Wilson v. State

Court of Appeals of Kansas·Decided September 4, 2015·No. 111962·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 111,962

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

KENNETH E. WILSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Osborn District Court; PRESTON A. PRATT, judge. Opinion filed September 4, 2015. Affirmed.

Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellant.

Lee J. Davidson, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., BUSER and GARDNER, JJ.

Per Curiam: Wilson, convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and other crimes, appeals from the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion which alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to file a motion to suppress. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel Wilson must establish prejudice, meaning that there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result absent counsel's deficient performance. Because Wilson fails to establish such prejudice, we affirm the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Nature of the case

A jury convicted Kenneth E. Wilson of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary, and criminal possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Wilson to life imprisonment plus 158 months. Wilson filed a direct appeal of his criminal case, and the Supreme Court affirmed. See State v. Wilson, 295 Kan. 605, 289 P.3d 1082 (2012). The underlying facts are fully set forth in that direct appeal, and we see no need to repeat them here.

Wilson then sought relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, and the district court held a preliminary hearing on the motion. The district court summarily dismissed all issues but one—whether Wilson's trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to file a motion to suppress.

Wilson's primary argument was that his counsel was deficient in not moving to suppress numerous items which had been seized from his residence but had not been listed in the search warrant. An evidentiary hearing was held at which KBI agents, law enforcement officers, and Wilson's trial attorney testified. Wilson was represented by stand-by counsel at that hearing after expressing his desire to represent himself. After considering the testimony and reviewing the exhibits, the district court took the motion under advisement and later issued a written decision denying Wilson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

The district court applied the proper two-prong test to determine whether Wilson's trial counsel was ineffective. The district court found that Wilson's counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress was reasonable, that the challenged items which were admitted at trial had been legally seized pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, that there was not a reasonable probability that the motion to suppress would have been granted, and that Wilson failed to show trial counsel's

performance was deficient. The court never reached the question whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the motion to suppress had been filed and granted.

Did the district court err by denying the 60-1507 motion?

Wilson contends the district court erred by finding that he failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective. Wilson claims his trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to file a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant because the warrant was not sufficiently particular and many items seized were not listed in the warrant.

A claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of fact and law. Consequently, we review the underlying factual findings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 343, 323 P.3d 853 (2014).

We apply the familiar two-pronged Strickland analysis to analyze the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 882 335 P.3d 1162 (2014). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant must establish (1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) "prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result absent the deficient performance." 300 Kan. at 882-83; State v. Betancourt, 301 Kan. 282, 306, 342 P.3d 916 (2015); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 934, 318 P.3d 155 (2014).

A defendant must demonstrate both Strickland prongs to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and a failure to prove either one is dispositive. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 n.14, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756 (2000) . "The performance component need not be addressed first. 'If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.'" Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697). Thus "this court can affirm the denial of habeas relief on whichever Strickland prong is the easier to resolve." Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001).

We choose to address the prejudice prong first, even though the district court relied solely on the performance prong. See State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012) (finding the basis for district court decision immaterial if the result is correct for any reason); State v. Irby, No. 109,077, 2014 WL 1096638,*5 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (denying Irby's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and affirming the district court's denial of the motion as correct, though for a different reason). We therefore review Strickland's prejudice inquiry de novo. See Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 461 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 (2000); Romano, 239 F.3d at 1172. In so doing, we do not intend to imply anything about counsel's performance – we simply choose not to address that matter.

Prejudice

Wilson concedes that police officers obtained a valid search warrant for his residence, and that various items seized from his residence were adequately described in the warrant: Items 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, and 26. Although Wilson challenges the seizure of numerous other items, the following Items were not admitted into evidence at his trial, so he could not have suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to move to

suppress them: Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 23, and 24. This leaves for our consideration Items 8, 17, 19, 22, and 25, which were admitted at trial.

Item 8 consisted of United States savings bonds which Undersheriff Troy Schaefer found in a stack of paperwork located under a pile of clothing on the floor of Wilson's bedroom. The bonds were found inside an envelope and contained a name and address of someone who did not reside in the home.

Item 17 consisted of a black case containing 24 compact discs, and a black and blue case containing 122 compact discs. Officers found these in the dining room of Wilson's residence, on top of a filing cabinet next to a computer desk. Three of the compact discs inside the cases were marked "T. Pope," and the search warrant listed "documentation identifying Terry and/or Tara Pope."

Item 19 was a brown lockbox which contained plastic bags with over 150 pieces of jewelry in them, including some imitation pearl necklaces and a fake gold coin pendant matching the description of one stolen from Elinor Fink.

Item 22 was a green fishing bag or fanny pack found in the basement of Wilson's residence. It contained a 1-gallon bag of assorted watches, and a grey cloth bag which also had wrist and pocket watches inside it.

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Smith v. Robbins
528 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Smith v. Gibson
197 F.3d 454 (Tenth Circuit, 1999)
Romano v. Gibson
239 F.3d 1156 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
State v. May
269 P.3d 1260 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2012)
Sola-Morales v. State
335 P.3d 1162 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2014)
State v. Betancourt
342 P.3d 916 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2015)
State v. Wilson
289 P.3d 1082 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2012)
Miller v. State
318 P.3d 155 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2014)
State v. Bowen
323 P.3d 853 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2014)
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
467 U.S. 1267 (Supreme Court, 1984)