmless error because those impairments were later considered by the ALJ when formulating Young's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) (all impairments, even those not deemed "severe," are to be considered when formulating RFC); see generally, Maziarz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987) (since ALJ reguired to consider all impairments whether or not severe in formulating RFC, once a single severe impairment has been found, failure to find another particular impairment severe "could not constitute reversible error"); Vining v. Astrue, 720 F. Supp. 2d 126, 132 (D. Me. 2010) (because ALJ adopted an RFC assessment accounting for condition, there was no error in failure to find that condition severe at Step 2). Both parties frame their arguments asking whether it is appropriate for a court to employ a "harmless error" analysis when reviewing alleged error in an administrative decision. See generally, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084-85 (1th Cir. 2004) (A1J's decision should be evaluated solely on reasons stated in decision); cf. Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 1976) (court will accept less than ideal clarity in administrative finding "if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned" (guotations omitted)). The court need not reach this issue, as it has concluded that there was no error. Further, given the structure of the regulations, where once an ALJ has concluded that a claimant has at least one "severe impairment" at Step 2, all medically determinable impairments are considered in formulating an RFC for purposes of Step 4 and Step 5, it appears that "harmless error" in the traditional sense is not a relevant inguiry.

21 the ALJ's conclusion that "[n]either [Young's] activities of

daily living nor the objective medical evidence supports a

finding of disability," Admin. R. 12, is erroneous. She argues

that her daily activities were limited in nature, reguired

freguent rest, and thus did not support the determination that

she was capable of sustained effort in a competitive environment.

See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.

Standing alone, the ability to perform basic household tasks

does not eguate with an ability to perform substantial gainful

activity. See generally id. "When evaluating the subjective

claims of pain it is proper and, indeed, reguired that the ALJ

consider daily activities such as driving, walking and household

chores. This allows the Secretary to juxtapose the claimant's

subjective allegations of pain with the relative intensity of

[her] daily regimen." St. Pierre v. Shalala, No. CV-94-232-JD,

1995 WL 515515, at *3 (D.N.H. May 25, 1995) (citations omitted).

"To be found disabled, a claimant must show that [she] cannot

perform 'substantial gainful activity,'17 not that [she] is

totally incapacitated." Id. (guotations omitted). Daily

17"Substantial gainful activity" means an ability to "perform substantial services with reasonable regularity either in competitive or self-employment." Blake v . Apfe1, No. 99-126-B, 2000 WL 1466128, at *8 (D.N.H. Jan. 28, 2000) (guotations omitted).

22 activity evidence is used to "assist the Secretary in

understanding the relationship between the medically determinable

impairment, the alleged pain, and the [claimant's] ability to

work." St. Pierre, 1995 WL 515515, at *4.

"While a claimant's performance of household chores and the

like ought not to be eguated to an ability to participate

effectively in the workforce, evidence of daily activities can be

used to support a negative credibility finding." Teixeira v.

Astrue, 755 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 (D. Mass. 2010). The ALJ's

"credibility determination - based on observations of the

claimant, evaluation of her demeanor, and consideration of how

her testimony fits in with the record evidence -is entitled to

deference, especially when supported by specific findings." Id.

A review of the entire record reveals ample support for the

ALJ's conclusion that Young's daily activity level was consistent

with an ability to perform light duty work.18 The ALJ correctly

noted that Young reported that she:

lives alone. In a typical day, she gets up in the late morning, watches television and the news, performs household chores, watches her diet, and prepares meals.

18Although Young urges the court to view daily activity evidence as supportive of disability, "a court must affirm the Commissioner's decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record could arguably justify a different result." Divirgilio v. Apfel, 21 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1998) .

23 She is able to read, watch television, go to appointments as needed, sit on the porch, and go for walks. She reported walking a few days per week. These activities are inconsistent with a finding of disability as they indicate that the claimant maintains a full range of activities that are consistent with [an ability to perform limited light work].

Admin. R. 12 (citations omitted). Further, the ALJ noted that

Young "manages to take her medications so that her diabetes is

well-controlled, which suggests that she is in control of her

faculties and can maintain a schedule." Id. at 13. The record

supports the ALJ's specific findings and the functional

inferences drawn from them were valid. While Young complained at

the hearing that her medication makes her tired. Admin. R. 37,

the record reveals that during at least one doctor's visit, she

attributed fatigue to a lack of sleep unrelated to objective

physiological challenges.19 Id. at 394, 398. Moreover, during

many regular check-ups at the Manchester Community Health Center,

she reported exercising multiple times per week, if not daily.

Id. at 344, 370, 372. During multiple follow-up appointments,

providers observed stated that she had her diabetes under control

and she exhibited a normal mental status. Id. at 242-43, 350,

368, 370, 382, 395-97, 408-10. Although Young argues that the

19The medical reports contradict Young's self generated function report, where she stated that due to her illness, she took afternoon naps, id. at 139, and that it caused her to freguently be awake at night. Id.

24 ALJ should have found that her reported daily activities support

a disability finding, "[t]hat [Young] claims to have had

assistance . . . in completing the household work and that she

often takes breaks does not prevent the hearing officer from

using the testimony of [Young's] daily activities as one factor

in assessing credibility." Teixeira, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 347,

citing Rogers v. Barnhart, 204 F. Supp. 2d 885, 894 (W.D.N.C.

2002) (daily activity evidence supported credibility finding even

though claimant testified that she had assistance and performed

activities at a slower pace) .20

Because there was record support for the ALJ's conclusion

that Young's description of the limiting effects of her

conditions was not credible, there was no error.21

20Indeed, it should be noted that Young's allegations were credited to some degree as the ALJ specifically limited her functional capacity to light work performed with a "slightly higher" than usual number of interruptions and a "slightly slower pace." Admin. R. 11.

21Young, citing several pieces of evidence, also contends that the ALJ ignored medical evidence when assessing her credibility. Most of the instances cited were either episodic and later resolved, or based on self reports by Young. See Admin. R. 219, 345, 347, 371, 374, 381-82, 389, 398, 412, 419, 422. More importantly, the evidence was contradicted by other substantial medical evidence on the record, including objective findings by health professionals, contradictory reports by Young herself, and mental health reviews by medical professionals. See id. at 242, 243, 344-45, 349-350, 359-60, 368, 370-72, 373-74, 387, 394-95, 397, 398, 408-09, 415, 416; cf^ icL at 381-82 (Young complains of anxiety, but is observed to have "no depression.

25 C. Treating and non-treating physicians

Young next asserts that the ALJ erroneously assigned weight

to various physician's evaluations of her mental and physical

functional capacities. In particular. Young faults the ALJ for

granting great weight to the opinion of Dr. Nault, and refusing

to grant controlling weight to the opinion of "treating

physician," Dr. Windier. Cl. Br. 18-20.

In a step four analysis, the ALJ, having already determined

that the claimant suffers a severe impairment, makes a

determination of the claimant's current functional capacity, or

RFC. If the RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence in

the record, it is conclusive. Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 35. Findings

anxiety, or agitation"). Indeed, her chief complaint that the ALJ ignored medical notations that she suffered from depression and anxiety. Cl. Br. 16, is contradicted by other objective evidence that her mental status examinations were generally normal and that Young, in both April and August 2009, denied she was depressed and that her mood had improved. Id. at 243, 350, 359, 368, 395; see also id. at 415 (Young reports she occasionally has "periods of depression"). As such. Young's argument appears to fault the ALJ for not resolving the conflicts in the evidence if her favor. "[T]he First Circuit has held that an ALJ's written decision need not directly address every piece of evidence in the administrative record" if it is cumulative of evidence already discussed by the ALJ or fails to support the claimant's position. Lord v. Apfel, 114 F. Supp. 2d 3, 13 (D.N.H. 2000). Conflicts in the evidence are for the ALJ to resolve. Pires, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 21. It is not error for an ALJ to resolve those conflicts against a claimant, so long as there is substantial record support for his decision. See DiVirgilio, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 77.

26 are not conclusive, however, "when derived by ignoring evidence,

misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts."

Determination of a claimant's RFC is an administrative

decision that is the responsibility of the Commissioner. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2), SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July

2, 1996). An ALJ is prohibited, however, from disregarding

relevant medical source opinions. See SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183,

at *5. Where an ALJ's RFC assessment is at odds with a medical

source opinion, he must explain his reasons for disregarding that

opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL

374184, at *7; Marshall v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-147-JD, 2008 WL

5396295, at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 22, 2008) (reversing ALJ decision

because treating source opinion was "simply overlooked").

A "treating physician's opinion is generally afforded

controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic technigues and is

not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case

record." Lopes v. Barnhart, 372 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193-94 (D.

Mass. 2005) (guotations and brackets omitted); see generally SSR

No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *1; Marshall, 2008 WL 5396295, at

*3; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). "The First Circuit has held

27 . . . that when a treating doctor's opinion is inconsistent with

other substantial evidence in the record, the requirement of

controlling weight does not apply." Rosario v. Apfel, 85 F.

Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 2000) (quotations omitted).

When an ALJ decides not to give controlling weight, he is

required to "give good reasons . . . for the weight [he] give[s]

your treating source's opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

The "good reasons" requirement mandates that the ALJ's order

"must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the

treating source's medical opinion, supported by evidence in the

case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to

any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

treating source's medical opinion and reasons for that weight."

SSR No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5.

Here, although the ALJ's discussion of the weight afforded

Dr. Windier's opinion is not lengthy, the court finds no error.22

220n this record, the court wonders why the ALJ even considered Dr. Windier a treating physician. A "treating source" is defined as a medical source who provides a claimant

with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you. . . . We will not consider an acceptable medical source to be your treating source if your relationship with the source is not based on your medical need for treatment . . . but solely on your need to obtain a report in support of your claim for disability.

28 Significantly, the ALJ stated that Dr. Windier's opinion was

"given little weight" because the severe restrictions imposed by

Dr. Windier "are not consistent with the claimant's documented

complaints and limitations in the record." Admin. R. 14. This

conclusion is supported by both the ALJ's specific observations

about the objective data and the medical evidence as a whole.

Earlier in the order, the ALJ noted that the objective medical

evidence did not support a finding of disability because she was

20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (emphasis added); see generally SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188. Dr. Windier is a physician in private practice in Manchester. The administrative record shows that Young was treated on multiple occasions for routine check-ups (primarily for her diabetes) and minor illnesses by another provider, the Manchester Community Health Center, from March 2008 through September 2009. Admin. R. 342-417. The first record evidence of an encounter with Dr. Windier is the physical evaluation dated March 9, 2010, shortly before the ALJ hearing. Id. at 20, 418. Indeed, the only treatment record from Dr. Windier indicates that the "reason for visit" was an "f.c.e.," presumably the acronym for a "functional capacity evaluation." Id. at 418; see generally id. at 418-23. During the hearing. Young was asked to name the physicians she sees to treat her diabetes and other illnesses. In response, she did not name Dr. Windier. Id. at 27-28. Moreover, Dr. Windier appears not to have prescribed a course of treatment for Young, casting further doubt on his status as a "treating physician." See Blanchette v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-349-SM, 2009 WL 1652276, at *7 (D.N.H. June 9, 2009) (fact that doctor failed to prescribe treatment bolstered ALJ's determination that supposed treating source limitations were unsupported by the medical evidence).

Thus, the court cannot fathom why Dr. Windier should be considered a treating physician whose opinion is entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating source); see generally, SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188.

29 observed "to have a normal gait and station," see id. at 12

(order), 243, 255, 350 (normal gait and station), and any

tingling or numbness inhibiting her ability to walk was not

attributable to diabetes or had only been the subject of an

isolated complaint. Id. at 13 (order), 254-55 (edema upon first

office visit after release from hospital in April 2008 after new

diagnosis of diabetes), 394-97 (in August 2009 no finding of

edema or loss of sensation); 405 (in June 2009 Young reported

severe back and leg pain resulting from a fall). Moreover, the

ALJ noted that in late 2009, Young reported having "no

concerns,"23 and that any disabling fatigue was not due to

diabetes, rather Young attributed it to "a poor sleeping

pattern." Admin. R. 13, 394; see also id. at 359 (Young denies

depression or anxiety, claims sleeplessness not due to anxiety);

387 (in late September 2009 Young reports feeling "fine," denies

any pain and has no concerns); 394 (in late August 2009, Young

denies any pain, reports fatigue is due to "a poor sleeping

pattern" and not diabetes); 395 (Young reports that she walks

23Young made these positive reports to physicians during routine health check-ups at the Manchester Community Health Center where she was seen on a regular basis from at least March 2008 through September 28, 2009. Although the ALJ stated that this visit occurred in August 2009, a review of the exhibit cited by the ALJ reveals that it in fact occurred a month later, on September 28, 200 9. Admin. R. 387-8 8.

30 three times per week, is not depressed, and that her anxiety is

better).

In contrast, at a visit to Dr. Windier in March 2010,

shortly before the hearing with the ALJ, Dr. Windier noted

Young's morbid obesity and stated she had an antalgic gait.24

Admin. R. 419. He noted that her mental status was normal.25

Id.; Joint Statement of Material Facts (document no. 11) at 9.

In an accompanying functional capacity evaluation opining that

Young was severely disabled, however. Dr. Windier stated as

supporting evidence that Young had chronic significant depression

"mostly" responsible for her limitations. Id. at 423. He also

noted that morbid obesity and likely restrictive lung disease

"severely limits general physical capacity." Id. Dr. Windier

also offered as support a history of back pain, tender knees and

left ankle, decreased sensation in her hands and feet, and

shoulder pain. Id. at 421-22.

The ALJ did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Windier.

The record supports the ALJ's conclusion that the stated physical

24"Antalgic" is defined as counteracting or avoiding pain, as a posture or gait assumed so as to lessen pain. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 2054 (31st ed. 2007) .

25The court observes that Dr. Windier's office notes are disorganized and barely legible. As such, the court relies heavily on the Joint Statement of Material Facts for clarity.

31 restrictions are not consistent with regular treatment notes pre­

dating Young's visit to Dr. Windier. Further, the ALJ's

conclusion that Windier's own treatment notes do not support his

conclusions is accurate. Dr. Windier on one hand noted a normal

mental status, id. at 419, but in his functional evaluation noted

that chronic depression was most responsible for her limitations.

Id. at 423. Because the ALJ could properly conclude that Dr.

Windier's opinion was unsupported by the bulk of the evidence,

and in part internally inconsistent, the ALJ was not reguired to

give Dr. Windier's opinion controlling weight. See, e.g.,

Rosario, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 67.

The court also concludes that the ALJ did not improperly

weigh non-treating physician Dr. Nault's opinion regarding

Young's physical and mental capabilities. Young contends that

the ALJ erred because Dr. Nault's opinion was rendered before Dr.

Windier examined Young, and that the ALJ's reasoning is

insufficient. The court disagrees.

Although determination of a claimant's RFC is an

administrative decision that is the responsibility of the

Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e), SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL

374183, at *2, an ALJ, as a lay person, cannot interpret a

claimant's medical records to determine his RFC. Manso-Pizarro,

76 F.3d at 17. Rather, "an ALJ is entitled to piece together the

32 relevant medical facts from the findings and opinions of multiple

physicians." Mulkerron, 2010 WL 2790463, at *9 (quotations

omitted).

[T]he opinions of State agency medical . . . consultants can be given weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record, considering such factors as the supportability of the opinion in the evidence including any evidence . . . that was not before the State agency, [and] the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole

SSR No. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996).

Thus, a court must determine whether the ALJ's evaluation of

Dr. Nault's opinion is supported by the evidence. Because state

agency physicians and consultants are experts in social security

disability programs, their opinions on the nature and severity of

a claimant's impairments cannot be ignored by an ALJ. See SSR

No. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2; see generally, 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(f). "[T]he First Circuit explained [that] an advisory

report of a non-examining, non-testifying physician is entitled

to evidentiary weight, which will vary with the circumstances,

including the nature of the illness and the information provided

the expert." Reeves v. Barnhart, 263 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (D.

Mass. 2003) (quotations omitted), see Berrios Lopez v. Sec'v of

Health & Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1991). In

this case there is ample record support for the ALJ's treatment

33 of Dr. Nault's opinion. First, when formulating an RFC, an ALJ

looks at all the medical and other relevant evidence in the file.

See SSR No. 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *4-*5. Here, the ALJ

supported his RFC decision with multiple references to medical

findings and other evidence dated before and after the

assessments completed by Dr. Nault. Moreover, the ALJ discussed

his reasons for weight attributed to the functional opinion of

six separate doctors, three of which were given greater weight.

The ALJ's decision to give only some weight to Dr. Nault's

mental health opinion is well founded. The ALJ relied on the

fact that Dr. Nault based his mental health determination on Dr.

Stenslie's first evaluation. As discussed supra. Dr. Stenslie's

first evaluation was suspect at best, because it rested on a very

flawed evaluation by Dr. Snipes.26

Similarly, the ALJ's decision to give Dr. Nault's opinion

regarding Young's physical capabilities great weight "because

they are consistent with and supported by the evidence of record"

was not error. See Admin. R. 13. Dr. Nault's stated reasons for

his conclusions, although not terribly lengthy, contained a

number of accurate citations to Young's medical records. See id.

26Indeed, even counsel for Young noted at the hearing that Dr. Snipes' evaluation probably involved a patient other than Young.

34 at 297. Dr. Nault's observations that despite Young's high

cholesterol and blood pressure she had no acute cardiopulmonary

issues, that her diabetes management had improved and was "under

better control," and that she was mobile, all supported his

conclusion that she could do light work. See id. Medical

records cited by Dr. Nault from the period following Young's

discharge from Eliot Hospital show that Young was managing her

diabetic condition, and had both full strength and intact

sensation. See id. at 226-227. Dr. Nault's physical capacity

determination was also supported by later developed evidence in

the file,27 including multiple notations that she had a normal

gait and station, took walks multiple times per week, managed her

diabetes well, and reported during a routine exam that she had

"no issues."28 Indeed, Young's primary objection to Dr. Nault's

assessment is that it did not comport with that of Dr. Windier,

which was, as discussed supra, properly given little weight. The

27This evidence, while not specifically identified by the ALJ during his discussion of the weight afforded Dr. Nault's opinion, was discussed earlier in the ALJ's order, and it is reasonable to assume that this recitation was the "record evidence" that the ALJ stated supported Dr. Nault's opinion.

28Further, on multiple occasions medical providers noted that Young exhibited full arm and leg strength. See id. at 226, 243, 255.

35 court concludes, therefore, that the ALJ's opinion was supported

by substantial evidence and there was no error.

D. Obesity

Finally, Young asserts that the ALJ erred in his analysis of

the impact of her morbid obesity on her ability to work. Young

asserts that " [g]iven the extreme nature of the plaintiff's

obesity it is critical for the ALJ to consider its effects in a

function by function analysis of the plaintiff's capacity to

perform work related tasks . . . ." Cl. Br. 24. Although the

ALJ did not perform an in-depth analysis of the functional

effects of Young's obesity, the record shows that he properly

considered it and committed no error.

The ALJ deemed Young's obesity a severe impairment. Admin.

R. 9. Social Security Ruling 02-lp counsels that " [a]ssessment

should also be made of the effect obesity has upon the

individual's ability to perform routine movement and necessary

physical activity within the work environment . . . As with any

other impairment, [the SSA] will explain how [it] reached [its]

conclusions on whether obesity caused any physical or mental

limitations." SSR 02-lp, 2002 WL 34686281, at *6-*7. The ALJ

specifically stated that he "considered the effects of the

claimant's obesity on her other impairments." Admin. R. 11. He

36 observed that although obesity affects Young's "overall condition

. . . she remains fully weight bearing and does not have abnormal

neurological functioning." Id. In his RFC analysis, the ALJ

found that obesity did not "prevent her from performing her

activities of daily living and [is] consistent with the above

residual functional capacity" assessment. Id. at 13; Smith v.

Astrue, No. 06-11499-GAO, 2008 WL 4447007, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept.

30, 2008) (ALJ adeguately considered obesity when he implicitly

addressed it in his RFC analysis and explicitly stated that his

analysis took it into account).

The ALJ's observation that despite her morbid obesity. Young

remains fully weight bearing is supported by numerous medical

records observing full leg strength, normal gait and carriage,

and a self reported ability to exercise multiple days per week.29

Id. at 226, 243, 255, 344, 350, 370, 372, 395. The ALJ

specifically gave no weight to the opinion of Dr. Peril, who

opined that Young's obesity did not gualify as a severe

impairment. Admin. R. 14. Conseguently, although the ALJ's

discussion was arguably brief, it was supported by record

29Moreover, fatigue was not reported by Young to be, id. at 394, or tied by her physicians, to her obesity. Id. at 398 (Young counseled about the stimulating effect of watching television at night and told to stop taking daytime naps); cf. SSR 02-lp, 2002 WL 34686281, at *6 (fatigue due to obesity often limits work ability).

37 evidence and did "deliver on the promise made in Ruling 02-lp

that an explanation would be provided." Kennison v. Comm'r, No.

1:10-cv-00113-JAW, 2011 WL 1130887, at *3 (D. Me. March 25, 2011)

(ALJ did not "deliver on the promise," by failing to mention

obesity in RFC assessment); see, e.g.. Smith, 2008 WL 4447007, at

*4; c f . Robles v. Barnhart, No. Civ.A. 04-11012-DPW, 2005 WL

1773963, at *6 (D. Mass. July 22, 2005) (ALJ adeguately

considered morbid obesity when he "found no indiction in the

record of any significant functional limitation").

The court determines that Young's remaining allegations of

error are without merit because the record adeguately supports

the ALJ's conclusions.30 See Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health &

30For example. Young argues that the ALJ failed to properly apply the so-called "Avery factors" used to evaluate a claimant's subjective reports of pain. See Avery v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 797 F.2d 19, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1986). While detailed written discussion of the Avery factors is preferred, see Frustaglia v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987), an ALJ may comply with Avery if he explores the factors at the administrative hearing, see Forni v. Barnhart, No. 05-cv-406-PB, 2006 WL 2956293, at *10 (D.N.H. Oct. 17, 2006) (Avery analysis sufficient even though express analysis was cursory, where "searching review" of the record revealed that ALJ reviewed Avery factors at the hearing); Lopes, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 192, so long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusions. Pires, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Courts also have "ruled that no grounds existed for reversal when the hearing officer omitted one factor, but adeguately attended

to the other relevant factors." Conte v. McMahon, 472 F. Supp. 2d 39, 50 (D. Mass. 2007) .

38 Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) ("We must uphold

the Secretary's findings if a reasonable mind, reviewing the

evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adeguate to

support his conclusion." (guotations and ellipses omitted)).

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Young's

motion to reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision31 is

denied. The Commissioner's motion to affirm the decision32 is

granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in

accordance with this order and close the case.

The ALJ took testimony about most, if not all, of the Avery factors during the hearing. Admin. R. 29, 32, 35-38, and then recited that testimony in the narrative of his order. Id. at 12 He found Young's statements regarding the intensity and limiting effects of her impairments to lack credibility. He supported this conclusion with specific references to her testimony during the hearing, her reports to medical providers, and observations of her medical providers. Id. The record, which substantially supports the ALJ's notations, reveals no error.

31Document no. 8.

32Document no. 10.

39 SO ORDERED.

Joareph N. Laplante United States District Judge

Dated: September 15, 2011

cc: Jeffry A. Schapira, Esq. Gretchen Leah Witt, Esq