Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 10, 2023
Docket7:23-cv-01981
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BENITA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1981 (ALC) -against- ORDER BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO., Defendant. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge: Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant has violated her rights with respect to a foreclosure proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court, Orange County. She sues Branch Banking & Trust Company. Plaintiff also filed an unsigned order to show cause requesting preliminary injunctive relief. She asks the Court to “Vacate Void Judgment/& Sheriff Sale and grant order for Quiet Title.” (ECF 3, at 11.) To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits of her case or (b)sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W.V. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F. 3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2000). Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s submissions do not demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (2)sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims – in which she asks this Court to review and vacate a judgment in a state court foreclosure proceeding – are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 See Worthy-Puqh v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 664 F. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2016) (plaintiff's quiet title claim properly dismissed because it

“challenge[d] [the state court foreclosure] judgment and effectively request[ed] that the federal district court rule that the judgment was void”); Gifford v. United N. Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., No. 18- CV-6324 (PAE) (HBP), 2019 WL 2912489, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2019) (fraud claims based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendants presented the state court with allegedly “void” and “forged” documents barred by Rooker-Feldman) (citation omitted); Pennicott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank. N.A., No. 16-CV-3044 (VB), 2018 WL 1891312 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2018) (“Rooker- Feldman bars claims that ask a court to find a defendant lacked standing to pursue foreclosure in a prior state court action, because such claims require a court to sit in review of the state court judgment.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an order to show cause (ECF 2) is DENIED. The Court

will fully address the merits of the complaint in due course. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s request for an order to show cause (ECF 2) is DENIED. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine–created by two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983)–precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). Cf Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: March 10, 2023. 7 (= New York, New York f ANDREW L. CARTER, JR. United States District Judge

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Related

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
544 U.S. 280 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
664 F. App'x 20 (Second Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-branch-banking-trust-co-nysd-2023.