Yorman Daniel Suarez Prieto, proceeding by his next friend Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

YORMAN DANIEL SUAREZ PRIETO, proceeding by his next friend MICHAEL JOSHUE SALINAS DELCID, Case No. 1:26-cv-2224

Petitioner, Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, proceeding by his next friend Mr. Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondent to release Petitioner. (Id., PageID.14.) In an order entered on August 4, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 6.) Respondent filed a response on August 7, 2026. (ECF No. 7.) After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that the petition is properly dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Mr. Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid to proceed as next friend of Petitioner in this action. Discussion I. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Mr. Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore, is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on

whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”

because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Mr. Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid, Petitioner’s friend, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that he is

truly dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Mr. Michael Joshue Salinas Delcid to proceed as next friend to Petitioner. II. Relevant Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Form I-94, ECF No. 1-3, PageID.21.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2022 and has remained in the United States since that time. (Id.) On February 6, 2026, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Respondents have not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2 III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Since September of 2025, this Court has considered hundreds of petitions similar to the present petition. In resolving those petitions, until recently, the Court has declined to require that

immigration detainees exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief or, in the alternative, the Court has waived the exhaustion requirement. Then, turning to the merits, the Court has determined that immigration detainees in Petitioner’s circumstance are properly detained, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and, accordingly, entitled to a custody redetermination hearing if the government intends to continue the detention. On May 11, 2026, in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs the detention of persons in Petitioner’s position. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit explained: Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus, noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in [removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.

2 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Id. at 732. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’ determinations that the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond under § 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at 734. In Respondents’ submissions to this Court, they indicate their intention to comply with the

binding holdings of Lopez-Campos and afford Petitioner a custody redetermination hearing. (Resp., ECF No. 7, PageID.40–41.) This changes the Court’s exhaustion analysis. At present the Court concludes that exhaustion would not be futile, and that the balance of prudential exhaustion factors weighs in favor of requiring exhaustion. There are no applicable statutes or rules that mandate administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion

rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test, Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:

(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)). Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion, the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See id. (citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). In resolving hundreds of prior petitions like Petitioner’s, this Court concluded that prudential exhaustion should not be required after balancing the prudential considerations and the likely futility of starting with an agency decision. But after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez- Campos and the government’s unequivocal commitment to apply its holding in this case, administrative review of the controlling legal question is likely to result in an agency decision that honors the law. This, in turn, means that exhaustion is no longer futile. Therefore, the Court will require Petitioner to exhaust the available administrative remedies. The Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice. Should the administrative remedies prove to be an unavailable path to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes, Petitioner may file a new petition.

Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.

Dated: August 13, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE