Wm. A. Smith Contracting Co. v. United States

155 Ct. Cl. 44
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 19, 1961
DocketNo. 279-59
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 155 Ct. Cl. 44 (Wm. A. Smith Contracting Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wm. A. Smith Contracting Co. v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 44 (cc 1961).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

This case was referred pursuant to Rule 45 to W. Ney Evans, a trial commissioner of this court, with directions to make findings of fact and recommendations for conclusions of law. The commissioner has done so in a report filed March 16,1960. Briefs were filed by both parties, exceptions to the commissioner’s findings was filed by the plaintiff, and the case was submitted to the court on oral argument by counsel. Since, after full consideration of the record, the court is in agreement with the findings and recommendations of the trial commissioner, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover and its petition will be dismissed.

It is so ordered.

OPINION OR COMMISSIONER

The contract in suit, for the rehabilitation of 24.3 miles of track of The Alaska Railroad, was performed by plaintiff to the satisfaction of the contracting officer. Plaintiff now seeks recovery for breach of the contract by defendant.

[46]*46All of tbe evidence in tbe case was received at a pretrial conference.1 It consists of (1) tbe official report of proceedings before the Board of Contract Appeals of tbe Department of tbe Interior; 2 (2) the exhibits received by tbe Board in that proceeding; and (3) tbe recommendations of tbe Board’s examiner and the decision of tbe Board.

Since tbe contract’s disputes clause contained tbe standard provision according finality to administrative decisions of “any dispute concerning a question of fact,” the threshold problem here is whether or not any of plaintiff’s disputes with tbe contracting officer was so predicated as to remove it from tbe question-of-fact category.3

The first of plaintiff’s claims relates to the bid item under which the contractor was to “raise, line, and dress track.”

The contract required that “ballast to make an average 6" raise (1,770 cubic yards per mile) will be spread to make two separate track lifts * * and that, “as an over all lift of six (6") inches is required, the first raise should be approximately four inches (4") although considerable variation from this rule must be allowed to eliminate sags and humps in the existing grade line.”

Plaintiff says that, in preparing its bid, it read these specifications to mean (1) that the track had to be lifted twice, for an overall raise of 6 inches, and (2) that ballast averaging 6 inches had to be placed, but not in two lifts on new ballast. The contracting officer required plaintiff to make two lifts on new ballast.

[47]*47Since plaintiff had already made one lift, while it was replacing and respacing ties, before the new ballast (to be supplied by the Railroad) was available, plaintiff contends the contracting officer in effect required an overall raise of 9 or 10 inches, in three raises, and that the third raise was extra work for which the contractor should receive an equitable adjustment.

In this connection plaintiff relies on the line of cases typified by Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. United States,4 wherein the court said:

* * * Where the Government draws specifications which are fairly susceptible of a certain construction and the contractor actually and reasonably so construes them, justice and equity require that that construction be adopted. * * *

The Board of Contract Appeals ruled, in effect, that the specifications were not susceptible of the construction urged by plaintiff.

Was this a dispute concerning a question of fact, within the meaning of the disputes clause ?

In Martin Wunderlich et al. v. Uriited States,5 the court said No, referring to “the unanimity of statement by courts that questions of the interpretation of written documents were‘questions of law’ * *

Wwnderlieh was reversed.6 The Supreme Court upheld the finality of the administrative decisions under the disputes clause in the absence of conscious wrongdoing.7

The so-called Wunderlich statute followed.8 Section 2 of the act provided:

No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.

[48]*48Considering the history of the Wunderlich Act, and the provisions of section 1,9 the foregoing provisions of section 2 must be deemed to place “question of law” in juxtaposition to “question of fact” within the meaning of the discussion of such juxtaposition in the Wwnderlich decision of the Court of Claims.

The Court of Claims opinion in Wwnderlich noted that:

* * * questions of the interpretation of written documents are not, speaking with analytical accuracy, in most cases questions of law in the sense that a lawyer or judge has the special skill needed to answer them. They may be questions of agriculture, or engineering, or ¿nance, or. medicine, or law. In the division of judicial functions between the judge and the lay jury which only by accident would have the requisite skill in a particular case, the judge reserved this function to himself, presumably as being more competent than the jury. And judges and lawyers began to call the questions “questions of law,” as a short way of saying that they should be decided by the judge. * * *

In the instant case, the question, in plaintiff’s first claim, is whether or not the specifications were reasonably susceptible of the interpretation which plaintiff says it placed upon them in the preparation of its bid. As between judge and jury, it might be for the jury to say whether or not plaintiff did, in fact, make the interpretation, or do so at the time it alleges. But surely it would be for the judge to say, at the outset, whether or not such an interpretation could reasonably have been made. If he thought not, there would be no question for the jury.

My conclusion, therefore, is that plaintiff’s claim for extra track lifting arose out of a dispute concerning a question of law. Consequently, the decision by the Board of Contract Appeals was not “final and conclusive,” wherefore plaintiff [49]*49is entitled to a review of the claim in the instant proceeding. Associated Traders, Inc. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 744, 169 F. Supp. 502.

Plaintiff’s second claim relates to the quantity of new ballast for which it was entitled to be paid.

A total of 1,227 cars of new ballast was loaded, hauled, and placed. The contracting officer credited plaintiff with 51,510 cubic yards because the specifications recited a capacity of 42 cubic yards per car.10 While the contract was under way, plaintiff challenged the accuracy of the specifications’ capacity listing, and adduced evidence tending to show that each car, as loaded, contained at least 48 cubic yards. On this basis, the pay quantity was 58,872 cubic yards.11

Although plaintiff requested the contracting officer to compute the pay quantities at the higher figure, he refused to do so, and plaintiff duly appealed his decision.

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Randolph Engineering Company v. The United States
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367 F.2d 425 (Court of Claims, 1966)

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155 Ct. Cl. 44, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wm-a-smith-contracting-co-v-united-states-cc-1961.