Wp Company LLC v. U.S. Small Business Administration

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided November 24, 2020·No. Civil Action No. 2020-1240·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WP COMPANY LLC d/b/a THE WASHINGTON POST, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 20-1240 (JEB) U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 20-1614 (JEB) U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On November 5, 2020, in these two Freedom of Information Act cases, this Court

ordered the Small Business Administration to “release the names, addresses, and precise loan

amounts” for borrowers that had obtained loans approved pursuant to the Paycheck Protection

Program and the Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) program. See No. 20-1240, ECF No.

22 (Order) at 2. Unhappy with that disposition, the agency now moves to put it on hold, seeking

a stay as it decides whether to appeal to the D.C. Circuit. Although cognizant that a denial of

such Motion could moot an appeal, the Court nonetheless finds that the relevant factors weigh

against a stay. It will, accordingly, deny the Motion and order SBA to release the requested

1 information by December 1, 2020. This will at least provide the agency a week to notice its

appeal and seek an administrative stay in the D.C. Circuit if it so chooses.

I. Background

As the facts and procedural history of these FOIA suits are set out in this Court’s recent

summary-judgment Opinion, see WP Co. LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Nos. 20-1240, 20-

1614, 2020 WL 6504534 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2020), the briefest of summaries will suffice.

Plaintiffs — a host of national-news organizations — submitted FOIA requests for records

concerning the PPP and EIDL program. Id. at *3. Administered by SBA, those programs

constituted the primary means by which the federal government assisted small businesses

adversely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. As of early November, the agency had processed

and approved $525 billion in more than 5.2 million individual PPP loans, along with an

additional $192 billion in EIDL loans. Id. at *2–3.

After their FOIA requests failed to bear fruit, Plaintiffs brought two largely identical suits

in this Court seeking an order requiring SBA to make available various loan-level data. Id. at

*3–4. Although the agency released some loan information in July, the data, much to Plaintiffs’

displeasure, contained glaring gaps: it did not provide both dollar figures and borrower names

and addresses for a single PPP loan. Id. at *3. For some loans, SBA released the recipient’s

name and address, but withheld the actual loan amount; for others, it disclosed precise dollar

amounts, but reserved borrower names and addresses. Id. SBA eventually settled on a similar

partial-disclosure approach for the EIDL data. Id. at *4. According to the agency, its

withholdings were based on FOIA Exemptions 4 and 6, which protect, respectively, confidential

commercial information and information the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. at *3–4 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (6)).

2 Objecting to those withholdings, Plaintiffs in both cases cross-moved for summary

judgment. Id. at *4. This Court ultimately agreed that neither of SBA’s claimed FOIA

exemptions covered the requested information. Id. at *9, 18. It accordingly ordered the agency

to release the names, addresses, and precise loan amounts for all individuals and entities that had

received PPP or EIDL COVID-related loans by November 19, 2020. See Order at 2.

A week before that deadline arrived, SBA moved to stay this Court’s Order until

December 7, 2020, or, if it files a notice of appeal by that date, pending appeal. See No. 20-

1240, ECF No. 24 (Def. Mem.) at 2. As a fallback, it seeks a stay pending the Circuit’s

resolution of any such future stay motion there. Id. This Court subsequently issued a temporary

stay of its Order just to cover the period during which it deliberated on the merits of the agency’s

Motion. See No. 20-1240, 11/13/20 Min. Order. Plaintiffs’ Opposition and SBA’s Reply having

been filed, the Court is now ready to rule.

II. Legal Standard

The party seeking a stay pending appeal bears the burden of justifying it based upon the

following factors: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of

the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay;

(3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest

in granting the stay.” Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974, 978 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). This familiar test is “‘essentially the same’ as the test for a preliminary injunction,

‘although courts often recast the likelihood of success factor as requiring only that the movant

demonstrate a serious legal question on appeal where the balance of harms favors a stay.’”

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Off. of Admin., 565 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 n.1

(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 & n.5 (D.D.C. 2005)). In

3 assessing the propriety of a stay, the Court bears in mind that it is an “extraordinary remedy,”

Cuomo, 772 F.2d at 978, that is “not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise

result” to the movant. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Instead, a stay is “an exercise of judicial discretion” that turns upon the

particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 433 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Merits of Appeal

In considering the four factors, the Court begins with the likelihood of SBA’s success on

appeal. The agency devotes the bulk of its Motion to arguing that it is likely to prevail on the

merits of its appeal, should it elect to file one. See Def. Mem. at 7–12. In so doing, SBA offers

little that it has not already argued and that the Court has not already rejected. The Court

remains convinced that its prior Opinion correctly resolved the legal issues present in these

cases. It recognizes, however, that so long as the other three factors “strongly favor a stay, such

remedy is appropriate if ‘a serious legal question is presented.’” Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d

108, 110 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Off. of

Admin., 593 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D.D.C. 2009)); see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n

v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Court does not dispute that

the present cases involve a novel application of FOIA Exemptions 4 and 6 and raise serious legal

questions and issues that do not lend themselves to immediate or obvious resolution. Indeed, the

length of the Court’s prior Opinion — a not-insubstantial 40 pages — implicitly admits as much.

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