[Cite as Dills v. Hogsett, 2025-Ohio-1496.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
TAYLOR DILLS, :
Petitioner-Appellant, : Case No. 24CA15
v. :
BREANNA HOGSETT, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Respondent-Appellee. :
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Taylor Dills, Chesapeake, Ohio, pro se.
Breanna Hogsett, Chesapeake, Ohio, pro se. ________________________________________________________________ CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:4-21-25 ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas
Court judgment that denied a request for a R.C. 2903.214 Civil
Stalking Protection Order. Taylor Dills, petitioner below and
appellant herein, assigns the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DISMISS CASE NO. 24OC619.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: LAWRENCE, 24CA15
2 “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW TO THIS CASE.” {¶2} On August 19, 2024, appellant filed a “Petition for
Civil Stalking Protection Order (R.C. 2903.214)” and alleged
that she needed protection from Breanna Hogsett, respondent
below and appellee herein. The petition alleged that appellee
“blocked her car” and tries to talk with her and “follows my car
and parks in front of my house.” Apparently, this dispute
revolved around a ring, some sweatshirts and a tiktok video.
{¶3} On August 26, 2024, the magistrate conducted a hearing
and gave the parties the opportunity to present evidence. The
hearing transcript consists of approximately 11 pages. Later
the same day, the trial court dismissed appellant’s request for
a protection order because “the evidence is not well taken” and
failed to meet the “statutory requirements.” On September 26,
2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
{¶4} On December 26, 2024, appellant filed her appellate
brief and set forth her two assignments of error.
{¶5} On January 8, 2025, appellee, without the benefit of a
cross-appeal, filed her “Brief of Appellant” and set forth her
two “assignments of error:”
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:”
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPEAL TO LAWRENCE, 24CA15
3 DILLS DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS MADE TO HOGSETT IN CASE NO. 24CA15.”
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:”
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO DENY MOTION TO APPEAL DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE, AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS MADE BY DILLS DURING FIRST HEARING.”
In her brief, appellee, inter alia, cites various statements and
alleged facts far beyond the evidence adduced at the hearing.
Appellee also “asks the court of appeals to reverse the
protection order made by Taylor Dills to protect defendant * * *
for future false accusations.” Here, however, the trial court
issued no particular order.
{¶6} On January 16, 2025, appellee then filed “Respondents
(SIC) Counterclaims to Brief for Defamation, Abuse of Process,
Perjury, and Requests for Sanctions.”
{¶7} On January 21, 2025, appellant filed her “Final
Response Brief” and cites a “lack of remorse” within
respondent’s brief.
{¶8} On January 27, 2025, appellant filed her “Response to
Counterclaim” and wades into a “discussion” about, inter alia,
defamation, abuse of process, perjury and sanctions.
{¶9} On February 3, 2025, appellee filed her “Respondent’s LAWRENCE, 24CA15
4 Response Confirming Reliance on Prior Brief and Expedited
Dismissal.” Appellee maintains that appellant continues a
pattern of “harassment and intimidation tactics.”
{¶10} At the outset, we take this opportunity to comment on
the multiple failures of both parties to conform to the Ohio
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although courts will generally
afford wide latitude to pro se litigants, in the case sub judice
the parties have failed to grasp not only the purpose of
appellate review, but also failed to make any attempt to comply
with the mechanics of the appellate review process. For
example, appellate courts only review facts adduced during a
trial court proceeding, not extraneous statements and claims
beyond that specific evidence. Here, the evidence consists of
the testimony adduced at the hearing before the magistrate,
which consists of 11 pages of testimony. Consequently, this
court may not consider any “evidence” or statements beyond that
included in the hearing transcript. Here, the parties submitted
no additional stipulations or other forms of admissible
evidence, but instead continued to submit a plethora of self-
serving unsworn statements that this court may not consider.
{¶11} Furthermore, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant to
file a brief that, inter alia, includes an “argument with LAWRENCE, 24CA15
5 respect to each assignment of error presented for review and
reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies.” App.R. 16(B) addresses an appellee’s answer
brief in response to the appellant’s merit brief. Finally,
App.R. 16(C) discusses an appellant’s reply brief, if necessary.
In the case sub judice, however, instead of consulting and
conforming to the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, both
parties appear to have concocted their own rules concerning the
appellate process. Additionally, both parties’ filings included
inapplicable legal terminology that appears to attempt to
describe various claims and causes of action, far beyond the
scope of the matter currently before us. Nevertheless, we will
endeavor to decipher the parties’ ramblings and attempt to
address the central issue in this matter.
{¶12} R.C. 2903.214 governs the filing of a “petition for
protection order.” R.C. 2903.214(C) provides:
A person may seek relief under this section for the person, or any parent or adult household member may seek relief under this section on behalf of any other family or household member, by filing a petition with the court. The petition shall contain or state all of the following:
An allegation that the respondent is eighteen years of age or older and engaged in a violation of section LAWRENCE, 24CA15
6 2903.211 of the Revised Code against the person to be protected by the protection order or committed a sexually oriented offense against the person to be protected by the protection order, including a description of the nature and extent of the violation;
Thus, before a court may grant a CSPO, a petitioner must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent has engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of
R.C. 2903.211. See Strausser v. White, 2009-Ohio-3597 (8th
Dist.) at ¶30; Caban v. Ransome, 2009-Ohio-1034 (7th Dist.) at
¶7. The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211(A)(1),
provides: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall
knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will
cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress
to the other person.” R.C. 2903.211 was “not enacted for the
purpose of alleviating uncomfortable situations, but to prevent
the type of persistent and threatening harassment that leaves
victims in constant fear of physical danger.” Kramer v. Kramer,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Dills v. Hogsett, 2025-Ohio-1496.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
TAYLOR DILLS, :
Petitioner-Appellant, : Case No. 24CA15
v. :
BREANNA HOGSETT, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Respondent-Appellee. :
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Taylor Dills, Chesapeake, Ohio, pro se.
Breanna Hogsett, Chesapeake, Ohio, pro se. ________________________________________________________________ CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:4-21-25 ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas
Court judgment that denied a request for a R.C. 2903.214 Civil
Stalking Protection Order. Taylor Dills, petitioner below and
appellant herein, assigns the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DISMISS CASE NO. 24OC619.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: LAWRENCE, 24CA15
2 “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW TO THIS CASE.” {¶2} On August 19, 2024, appellant filed a “Petition for
Civil Stalking Protection Order (R.C. 2903.214)” and alleged
that she needed protection from Breanna Hogsett, respondent
below and appellee herein. The petition alleged that appellee
“blocked her car” and tries to talk with her and “follows my car
and parks in front of my house.” Apparently, this dispute
revolved around a ring, some sweatshirts and a tiktok video.
{¶3} On August 26, 2024, the magistrate conducted a hearing
and gave the parties the opportunity to present evidence. The
hearing transcript consists of approximately 11 pages. Later
the same day, the trial court dismissed appellant’s request for
a protection order because “the evidence is not well taken” and
failed to meet the “statutory requirements.” On September 26,
2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
{¶4} On December 26, 2024, appellant filed her appellate
brief and set forth her two assignments of error.
{¶5} On January 8, 2025, appellee, without the benefit of a
cross-appeal, filed her “Brief of Appellant” and set forth her
two “assignments of error:”
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:”
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPEAL TO LAWRENCE, 24CA15
3 DILLS DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS MADE TO HOGSETT IN CASE NO. 24CA15.”
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:”
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO DENY MOTION TO APPEAL DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE, AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS MADE BY DILLS DURING FIRST HEARING.”
In her brief, appellee, inter alia, cites various statements and
alleged facts far beyond the evidence adduced at the hearing.
Appellee also “asks the court of appeals to reverse the
protection order made by Taylor Dills to protect defendant * * *
for future false accusations.” Here, however, the trial court
issued no particular order.
{¶6} On January 16, 2025, appellee then filed “Respondents
(SIC) Counterclaims to Brief for Defamation, Abuse of Process,
Perjury, and Requests for Sanctions.”
{¶7} On January 21, 2025, appellant filed her “Final
Response Brief” and cites a “lack of remorse” within
respondent’s brief.
{¶8} On January 27, 2025, appellant filed her “Response to
Counterclaim” and wades into a “discussion” about, inter alia,
defamation, abuse of process, perjury and sanctions.
{¶9} On February 3, 2025, appellee filed her “Respondent’s LAWRENCE, 24CA15
4 Response Confirming Reliance on Prior Brief and Expedited
Dismissal.” Appellee maintains that appellant continues a
pattern of “harassment and intimidation tactics.”
{¶10} At the outset, we take this opportunity to comment on
the multiple failures of both parties to conform to the Ohio
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although courts will generally
afford wide latitude to pro se litigants, in the case sub judice
the parties have failed to grasp not only the purpose of
appellate review, but also failed to make any attempt to comply
with the mechanics of the appellate review process. For
example, appellate courts only review facts adduced during a
trial court proceeding, not extraneous statements and claims
beyond that specific evidence. Here, the evidence consists of
the testimony adduced at the hearing before the magistrate,
which consists of 11 pages of testimony. Consequently, this
court may not consider any “evidence” or statements beyond that
included in the hearing transcript. Here, the parties submitted
no additional stipulations or other forms of admissible
evidence, but instead continued to submit a plethora of self-
serving unsworn statements that this court may not consider.
{¶11} Furthermore, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant to
file a brief that, inter alia, includes an “argument with LAWRENCE, 24CA15
5 respect to each assignment of error presented for review and
reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies.” App.R. 16(B) addresses an appellee’s answer
brief in response to the appellant’s merit brief. Finally,
App.R. 16(C) discusses an appellant’s reply brief, if necessary.
In the case sub judice, however, instead of consulting and
conforming to the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, both
parties appear to have concocted their own rules concerning the
appellate process. Additionally, both parties’ filings included
inapplicable legal terminology that appears to attempt to
describe various claims and causes of action, far beyond the
scope of the matter currently before us. Nevertheless, we will
endeavor to decipher the parties’ ramblings and attempt to
address the central issue in this matter.
{¶12} R.C. 2903.214 governs the filing of a “petition for
protection order.” R.C. 2903.214(C) provides:
A person may seek relief under this section for the person, or any parent or adult household member may seek relief under this section on behalf of any other family or household member, by filing a petition with the court. The petition shall contain or state all of the following:
An allegation that the respondent is eighteen years of age or older and engaged in a violation of section LAWRENCE, 24CA15
6 2903.211 of the Revised Code against the person to be protected by the protection order or committed a sexually oriented offense against the person to be protected by the protection order, including a description of the nature and extent of the violation;
Thus, before a court may grant a CSPO, a petitioner must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent has engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of
R.C. 2903.211. See Strausser v. White, 2009-Ohio-3597 (8th
Dist.) at ¶30; Caban v. Ransome, 2009-Ohio-1034 (7th Dist.) at
¶7. The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211(A)(1),
provides: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall
knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will
cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress
to the other person.” R.C. 2903.211 was “not enacted for the
purpose of alleviating uncomfortable situations, but to prevent
the type of persistent and threatening harassment that leaves
victims in constant fear of physical danger.” Kramer v. Kramer,
2002-Ohio-4383 (3rd Dist.) at ¶17. Furthermore, “‘Pattern of
conduct’ means two or more actions or incidents closely related
in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based
on any of those actions or incidents. * * * *” R.C.
2903.211(D)(1). Thus, one incident is insufficient to establish LAWRENCE, 24CA15
7 a “pattern of conduct.” See State v. Scruggs (2000), 136 Ohio
App.3d 631, 737 N.E.2d 574; Dayton v. Davis (1999), 136 Ohio
App.3d 26, 735 N.E.2d 939.
{¶13} In determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct
for purposes of R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), courts must take every
action into consideration “even if some of the person’s actions
may not, in isolation, seem particularly threatening.” Guthrie
v. Long, 2005-Ohio-1541 (10th Dist.) at ¶12; Miller v. Francisco,
2003-Ohio-1978 (11th Dist.) at ¶11; see, also, Smith v. Wunsch,
2005-Ohio-3498 (4th Dist.) at fn.3.
{¶14} Additionally, the decision whether to grant a civil
protection order lies within a trial court’s sound discretion.
The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the court’s attitude
is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
Moreover, an “appellate court may not simply substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court so long as there is some
competent, credible evidence to support the lower court
findings.” State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Environmental
Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 53 Ohio St.3d 147, 154, 559 N.E.3d LAWRENCE, 24CA15
8 1335.
{¶15} It is also important to recognize that when an
appellate court reviews a trial court’s judgment, the appellate
court will generally defer to the fact-finder’s weighing of the
evidence and credibility determinations. See, e.g., Seasons
Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461
N.E.2d 1273. Moreover, a trier of fact is free to believe all,
part, or none of the testimony of any witness who appears before
it. See Rogers v. Hill (1998), 124 Ohio App.3d 468, 470, 706
N.E.2d 438; Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d
35, 42, 623 N.E.2d 591; see, also, State v. Nichols (1993), 85
Ohio App.3d 65, 76, 619 N.E.2d 80; State v. Harriston (1989), 63
Ohio App.3d 58, 63, 577 N.E.2d 1144.
{¶16} After our review in the case sub judice, we conclude
that the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s request for a
CSPO does not constitute an abuse of discretion. We agree with
the trial court that the evidence adduced at the hearing falls
far short of the statute’s requirement. We hasten to add,
however, that this court encourages both parties, for their own
benefit and well-being, to conduct themselves in a manner that
need not involve the participation of the judiciary. Their
failure to do so will be detrimental to everyone involved. LAWRENCE, 24CA15
9 {¶17} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s assignments of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellee and appellant equally divide the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court LAWRENCE, 24CA15
BY:_______________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.