Disedare v. Brumfield

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 17, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-02680
StatusUnknown

This text of Disedare v. Brumfield (Disedare v. Brumfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Disedare v. Brumfield, (E.D. La. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA CLYDE DISEDARE * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 22-2680

SGT. COLTER BRUMFIELD, ET AL. * SECTION “E” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. ECF No. 21. Defendants timely filed an Opposition Memorandum. ECF No. 27. Plaintiff sought leave and filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos. 29-31. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary. Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated herein. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Clyde Disedare filed suit asserting claims under § 1983 and for negligence and respondeat superior liability alleging that he sustained damages from the use of unnecessary and excessive force, retaliation, and negligent supervision and training relating to an incident that occurred while he was incarcerated at Rayburn Correctional Center on March 16-19, 2021. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 6-6, 55-65. Plaintiff now seeks to compel full and complete responses to certain Interrogatories and Requests for Production, arguing that Defendants’ responses have been delinquent, insufficient, and were likely not tendered by any of the defendants themselves, warranting an Order compelling production and an award of attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 21, 21-2. Defendants oppose the motion, asserting that the motion is moot as to many requests and premature as to others because Plaintiff issued his first set of discovery in advance of the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference and failed to engage in a fulsome Rule 37 conference regarding Plaintiff’s identified alleged deficiencies. Specifically, Defendant notes that Plaintiff filed his motion to compel only four business days after the parties’ Rule 37 conference, thus failing to allow Defendants an opportunity to address the deficiencies, and Plaintiff also raises “several new issues that Plaintiff’s counsel has never addressed with Defense counsel” until the filing of the motion to compel. ECF No. 27 at 4-5. Accordingly, Defendants argue, the motion and request for attorneys’ fees should be denied. Id. In Reply, Plaintiff indicates that some of the identified deficiencies have been cured, but others

remain outstanding or allegedly require certification. ECF No. 31 at 1-2. Plaintiff further argues that counsel has invested too much time “begging Defendants to sign discovery and produce relevant documents” despite Defendants’ duty to timely respond or object to discovery. Id. at 2. II. APPLICABLE LAW A. The Scope of Discovery “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). This broad

duty of disclosure extends to all documents that fit the definition of relevance for the purposes of discovery—whether the documents are good, bad, or indifferent.1 The disclosure duty is a central concept of the discovery process and finds expression not only in the rules of discovery, but also in the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit an attorney from suppressing any evidence subject to a legal obligation to reveal or produce.2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and (e) also require

1 Yelton v. PHI, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 377, 384 (E.D. La. 2011), objections overruled, 284 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. La. 2012) (citation omitted). 2 Id. a litigant to supplement disclosures and discovery responses once the litigant learns that the disclosures or discovery responses are incomplete. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Information need not be admissible into evidence to be discoverable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Rather, the information merely needs to be proportional and relevant to any claim or defense. Id. The relevancy evaluation necessarily begins with an examination of Plaintiffs’ claims.3 The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance of admissibility of evidence at the trial stage.4 This broader scope is necessary given the nature of litigation, where determinations of relevance for discovery purposes are made well in advance of trial.5 At the

discovery stage, relevance includes “[a]ny matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”6 Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes that the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.”7 If relevance is in doubt, the court should be permissive in allowing discovery.8 Facts that are not considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due course of the proceeding.9 A party seeking discovery must comply with Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality limits on discovery requests and is subject to Rule 26(g)(1)(B)’s requirement to certify that the discovery request is “(i) consistent with these rules . . . ; (ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to

harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery

3 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Crescent Ford Truck Sales, Inc., No. 02-3398, 2006 WL 378523, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2006) (Zainey, J.). 4 Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted). 5 Id. at 590 n.5 (citation omitted). 6 Id. at 590 (citations omitted). 7 Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (citing Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). 8 E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro– Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 9 Rangel, 274 F.R.D. at 590 n.5. in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B). B. Obligation to Hold Rule 26(f) Conference Before Beginning Discovery Rule 26(d)(1) precludes a party from seeking discovery until the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except when the case is exempt from initial disclosures, when otherwise authorized by the rules, by stipulation, or by court order. The requirement for a Rule 26(f) conference is not a mere technicality.10 Only after the defendants have appeared and the parties have held the required Rule 26(f) conference may discovery commence.11

Rule 26(d)(2)(B) expressly addresses how responses to prematurely served Rule 34 requests,12 but the rule does not provide a similar procedure for prematurely served interrogatories or requests for admission. Courts that have addressed the issue hold that premature requests for admission, served before the Rule 26(f) conference, are not deemed admitted by failing to respond13 and may be stricken.14 Further, responses may not be compelled for premature discovery.15 C. Rule 37’s Meet and Confer Requirement In connection with a discovery motion, Rule 37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

10 See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Peuler, No.

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Disedare v. Brumfield, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disedare-v-brumfield-laed-2023.