Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided July 19, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-00793·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE CHARLOTTE WINELAND, Individually, and SUSAN WINELAND, as Personal Cause No. C19-0793RSL Representative of the Estate of JOHN DALE WINELAND, deceased, ORDER GRANTING ALFA LAVAL Plaintiffs, INC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. # 313) v. AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant Alfa Laval Inc.’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.” Dkt. # 313. Plaintiffs’ decedent, John Dale Wineland, worked aboard a series of Navy ships and in Navy offices between 1963 and 1984. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Wineland was exposed to asbestos contained in Alfa Laval products1 while aboard the USS DYNAMIC (1963-1966), the USS PLEDGE (1966-1967), the USS LOYALTY (1970-1972), the USS TUSCALOOSA (1972-1974), and the USS ESTEEM (1978-1980). Mr. Wineland worked primarily in the engine rooms of the ships to which he was assigned, repairing and maintaining machinery and equipment such as diesel engines, pumps, air compressors, and valves. Mr. Wineland developed mesothelioma, an asbestos-related disease, and died in 2018. 1 Alfa Laval is answering in this case for products sold under the names Sharples and DeLaval. ORDER GRANTING ALFA LAVAL’S Plaintiffs assert that Alfa Laval is liable for Mr. Wineland’s illness and death under theories of negligence and strict liability. Alfa Laval seeks summary dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that, under either Washington or maritime law, plaintiffs have failed to produce admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that (a) Mr. Wineland’s exposure to asbestos from Alfa Laval products, if any, was a substantial contributing factor in his illness and death and (b) even if such exposure were shown, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the asbestos was original to the equipment or otherwise manufactured, supplied, or specified by Alfa Laval. Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties2 and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court finds as follows: A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of the case “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) and “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The Court will “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . 2 This matter can be decided on the papers submitted in connection with this motion and the supplemental briefing regarding the applicability of maritime law. The parties’ requests for oral argument are DENIED. ORDER GRANTING ALFA LAVAL’S and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018). Although the Court must reserve for the trier of fact genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate inferences, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will be insufficient” to avoid judgment. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2014). In other words, summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict in its favor. Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019). B. Causation For the reasons set forth in the Order Granting Crane Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 550), the Court finds that maritime law applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims. To prevail on their negligence and strict liability claims, plaintiffs “must demonstrate, among other things, that [Mr. Wineland’s] injuries were caused by exposure to asbestos that was attributable to [Alfa Laval’s] conduct.” McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019). To establish causation under maritime law, plaintiffs must show that Mr. Wineland’s exposure to asbestos from Alfa Laval products “was a substantial contributing factor in causing his injuries.” McIndoe, 817 F.3d at 1174. Evidence of only minimal exposure to asbestos dust attributable to ORDER GRANTING ALFA LAVAL’S each defendant is insufficient: plaintiffs must provide “evidence regarding the amount of exposure to dust” attributable to Alfa Laval and, “critically, the duration of such exposure.” Id. at 1176-77 (emphasis in original). The evidence must show “a high enough level of exposure that an inference that the asbestos was a substantial factor in the injury is more than conjectural.” Id. at 1176 (quoting Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492). “[M]ore is needed” than simply placing a defendant’s products in the workplace and showing that the decedent was occasionally exposed to asbestos dust from those products. Id. at 1176-77. There is evidence that Alfa Laval purifiers were installed in the aft engine rooms of the DYNAMIC, LOYALTY, ESTEEM, PLEDGE, and TUSCALOOSA (Dkt. # 394-2 at 15; Dkt. # 394-6 at 46; Dkt. # 394-7 at 17; Dkt. # 394-8 at 67), that DeLaval lube oil pumps serviced the main propulsion reduction gears installed on DYNAMIC, LOYALTY, ESTEEM, and PLEDGE (Dkt. # 394-2 at 15), and that the company provided a transfer pump installed on the TUSCALOOSA (Dkt. # 394-2 at 18). Plaintiffs have also provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Wineland was exposed to significant levels of asbestos dust while working in the engine rooms of the five vessels.3 The problem is that plaintiffs have not 3 Based on his extensive experience in the Navy and at naval shipyards, including the supervision of enginemen during the relevant time frame aboard the USS BRUMBY and the USS NEWPORT NEWS, Captain Arnold Moore opines that Mr. Wineland repaired, assisted with the repair, observed the repair or cleaned up after the repair of the major machinery and many of the valves in the engine rooms of the DYNAMIC, LOYALTY, ESTEEM, PLEDGE, and TUSCALOOSA. Dkt. # 394-2 at 8. Captain Moore describes how these repairs would be carried out, including activities which would invariably create asbestos dust, including the removal of old, dried packing and gaskets and the cutting and i

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