Williams v. Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 17, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-08715
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation (Williams v. Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DERICK LOUIS WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-8715 (LTS) BREAKING GROUND HOUSING ORDER TO AMEND DEVELOPMENT FUND CORPORATION; KAREN WARNER; MUHAMET ISLAMOVIC, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that his former employer wrongfully terminated his employment. By order dated January 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action alleging that his employment was “wrongfully terminated of sexual harassment.” (ECF 2, at 2.) He sues Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation (“Breaking Ground”), his former employer; Karen Warner, a building manager; and Muhamet Islamovic, a supervisor. Plaintiff seeks severance pay and other damages. The following assertions are taken from the complaint. Plaintiff was employed by Breaking Ground at a building in Upper Manhattan. On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff was falsely accused of improperly touching a woman and violating Breaking Ground’s sexual harassment policy. He was later fired from his job. Plaintiff contends that the false accusation made it harder for him to find employment and constitute “character assassination” and an “attempt to destroy [him].” (Id. at 6.) While Plaintiff’s complaint contains few factual allegations, he submits multiple attachments, which include documents he filed with the New York State Department of Labor for

unemployment benefits; and a charge of discrimination and letters he submitted to the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”). A decision from the State of New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board provides that Plaintiff was employed as a porter by Breaking Ground from December 20, 2021, through March 29, 2022. On March 25, 2022, a case manager from one of Breaking Ground’s partners accused Plaintiff of touching her arm as she was leaving the building. She also said that Plaintiff had previously made inappropriate comments about her physical appearance. Plaintiff was fired “for violation of [his] employer’s policy by touching the partner company employee.” (Id. at 14.) In the complaint he filed with the NYSDHR, Plaintiff asserted that he was subject to discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination of his employment.1 He claimed that his accuser subjected him to sexual harassment

by making “unwarranted terms of endearment” to him, such as “Good morning Love. Honey. Baby for almost two [] months,” and when he reported the conduct to Defendant Warner, she said that the accuser was “just kidding around.” (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff argued that, because Warner

1 Plaintiff also indicates in his NYSDHR complaint that he was fired for whistleblowing after he reported violations to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on February 12, 2022. He attaches to the complaint a letter from OSHA dated February 15, 2022, which stated that OSHA received his “possible whistleblower complaint,” and had a conversation with him on February 15, 2022, providing him with information concerning the scope of OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Programs. (Id. at 37.) The letter further noted that, because Plaintiff had “not suffered an adverse employment action/termination, related to activities protected under the OSHA Act,” OSHA was closing the complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that he is bringing this action on the basis of his alleged whistleblowing activities. was a “good friend” of the accuser, she covered up the accuser’s unlawful sexual harassment of him. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Claims of Employment Discrimination Plaintiff brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction but does not

assert a statutory basis for his claims. Because he indicates that he was subject to discrimination in employment the Court will consider whether any of the federal antidiscrimination statutes applies to his claims. In an employment discrimination action, several antidiscrimination statutes may apply, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.

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Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Breaking Ground Housing Development Fund Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-breaking-ground-housing-development-fund-corporation-nysd-2023.