Woodcraft Corp. v. United States

173 F. Supp. 613, 146 Ct. Cl. 101, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 149
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 3, 1959
DocketNo. 260-56
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 173 F. Supp. 613 (Woodcraft Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodcraft Corp. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 613, 146 Ct. Cl. 101, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 149 (cc 1959).

Opinion

BeyaN, District Judge,

sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court:

Ambiguities in the contract, it is alleged, caused additional costs in the manufacture of several thousand camp tables for the United States Army, and for these outlays the contractor now petitions us to award judgment against the United States. Having satisfied the contract price, the Government replies that the incurrence of the added expense was wholly voluntary and without promise or obligation, express or implied, of reimbursement. We agree with the defendant.

Condensed, the facts are these. A preproduction, finished specimen table was, pursuant to the contract, submitted to the Government’s contracting officer and, in the respects relevant here, approved by him. After about 600 of the tables similar to the sample had been processed, they were exhibited to the Army Quartermaster’s inspector. He found they failed in two particulars to meet the specifications. First, he said, “the four vertical edges of each leg” had not been “sanded smooth”. Second, he noted in the language of the specifications again, that although “All surfaces of the table” had been “given a coat of sealer” and “after drying, a coat of olive drab enamel” had been “applied to all surfaces”, yet because the table tops were still not attractive, “the finished articles” were not “free from any defect which may affect appearance”.

One imprecision in the specifications is that “vertical edges” could mean either the flat faces of the square, tapering legs of the table or the line of intersection of the planes of the faces. Plaintiff had assumed the latter; the inspector held the other view. The other uncertainty arose because the table tops were of cottonwood, and this wood, while acceptable under the contract, is soft as well as varying in its parts in absorbency, with the result that a sealer or paint will raise the fiber and grain of the wood. The effect is to mar the appearance without lessening the durability of the table.

Entirely amenable, the contractor dismantled the tables and reprocessed them, as well as the materials awaiting assembly, in conformity with the inspector’s judgment. This pattern was followed for several weeks until this inspector [103]*103was replaced by another. But the successor inspector decided, on inquiry from the plaintiff, that the original method of finishing the tables was proper. Whereupon the contractor reverted to that process and in that form completed the contract. The additional costs now sought are the expense occasioned by the adoption of the first inspector’s interpretation.

For our decision, we may accept the plaintiff’s assertion of ambiguity in both of the pertinent specifications. We may likewise grant that the new work was actually not within the contract and, also arguendo, that the first inspector’s directions caused the excess investment now claimed by the plaintiff. But still the loss would be unrecoverable. The reason is that in these disbursements the plaintiff was a volunteer.

Quite explicitly the contract vested the contracting officer, subject only to appeal, with the power to resolve “any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract”. Further, at the inception of the agreement the contractor was advised in writing by the Government, inter alia,: “The Inspector has no authority to advise or direct a contractor to use a particular method of production. * * * If a contractor * * * accepts advice from an inspector, the contractor assumes sole responsibility for the results thereof.”

As the plaintiff must admit, the additional costs were ultra oontractum,. Therefore, to win their recovery some extrinsic promise, implied or express, must be shown, such as an involuntary and compelled compliance, an allowed extra or a change in the contract. But an expenditure could not be involuntary and compelled without a previous protest to the contracting officer; J. A. Ross & Company v. United States, 126 C. Cl. 323, 329 (1953); and under the contract he alone could bind the defendant to an extra or a change. Thus, the plaintiff having acceded without objection to the inspector’s demands, and now unable to plead either an ordered extra or an authorized change, the plaintiff’s claim is without legal predicate.

We have thus far considered the questions presented by the plaintiff’s claim as matters of law. But if they be [104]*104factual, the administrative action has adequately and conclusively answered them. Dejected by the contracting officer, on review the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals likewise adjudged the claim unfounded.

Denial and dismissal of the petition are ordered.

Laramore, Judge./ Madden, Judge; Whitaker, Judge, and Jones, Chief Judge, concur,

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Mastín G. White, and the briefs and arguments of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. The plaintiff is, and at all times material to this action was, a corporation duly created, organized, and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan, with its principal office and place of business at Bay City, Michigan.

2. On September 25, 1951, the plaintiff and the defendant (acting through a contracting officer of the Chicago Quartermaster Depot, United States Army Quartermaster Purchasing Division) entered into a written contract, No. DA 11-009-QM-13021 (hereafter referred to in the findings as “the contract”), whereby the plaintiff agreed to construct and deliver to the defendant 15,398 folding camp tables. The tables were to be made of wood and in accordance with Military Specification MIL-T-3338, “Table, Camp, Folding,” dated November 7, 1950 (hereafter referred to in the findings as “the specifications”), at a unit price of $6.508 per table, or a total contract price of $100,210.18.

3. The contract contained the following general provisions (among others):

2. CHANGES
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and without notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general, scope of this contract, in any one or more of the following: (i) drawings, designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to he specially manufactured for the Government in accordance therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery. If any such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, performance of this contract, an equitable adjust[105]*105ment shall be made in the contract price or delivery schedule, or both, and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly. Any claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted within SO days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of the notification of change: Provided, however, That the Contracting Officer, if he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and act upon any such claim asserted at any time prior to final payment under this contract. Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled “Disputes.” However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the contract as changed.
3. EXTRAS

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Bluebook (online)
173 F. Supp. 613, 146 Ct. Cl. 101, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodcraft-corp-v-united-states-cc-1959.