Woods v. Broomfield

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 25, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00120
StatusUnknown

This text of Woods v. Broomfield (Woods v. Broomfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woods v. Broomfield, (S.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Earnest C. WOODS, II, Case No.: 24-cv-0120-AGS-AHG

5 Petitioner, ORDER: 6 v. (1) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF 2); 7

8 Ron BROOMFIELD, et al., (2) DISMISSING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 9 Respondents. PREJUDICE (ECF 1); 10 (3) DENYING AS MOOT ANCILLARY 11 MOTIONS (ECF 3–7); AND 12 (4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 13 APPEALABILITY 14

15 Petitioner Earnest Woods, II, is a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus 16 challenging his 1987 conviction and sentence in San Diego County Superior Court case 17 number CR 83908. (See ECF 1 at 1.) Woods has requested to proceed in forma pauperis, 18 that is without paying the court’s filing fee. (ECF 2). Woods also has filed a pile of other 19 motions. (See ECF 3–7.) Since this case must be dismissed, though, each of those is moot. 20 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 21 The statement of recent account activity accompanying Woods’s motion to proceed 22 in forma pauperis reflects a $2,316.13 balance in Woods’s inmate trust account as of 23 January 3, 2024. (ECF 2 at 5–9.) The filing fee associated with this type of action is $5.00. 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because it appears Woods can pay the requisite filing fee, the 25 Court DENIES Woods’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 26 27 28 1 Because this Court cannot proceed until Woods has either paid the $5.00 filing fee 2 or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, the case is subject to dismissal without 3 prejudice.1 See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 4 SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITION BAR 5 Even if Woods had paid the fee, his habeas petition is barred as a second or 6 successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (barring subsequent habeas petitions 7 unless “the appropriate court of appeals” permits the petition after motion). Wood admits 8 this is not his first federal habeas petition challenging his 1987 conviction and sentence. 9 (See ECF 1, at 5.) On August 27, 1991, Woods filed a petition challenging this same 10 conviction and sentence. (See ECF 1, So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM)). On 11 June 26, 1992, the Court denied that petition on the merits. (See ECF 12, So. Dist. Cal. 12 Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM)). On October 29, 1992, the Ninth Circuit denied Woods’s 13 request for a certificate of probable cause. (See ECF 17, So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 91cv1175 14 H (HRM) (copy of Ninth Circuit’s order)). On May 20, 2004, the Ninth Circuit also denied 15 Woods’s application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 16 petition with respect to that same conviction. (See ECF 19, So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 17 91cv1175 H (HRM) (copy of Ninth Circuit’s order)); see also ECF 2 in Woods v. Borg, 18 No. 04-71661 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court takes judicial notice of these prior filings and 19 orders. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take 20 judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court 21 in other cases.”). 22 23

24 25 1 Woods asserts that officials refused to provide a certified copy of his trust-account statement or process his trust-account withdrawal form to facilitate payment of the filing 26 fee. (See, e.g. ECF 2, at 1–2.) He asks the Court to direct the institution to comply with his 27 requests. (Id.) Yet the attached documents reflect that Woods’s trust withdrawal was not processed because it was incomplete. (See id. at 39.) At any rate, there are other reasons to 28 1 Woods asserts that the instant petition should not be found either abusive or 2 successive because of an intervening change in law, citing: (1) several recent California 3 statutes; (2) federal case law and federal Constitutional provisions; and (3) purported 4 newly discovered evidence, which might serve to satisfy an exception to the bar against 5 second and successive petitions. (See generally ECF 1.) 6 But the fact remains that a habeas petition is “second or successive” when a 7 petitioner challenges “the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court” as 8 in a prior petition. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007). Thus, even were Woods 9 able to demonstrate that the instant petition falls within the statutory provisions allowing 10 him to file a second or successive habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B), he 11 must first present that argument and obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit. See 12 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Morales v. Sherman, 949 F.3d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2020) 13 (per curiam) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) is “a provision that bars district 14 courts from entertaining a second or successive petition unless its filing has first been 15 authorized by the court of appeals”). Woods concedes he has not obtained permission from 16 the Ninth Circuit. (See ECF 1, at 5.) Thus, to the extent Woods challenges his 1987 17 conviction and sentence, this Court may not consider the petition.2 18 19 20 21 22 2 The Court takes judicial notice that Woods has on multiple prior occasions 23 attempted to challenge this same 1987 conviction and sentence in petitions which were each dismissed as second or successive. (See, e.g., ECF 7 in So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 24 21cv1391 JLS (DEB) (summary dismissal of successive petition); ECF 2 in So. Dist. Cal. 25 Case No. 16cv1453 CAB (NLS) (same); ECF 8 in So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 15cv1772 WQH (NLS) (same); ECF 5 in So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 14cv0289 GPC (RBB) (same); ECF 4 in 26 So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 12cv3088 AJB (NLS) (same); ECF 6 in So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 27 09cv1730 WQH (NLS) (same); ECF 40 in So. Dist. Cal. Case No. 04cv230 BEN (BLM) (order adopting report and recommendation and granting motion to dismiss petition as 28 1 CLAIM CHALLENGING ACTIONS OF PRISON OFFICIALS 2 In his petition, Woods also contends “California” has violated his First Amendment 3 right against retaliation and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process “by seizing 4 money derived from his Veteran’s benefits to pay court costs.” (ECF 1, at 38.) 5 Yet this allegation doesn’t affect the “fact or length of custody,” so it falls under 6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 7 (1973) (“[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a 8 constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of 9 his custody.”); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 10 (“[W]e hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it 11 may not be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”) 12 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)).

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Burton v. Stewart
549 U.S. 147 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. John Paul Wilson
631 F.2d 118 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Paolino v. JF Realty, LLC
830 F.3d 8 (First Circuit, 2016)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Nicolas Morales v. Stuart Sherman
949 F.3d 474 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Skinner v. Switzer
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (Supreme Court, 2011)

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Woods v. Broomfield, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woods-v-broomfield-casd-2024.