Wilson v. Canup

2025 Ohio 2443

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Wilson v. Canup, 2025-Ohio-2443.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY

KEITH WILSON, : : Case No. 24CA2 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY LEE CANUP, : : Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 07/02/2025 :

APPEARANCES:

Lee Canup, Scottown, Ohio, Appellant, pro se.

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Lee Canup, is appealing the Lawrence County Municipal

Court’s decision granting appellee, Keith Wilson’s,1 small claims complaint for

payment of $1,300 for the unpaid balance he is owed. The trial court granted

Wilson’s request after a full hearing and determined that there was a verbal

contract for Canup to pay Wilson $2,500 for his labor to install a new liner in her

pool.

{¶2} Canup presents three separate assignments of error challenging the

trial court’s factual determination that: (1) there was a meeting of the minds

regarding the terms of the verbal contract; (2) Wilson substantially completed the

work as agreed upon; and (3) Wilson completed the work despite occurrences

outside of his control that affected Canup’s use of the pool.

1 Appellee has not filed an appellate brief and is not otherwise participating on appeal. Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 2

{¶3} We overrule each of Canup’s assignments of error and find that the

trial court’s factual determinations were supported by the evidence presented at

trial. There was a verbal contract between Wilson and Canup for Wilson to install

a new liner for her pool and the labor cost was $2,500. Canup only paid Wilson

$1,200. We find that Wilson substantially completed the work and Canup owed

him the remainder of the balance being $1,300. We therefore, affirm the trial

court’s judgment entry in favor of Wilson.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

{¶4} In the fall of 2021, Canup purchased her home that has a salt-water

pool. According to Wilson, such pools have a salt-cell that converts the salt

water into chlorine. Thus, when you add salt to the pool water, the salt mixes

with the water and that mixture of water and salt will then go through the salt-cell

and be converted into chlorine.

{¶5} In December 2021, Canup hired Wilson to close the pool and he did.

For that service, she paid him $250 and also the cost of purchasing a pool cover

of $1,650. In the summer of 2022, she hired Wilson again but this time to open

her pool. At that time, according to her testimony, she paid Wilson $900 to re-

attach the liner at certain spots around the pool. There were no issues in 2022 in

opening and closing Canup’s pool and she paid Wilson the agreed upon amounts

in full.

{¶6} In April 2023, Canup again hired Wilson to open her pool. When

opening the pool, Wilson noticed that there was water under the pool’s liner. He

informed Canup and they agreed for Wilson to drain the water and she paid him Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 3

$500 for his labor. However, upon further inspection, it was determined that the

water that was under the liner was too much to where the water pulled the liner

loose. Wilson recommended removing the liner and installing a new liner.

Canup approved the liner replacement. Wilson placed the order for the liner and

Canup paid him for the material cost.

{¶7} At the end of June, Wilson installed the new liner, and a few days

later, he added 15 bags of salt, 4 gallons of shock and a bottle of algaecide in the

pool. In early July, after Canup started the pool up, she reached out to Wilson

and informed him that the pool computer indicates that the salt level was zero.

The computer also indicated that the salt-cell should be inspected. Wilson

responded and informed her that the salt-cell probably needed cleaning, but he

did not have the proper acid cleaner that would be required. Wilson also told

Canup that he will return and add five bags of salt into the pool, which he did.

{¶8} A few days later, Canup reached out again and informed Wilson that

the salt readout is 500 and still indicates that the salt level is low and again to

inspect the salt-cell. The 500-salt level is low as the normal range should be

between 2800 to 3200. He again informed her that the issue may be her salt-

cell, and Canup, at this point, took a sample of her pool water to get tested. On

July 14, the pool computer indicated the level was 1000, but at the testing facility,

the readout was 813. Wilson again suggested that the issue may be her salt-cell

not working properly.

{¶9} On July 4 Wilson provided Canup an invoice specifically stating that

he is owed “$2,500 for labor and salt and new gaskets and face plates.” And Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 4

then on July 10, Wilson requested payment as his truck payment was coming

due. Canup placed a check in the amount of $1,200 in her mailbox for Wilson,

which he picked up. But then on July 20, when Wilson requested the remainder

of his payment, Canup in turn, sent Wilson a letter with a set of documents

explaining that she only owed him $161.98 and enclosed a check in that amount.

Wilson rejected the check, consulted an attorney who sent Canup a letter on

behalf of Wilson demanding the remaining balance of $1,300. After

approximately two months, Wilson filed his small claims complaint requesting the

full payment of $1,300, the filing fee of $84, and the attorney fee of $125.

{¶10} During her testimony at the hearing, Canup presented a packet of

exhibits that included, among other documents, images of the pool liner

separating in certain locations, images of text message exchanges between

them, and the letter she sent Wilson with a copy of the $161.98 check. Canup

elaborated on the reasoning for her letter and how she did not agree to pay

Wilson $2,500 for the labor to install the pool liner. In her mind, she was paying

Wilson for the liner, and opening the pool, which included making sure that the

water/salt/chlorine ratios were at the proper levels so she could swim in the pool.

Instead, the levels were off and she and her friends got a yeast infection. The

packet of exhibits also included a table created by Canup based on her home

security cameras of the days and hours Wilson was at her house: Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 5

Security Cameras Captured [Wilson] or Other Associates on the Property. All 15- minute water level checks were rounded up to 1 hour.

Date Hours on Property (rounding up) # of Workers Present 06/19/2023 4 X2 06/24/2023 1 X1 06/25/2023 6 X2 06/27/2023 1 X1 06/28/2023 1 X1 06/29/2023 1 X1 06/30/2023 1 X2 07/01/2023 1 X1 07/05/2023 1 X1 07/07/2023 1 X1 07/12/2023 1 X1 19 hours captured

{¶11} Based on the hours and what she believes is a reasonable hourly

rate, Canup testified that she previously paid Wilson $1,730.47 for labor and

based on her calculation, she only owed him an additional $161.98.

{¶12} After hearing the testimony and admission of Wilson and Canup’s

exhibits, the trial court took the matter under advisement and adjourned. The

trial court issued an order granting in part Wilson’s request:

After reviewing the testimony and the exhibits the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to payment for the job that the parties contracted for. He did the work and was entitled to $2500.00 for the work. After considering the payment made by defendant in the amount of $1200.00 the plaintiff is therefore owed $1300.00 from defendant. The plaintiff performed the work. Occurrences happened that were out of his control. Pools inherently cause problems, this pool is no exception. The defendant is not entitled to a reduction of the amount owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement for the money he paid his lawyer. The plaintiff shall pay his own court cost. Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 6

It is therefore ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff $1300.00.

{¶13} It is from this entry that Canup appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES HAD A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH RESPECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE WORK TO BE PERFORMED.

II. IF AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT WILSON SUBSTANTIALLY PERFOMED.

III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT WILSON WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMING BASED ON CONDITIONS OUTSIDE OF WILSON’S CONTROL.

{¶14} Under the first assignment of error, Canup argues that both she and

Wilson testified and that in her testimony, she was clear from the beginning that

she did not agree with Wilson’s assertion that she was to pay him $2,500 for just

installing the lining of the pool. To the contrary, it was her understanding that

Wilson was going to reopen the pool which did not occur here. Based on her

testimony, Canup maintains that there can be no meeting of the minds in regard

to the contract as asserted by Wilson.

{¶15} Under the second assignment of error, Canup argues that the trial

court’s factual conclusion that Wilson completed the work is contrary to the

evidence she presented. He did not complete any work as evidenced by the

failed salt/water ratio testing and that she was the one who ended the contract

and properly deducted the damages and additional expenses she incurred.

{¶16} Under the final assignment of error, Canup argues that the trial Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 7

court’s finding that Wilson was excused from performing his job because of the

weather is pure speculation. She presented evidence as an exhibit that

demonstrated that the rainfall did not affect the salt level.

I. Law and analysis

{¶17} We will address Canup’s three assignments of error together

because they attack the trial court’s factual findings relating to the same verbal

contract involving Canup’s pool.

A. Law

{¶18} Generally, “[l]egal issues involving contract interpretation are subject

to a de novo standard of review.” S.P. Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Cooper’s

Excavating, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-55, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.). But that is not the standard

when reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations, and in that

case,

great deference is given to the trial court’s factual findings supporting its legal

conclusions. Id. Thus, the trial court’s decision will be upheld “if some

competent, credible evidence exists to support them.” Id. Accordingly, “we do

not review the trial court’s factual findings under an abuse of discretion standard,

but rather, we look to see if those facts and the resulting judgment are both

supported by the weight of the evidence.” Id., citing Patton v. Patton, 2001-Ohio-

2599 (4th Dist.). “ ‘[W]e are required to uphold the judgment so long as the

record, as a whole, contains some evidence from which the trier of fact could

have reached its ultimate factual conclusions.’ ” Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 2010-

Ohio-1894, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), quoting Bugg v. Fancher, 2007-Ohio-2019, ¶ 9 (4th Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 8

Dist.). Thus, we

must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20. In weighing the evidence, we must presume that the findings of the trier of fact are correct, and if the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, as a reviewing court, we must give it that interpretation that is consistent with the verdict or finding and judgment. See id. at ¶ 21.

Maddali v. Haverkamp, 2022-Ohio-3826, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.).

{¶19} Contract formation requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and

mutual assent between two or more parties with the legal capacity to act. See

Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16. A contract can be verbal and may be

enforceable provided there is “sufficient particularity to form a binding contract[.]”

Id. at ¶ 15. And the terms of an oral contract may be determined from “ ‘words,

deeds, acts, and silence of the parties.’ ” Id., quoting Rutledge v. Hoffman, 81

Ohio App. 85, 75 N.E.2d 608 (12th Dist.1947). “The burden of proof on one

seeking to enforce an oral contract requires that party to prove the existence of

the contract by clear and convincing evidence.” Bumgarner at ¶ 20, citing

Nofzinger v. Blood, 2003-Ohio1406, ¶ 53 (6th Dist.).

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶20} For a contract to be enforceable, there must be a “meeting of the Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 9

minds” as to the essential terms of the agreement, i.e., the essential terms of the

agreement must be “ ‘reasonably certain and clear’ ” and mutually understood by

the parties. Kostelnik at ¶ 16-17, quoting Rulli v. Fan Co., 79 Ohio St.3d 374,

376 (1997).

To have a meeting of the minds, “ ‘there must be a definite offer on one side and an acceptance on the other.’ ” Turoczy Bonding Co. v. Mitchell, 2018-Ohio-3173, 118 N.E.3d 439, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), quoting Garrison v. Daytonian Hotel, 105 Ohio App.3d 322, 325, 663 N.E.2d 1316 (2d Dist.1995). Furthermore, “[t]he relevant inquiry is the manifestation of intent of the parties as seen through the eyes of a reasonable observer, rather than the subjective intention of the parties.” Bennett v. Heidinger, 30 Ohio App.3d 267, 268, 507 N.E.2d 1162 (8th Dist.1986).

Widok v. Est. of Wolf, 2020-Ohio-5178, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.).

{¶21} And “[s]ubstantial compliance is a concept that allows a party to

enforce a contract where the party seeking enforcement has substantially

complied with its terms. A nominal or trifling breach is excused.” Sims v.

Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2727, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.).

B. Analysis

{¶22} We first observe that deference is given to the findings of the trial

court as “the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their

demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in

weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.

City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “Moreover, a trier of fact is free

to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness who appears before

it.” Dills v. Hogsett, 2025-Ohio-1496, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.).

{¶23} And in this case, based on the trial court’s conclusions, it found Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 10

Wilson’s testimony to be credible. And Wilson’s testimony is supported by the

admitted exhibits.

{¶24} The admitted exhibits, which consisted of the text messages

between Wilson and Canup, demonstrate that in May, Canup approved ordering

the new liner for her pool. She said go ahead and order it after she was informed

by Wilson that the cost for the liner is $2,984.38, which is the quote he received.

Based on her approval, Wilson ordered the liner and picked it up in June.

{¶25} After receiving the liner, Wilson on June 25 went and installed the

20x40 feet liner in the pool. The installation date corresponds with Canup’s table

establishing that on that date, Wilson and an associate were at her home for six

hours. Moreover, during their exchanges, Wilson asked what is the money tally

so far as he is not good with tracking the money. To which Canup responded:

“500 for getting the water out of behind it and the chemicals to clean it to get it

open and running. And 2500 for labor of installation of liner fixing the poolbase,

and fixing the coping that was coming off.”

{¶26} Canup also testified that in 2022, she paid Wilson $900 to have the

liner re-attached. Thus, it is reasonable that she would pay $2,500 for the full

installation of the liner that is 20x40 feet in size. Wilson installed the liner and

after being informed by Canup that some areas of the liner were separating, he

testified that he returned on July 12 and reconnected the liner and fixed the

coping. His testimony is corroborated by text messages between them and also

the admitted table by Canup in which she noted that on July 12, Wilson was at

her property for an hour. Canup claimed that some areas of the liner are still Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 11

detached, but she did not state whether she gave Wilson the opportunity to

return and fix those areas. There is no evidence showing that he declined to

return and address any issues with the liner.

{¶27} After reviewing the testimonies and the admitted evidence, we

ascertain that Wilson and Canup formed a friendship and Wilson was doing odd

jobs for her. We believe that Wilson did not intend to charge Canup in the

summer of 2023 for the labor to add the salt bags to her pool. However, it seems

his good deed was mistreated by Canup in believing that he was going to make

sure her salt/chlorine ratios were at safe levels for her to swim in the pool. But

there is nothing in the record to support the finding that he agreed to do that.

{¶28} What the record demonstrates is that a verbal contract was

established in which Canup agreed to pay Wilson $2,500 for his labor to install a

new liner in her pool. Wilson installed the liner. Canup partially paid him for his

labor and he is owed the remainder of his fee.

{¶29} Finally, we wish to address Canup’s argument in which she has an

issue with the trial court’s conclusion “[o]ccurrences happened that were out of

his control.” Canup maintains that the trial court’s finding is contradicted by her

exhibit demonstrating that rainfall was minimal and could not have affected the

Ph/salt level in her pool as Wilson claimed. But if we review the trial court’s

complete finding, he continues by stating: “Pools inherently cause problems, this

pool is no exception. The defendant is not entitled to a reduction of the amount

owed to the plaintiff.” We believe the trial court’s finding is not related to the

rainfall or the weather, but rather, to the pool’s computerized equipment. The Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 12

record demonstrates that there was an issue with Canup’s salt-cell computerized

system. This is evidenced by Canup’s own testimony in which she herself took

her pool water to be tested, and there was a discrepancy. Her unit read the salt

level at 1000, but the testing lab found it to be only 813. Therefore, we find that

the trial court’s conclusion is supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

{¶30} We overrule Canup’s assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s

decision finding in favor of Wilson and ordering Canup to pay him $1,300.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Lawrence App. No. 24CA3 13

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.

Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.