Wilbur Crane Eveland, III v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency

843 F.2d 46, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4077, 1988 WL 27620
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 4, 1988
Docket87-1480
StatusPublished
Cited by49 cases

This text of 843 F.2d 46 (Wilbur Crane Eveland, III v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilbur Crane Eveland, III v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency, 843 F.2d 46, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4077, 1988 WL 27620 (1st Cir. 1988).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

On November 12,1986, appellant, Wilbur Crane Eveland, III, commenced a pro se action in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint, in its caption, names William J. Casey and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as defendants. Additional individuals and government agencies are named in the body of the complaint and in an accompanying document entitled “Charges and Petition.” We will refer to both items as the “complaint.”

It is unclear exactly whom Eveland intends to denominate as defendants. However, according to the brief of the Assistant Attorney General, Eveland made service upon Richard Helms, William E. Colby, Kermit Roosevelt, Sr., Archibald B. Roosevelt, Henry Kissinger, Robert McFar-lane, James J. Angleton and George Shultz. *48 Because we have no evidence to the contrary, we assume that the above individuals are the only defendants served with the complaint and a summons.

Eveland bases jurisdiction on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Although the complaint is complex and confusing, his substantive allegations appear to fall within two general categories. The first concerns United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Eveland, who apparently has had extensive experience in government service in the Middle East, offered to assist the Reagan administration in its efforts to resolve certain crises, such as the hostage situation in Lebanon, in that region of the world. He claims that various officials, including Schultz, obstructed his efforts and refused to accept his guidance. Eveland goes on to allege generally that Kissinger has assumed the powers of the President and has enabled the government of Israel to dominate the conduct of United States foreign policy. He recites detailed and convoluted historical data concerning events from 1940 through the present to support this claim.

The second category involves allegations that government officials engaged in tor-tious conduct against Eveland. Such activity includes libel, slander, character assasi-nation, the publication of false charges, and attempted murder and other life-threatening actions. Specifically, Eveland alleges that Kissinger acted to discredit Eveland as a national security risk, did away with Eve-land’s “business interests and professional position,” caused Eveland to live below the poverty level and engaged in measures to eliminate Eveland. Some of these allegations concern events that took place in 1975 and involve a lawsuit in England. Eveland also alleges that in 1951 Angleton, acting with Israel’s Mossad, falsified documents which indicated that Eveland had passed classified information to British double agent, Kim Philby. He finally alleges that his mail was intercepted.

Eveland seeks various forms of relief. He asks for compensatory and punitive damages. He requests that the CIA, the Department of State, the National Security Council and other federal entities produce all documents relating to him. He seeks an order requiring the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United Postal Service, Secret Service and other United States law enforcement agencies to expunge from their files and alert lists all “unwarranted” information concerning him. Finally, Eveland asks that letters of apology be issued and that he be awarded any medals, citations and commendations for which he was recommended, but which were never issued. He does not specify what agencies would be responsible for complying with this last request. 1

The government defendants moved to dismiss Eveland’s complaint. On May 1, 1987, the district court granted their motion. It held that there is no case or controversy concerning the foreign policy allegations because Eveland was not in “danger of any immediate and direct injury as a result of the defendants’ conduct.” In addition, it pointed out that the administration of foreign policy and national security raised “purely political questions” for which there is no judicial remedy. As for Eveland’s other allegations, the court stated that the complaint violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 in that it did not specify which defendant was allegedly responsible for what injury. The court further noted that Eveland had not established that the court had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants nor had Eveland demonstrated that venue was proper in Massachusetts. Finally, the court held that the conduct of foreign policy and national security did not state a claim under RICO.

*49 DISCUSSION

“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted). Because Eveland is appearing pro se, his complaint is held to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). Even reading Eveland’s papers liberally, however, we conclude that the district court was correct in dismissing the complaint. We base our conclusion on three grounds: failure to state a justiciable cause of action, lack of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants and principles of sovereign immunity.

1. Justiciability

The allegations concerning the conduct of the United States in the Middle East clearly reflect Eveland’s attempt to litigate his disagreement with how this country’s foreign policy is managed. The United States Supreme Court has held that

the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) (citations omitted); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 310-11, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). Although courts will address some areas of foreign relations, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13, 82 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
843 F.2d 46, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4077, 1988 WL 27620, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilbur-crane-eveland-iii-v-director-of-central-intelligence-agency-ca1-1988.