Winn v. Winn

611 P.2d 1055, 101 Idaho 270, 1980 Ida. LEXIS 566

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 2, 1980
• Docket: 12951
• Status: Published

Opinions

BAKES, Justice.

Plaintiff respondent Virgil Winn filed this divorce action alleging, among other things, that the house in which he and defendant appellant Alfreda Winn resided was his sole and separate property. The case was tried before a magistrate. In a brief memorandum opinion, the magistrate granted the divorce and concluded that the residence was community property. Thereafter, the magistrate adopted verbatim the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment prepared by the. wife’s counsel. The husband appealed to the district court.

In a memorandum opinion, the district court was highly critical of the findings and conclusions of the magistrate. The court felt that the findings prepared by counsel were adopted in violation of the ruling of this Court in Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977). In Compton, we denounced the practice of routinely delegating the task of preparing the findings of fact and conclusions of law to counsel for the prevailing party. In the instant case, after discussing at length the magistrate’s failure to adhere to the dictates of Compton, the district court proceeded to conduct an appellate review pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(u)(1). The district court then “reversed” the magistrate’s decision and ordered a trial de novo in the district court. As the district court saw it, it had two choices: it could either remand the matter to the magistrate for a new trial applying the correct rules of law or it could hold a trial de novo. It chose the latter, and this appeal followed.

Before the case was argued, we noted that the orders appealed from might not be appealable under I.A.R. 11. In response to our request, the parties filed additional briefing on this issue. Because we find that the decision of the district court is not an appealable order, the appeal is dismissed.

We commence our analysis by noting that if the district court had only ordered a trial de novo, such an order would not have been appealable. I.A.R. 11. Appellate Rule 11 contains no provision permitting an appeal from an order entered under I.R.C.P. 83(b), -(u), and I.C. § 1-2213 for a trial de novo. The problem in this case is that the district court also undertook an appellate review, ultimately concluding that the case must be reversed. Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, or reversing or remanding an appeal are appealable. I.A.R. 11(a)(1). We are thus confronted with an appeal that has two components, one of which ordinarily is appealable and one which ordinarily is not. Closely related to the appealability question is the issue of whether a district court, once having undertaken an appellate review, is empowered to thereafter order a trial de novo in the district court.

We first review the statute and rules pertaining to appeals to the district court from the magistrates division. I.C. § 1-2213(2) reads as follows:

“1-2213. APPEALS — POWERS OF DISTRICT JUDGE.— . . .

“(2) Unless otherwise provided by law or rule, a district court judge shall review the case on the record on appeal and affirm, reverse, remand, or modify the judgment; provided, that the district judge in his discretion, may remand the case for a new trial with such instructions as he may deem necessary or he may direct that the case be tried de novo before him.”

Rule 83(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

“RULE 83(b). MAGISTRATE APPEALS — JUDICIAL REVIEW. — All appeals from the magistrate’s division shall be heard by the district court as an appellate proceeding unless the district court orders a trial de novo; provided, however, all appeals from the small claims department of the magistrates division shall be heard by the district court as a trial de novo on the merits.”

Rule 83(u) reads in pertinent part as follows:

“RULE 83(u). APPELLATE REVIEW. —The scope of appellate review on an appeal to the district court shall be as follows:

“(1) Upon an appeal from the magistrate’s division of the district court, not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.

“(2) Upon an appeal from the magistrates division of the district court or a governmental agency, body or board, involving a trial de novo, or in which the court elects to hear additional evidence or testimony, the district court shall render a decision in the action as a trial court as though the matter was initially brought in the district court.

Although the district court has several options under the above rules and statute, these options fall basically into two categories. The district court may conduct an appellate review of the magistrate’s decision just as this Court would conduct a review of a district court decision, or the district court may choose to wipe the slate clean by ordering a trial de novo and beginning the case anew. Appellant insists that these options are mutually exclusive. Appellant contends that the district court, having undertaken its appellate review, was not empowered to thereafter order a trial de novo. Thus appellant argues that the district court’s order reversing the magistrate after an appellate review was the primary order entered and is appealable under I.A.R. 11(a)(1).

Although this Court has not specifically addressed this issue, there have been cases where we have recognized that the district court’s options under I.C. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83 are not always mutually exclusive. For example, in Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), the district court had conducted an appellate review of a magistrate’s decision in a child custody case. Although the district court did not order a trial de novo in that case, Justice Bistline, writing for the majority, observed:

“Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the trial court’s findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment. Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new findings, or, alternatively, act under I.C. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and conduct a partial or whole trial de novo.” 99 Idaho at 789, 589 P.2d at 536 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

While this language is admittedly dictum, it nonetheless suggests that in appropriate circumstances a district court may order a trial de novo after conducting an appellate review.

Koester v. Koester, 99 Idaho 654, 586 P.2d 1370 (1978), is another case in which the district court conducted both an appellate review and a trial de novo. Koester was also a child custody case. The magistrate had given custody of the children to the husband. The wife appealed the magistrate’s determination to the district court. In addition to contesting the magistrate’s decision, the wife also alleged that there had occurred a change in circumstances which, she urged, should be considered by the district court in reviewing the trial court. The parties stipulated that the change in circumstances could be considered by the district court on affidavits.

Justice McFadden, writing for the Koester majority, observed that the district court’s scope of review was different when it considered the affidavits. In reviewing the magistrate’s record, the district court was confined to the role of an appellate court under I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). In considering the issue of changed circumstances, the district court sat as the trial court. Justice McFadden wrote:

“Although the resolution of this issue is not explicitly stated in I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2), and is therefore a matter of first impression, we hold that where the district court chooses to handle an appeal as an appellate review and then elects to hear additional evidence on one or more issues, those issues affected by the additional evidence shall be treated as if involving a trial de novo.” Koester v. Koester, 99 Idaho at 656, 586 P.2d at 1372.

In In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), we again had occasion to comment on the role of a district court in reviewing a decision from the magistrates division. The most noticeable problem in Stibor was the magistrate’s failure to set forth his opinion in formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. The absence of the formal findings effectively prevented a meaningful appellate review. Nonetheless, the district judge held that the magistrate’s memorandum opinion sufficed as findings of fact and conclusions of law. We reversed, recognizing that had the magistrate explicitly set forth his rationale in findings and conclusions, the district court could have determined whether the findings were sufficiently supported by the evidence and the result in accordance with appropriate principles of law. We went on to note that, with proper findings of fact, “the district court could have properly determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de novo before the district court. I.C. § 1-2213.” In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho at 164, 525 P.2d at 359. We concluded:

“For the foregoing reasons the order of the district court affirming the order of the magistrate is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to review the record to determine whether this will contest should be tried de novo in the district court (I.C. § 1-2213[2]), or whether it should be remanded to the magistrate . . .” Id. at 165, 525 P.2d at 360.

The above cases demonstrate that the district court, having undertaken the task of conducting an appellate review, is not as a result precluded from conducting a trial de novo. The reasoning behind this proposition is clear: when circumstances prevent a decisive, complete, or meaningful appellate review, it may be advisable for the district court to augment the trial record or create a new record in order to completely resolve the controversy. This occurs “[w]here the trial court’s findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what findings are correct . . .” Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 789, 589 P.2d at 536. In Koester, it was the presence of changed circumstances during the pendency of the appeal that required a trial de novo on some of the issues. In Stibor, it was the magistrate’s failure to issue explicit findings which required that the district court either try the case de novo or remand for a new trial before the magistrate.

In view of the thrust of these cases, the issue in the instant case is whether, under these circumstances, the district judge was justified in ordering a trial de novo due to his determination that he was unable to conduct a thorough and meaningful appellate review of the magistrate’s decision because of the trial court’s impermissible delegation of its factfinding duty. In Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977), we remarked that the inherent difficulties in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings are compounded immeasurably in those circumstances where the trial court merely adopts the proposed findings of the prevailing party. In Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 572 P.2d 861 (1977), we iterated our strong admonition against such a practice, observing that these findings “won’t be worth the paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining why the judge decided the case.” Id. at 762, 572 P.2d at 865.

In the case at bar, the magistrate’s memorandum opinion was conclusory and failed to set forth the rationale underlying his decision. In reviewing the magistrate’s decision, the district judge remarked that he was “without benefit of the rationale and reasoning of the trial court per se whereby it determined the nature of the property to be community.” The district judge went on to state that the magistrate’s delegation of the factfinding function to counsel was in contravention of our Compton admonition. The district judge stated:

“As a result, the formal findings and conclusions entered by the court reflect the position of the respondent at trial, in the first instance, not that of the trial court. If on appeal this court were merely to review the record to determine if the entered findings were supported by the evidence, the district court would consequentially be put into a position of joining with the magistrate and ignoring the directive of the Supreme Court in Compton v. Gilmore, thereby fostering utilization of a denounced procedure.

“This Court feels that a more appropriate avenue is available for resolving the issues apparently raised on appeal. .

“Ordinarily, on appeal, the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the trial court when they are supported by substantial, competent albeit conflicting evidence.

“This of course presumes that the trial court properly entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.” (Citations omitted.)

The district court’s concern was evident. The circumstances indicated that the court would be effectively precluded from evaluating the decision-making process of the court below. Admittedly, the district court went on to conduct an appellate review, eventually concluding that the magistrate’s disposition of the case was in error as “not being supported by substantial evidence and not in conformity with the applicable law.” However, we must view this component of the district court’s decision along with that part of the opinion which dealt with the Compton defect. In view of the difficulty inherent in reviewing the unarticulated reasoning of the magistrate, it was not error for the district court to conclude that “[ujnder the circumstances, and in the interests of justice,” a trial de novo should be ordered.

Appellant, citing I.A.R. 11(a)(1), insists that this order is appealable because the district court “reversed” the magistrate. We disagree. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:

“RULE 11. APPEALABLE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS. — An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments and orders:

(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil action:

“(1) Final judgments and decrees including decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, or reversing or remanding an appeal.

“Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be determined by its content and substance, and not by its title.” Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 99 Idaho 517, 519, 584 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1978), quoting Howell v. Reimann, 77 Idaho 84, 87, 288 P.2d 649, 651 (1955). Notwithstanding the district court’s terminology, the effect of its decision is clear. The district court was to retain jurisdiction and conduct a trial de novo to finally settle a controversy which, on the state of the record and in view of the nature of the findings of the court below, was not susceptible of final resolution. The order for a trial de novo, which the district court was empowered to enter, precludes the decision from being appealable; the “reversal” of the magistrate does not render the decision appealable. In a sense, every order for a trial de novo “reverses” the decision of the court below. It not only “reverses” the lower decision, but it legally wipes it off the judicial record. Therefore, the paramount order entered was the order for a trial de novo, which is not an appealable order. I.A.R. 11.

For the above reasons, this appeal is dismissed. Costs are awarded to respondent. No attorney fees.

DONALDSON, C. J., and SHEPARD and McFADDEN, JJ., concur.