Randolph Engineering Co. v. United States

367 F.2d 425, 176 Ct. Cl. 872
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 15, 1966
DocketNo. 114-61
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 367 F.2d 425 (Randolph Engineering Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Randolph Engineering Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 425, 176 Ct. Cl. 872 (cc 1966).

Opinion

Reed, Justice (Ret.),

sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff is seeking compensation for cleaning work which the United States required it to perform as part of a contract between the parties to clear a defense plant and place the equipment for production of 155mm shells in government reserve storage. Plaintiff contends that the contract did not obligate it to do the type of cleaning demanded by the government. The government contends that the contract did necessitate such cleaning without extra pay. We have concluded that the government’s interpretation is correct.

The reserve storage program was developed by Army Ordnance after the Second World War to facilitate any future [874]*874mobilization by preserving presently unneeded, defense production equipment in usable condition. Army Ordnance has established a number of storage facilities as depositories for such equipment.

This particular reserve storage project resulted from the government’s decision in 1957 to cancel the production of 155mm shells at The Englander Company plant in Birmingham, Alabama. The Army’s Birmingham Ordnance District was instructed to make the necessary arrangements for placing the equipment in reserve storage. Birmingham Ordnance originally decided to accomplish this in two stages. It would first let a contract to Englander to clear the plant and ship the equipment to the Michoud Ordnance Depot in Louisiana, the storage facility for the Birmingham District. Birmingham Ordnance would then let a second contract to rehabilitate the equipment, process it for long-term storage, and place it in final storage at Michoud.1

Plaintiff’s officers were first contacted by an officer of the Englander Company who invited them to bid on the plant clearance and shipment subcontract and told them that he understood that Birmingham Ordnance would be letting a second contract for the rehabilitation work at Michoud sometime in the future.2 Plaintiff is an industrial engineering firm which specializes in plant clearance and preservation work. Plaintiff has operated the Cleveland Ordnance District’s storage facility at Lordstown, Ohio, and has processed substantial quantities of equipment for reserve storage under contracts with Army Ordnance.3

Englander furnished plaintiff with a copy of the contract specifications for removal of the machinery from Englander which were drawn by Birmingham Ordnance for plaintiff’s guidance in preparing its bid. Although reserve storage processing work is normally done according to an Ordnance [875]*875Manual which is entitled “Preparation, Handling, and Maintenance of Production Equipment for Reserve Storage” and which is commonly known as ORDM 4-6, Birmingham Ordnance did not simply instruct the contractor to do the work according to the manual. The contract specifications contained detailed instructions for each phase of the work. Some of these instructions incorporated parts.of ORDM 4r-6 by reference, some repeated instructions in ORDM 4-6, and others varied from ORDM 4-6 procedures.

The instructions for cleaning, preserving, and skidding were contained in Part 4 of the Englander specifications. The Part 4 instructions provided that each type of machinery should be cleaned in accordance with “good commercial shop practice,” coated with a designated preservative, and skidded in accordance with ORDM 4-.6.4 For example, Paragraph 4.1.1 said:

Metal working machinery will be cleaned of all chips, dirt, grease etc. in accordance with good commercial shop practice. External precision and other bright metal surfaces will be coated with MIL-C-16173, Grade 2, Preservative. Piping to a machine will not be cut but will be disconnected in a workmanlike manner with proper labelling for identification. Electrical supply cables will be handled in accordance with Paragraph 2.6, this Appendix. iSkidding will be accomplished in accordance with ORDM 4-6.

When plaintiff’s officers read the specifications, they concluded that the government did not want an ORDM 4r-6 cleaning job. The instructions in ORDM 4-6 provide for the disassembly of equipment, hand-cleaning of individual parts with solvent, and reassembly of the equipment.5 Plaintiff’s officers had frequently seen commercial machine shops clean equipment of this type by simply blowing out the chips and wiping the exterior critical surfaces. They assumed that the government had used the term “commercial shop practice” to describe that type of superficial cleaning and computed their bid to Englander on that basis.6

[876]*876T. A. Rivenbark, the industrial engineer at Birmingham Ordnance who drafted the specifications, testified that he was thinking of an altogether different commercial cleaning practice. Rivenbark said that commercial firms sometimes use mechanical techniques such as steam-cleaning and shot-blasting to clean the external and internal parts of this type of machinery and that those techniques are less costly and time-consuming than hand-cleaning with solvent and accomplish much the same result. Therefore, he concluded that it would be advantageous to permit the contractor to use any accepted commercial cleaning method so long as the end result was equivalent to OREM 4-6 cleaning.7

The plaintiff’s conception of commercial shop practice cleaning differed radically from the type of cleaning Riven-bark said he had in mind. Plaintiff’s officers assumed that they would not be required to perform any internal cleaning while Rivenbark meant that they could use mechanical techniques to accomplish the internal cleaning.

If the proposed Englander subcontract had been awarded to plaintiff, we would be inclined to uphold the plaintiff’s interpretation. Since the type of cleaning plaintiff planned to do and the type of cleaning Birmingham Ordnance expected plaintiff to do are both commercial cleaning practices, we cannot say that the language of Part 4 necessarily requires one or the other. Under such circumstances this court has usually adopted the contractor’s interpretation of an ambiguous government-drawn contract if the contractor actually and reasonably relied upon that construction at the time of the bidding. See WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 323 F. 2d 874 (1963). Since this equipment was to be cleaned again as part of the rehabilitation contract it would have been reasonable to assume that the superficial cleaning plaintiff expected to perform would be adequate to maintain the equipment until the second cleaning was performed.

However, the proposed subcontract was never let. Eng-lander decided that it did not want to assume responsibility [877]*877for clearing tlie plant and asked Birmingham Ordnance to arrange plant clearance directly.8 At about the same time Birmingham Ordnance learned that the Army did not have sufficient funds to rehabilitate the equipment. Therefore, Birmingham Ordnance decided to revise its plans and to let one contract to clear the plant, ship the equipment to Michoud, and place it directly into final storage at Michoud without rehabilitation.9

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367 F.2d 425, 176 Ct. Cl. 872, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randolph-engineering-co-v-united-states-cc-1966.