Yelton v. PHI, Inc.

279 F.R.D. 377, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140936, 2011 WL 6100445
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedDecember 7, 2011
DocketCivil Action Nos. 09-3144, 09-3475, 09-3551, 09-3459, 09-3814, 09-3496; 09-3847, 09-4197, 09-04182; 09-4350, 10-0008, 10-1328
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 279 F.R.D. 377 (Yelton v. PHI, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yelton v. PHI, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 377, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140936, 2011 WL 6100445 (E.D. La. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER

KAREN WELLS ROBY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is a PHI, Inc. and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Louisiana’s Motion for Sanctions (R. Doc. 598) seeking an order from this Court imposing sanctions against Defendant Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (“Sikorsky”). Sikorsky opposes the motion. (R. Doc. 632). The motion was heard with oral argument on Wednesday, September 28,2011.

[380]*380I. Factual Background

A. The Helicopter Crash

This product liability action arises as a result of the January 4, 2009 crash of a Sikorsky S-76C + + helicopter, N748P, in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana, which caused the death of seven people and severely injured the only surviving passenger, Steven Yelton. The accident allegedly occurred as a result of a female red-tailed hawk striking the windshield of the helicopter resulting in a loss of engine power.

The helicopter was owned and operated by Defendant/Cross Claimant PHI, Inc. (“PHI”) and manufactured by Sikorsky. While Sikorsky manufactured the helicopter, the factory-installed windshield was replaced by PHI with a non-Sikorsky after market windshield manufactured by Defendant Aeronautical Accessories, Inc. (“AAI”).

Two days after the accident, the National Transportation and Safety Board (“NTSB”) began its investigation into the cause of the crash and designated several party representatives who would participate in the investigation.1 Christopher Lowenstein, Sikorsky’s Chief Air Safety Investigator, was designated as the party representative for Sikorsky. Mr. Lowenstein participated in the NTSB investigation as Sikorsky’s party representative, and oversaw the data exchange between Sikorsky and the NTSB.2

B. The Litigation Hold

Within a few days of the accident, Sikorsky voluntarily instituted a litigation hold directed to its employees who reasonably and potentially had information and knowledge of the helicopter and the crash.3 Dr. Michael Urban, Chief of Structural Methods and Prognostics for Sikorsky, was not included in the litigation hold. The instant lawsuit was filed on March 26, 2009.

Around the time the instant lawsuit was filed, Sikorsky had rehired Dr. Wonsub Kim, a Staff Engineer of Structures Methodology and Prognostics. Phil Potts, Chief Systems Engineer-Safety/Technieal Fellow for Safety and Airworthiness & Structural Analyst Representative for Sikorsky, asked Dr. Kim to conduct an analysis of a simulated bird strike event on a S76 aircraft cockpit to help Sikorsky determine the effect of a bird strike on the S76 canopy structure.4 Dr. Kim was not advised of the litigation hold at the time he was rehired and asked to conduct the bird strike simulation.5

On April 23, 2009, Wayne Lovington, Product Safety, sent an internal email to James Antippas, the in-house attorney handling discovery for Sikorsky, in which he advised him to include “names to the legal hold for the PHI matter.” The email seemingly contained the pasted contents of an earlier email, and included the names of Sikorsky employees who received an earlier email regarding the estimate for the bird strike analysis including, Frank Krzyzanki, S76 Project Engineer-Team Lead, Dr. Wonsub Kim, Eric Hansen, Senior Program Manager, Alan Dobyns6, and Phil Potts.7

[381]*381C. PHI’s Discovery Requests

On September 2, 2009, PHI and Plaintiffs propounded their first set of joint discovery to Sikorsky.8 Before Sikorsky could respond to the initial discovery, PHI separately propounded discovery consisting of additional interrogatories, requests for production, and seventy-four requests for admissions.9

Several of the discovery requests sought information regarding any investigation, testing, analysis or studies performed or commissioned by Sikorsky concerning any failure, malfunction or defect in the S76 windshield, cockpit engine controls, or engine control quadrant throttle lever and low rotor warning system.10

D. Dr. Kim’s Report and Data

On November 30, 2009, Dr. Kim issued an internal report related to his S76 aircraft cockpit structure bird strike simulation and analysis. In his report, Dr. Kim concluded that a strike involving a 4.0 lb. bird at 136 knots would not stress the windshield beyond the defined stress limits. He further indicated that he did not model the windshield attachment fastener holds for stress.

Dr. Kim’s report also concluded that subject to the testing parameters and set of assumed failure criteria applied in his analysis, the S76 canopy structures failed at and around the impact location. According to Dr. Kim’s simulation, the components that would be damaged were the canopy skin, the upper box sill, and adhesive bond line that attaches to the triangular shaped gusset.11

E. Sikorsky’s Discovery Responses

A review of PHI’s discovery requests and Sikorsky’s responses reveals that before November 2009, Sikorsky indicated that it had no documents concerning tests or simulation of a bird strike and its impact on a S76.12 After that date, Sikorsky routinely objected to producing information and documents related to testing on the basis of overbreath, vagueness, and relevancy.13 To the extent PHI’s discovery requests sought the identity of individuals who participated in post-accident testing, Sikorsky identified Allan Clapp, Allan Lovington, Joe DaSilva, Frank Kryzanski, Phil Potts, Francis Bonomo, and Frederick Brisbois only.14

In March 2010, PHI’s counsel sent a letter to Sikorsky’s counsel, Rick Christovich, noting Sikorsky’s efforts to be forthcoming with information and documents, and further indicating that he understood why the document production may be rolling. PHI’s counsel also took issue, however, with Sikorsky’s response regarding (1) the readability/viewabil[382]*382ity and lack of color of some documents produced by Sikorsky; (2) the form of some documents produced by Sikorsky; (3) certain objections raised by Sikorsky; and (4) the incompleteness of Sikorsky’s document production.15

A few days later, PHI’s counsel sent another letter to Mr. Christovich as a supplemental request to Sikorsky to supplement its document production in response to PHI’s First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and Request for Admissions to Sikorsky.16 While not formally requested in its written discovery, counsel for PHI observed that Sikorsky had identified several employees who were involved in the development, engineering, testing and certification of the S76. Based on counsel for PHI’s review of some of the documents produced by Sikorsky, counsel for PHI informally requested documents related to fifty-nine additional people, who had information relevant to the crash investigation.17

Not satisfied with Sikorsky’s response, PHI filed a motion to compel Sikorsky’s responses to its requests for production, namely numbers 45, 46, 67, 68, 60, 61, and 69-73.18

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279 F.R.D. 377, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140936, 2011 WL 6100445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yelton-v-phi-inc-laed-2011.