Yi Li v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01381
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Yi Li, Case No. 2:25-cv-01381-RFB-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services 9 LLC; et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and forma pauperis 13 (meaning, without paying the filing fee). Plaintiff has filed a third amended complaint (ECF No. 14 28), which the Court screens under § 1915. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown 15 that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his federal claims and certain of 16 his state claims, and because the Court lacks subject matter and supplemental jurisdiction over 17 Plaintiff’s remaining state claims, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and 18 with leave to amend. 19 I. Legal standard for screening. 20 As Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court will therefore 21 screen the complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if 22 the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given 25 leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from 26 the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 27 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 2 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 3 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 4 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 5 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 6 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 7 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 8 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 9 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 10 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 12 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 13 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 14 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 15 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 16 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 17 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 18 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 20 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 21 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 22 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 23 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 24 “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a 25 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 26 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 27 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 1 different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete 2 diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each 3 of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 4 II. Screening the complaint. 5 Plaintiff sues Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; and various Amazon 6 employees including Joy Willis, a central human resources (“HR”) investigator; Nick B., a 7 manager at the Amazon Nevada facility; Kyra Carpenter, a manager at the Amazon Nevada 8 facility; Jasmine, a loss prevention staff member; Jane Doe 1, an employee; Jane Doe 2, a safety 9 supervisor; and Jane Doe 3, an employee. Plaintiff brings claims for race/color discrimination 10 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) 11 613.330; retaliation under Title VII and NRS 613.340; “failure to prevent discrimination and 12 harassment” which the Court liberally construes as a discrimination claim arising under both Title 13 VII and NRS 613.330; “constructive discharge/wrongful termination” which the Court liberally 14 construes as a discrimination claim arising under Title VII and NRS 613.330; assault; battery; 15 defamation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligent supervision and retention. 16 Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendants (presumably Amazon.com, Inc. and 17 Amazon.com Services LLC) from December 2023 through April 3, 2025. Plaintiff describes 18 himself as a “light complected employee” and asserts that he was “of a distinctly different racial 19 background and lighter skin complexion” than the Defendants and that “[n]early all of the 20 individuals involved…were of the same racial and ethnic background as one another.” 21 In April of 2024, Plaintiff alleges that due to a supervisor’s oversight, he was mistakenly 22 assigned to another employee’s workstation. The employee—Jane Doe 1—yelled profanities at 23 Plaintiff and blocked his movement for about fifteen seconds. Plaintiff asked nearby coworkers 24 to notify security, but nobody intervened. Plaintiff asserts that management took no action, which 25 Plaintiff asserts reveals “preferential treatment and lack of accountability for certain employees, 26 creating an early perception of bias against Plaintiff.” 27 In September of 2024, after Plaintiff learned that on-site supervisors were ignoring 1 independent third-party ethics hotline. Shortly after, Jane Doe 2, a safety supervisor, confronted 2 Plaintiff and became defensive when Plaintiff mentioned quota cheating. Plaintiff asserts that 3 Jane Doe 2 raised her voice while falsely accusing Plaintiff of yelling. Within a few days, 4 Plaintiff received a disciplinary notice and behavioral write up, which Plaintiff claims was in 5 retaliation for his reporting quota cheating. That notice falsely accused Plaintiff of yelling and 6 being disruptive. The write up was issued and signed by Joy Willis, an Amazon central HR 7 investigator. Plaintiff asserts that the write up incorporated Jane Doe 2’s false narrative and 8 disregarded Plaintiff’s version of events. 9 On December 7, 2024, Plaintiff claims that Jane Doe 3 chased him down a corridor and 10 struck him on the upper back. Plaintiff fled and promptly sought help from two managers. The 11 first, Kyra Carpenter, who had been Plaintiff’s direct manager for a brief period earlier that year, 12 looked up at Plaintiff from her laptop as he approached her in visible distress, but looked away 13 and back down at her laptop without saying a word. So, Plaintiff sought out Nick B., another 14 manager, to report the attack. Jasmine, a loss prevention employee, later stated that she would 15 review the security footage, but then “issued a false statement” that Plaintiff had “turned around 16 and pointed a finger at her face” (presumably Jane Doe 3’s face) while he fled. Plaintiff asserts 17 that he never pointed a finger, but “simply raised an open hand while identifying the batterer 18 during his report of the assault.” Plaintiff claims that Jasmine, Carpenter, and Nick B. “falsely 19 corroborated each other’s accounts to portray Plaintiff as the aggressor.” Willis issued a second 20 behavioral write up against Plaintiff, which write up included the falsehood that Plaintiff was the 21 aggressor. Plaintiff asserts that Amazon failed to take corrective action, ignored exculpatory 22 video evidence, and used the falsified reports to “justify continued retaliation.” Plaintiff asserts 23 that Carpenter’s conduct also “reflects retaliatory motive and racial bias” because Plaintiff had 24 previously reported Carpenter for failing to follow policy. 25 After the December 2024 incident, Plaintiff repeatedly requested transfers to other 26 departments. His requests were denied. Plaintiff states that he was forced to resign on April 3, 27 2025, due to intolerable working conditions. Plaintiff claims that after his resignation, Amazon 1 Employment, Training, and Rehabilitation (“DETR”), falsely accusing Plaintiff of property 2 damage and aggressive conduct. Plaintiff claims that these defamatory statements were on 3 DETR’s portal (it is unclear if they were published or public) and damaged his reputation and 4 employment prospects. 5 A. Plaintiff’s claims arising under Title VII, NRS 613.330, and NRS 613.340. 6 Plaintiff brings claims for race/color discrimination, retaliation, “failure to prevent 7 discrimination and harassment,” and “constructive discharge/wrongful termination” that arise 8 under Title VII, NRS 613.330, and NRS 613.340 due to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants’ 9 actions were racially motivated. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (explaining that it is unlawful for 10 an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 11 conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 12 national origin”); see Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.330(1) (explaining that it is unlawful for an employer to 13 “discriminate against any person with respect to the person’s compensation, terms, conditions or 14 privileges of employment, because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 15 gender identity or expression, age, disability or national origin”); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 16 (explaining that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the 17 employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); 18 see Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.340(1) (explaining that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 19 against an employee because the employee has “opposed any practice made an unlawful 20 employment practice by NRS 613.133 or 613.310 to 613.4383, inclusive”); see Lawson v. 21 Washington, 296 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, for the purposes of Title VII, a 22 “constructive discharge occurs when a person quits his job under circumstances in which a 23 reasonable person would feel that the conditions of employment have become intolerable”); see 24 Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 216 P.3d 788, 791 (Nev. 2009) (declining to recognize a claim for 25 tortious discharge where an adequate statutory remedy, such as NRS Chapter 613, already exists). 26 However, both Plaintiff’s claims arising under Title VII and those arising under NRS Chapter 613 27 require Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies first. 1 Before filing employment discrimination claims in federal court pursuant to Title VII, 2 plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination. 42 3 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Title 4 VII and the EEOC’s implementing regulations set forth specific administrative procedures that a 5 complainant must first exhaust before gaining access to the federal courts on a discrimination 6 complaint.”). Title VII directs that a “charge ... shall be filed” with the Equal Employment 7 Opportunity Commission “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved” within 180 days 8 “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occur[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (e)(1); Fort 9 Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 544-45 (2019). For complaints concerning a practice 10 occurring in a State or political subdivision that has a fair employment agency of its own 11 empowered “to grant or seek relief,”—in Nevada, the Nevada Equal Rights Commission 12 (“NERC”)—Title VII instructs the complainant to file her charge first with the state or local 13 agency. § 2000e–5(c); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a). The complainant then has 300 days following 14 the challenged practice, or 30 days after receiving notice that state or local proceedings have 15 ended, “whichever is earlier,” to file a charge with the EEOC. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If the state or 16 local agency has a “worksharing” agreement with the EEOC, a complainant ordinarily need not 17 file separately with federal and state agencies. He may file his charge with one agency, and that 18 agency will then relay the charge to the other. See 29 CFR § 1601.13 (2018). 19 Upon receiving a charge, the EEOC notifies the employer and investigates the allegations. 20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b). If the Commission finds “reasonable cause” to believe the charge is 21 true, the Act instructs the Commission to “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful 22 employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Ibid. 23 When informal methods do not resolve the charge, the EEOC has first option to “bring a civil 24 action” against the employer in court. § 2000e–5(f)(1). 25 In the event that the EEOC determines there is “n[o] reasonable cause to believe that the 26 charge is true,” the Commission is to dismiss the charge and notify the complainant of his or her 27 right to sue in court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), f(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. Whether or not the EEOC 1 filed. § 2000e–5(f)(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. And within 90 days following such notice, the 2 complainant may commence a civil action against the allegedly offending employer. § 2000e– 3 5(f)(1). 4 Under Nevada law, a person claiming discrimination under NRS 613.330 or NRS 613.340 5 may file a complaint with the NERC. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.405(1). Under NRS 613.420(1), if 6 NERC “does not conclude that an unfair employment practice within the scope of NRS 613.310 7 to 613.4383, inclusive, has occurred, the Commission shall issue,” amongst other things, a right- 8 to-sue notice “indicat[ing] that the person may, not later than 90 days after the date of receipt of 9 the right-to-sue notice, bring a civil action in district court against the person named in the 10 complaint.” However, no action authorized by NRS 613.420 may be brought more than 180 11 days after the date of the act complained of. Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.430(a). The Nevada Supreme 12 Court has held that “the legislature intended that claims involving employment discrimination 13 were to be administratively exhausted prior to seeking redress in the district courts.” Palmer v. 14 State, 787 P.2d 803, 804 (Nev. 1990). The Nevada Supreme Court has also held that “an 15 employee who brings…claims [unrelated to discrimination claims already pursued before the 16 NERC] in the district court without first presenting them to NERC has failed to exhaust her 17 administrative remedies.” Pope v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277, 280 (Nev. 2005); see Gonzales v. 18 Harrah’s Operating Co., No. 3:13-CV-230-RCJ-WGC, 2013 WL 6284172, at *6 (D. Nev. Dec. 19 4, 2013). 20 Here, Plaintiff has neither claimed to have received a right to sue notice from the EEOC 21 and/or the NERC nor attached any evidence to show that he has. So, Plaintiff has failed to show 22 that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s 23 discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, and constructive 24 discharge/wrongful termination claims arising under Title VII, NRS 613.330, NRS 613.340 25 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 26 /// 27 /// 1 B. Subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims. 2 Plaintiff’s remaining claims for assault,1 battery,2 defamation,3 intentional infliction of 3 emotional distress,4 and negligent supervision and retention,5 all arise under Nevada law. 4 However, as outlined above, the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal Title VII claims. So, it 5 lacks federal question jurisdiction, and therefore supplemental jurisdiction, over Plaintiff’s 6 remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff does not invoke the 7 Court’s diversity jurisdiction and, even if he did, it is unclear if the Court has diversity 8 jurisdiction over his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. So, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law 9 claims without prejudice as well. 10 11 12 1 To establish a claim for assault under Nevada law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 13 (1) intended to cause harmful or offensive physical contact, and (2) the victim was put in apprehension of such contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21 (1965); Burns v. Mayer, 175 14 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1269 (D. Nev. 2001). 15 2 To establish a battery claim under Nevada law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, and (2) such contact did occur. Restatement 16 (Second) of Torts, §§ 13, 18 (1965); Burns v. Mayer, 175 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1269 (D. Nev. 2001). 17 3 Defamation encompasses both slander (spoken) and libel (written) defamatory statements. Flowers v. Carville, 292 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1232 n.1 (D. Nev. 2003). To state a claim for 18 defamation, Plaintiff must allege the following elements: “(1) a false and defamatory statement 19 by [a] defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages.” Rosen v. Tarkanian, 453 20 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Nev. 2019); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.510(1) (defining libel). 21 4 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nevada law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless 22 disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual or proximate causation.” Welder v. Univ. of S. Nevada, 833 23 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1245 (D. Nev. 2011) (quoting Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882, 886 (Nev. 1999)). 24 5 “To establish a claim for negligent hiring, training, retention, or supervision of employees, a 25 plaintiff must show (1) a duty of care defendant owed the plaintiff; (2) breach of ‘that duty by hiring, training, retaining, and/or supervising an employee even though defendant knew, or 26 should have known, of the employee’s dangerous propensities; (3) the breach was the cause of 27 plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) damages.’” Freeman Expositions, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark, 520 P.3d 803, 811 (Nev. 2022) (quoting Peterson v. Miranda, 57 F. Supp.3d 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint (ECF No. 28) 2 is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with 3 leave to amend. Plaintiff will have until June 8, 2026, to file an amended complaint if the noted 4 deficiencies can be corrected. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed 5 that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading (i.e., the original complaint) to make the amended 6 complaint complete. This is because, generally, an amended complaint supersedes the original 7 complaint. Local Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete without reference 8 to any prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no 9 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 10 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 11 Failure to comply with this order will result in the recommended dismissal of this case. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send Plaintiff 13 a copy of this order. 14 15 DATED: May 7, 2026, 16 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27