Williams v. Orange County Jail Administration/Officers

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 17, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-10614
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Orange County Jail Administration/Officers (Williams v. Orange County Jail Administration/Officers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Orange County Jail Administration/Officers, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEVIN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-10614 (LTS) ORANGE COUNTY JAIL ADMINISTRATION/OFFICERS; CAPTAIN ORDER TO AMEND POTTER; LT. BURLINSKI; SRG. PROCIA; SRG. KITSZLCA; OFFICER WETZEL; OFFICER CZHUBAK; TOWN OF GOSHEN, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Orange County Jail, brings this action pro se, alleging that Defendants violated his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights.1 By order dated April 9, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).2 For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

1 On March 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter to inform the Court that he has been released and to update his mailing address. (ECF No. 5.) 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Devin Williams brings this complaint against the town of Goshen, and administrators and officers of the Orange County Jail. He alleges that, for over ten months in 2020, Defendants denied him the right to communicate with his co-defendants, based on a “false excuse that NY state has made a mandated Executive Order to keep co-defendants apart.” (ECF

No.1 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that this restriction of communication violated his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION A. First Amendment Claim Plaintiff’s claim that he was not allowed to communicate with his co-defendants fails to state a claim. “A prison inmate . . . retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1053 (2d Cir. 1995)). Although “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution,” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407

(1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), those protections are of a limited scope in view of the “inordinately difficult” modern prison administration, id. Challenges to the constitutionality of prison regulations must be assessed in the light of legitimate penal objectives. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). The Supreme Court listed four factors that a court must consider in determining whether a prison regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights is permissible: (1) whether there is a rational connection between the challenged restriction and the legitimate governmental interest used to justify it; (2) whether alternative avenues of exercising the right remain open to the inmate; (3) whether accommodation of the right will have an adverse impact on guards, other inmates, and allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether obvious, easy alternatives to the restriction exist. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987). Specifically, the Second Circuit held that revocation of an inmate’s privilege of correspondence with another inmate was

reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns and was therefore constitutional. Purnell v. Lord, 952 F.2d 679, 683 (2d Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has held that a prison regulation restricting inmates’ direct communication with others is constitutional if inmates can communicate indirectly through their families, friends, clergy, or attorneys. Pell, 417 U.S. at 825. Here, Plaintiff’s mere allegation that he was not permitted to communicate with his co- defendants does not state a First Amendment claim. Given the plethora of legitimate penological concerns, such a claim is not “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Pell v. Procunier
417 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Turner v. Safley
482 U.S. 78 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Thornburgh v. Abbott
490 U.S. 401 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ervan Purnell v. Elaine A. Lord, Walter E. Kelly
952 F.2d 679 (Second Circuit, 1992)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Shakur v. Selsky
391 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Orange County Jail Administration/Officers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-orange-county-jail-administrationofficers-nysd-2021.