McFADDEN, Justice.
In January 1946, Lloyd Ramsey enlisted in the United States Air Force and he continued to serve until his discharge and retirement in 1966. At the time of his enlistment he was residing with his parents in Burley, Idaho. He married Alene P. Ramsey on November 11, 1949, while stationed in Georgia. During the years following the marriage Ramsey was stationed in various locations, including Georgia, Germany, Korea, South Carolina, Utah, and California. During the service years his wife accompanied him on the various changes of station excepting the time Ramsey was in Korea. After completion of twenty years of service, Ramsey retired from the Air [674]*674Force and they moved to Burley, Idaho, where they have since resided.
In 1972, Alene P. Ramsey instituted this action for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody of the two minor children (one of whom later became of age), division of the community property, support for herself and her minor children, and attorney fees.
Following trial of the issues raised by the pleading, the trial court rendered its memorandum opinion, which by stipulation of the parties was considered as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court. Thereafter judgment and an amended judgment were entered dissolving the marriage, awarding custody of one child to the mother, together with a monthly allowance for his support, and division of the community property of the parties, both real and personal. Lloyd E. Ramsey (hereinafter referred to as defendant) appealed from the amended judgment, and Alene P. Ramsey (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) cross-appealed from the same judgment.
The issues presented on this appeal pertain primarily to the division of community property. After the defendant retired from the Air Force he received monthly military retirement benefits of $341.27 per month. See, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 8914, 8929, 8991. He has also maintained in force his National Service Life Insurance Policy, which is a governmental life insurance program afforded military personnel. On his appeal the defendant asserts the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff forty per cent (40%) of his monthly retirement pay. On her appeal, the plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in finding the National Service Life Insurance Policy was the husband’s separate property, and erred in dealing with certain other funds to be received by the defendant from a corporation.
In this opinion we will first consider the cross-appeal taken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in her cross-appeal, as her first assignment of error, challenges the trial court’s finding that the National Service Life Insurance Policy was the separate property of the defendant. She contends that this policy is similar to other life insurance policies and should be held to be community property. This contention overlooks the unique nature of the National Service Life Insurance Policy and the case law interpreting the federal legislation creating the serviceman’s right to this type of insurance. In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L. Ed. 424 (1950), the United States Supreme Court stated :
“The National Service Life Insurance Act is the congressional mode of affording a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of the United States. A liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named beneficiary is everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan. Premiums are very low and are waived during the insured’s disability; costs of administration are borne by the United States; liabilities may be discharged out of congressional appropriations.” 70 S.Ct. at 399.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected a lower court’s finding that the proceeds of the policy were community property.
“* * * [Sjince the statute which made the insurance proceeds possible was explicit in announcing that the insured shall have the right to designate the recipient of the insurance, and that ‘No person shall have a vested right’ to those proceeds, 38 U.S.C. § 802(i), 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture. The federal statute establishes the fund in issue, and forestalls the existence of any ‘vested’ right in the proceeds of federal insurance. Hence no constitutional question is presented. However ‘vested’ her right to the proceeds of nongovernmental insurance under California law, that rule cannot apply to this insurance.” 70 S.Ct. at 401.
[675]*675To hold that the National Service Life Insurance Policy is community property thus creating “vested rights” in the policy for the plaintiff would be contrary to federal statute and case law. Harris v. Harris, 94 Idaho 358, 487 P.2d 952 (1971); United States v. Donall, 466 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1972). See also, In re Marriage of Fithian (Fithian v. Fithian), 10 Cal.3d 592, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449 (1974), cert. den., 419 U.S. 825, 95 S.Ct. 41, 42 L.Ed.2d 48 (1974); In re Marriage of Milhan (Milhan v. Milhan), 13 Cal.3d 129, 117 Cal.Rptr. 809, 528 P.2d 1145 (1974).
On her cross-appeal, the plaintiff has also assigned as error the following portion of the judgment and decree:
“11. That plaintiff is awarded an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in all funds held by Ramsey Produce Company as a result of retained stock dividends or earnings or sums loaned to Ramsey Produce Company by defendant prior to July 14, 1972, and defendant shall deliver one-half (%) of all such funds to the plaintiff upon receipt of said sums by defendant from Ramsey Produce Company, an Idaho corporation.”
This portion of,the decree is too indefinite to be enforceable. The trial court should have specifically determined the nature of the interest of the parties, i. e., whether it was a loan of funds to the corporation, whether it was the result of an investment in the firm, and also whether the interest was community or separate property. After such determination has been made, the trial court should then divide this interest between the parties as the facts indicate, and if feasible, have the interest vest immediately by way of cash settlement or division of the property. See, Larson v. Larson, 95 Idaho 376, 509 P.2d 1297 (1973); McNett v. McNett, 95 Idaho 59, 501 P.2d 1059 (1972). Should the trial court deem it appropriate, it may, on application of either party, receive additional evidence on the nature of this property.
At this point we will consider the issues raised by the defendant on his appeal. The trial court found that the parties had been married seventeen of the twenty years that the defendant served in the Air Force and therefore, 17Ao of the retirement pay was community property because the defendant had been domiciled in Idaho throughout his Air Force career.
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McFADDEN, Justice.
In January 1946, Lloyd Ramsey enlisted in the United States Air Force and he continued to serve until his discharge and retirement in 1966. At the time of his enlistment he was residing with his parents in Burley, Idaho. He married Alene P. Ramsey on November 11, 1949, while stationed in Georgia. During the years following the marriage Ramsey was stationed in various locations, including Georgia, Germany, Korea, South Carolina, Utah, and California. During the service years his wife accompanied him on the various changes of station excepting the time Ramsey was in Korea. After completion of twenty years of service, Ramsey retired from the Air [674]*674Force and they moved to Burley, Idaho, where they have since resided.
In 1972, Alene P. Ramsey instituted this action for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody of the two minor children (one of whom later became of age), division of the community property, support for herself and her minor children, and attorney fees.
Following trial of the issues raised by the pleading, the trial court rendered its memorandum opinion, which by stipulation of the parties was considered as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court. Thereafter judgment and an amended judgment were entered dissolving the marriage, awarding custody of one child to the mother, together with a monthly allowance for his support, and division of the community property of the parties, both real and personal. Lloyd E. Ramsey (hereinafter referred to as defendant) appealed from the amended judgment, and Alene P. Ramsey (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) cross-appealed from the same judgment.
The issues presented on this appeal pertain primarily to the division of community property. After the defendant retired from the Air Force he received monthly military retirement benefits of $341.27 per month. See, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 8914, 8929, 8991. He has also maintained in force his National Service Life Insurance Policy, which is a governmental life insurance program afforded military personnel. On his appeal the defendant asserts the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff forty per cent (40%) of his monthly retirement pay. On her appeal, the plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in finding the National Service Life Insurance Policy was the husband’s separate property, and erred in dealing with certain other funds to be received by the defendant from a corporation.
In this opinion we will first consider the cross-appeal taken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in her cross-appeal, as her first assignment of error, challenges the trial court’s finding that the National Service Life Insurance Policy was the separate property of the defendant. She contends that this policy is similar to other life insurance policies and should be held to be community property. This contention overlooks the unique nature of the National Service Life Insurance Policy and the case law interpreting the federal legislation creating the serviceman’s right to this type of insurance. In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L. Ed. 424 (1950), the United States Supreme Court stated :
“The National Service Life Insurance Act is the congressional mode of affording a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of the United States. A liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named beneficiary is everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan. Premiums are very low and are waived during the insured’s disability; costs of administration are borne by the United States; liabilities may be discharged out of congressional appropriations.” 70 S.Ct. at 399.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected a lower court’s finding that the proceeds of the policy were community property.
“* * * [Sjince the statute which made the insurance proceeds possible was explicit in announcing that the insured shall have the right to designate the recipient of the insurance, and that ‘No person shall have a vested right’ to those proceeds, 38 U.S.C. § 802(i), 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture. The federal statute establishes the fund in issue, and forestalls the existence of any ‘vested’ right in the proceeds of federal insurance. Hence no constitutional question is presented. However ‘vested’ her right to the proceeds of nongovernmental insurance under California law, that rule cannot apply to this insurance.” 70 S.Ct. at 401.
[675]*675To hold that the National Service Life Insurance Policy is community property thus creating “vested rights” in the policy for the plaintiff would be contrary to federal statute and case law. Harris v. Harris, 94 Idaho 358, 487 P.2d 952 (1971); United States v. Donall, 466 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1972). See also, In re Marriage of Fithian (Fithian v. Fithian), 10 Cal.3d 592, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449 (1974), cert. den., 419 U.S. 825, 95 S.Ct. 41, 42 L.Ed.2d 48 (1974); In re Marriage of Milhan (Milhan v. Milhan), 13 Cal.3d 129, 117 Cal.Rptr. 809, 528 P.2d 1145 (1974).
On her cross-appeal, the plaintiff has also assigned as error the following portion of the judgment and decree:
“11. That plaintiff is awarded an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in all funds held by Ramsey Produce Company as a result of retained stock dividends or earnings or sums loaned to Ramsey Produce Company by defendant prior to July 14, 1972, and defendant shall deliver one-half (%) of all such funds to the plaintiff upon receipt of said sums by defendant from Ramsey Produce Company, an Idaho corporation.”
This portion of,the decree is too indefinite to be enforceable. The trial court should have specifically determined the nature of the interest of the parties, i. e., whether it was a loan of funds to the corporation, whether it was the result of an investment in the firm, and also whether the interest was community or separate property. After such determination has been made, the trial court should then divide this interest between the parties as the facts indicate, and if feasible, have the interest vest immediately by way of cash settlement or division of the property. See, Larson v. Larson, 95 Idaho 376, 509 P.2d 1297 (1973); McNett v. McNett, 95 Idaho 59, 501 P.2d 1059 (1972). Should the trial court deem it appropriate, it may, on application of either party, receive additional evidence on the nature of this property.
At this point we will consider the issues raised by the defendant on his appeal. The trial court found that the parties had been married seventeen of the twenty years that the defendant served in the Air Force and therefore, 17Ao of the retirement pay was community property because the defendant had been domiciled in Idaho throughout his Air Force career.
Throughout this case the defendant has contended that the trial court erred in its allocation to the plaintiff wife of forty percent (40%) of the monthly retirement benefits received by the defendant from his military retirement pay. It is his contention that throughout the time of his service with the Air Force, he was domiciled not in Idaho, but in the various stations where he served which, aside from California, were common law and not community property states. He contends that his domicile was moved from Idaho to Georgia upon his marriage to plaintiff in accordance with his actual residence and intention; that this domicile continued for the first seven years of the marriage, and later his domicile was changed to South Carolina, Utah and California in that order. He further contends that he never intended to return to Idaho, but did return to Idaho only when he was offered employment by his father to join in his father’s business, Ramsey Produce Company. He asserts that for fifteen years of the marriage, he and his wife lived in various common law states and for two years they lived in California, a community property state. He thus asserts the trial court erred in its award of forty percent (40%) of his retirement pay to the wife.
Before considering the issue of the domiciliary states of the parties it is necessary first to examine the nature of the defendant’s retirement pay.
It is generally recognized that retirement pay based upon military or naval service is not a gratuity, but is an earned property right which accrues by reason of the individual’s years of military service. Berkey v. United States, 361 F.2d 983, 176 Ct.Cl. 1 (1966); Morris v. Morris, 69 Wash.2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966); LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d [676]*676755 (1969); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1970). It is also generally recognized in community property states that military retirement benefits, to the extent that such benefits have vested or accrued while the husband and wife are domiciliary in a community property state, are community property subject to division between the parties upon dissolution of the marriage.1 In re Marriage of Wilson (Wilson v. Wilson), 10 Cal.3d 851, 112 Cal.Rptr. 405, 519 P.2d 165 (1974); Smith v. Lewis, 107 Cal.Rptr. 95 (Cal.App.1973); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash.2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973); Morris v. Morris, supra; Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M. 331, 455 P.2d 642 (1969); LeClert v. LeClert, supra; Busby v. Busby, supra; Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ.App.1968).
The most recent cases on point have focused on the issue of whether the application of a state’s community property law to military retirement, pay has been pre-empted by the federal laws creating the serviceman’s rights to those benefits.2 In re Marriage of Fithian (Fithian v. Fithian), 10 Cal.3d 592, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449 (1974), cert. den., 419 U.S. 825, 95 S.Ct. 41, 42 L.Ed.2d 48 (1974); Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ. App.1972); cert. den., 409 U.S. 1028, 93 S.Ct. 462, 34 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972); see, Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ. App.1968); Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Civ.App.1969). The California Supreme Court, in the Fithian case, supra, has succinctly defined the pre-emption issue:
“When there have been questions of property law involving a conflict between a state decision and a valid federal statute, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the supremacy clause requires the state law to yield no matter how clearly the subject matter otherwise falls within the state’s acknowledged sphere of power. (Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180; Wissner v. Wissner (1950), 338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L.Ed. 424.) Our task, therefore, is to ascertain whether the application of California community property law to hus[677]*677band’s federal military retirement pay interferes in any way with the accomplishment of the goals of Congress in creating the current military retirement scheme.” 111 Cal.Rptr. 372, 517 P.2d 452.
The federal statutes dealing with the pay of enlisted Air Force personnel are silent as to the purposes and goals of such statutes. 10 U.S.C.A. § 8914, § 8929, and § 8991. After extensive independent research, this court finds that it must concur in this statement by the California Supreme Court.
“We have studied Senate reports and congressional hearings concerned with the adoption of the federal military retirement pay system in an effort to ascertain any legislative intent to preserve the benefits of the system as the separate property of the recipient. We fail to find in the legislative background any indication that Congress intended military retirement pay to be separate property, or, conversely, that treating the pay as community property circumvents the congressional scheme. There is considerable evidence that Congress enacted the federal military retirement pay system in order to bolster the morale of the serviceman and to provide him with an incentive to remain in the armed services, as well as to afford him material protection in his later years. It does not follow therefrom that applying community property law to retirement pay creates a disincentive to establish a career in the military, or detracts from a serviceman’s spirit or future security.” In re marriage of Fithian, supra, 111 Cal.Rptr. at 373, 517 P.2d at 453.
The Texas Supreme Court has also examined the question and has reached the same conclusion as the California court. Dominey v. Dominey, supra. See, Mora v. Mora, supra; Webster v. Webster, supra.
The conclusion that Congress has not pre-empted the application of community property laws to military retirement pay is not in conflict with either Wissner v. Wissner, supra, or Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962). In the Wissner case, the United States Supreme Court found that an award of a community property interest in a serviceman’s National Service Life Insurance Policy “frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress” and that therefore such an award “cannot stand”. 70 S.Ct. 400. The keystone of that opinion is the following language.
“ * * * And since the statute which made the insurance proceeds possible was explicit in announcing that the insured shall have the right to designate the recipient of the insurance, and that ‘No person shall have a vested right’ to those proceeds, 38 U.S.C. § 802 (i), 38 U.S.C.A. § 802 (i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture.” 70 S. Ct. 401.
“The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured ‘shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance [within a designated class], * * * and shall * * * at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries * * *.’ 38 U.S.C. § 802(g), 38 U.S.C. A. § 802(g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.” 70 S.Ct. 400.
The court concluded that these statutory provisions created a direct conflict with state community property laws and therefore, the federal law must prevail. Our research does not disclose a comparable conflict between the statutes creating a serviceman’s retirement pay rights and the application of state community property law to that pay.
The Supreme Court, in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962), construed the relationship of Texas community property laws to the ownership rights of a United States Savings Bond as defined by regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Treasury regulations at issue provided:
[678]*678“ * * * the co-owner of a savings bond issued in the ‘or’ form who survives the other co-owner ‘will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner’ of the bond, 31 CFR § 315.61, and that ‘[n]o judicial determination will be recognized which would * * * defeat or impair the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations,’ 31 CFR § 315.20.” 82 S.Ct. 1092-93.
The bond in controversy was purchased with community funds and issued to “Mr. or Mrs.” Free. Mrs. Free’s son, who was the principal beneficiary under his mother’s will, claimed an interest in the bonds by virtue of the state community property laws. Her husband, relying upon a treasury regulation cited above, claimed exclusive ownership of the bonds. The court, finding that “the State has interfered directly with a legitimate exercise of the power of the Federal Government to borrow money”, ruled that the survivorship provision conflicted with the state law and so the federal law must prevail. 82 S.Ct. 1093. Again, our research does not disclose a comparable conflict in the case at bar.
In summary, it is the conclusion of this court that defendant’s Air Force retirement benefits are community property to the extent that they were earned during his years of active service and while he was married.
The military retirement benefits must be apportioned as community or separate property according to whether the active service upon which the benefits are based took place prior to marriage or after-marriage. Accord, Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Civ.App.1974); In re Marriage of Wilson (Wilson v. Wilson), supra; Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal.App.3d 889, 102 Cal.Rptr. 255 (1972); Brown v. Brown, 27 Cal.App.3d 188, 103 Cal.Rptr. 510 (1972); LeClert v. LeClert, supra; Mora v. Mora, supra. In the instant case the defendant served three years of his twenty years of service in the Air Force prior to his marriage to the plaintiff and the balance of his service was during his marriage. It thus follows that 1%oths of the defendant’s military retirement pay was earned during marriage, and would be the community property of the parties, subject to distribution by the trial court in the divorce action, contingent upon resolution of the issue concerning domiciliary status of the parties in a common law or community property state.
Concerning the domiciliary status of the parties, the trial court, after reviewing the evidence recognized that at the outset of his military service, the defendant was domiciled in Idaho, and that at the time of the divorce the parties were likewise domiciled in Idaho. In its memorandum opinion the trial court also stated:
“If there was any change of the defendant’s domicile after he left Idaho in 1946, he had the burden of establishing such change by a preponderance of the evidence, and I do not believe he has met that burden. I find, therefore, that the defendant was domicilecl in the State of Idaho at all times during his marriage, and that the laws of Idaho must determine the nature of the source of the Armed Services Retirement Pay as well as the character of the pay itself.”
Two issues are presented in this statement ■ — first, did the trial court correctly place the burden of proof on the defendant; and secondly, was the trial court’s finding sustained by the record. Examination of the record reveals a sharp conflict in the evidence concerning the intent of the parties as to whether they intended Idaho should be considered their domicile, or whether they intended a change each time that the defendant’s place of service was changed. On several of his tax returns, Idaho was listed as defendant’s home address, and his military records listed Burley, Idaho, as his permanent mailing address. Upon retirement the defendant returned to Idaho where he had employment. It is the conclusion of this court that this finding of fact was sustained by competent and substantial, although conflicting evidence.
[679]*679Nor do we find error in the trial court’s placing upon the defendant the burden of proof of a change of domicile from Idaho. In this case the wife instituted this divorce action, claiming that numerous items of personal property were community property, and also alleging that the defendant’s retirement benefits were community property. She established at trial that ^oths of the retirement pay was acquired during the time the parties were married. All property acquired by either spouse during coverture is presumed to be community property. This presumption may be rebutted, but the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts it to be separate property to show such fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Jacobson v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Concentrating Co., 3 Idaho 126, 28 P. 396 (1891); McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163, 280 P. 220 (1929); Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 430 P.2d 685 (1967); Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P.2d 1317 (1973). Brockelbank, The Community Property Law of Idaho (1962), p. 123. The defendant in asserting that his domicile was not in Idaho was attempting to establish that his retirement pay (to the extent that it was based on the time he was serving in common law states) was separate property. In other words he was attempting to rebut the presumption of community property as to this retirement pay, and in this regard failed to carry his burden of proof. We find no error by the trial court in placing this burden on the defendant.
The defendant also claims the trial court should have established a lump sum amount computed on the present value of the wife’s interest in the retirement pay he would receive.
In several cases from other jurisdictions which have held retirement pay from the armed forces to be community property, the courts have required payment to the former wife of her community interest out of the monthly checks received by the retired serviceman. Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.Civ.App.1971); In re Marriage of Wilson (Wilson v. Wilson), supra; Morris v. Morris, 69 Wash.2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966).
This method of settlement of the community interest due to the wife is contrary to the concept that in this state upon dissolution of a community by divorce each spouse should have immediate control of his or her share of the community property, or at least within a reasonable time. Largilliere v. Largilliere, 50 Idaho 496, 298 P. 362 (1931); Larson v. Larson, 95 Idaho 376, 509 P.2d 1297 (1973).
The trial court shall determine as of the date of the amended decree of divorce (November 21, 1972), the then present value of the defendant’s retirement pay based on his life expectancy at that time. In computation of the present value, the trial court shall use the discount rate of 6% per annum for the purpose of arriving at the discounted value of such retirement pay. Thereafter the trial court shall compute the value of the plaintiff’s interest in this retirement pay and enter judgment accordingly. From the date of entry bf the decree of divorce until July 1, 1974, the balance due on the judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum and after that date, the balance due on the judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 8% per annum. I.C. § 28-22-104, and S. L.1974, Ch. 229, p. 1586, amending § 28-22-104 as of July 1, 1974.
The trial court shall further make provision for payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum found due by reason of the retirement pay, such payment to be made within a reasonable time from the final judgment. Larson v. Larson, 95 Idaho 376, 509 P.2d 1297 (1973).
The trial court shall allow the parties opportunity to present such evidence as it deems proper on the issues concerning the determination of the present value of the retirement pay, or as to the reasonableness of the time within which payment should be made.
The judgment of the trial court granting the decree of divorce, the support and cus[680]*680tody of the minor children and the division of property concerning which no issue was raised is affirmed. That portion of the judgment concerning the status of the National Service Life Insurance Policy is also affirmed, as is that portion of the judgment pertaining to the status of the retirement pay being community property. However, that portion of the judgment concerning the interest of the parties in the Ramsey Produce Company is reversed. That portion of the judgment providing for payment of the community interest in the retirement pay to be made out of the monthly payments is also reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings to determine the present value of the plaintiffs interest in the military retirement pay and to fix a reasonable time for payment of the sum so found, to determine the nature and the extent of the community interest in Ramsey Produce Company and to provide for division of that interest; all in conformity with the views herein expressed.
No costs allowed.
DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.