Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

664 F. App'x 20

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: October 18, 2016
• Docket: 16-857-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant LaQuisha Worthy-Pugh, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”): (I) that the Connecticut Superior Court’s prior judgment of strict foreclosure was void ab ini-tio, (II) for extrinsic fraud, (III) for theft of funds, (IV) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (V) to quiet title, and (VI) for slander of title. She also appeals from the district court’s subsequent order denying reconsideration of that decision. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively seek review of state court judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 76 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). A claim is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when: “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiffs federal suit commenced.” McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010). We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009).

Claims I, V, and VI are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. A Connecticut state court issued a strict foreclosure judgment against Worthy-Pugh. Claims I, V, and VI challenge this judgment and effectively request that the federal district court rule that the judgment was void. See Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the plaintiff asked the federal court “to review the state proceedings and determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in error”). Worthy-Pugh’s argument that the judgment was void because it was obtained through a fraudulent scheme to interfere with the judicial process does not defeat application of Rooker-Feldman. See id. (“To the extent [plaintiff] asks the federal court to grant him title to his property because the foreclosure judgment was obtained fraudulently, Rooker-Feldman bars [his] claim.”). The district court lacked jurisdiction to invalidate the foreclosure judgment.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a district court from reviewing a claim for damages stemming from an allegedly fraudulent foreclosure judgment, because the district court can determine damages liability without reviewing the propriety of the state court judgment. See id. at 427-28 (stating that the plaintiff’s complaint was not barred by Rooker-Feld-man to the extent that he sought damages from the defendants for injuries suffered from the alleged mortgage-foreclosure fraud). Claim II can be liberally construed as asserting a fraud claim seeking damages. Therefore, Worthy-Pugh is correct that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over this claim.

However, the district court properly dismissed Claim II on the alternate ground of res judicata. We review de novo a district court’s application of res judicata principles. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1997). When applying the doctrine of res judicata, “a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); see also O’Connor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Under Connecticut state law, a prior action bars subsequent litigation between the same parties arising from the same subject matter, provided the precluded party had an adequate opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding. O’Con-nor, 568 F.3d at 69. A party has not had an adequate opportunity to’ litigate a claim if “the court in the first action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion.” Id. at 71 (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Ryt-man, 241 Conn. 24, 694 A.2d 1246, 1257 (1997)); see also id. at 69 (“Claim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made.”) (quoting Joe’s Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 236 Conn. 863, 675 A.2d 441, 446 (1996)). Connecticut state law permits a defendant in a strict foreclosure action to present counterclaims for damages based on alleged mortgage fraud. See Morgera v. Chiappardi, 74 Conn.App. 442, 813 A.2d 89, 92, 100 (2003). Thus, the district court properly determined that res judicata barred Worthy-Pugh’s mortgage-fraud claim, because she had the opportunity to litigate that claim in her prior state court action. Contrary to Worthy-Pugh’s contention, neither her reliance on “extrinsic fraud” nor the “newly discovered evidence” that purportedly bolstered her fraud claim affected the res judicata analysis and she cites to no authority suggesting otherwise.

Worthy-Pugh’s challenge to the dismissal of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim also lacks merit. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 22 A.3d 1214, 1221 (2011). To trigger liability, the alleged conduct must “exceed[] all bounds usually tolerated by decent society,” Appleton v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 757 A.2d 1059, 1062 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the emotional distress “must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it,” Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n, 316 Conn. 558, 113 A.3d 932, 957 (2015). We review dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting as true all facts alleged in the complaint and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Entm’t Prop. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016). Here, even accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, Worthy-Pugh has failed to allege emotional distress that was sufficiently severe to trigger liability. See Squeo, 113 A.3d at 951 n.15; Appleton, 254 Conn. at 210-12, 757 A.2d 1059. 1

Finally, though Worthy-Pugh states in her notice of appeal that she is challenging the denial of reconsideration by the district court, she raises no specific arguments concerning that denial. In any event, because dismissal was warranted, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. See Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[D]enial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

We have considered Worthy-Pugh’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

1 . In addition, Worthy-Pugh raises no arguments on appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of her theft-of-funds claim. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of that claim. United States v. Joyner, 313 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2002) ("It is well established that an argument not raised on appeal is deemed abandoned and lost”).