WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Wilmot v. Racine County, 128 Wis. 2d 138, 382 N.W.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1985), affirming a judgment of the circuit court for Racine county, Judge James Wilbershide, which [59]*59allowed separate recoveries up to the governmental liability limit by David Wilmot and his subrogee, the Milwaukee Area Truck Driver’s Health and Welfare and Express Trust. The issue on review is whether an injured party and his or her subrogee may recover separately up to the governmental liability limit provided by sec. 893.80(3), Stats. Because we find that a subrogee’s rights are not separate from those of the subrogor, we conclude that sec. 893.80(3) does not permit a subrogee and subrogor to recover separately. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
On June 20, 1982, Donald Wilmot (Wilmot) suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident. The details of the accident are not relevant to the determination of the issue on review and, therefore, we omit them. Pursuant to a health and welfare insurance plan, Milwaukee Area Truck Driver’s Health and Welfare Fund and Express Trust (Health Fund) made payments totaling $26,496.63 to cover the medical expenses incurred by Wilmot as a result of the accident. Because of these payments, the Health Fund became subrogated to Wilmot’s claim for damages.1 On February 7, 1983, Wilmot commenced an [60]*60action against the driver of the other automobile (Mokry) and his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Racine county, Racine county Sheriff Robert Rohner, the Town of Caledonia and its insurer, Wausau Mutual Insurance Company, Harvey Shebesta, John White, and the Health Fund.
The Health Fund was named as defendant in the action because of its subrogated interest arising out of medical payments made for the benefit of Wilmot. However, Wilmot and the Health Fund stipulated that the interest of the Health Fund in any recovery made by Wilmot was excluded as an issue at trial and was to be determined by the trial court following the trial of the negligence action. Furthermore, Sheriff Rohner was dismissed as a party prior to trial pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Mokry’s insurer settled with Wilmot and was released before trial.
A jury trial was held in which Mokry was found 75 percent causally negligent, Racine county 20 percent causally negligent, and Wilmot 5 percent causally negligent. The jury found no negligence on the part of the Town of Caledonia, John White, and Harvey Shebesta. The jury further found that $125,000 would properly compensate Wilmot for his personal injuries. Additionally, the court determined that Wilmot sustained $29,773.62 in medical expenses and $51,206.30 in past loss of earnings.
The trial court, in denying a series of motions made by Racine county, refused to limit Racine county’s aggregate liability to Wilmot and the Health Fund to a total of $50,000, pursuant to sec. 893.80(3), Stats.2 Instead, the court granted judgment to Wilmot [61]*61against Racine County in the amount of $50,000, plus costs, and to the Health Fund against Mokry and Racine County in the amount of $25,171.70, plus costs.3 All claims against Harvey Shebesta, John White, the Town of Caledonia, and Wausau Mutual Insurance Company were dismissed.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court’s decision, regarding the extent of Racine county’s liability, was básed upon the court’s interpretation of the "plain language” of sec. 893.80(3), Stats., which limits the amount recoverable by "any person” against a governmental subdivision to $50,000. The court of appeals noted that this court had held that, although a husband’s claim for medical expenses and loss of consortium is derivative from his wife’s personal injury claim under the predecessor to sec. 893.80(3), the two claims are separate and distinct, and each may recover up to the governmental statutory limits. Wilmot, 128 Wis. 2d at 148. According to the court, because the Health Fund constituted a person under the statutes, the Health Fund was entitled to recover separately its subrogated medical expenses from Racine County. Id. at 147-48. On March 21, 1986, this court granted Racine county’s petition for review.
[62]*62In granting Racine county’s petition, we limited our review to whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that Wilmot and the Health Fund could recover separately up to $50,000 against Racine county under sec. 893.80(3), Stats. Our determination of this issue involves the construction of a statute in relation to a particular set of facts and is thus a question of law. State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 24, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986). Accordingly, we need not defer to the decisions of the lower courts. Id.
Under sec. 893.80(3), Stats., "[t]he amount recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or death in any action founded on tort against any ... governmental subdivision ... shall not exceed $50,000.” This court has previously interpreted this section as applying the statutory limitation "to each person asserting a cause of action for damages regardless of whether the cause of action is separate and independent or separate but derivative.” Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972). Furthermore, in Wood v. Milin, 134 Wis. 2d 279, 285, 397 N.W.2d 479 (1986), we stated: "It is clear from [the above passage in Schwartz] that separateness of the causes of action for damages was key to the court’s interpretation of the statute.” It is therefore necessary to find separate causes of action before parties asserting claims against a governmental subdivision may recover separately up to the statutory limit provided in sec. 893.80(3).
It is not enough, as the Health Fund argues, to find that each entity claiming against a government subdivision is "a person” under the law. Schwartz and Wood make it clear that not only must each claimant be "a person” but that each claimant must also have a [63]*63separate cause of action, be it independent or derivative.
The Health Fund contends that, by virtue of its interest as a subrogee, it may recover separately against Racine county under sec. 893.80(3), Stats. We recognize that the Health Fund is "a person” under the statute. Thus, the dispositive question is whether the Health Fund, as a subrogee, has a separate cause of action, be it independent or derivative.
We have previously held that under subrogation a subrogee succeeds to the legal rights or claims of another (subrogor). See Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977). Thus a subrogee is one who steps into the shoes of the subrogor to the extent it has made payment as a result of the actionable event. However, subrogation confers no greater rights on the subrogee than the subrogor had at the time of the subrogation. Id.
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WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Wilmot v. Racine County, 128 Wis. 2d 138, 382 N.W.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1985), affirming a judgment of the circuit court for Racine county, Judge James Wilbershide, which [59]*59allowed separate recoveries up to the governmental liability limit by David Wilmot and his subrogee, the Milwaukee Area Truck Driver’s Health and Welfare and Express Trust. The issue on review is whether an injured party and his or her subrogee may recover separately up to the governmental liability limit provided by sec. 893.80(3), Stats. Because we find that a subrogee’s rights are not separate from those of the subrogor, we conclude that sec. 893.80(3) does not permit a subrogee and subrogor to recover separately. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
On June 20, 1982, Donald Wilmot (Wilmot) suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident. The details of the accident are not relevant to the determination of the issue on review and, therefore, we omit them. Pursuant to a health and welfare insurance plan, Milwaukee Area Truck Driver’s Health and Welfare Fund and Express Trust (Health Fund) made payments totaling $26,496.63 to cover the medical expenses incurred by Wilmot as a result of the accident. Because of these payments, the Health Fund became subrogated to Wilmot’s claim for damages.1 On February 7, 1983, Wilmot commenced an [60]*60action against the driver of the other automobile (Mokry) and his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Racine county, Racine county Sheriff Robert Rohner, the Town of Caledonia and its insurer, Wausau Mutual Insurance Company, Harvey Shebesta, John White, and the Health Fund.
The Health Fund was named as defendant in the action because of its subrogated interest arising out of medical payments made for the benefit of Wilmot. However, Wilmot and the Health Fund stipulated that the interest of the Health Fund in any recovery made by Wilmot was excluded as an issue at trial and was to be determined by the trial court following the trial of the negligence action. Furthermore, Sheriff Rohner was dismissed as a party prior to trial pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Mokry’s insurer settled with Wilmot and was released before trial.
A jury trial was held in which Mokry was found 75 percent causally negligent, Racine county 20 percent causally negligent, and Wilmot 5 percent causally negligent. The jury found no negligence on the part of the Town of Caledonia, John White, and Harvey Shebesta. The jury further found that $125,000 would properly compensate Wilmot for his personal injuries. Additionally, the court determined that Wilmot sustained $29,773.62 in medical expenses and $51,206.30 in past loss of earnings.
The trial court, in denying a series of motions made by Racine county, refused to limit Racine county’s aggregate liability to Wilmot and the Health Fund to a total of $50,000, pursuant to sec. 893.80(3), Stats.2 Instead, the court granted judgment to Wilmot [61]*61against Racine County in the amount of $50,000, plus costs, and to the Health Fund against Mokry and Racine County in the amount of $25,171.70, plus costs.3 All claims against Harvey Shebesta, John White, the Town of Caledonia, and Wausau Mutual Insurance Company were dismissed.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court’s decision, regarding the extent of Racine county’s liability, was básed upon the court’s interpretation of the "plain language” of sec. 893.80(3), Stats., which limits the amount recoverable by "any person” against a governmental subdivision to $50,000. The court of appeals noted that this court had held that, although a husband’s claim for medical expenses and loss of consortium is derivative from his wife’s personal injury claim under the predecessor to sec. 893.80(3), the two claims are separate and distinct, and each may recover up to the governmental statutory limits. Wilmot, 128 Wis. 2d at 148. According to the court, because the Health Fund constituted a person under the statutes, the Health Fund was entitled to recover separately its subrogated medical expenses from Racine County. Id. at 147-48. On March 21, 1986, this court granted Racine county’s petition for review.
[62]*62In granting Racine county’s petition, we limited our review to whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that Wilmot and the Health Fund could recover separately up to $50,000 against Racine county under sec. 893.80(3), Stats. Our determination of this issue involves the construction of a statute in relation to a particular set of facts and is thus a question of law. State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 24, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986). Accordingly, we need not defer to the decisions of the lower courts. Id.
Under sec. 893.80(3), Stats., "[t]he amount recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or death in any action founded on tort against any ... governmental subdivision ... shall not exceed $50,000.” This court has previously interpreted this section as applying the statutory limitation "to each person asserting a cause of action for damages regardless of whether the cause of action is separate and independent or separate but derivative.” Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972). Furthermore, in Wood v. Milin, 134 Wis. 2d 279, 285, 397 N.W.2d 479 (1986), we stated: "It is clear from [the above passage in Schwartz] that separateness of the causes of action for damages was key to the court’s interpretation of the statute.” It is therefore necessary to find separate causes of action before parties asserting claims against a governmental subdivision may recover separately up to the statutory limit provided in sec. 893.80(3).
It is not enough, as the Health Fund argues, to find that each entity claiming against a government subdivision is "a person” under the law. Schwartz and Wood make it clear that not only must each claimant be "a person” but that each claimant must also have a [63]*63separate cause of action, be it independent or derivative.
The Health Fund contends that, by virtue of its interest as a subrogee, it may recover separately against Racine county under sec. 893.80(3), Stats. We recognize that the Health Fund is "a person” under the statute. Thus, the dispositive question is whether the Health Fund, as a subrogee, has a separate cause of action, be it independent or derivative.
We have previously held that under subrogation a subrogee succeeds to the legal rights or claims of another (subrogor). See Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977). Thus a subrogee is one who steps into the shoes of the subrogor to the extent it has made payment as a result of the actionable event. However, subrogation confers no greater rights on the subrogee than the subrogor had at the time of the subrogation. Id. Accordingly, the identity of a cause of action is not changed by the subrogation, and no new cause of action is created thereby. See 16 Couch on Insurance 2d sec. 61:37 (Rev. ed. 1983). Thus, where one acquires a right by subrogation, that right is not a separate cause of action from the right held by the subrogor. We conclude, therefore, that the subrogated interest of the Health Fund does not constitute a separate cause of action.
We note that this court in Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973), characterized the interests of a subrogor and subrogee as "[e]ach actually own[ing] separately a part of the liability of the tort-feasor.” Although such language might suggest that a subrogee’s claim constitutes a separate cause of action for the purposes of sec. 893.80(3), [64]*64Stats., the Heifetz court further noted that "it is better to think of the insurer as an assignee of part of the claim." Id. (emphasis added). We agree with this latter characterization of the insurer’s interest as that of the owner of a part of the claim. However, as noted earlier, sec. 893.80(3) requires that the person bringing the action against the governmental subdivision be the owner of a separate cause of action. See Wood, 134 Wis. 2d at 285. It is clear that one who owns only a part of a claim does not own a separate cause of action from the owner of the other part of the claim. Thus, a subrogee, as an owner of only part of a claim, may not recover separately under sec. 893.80(3). Because the claims of Wilmot and the Health Fund are not separate causes of action, sec. 893.80(3) limits the aggregate recovery by Wilmot and the Health Fund against Racine county to $50,000.
The court of appeals’ reliance upon our conclusion that a husband may recover for medical expenses and loss of consortium was in error because this court has recognized that the husband has a legal obligation to pay medical expenses4 and that the loss of consortium is his separate loss.5 Unlike a spouse who has a separate but derivative cause of action for medical expenses and loss of consortium, the claim of a subrogee, while derivative, is not separate.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the [65]*65circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.