Wilson v. Evans

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Wilson v. Evans

679 S.W.2d 205, 284 Ark. 101, 1984 Ark. LEXIS 1903

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

DecidedNovember 19, 1984

Docket84-170

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 679 S.W.2d 205 (Wilson v. Evans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Wilson v. Evans, 679 S.W.2d 205, 284 Ark. 101, 1984 Ark. LEXIS 1903 (Ark. 1984).

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Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice.

This personal injury case involves two automobile accidents. On October 2, 1979, appellant, Connie Wilson, struck the rear of the vehicle of Thomas J. Evans, appellee. Over five months later, appellee ran into the back of a third party’s vehicle. Appellee contends that the second accident was a result of a black out spell caused by his first accident. This is the second appeal in this case which was reversed and remanded on different issues. Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224, 650 S.W.2d 569 (1983). After reversal, a verdict and judgment of $35,000.00 was awarded Mr. Evans. On appeal, appellant argues that the second accident was not proximately caused by appellant’s acts and that proof of damages sustained in the second accident should not have been presented. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.

Proximate cause is defined in terms of direct causadon. Kubik v. Iglehart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983). Proximate cause is that cause which “in a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage.” AMI 501; Bull v. Manning, 245 Ark. 552, 433 S.W.2d 145 (1968); Ben M. Hogan & Co. v. Krug, 234 Ark. 280, 351 S.W.2d 451 (1961).

In this case, over five months had elapsed between the first accident and Mr. Evans’ second accident. Less than a month before the second accident, Mr. Evans had consulted a physician for vertigo and blacking out, yet he continued to drive his automobile knowing he was subject to spells of dizziness and blacking out.

There was no issue for the jury presented since appellant’s acts did not lead in natural sequence without an intervening cause to appellee’s injuries suffered in the second accident. Although proximate causation is usually a question for the jury, where reasonable minds cannot differ a question of law is presented for determination by the court. Cragar v. Jones, 280 Ark. 549, 660 S.W.2d 168; Keck v. American Employment Agency, Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d2 (1983).

Reversed and remanded.

Smith, J., concurs.

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Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice.

This personal injury case involves two automobile accidents. On October 2, 1979, appellant, Connie Wilson, struck the rear of the vehicle of Thomas J. Evans, appellee. Over five months later, appellee ran into the back of a third party’s vehicle. Appellee contends that the second accident was a result of a black out spell caused by his first accident. This is the second appeal in this case which was reversed and remanded on different issues. Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224, 650 S.W.2d 569 (1983). After reversal, a verdict and judgment of $35,000.00 was awarded Mr. Evans. On appeal, appellant argues that the second accident was not proximately caused by appellant’s acts and that proof of damages sustained in the second accident should not have been presented. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.

Proximate cause is defined in terms of direct causadon. Kubik v. Iglehart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983). Proximate cause is that cause which “in a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage.” AMI 501; Bull v. Manning, 245 Ark. 552, 433 S.W.2d 145 (1968); Ben M. Hogan & Co. v. Krug, 234 Ark. 280, 351 S.W.2d 451 (1961).

In this case, over five months had elapsed between the first accident and Mr. Evans’ second accident. Less than a month before the second accident, Mr. Evans had consulted a physician for vertigo and blacking out, yet he continued to drive his automobile knowing he was subject to spells of dizziness and blacking out.

There was no issue for the jury presented since appellant’s acts did not lead in natural sequence without an intervening cause to appellee’s injuries suffered in the second accident. Although proximate causation is usually a question for the jury, where reasonable minds cannot differ a question of law is presented for determination by the court. Cragar v. Jones, 280 Ark. 549, 660 S.W.2d 168; Keck v. American Employment Agency, Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d2 (1983).

Reversed and remanded.

Smith, J., concurs.

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679 S.W.2d 205, 284 Ark. 101, 1984 Ark. LEXIS 1903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-evans-ark-1984.

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