Womack v. Shell Chemical Co.

514 F. Supp. 1062, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13843
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedMay 18, 1981
DocketCiv. A. 80-06-50H
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 514 F. Supp. 1062 (Womack v. Shell Chemical Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Womack v. Shell Chemical Co., 514 F. Supp. 1062, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13843 (S.D. Ala. 1981).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAND, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Shell Chemical Company, a division of Shell Oil Company (Shell). Shell seeks summary judgment on each claim asserted by plaintiff Joe Neal Womack (Womack) on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Shell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Womack initially brought this action against Shell under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Womack alleged:

[Womack] was not promoted by [Shell] because [Womack] is black and for no other valid reason.
Donna Lowery [a white female accountant] was promoted over [Womack] because [Womack] is black and for no other reason.

(Complaint ¶ 13, ¶ 15).

[Womack] was [in February 1980] denied the training [on Shell’s Product Cost Information System that had been given to his white predecessor, Donna Lowery.
This training has been denied [Womack] because he is black and for no other reason.

(Complaint ¶ 18 and ¶ 19).

The rating system used by [Shell] to grade its professional staff, specifically its accounting staff, is applied to those employees desiring a promotion in such an arbitrary and capricious manner by [Shell] ... so as to amount to no rating system at all, but merely a device to promote some employees and deny promotion to others not based on actual job performance.

(Complaint ¶ 22 (emphasis supplied).

Shell answered the complaint and asserted defenses under Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 23, 1980, this court dismissed (a) all claims under the fourteenth amendment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (b) the promotion claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as barred by the statute of limitations. 1 The court retained for adjudication (a) the promotion claim under Title VII and (b) the Product Cost Information System (PCIS) training claim under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court has not previously addressed Womack’s allegation that the rating system utilized by Shell to grade professional accounting staff is “arbitrary and capricious” and “is applied” as “a device” to deny promotion to “some employees.” Although Womack did not allege that the rating system is applied as a device to deny promotion on the basis óf race, the court has liberally construed the allegation within the context of Womack’s other claims of race discrimination and has fully considered the claim herein.

Shell seeks summary judgment on the following grounds:

(1) This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 2 over Womack’s Title VII claims *1065 (promotion and PCIS) because Womack failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in connection with the only claimed act of racial discrimination — a poor performance rating given Womack in March 1977;

(2) Womack has failed to adduce facts to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under either Title VII or § 1981 in connection with his failure to achieve promotion, his delay in receiving training on the Product Cost Information System, or the application of Shell’s rating system; and,

(3) Eegardless whether Womack could establish a prima facie case, Shell has adduced undisputed facts articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the promotion and PCIS decisions and Womack has filed to adduce facts to establish that the proffered reasons are a pretext for racial discrimination.

The court is cognizant that summary judgment is “especially questionable” in employment discrimination cases, because such eases necessarily involve examining motive and intent. Summary judgment should be used cautiously in such cases and all procedural requirements must be given strict adherence. See Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981); Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979) 3 The Fifth Circuit has particularly cautioned against summary disposition “on a potentially inadequate factual presentation.” Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979). See also, 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[7] (2d ed. 1980).

In considering the motion for summary judgment, this court may not adjudicate factual issues. This court’s duty is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried. Shell has the burden of clearly establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against Shell. In reviewing the entire record, this court has viewed the facts together with all underlying inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to Womack. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1979); Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.15 (2d ed. 1976).

Furthermore, in considering a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case such as this, the court must fully heed the admonition of the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977):

[Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.

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Bluebook (online)
514 F. Supp. 1062, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13843, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/womack-v-shell-chemical-co-alsd-1981.