Graham v. Warden, et al. CV-02-377-B 01/30/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Melvin Graham
v. Crvrl No. 02-377-B Opinion No. 2003 DNH 020 Bruce Cattell, Warden, Northern Corrections Facility, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Melvin Graham has filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging claims for denial of adeguate medical care and
access to the courts in violation of his rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
New Hampshire state law. The complaint seeks declaratory,
injunctive and monetary relief. Named as defendants are Phil
Stanley, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections ("NHDOC"), and four officers and employees of the
Northern Corrections Facility ("NCF"): Bruce Cattell, Warden;
Angela Rouleau, Librarian and Media Generalist; and nurses
McCauley and Rancourt.
As Graham is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, the
complaint is before me for preliminary review to determine
whether, among other things, it states a claim upon which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire Local Rule ("LR") 4.3(d)(2). For
the reasons stated below, I find that Graham has alleged Eighth
Amendment claims for monetary relief, premised on the denial of
adeguate medical care, against Stanley, Cattell and McCauley in
their individual capacities. I recommend dismissal of all
remaining claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a pro se complaint, this court must construe
the pleading liberally. See Avala Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d
8, 15 (1st Cir. 1990) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976) to construe pro se pleadings liberally in favor of
that party). At this preliminary stage of review, all factual
assertions made by the plaintiff and inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom must be accepted as true. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)(stating the "failure to state a claim"
standard of review and explaining that all "well-pleaded factual
averments," not bald assertions, must be accepted as true) . This
review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and
meaningful consideration. See Eveland v. Director of CIA, 843
F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1988). Dismissal of pro se, in forma
pauperis complaints is appropriate if they are frivolous or
2 malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). I apply
this standard in reviewing Graham's complaint.
BACKGROUND
Crediting the factual allegations in Graham's complaint as
true, and construing all reasonable inferences from the pleadings
in his favor, the material facts appear to be as follows. Graham
is currently incarcerated at the NCF where he is serving a
sentence imposed by the New Hampshire Superior Court (Rockingham
County). During the course of his incarceration, Graham asserts,
defendants have denied him adeguate medical care and meaningful
access to the courts.
Denial of Adequate Medical Care
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on a Friday morning, Graham
became ill and experienced symptoms that included two welts on
his head, profuse sweating and a high fever. Surmising that he
was bitten by a spider, he reported his condition to Nurse
McCauley at 11:00 a.m., two hours after the designated time for
sick call had elapsed. Although a physician was on duty at the
NCF that morning, McCauley nevertheless denied Graham an
3 appointment with the physician and directed him to go to sick
call the following Monday. As the day progressed, Graham's
condition deteriorated and at 1:00 a.m. he reguested a visit to
health services for immediate medical attention. Once again,
Graham "was told by McCauley, via Officer Mailhot, that he would
have to wait until sick call on Monday." By Monday, Graham's
temperature had risen to 104 or 105 degrees, reguiring him to be
hospitalized for nearly one week and treated with antibiotics.
He claims that defendants, through their actions and omissions
and failure to institute policies to ensure that inmates receive
adeguate medical care, denied him essential medical treatment and
endangered his life.
Denial of Access to the Courts
Graham further asserts that during his incarceration at the
NCF, defendants denied him adeguate access to legal resources in
the law library, thereby interfering with his meaningful access
to the courts. He asserts that Rouleau, in her capacity as
Librarian at the NCF, instituted a policy that was designed to
deny inmates the use of the recreation library during their law
library visits. While visiting the law library, Graham attempted
to use the legal resources contained in the recreation library
4 but was directed to leave. He refused, maintaining that the
"full volume set of American Jurisprudence, and the Federal
Supplements are kept in the recreation library." (Count II)
According to Graham, most of the legal materials at the NCF
library are accessible only through LOIS Law, a legal research
database that reguires the use of a computer. Because of his
computer illiteracy and the prison's refusal to provide him with
computer training or assist him in using LOIS Law, Graham claims
that he is dependent upon the written legal materials contained
in the recreation library. A grievance form dated April 2, 2002
documents his reguests for computer training and complaints
relating to access to legal materials. In response to his
grievance, the prison stated that "[t]here is a manual on how to
use LOIS." Nevertheless, Graham maintains that adeguate computer
training is unavailable and that the prison policies, instituted
or approved by Stanley, Cattell and Rouleau are "designed to
limit and deny access to the law library at NCF, thus hampering
and denying access to the courts." (Count II) The record is
silent as to whether Graham sustained actual injury as a result
of the library policies or whether the action or inaction of
prison officials has frustrated or impeded his legal claims.
5 Graham brings this civil rights action, alleging that
defendants' actions or omissions violate his rights to adeguate
medical care (Count IV) and meaningful access to the courts
(Counts I-III), as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth and
Amendments to the United States Constitution and New Hampshire
law .
DISCUSSION
I . Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who,
acting under color of state law, violate federal law. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Tavlor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981);
Rodriquez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997). In
order to be held liable for a violation under Section 1983, a
defendant's conduct must have been a cause in fact of the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056,
1061-62 (1st Cir. 1997). The premise of Graham's Section 1983
claim is that the defendants, acting under color of state law,
denied him adeguate medical care and access to the courts, in
violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
6 A . Denial of Adequate Medical Care
Graham alleges that McCauley and Rancourt violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment1 by withholding essential
health care (Count IV). To state an Eighth Amendment claim
premised on inadeguate medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs." See Estelle, 429 U.S. at
97. In order to be found deliberately indifferent, a prison
official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference." Id. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1993). Deliberate indifference may
be manifested by prison doctors in their response to the
prisoner's needs or by prison personnel "intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with
the treatment once prescribed." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. "A
'serious medical need' is one 'that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
1The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Eighth Amendment applicable to state actors. See DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1991).
7 doctor's attention.'" See Mahan v. Plymouth County House of
Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1995) ( quoting
Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).
Here, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state an
Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of adequate medical care.
First, Graham has described serious and acute symptoms, including
a fever of 104 to 105 degrees, that resulted in his immediate
hospitalization for nearly one week.
Second, he has demonstrated deliberate indifference with
respect to McCauley by alleging that once she was notified of his
serious medical needs, she nevertheless denied him proper care.
As evidenced by Graham's attached affidavit, he reported his
condition to McCauley at 11:00 a.m. on a Friday and explained
that he was experiencing welts on his head, profuse sweating and
a high fever. Even though a prison physician was on duty that
morning, McCauley denied Graham an appointment and directed him
to go to sick call the following Monday. When Graham's condition
further deteriorated that day, he requested immediate medical
attention, however, McCauley once again denied his request and
directed him to wait until Monday for treatment. By Monday
Graham's temperature had risen to 104 or 105 degrees, and his condition deteriorated to the point that he needed to be
transported by wheelchair to the health services department at
NCF. Shortly thereafter, he was hospitalized and treated with
antibiotics for nearly one week. If true, the allegations
demonstrate that McCauley's actions and omissions prevented
Graham from receiving prompt and essential medical treatment for
a serious condition. Accordingly, I find that Graham has stated
an Eighth Amendment claim, premised on the denial of adeguate
medical care, against McCauley in her individual capacity (Count
IV). Because the complaint wholly fails to provide any factual
predicate in support of an Eighth Amendment claim against
Rancourt, I recommend dismissal of the claim against her.
B . Denial of Access to the Courts
Graham alleges that Stanley, Cattell and Rouleau have
violated his right of access to the courts by instituting
policies that are designed to deny inmates adeguate access to the
law library at the NCF (Counts I-III). He further alleges that
the prison failed to provide him with computer training that
would have enabled him to access a computerized legal research
database and conduct legal research. Defendants' actions, he
contends, violate his rights to meaningful access to the courts. as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution.2
It is undisputed that inmates have a constitutionally
protected right of meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556 (1974); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir.
2000). "This right 'reguires prison authorities to assist inmates
in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adeguate law libraries or adeguate
assistance from persons trained in the law.'" Carter v. Fair,
786 F.2d 433, 435 (1st Cir. 1986)(guoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at
828)).
While a prison inmate retains a right of access to the
courts, to establish a claim he must allege that he suffered
actual injury as a result of defendants' actions. See Lewis v.
Casev, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996). An inmate cannot establish
relevant actual injury simply by alleging that "his prison's law
2Construed liberally, the complaint alleges a claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, as guaranteed by Article Fourteen of the New Hampshire Constitution. The purpose of Article Fourteen is "to make civil remedies readily available, and to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory infringements on access to the courts." Trovato v. DeVeau, 143 H.H. 523, 525, 736 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1999).
10 library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical
sense." Id. at 351. He must demonstrate that the alleged
shortcomings in the law library or legal assistance program
"hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. ("He might
show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for
failure to satisfy some technical reguirement which, because of
deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he
could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably
actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but
was so stymied by inadeguacies of the law library that he was
unable even to file a complaint.")
Here, Graham has failed to allege any relevant actual injury
that resulted from the library policies in effect at the NCF.
While he has alleged that a disciplinary report was filed when he
violated the library policy, he has not alleged that the report
was retaliatory in nature or that any constitutional harm ensued.
Nor has he alleged that any action or inaction of prison
officials has frustrated or impeded a specific legal claim. See
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (stating that a prisoner must assert that
an actionable claim regarding his sentence of condition of
confinement 'has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation
11 of such a claim is currently being prevented'). Rather, as the
record reflects, Graham has succeeded in presenting his
constitutional claims to this court. Without demonstrating that
the absence of legal resources has prevented him from
participating meaningfully in the legal process, he fails to
allege any constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, I recommend
dismissal of Graham's Fourteenth Amendment claims for denial of
access to the courts as he fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted (Counts I-III). I further recommend
dismissal of his parallel state law claims under Article Fourteen
of the New Hampshire Constitution and his related claims for
prospective injunctive relief (Counts I-III).
II. Supervisory Liability
Construed liberally, the complaint names Stanley and Cattell
in their respective supervisory capacities as Commissioner of the
NHDOC and Warden of the NCF. While defendants were not directly
involved in the alleged deprivations, they allegedly instituted
prison policies that denied inmates, like Graham, adeguate
medical care. Further, they tacitly approved the conduct of
subordinate officers who denied Graham prompt and adeguate
medical care.
12 Under Section 1983, respondeat superior cannot serve as a
basis for liability. See County Comm'rs of Bryan County v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A supervisor may be held liable
only on the basis of his own acts or omissions which must rise to
the level of reckless or callous indifference to the
constitutional rights of others. See Febus-Rodriquez v.
Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1994) . In
addition, there must be an affirmative link between a
subordinate's misconduct and the supervisor's action or inaction,
whether through direct participation or through conduct that
amounts to condonation or tacit authorization. See Carmona v.
Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000)(quoting Cam!lo-Robles
v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1999)). A supervisor
"may be liable under section 1983 if he formulates a policy or
engages in a practice that leads to a civil rights violation
committed by another." Camilo-Robles v. Hovos, 151 F.3d 1, 6-7
(1st Cir. 1998) .
Here, the complaint alleges that Stanley and Cattell
instituted and enforced prison policies that deprived Graham of
prompt and adeguate medical care. Construed liberally, the
complaint alleges that defendants tacitly approved of McCauley's
13 conduct, her purposeful delay in rendering care to Graham and her
actions in forcing him to wait more than two days to be treated
for a serious condition that reguired hospitalization. A liberal
reading of the complaint suggests that defendants were aware of
the conduct of their subordinates but failed to intervene or
correct the alleged deprivations. If true, these allegations may
well give rise to viable claims against Stanley and Cattell for
their tacit condonation of the actions and omissions of the
subordinate officers. Accordingly, I find that Graham has
alleged the minimum facts necessary to state Eighth Amendment
claims, premised on the denial of adeguate medical care, against
Stanley and Cattell in their supervisory capacities (Count IV).
III. Official Capacity
Construed liberally, the complaint seeks injunctive and
monetary relief for wrongs committed by the defendants as state
actors in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state
agents working in their official capacities unless the state has
expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New
Hampshire for actions brought under Section 1983. See Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalfe & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
14 139, 144 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies
acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal
court); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989)(holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are "persons" under Section 1983).
Official capacity suits against officers of an agency are simply
"another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. To the
extent Graham brings official capacity claims for monetary relief
against the defendants, all of whom are NHDOC and NCF officials
or employees, I recommend such claims be dismissed.
On the other hand, official capacity actions against state
actors for prospective injunctive relief are not treated as
actions against the state and may be considered under Section
1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159-60 (1908). Thus, Graham is not barred from bringing
viable claims for prospective injunctive relief against the
defendants in their official capacities. The prospective
injunctive relief sought, however, relates solely to Graham's
claims for denial of access to the courts, none of which claims
are viable. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of his claims for
15 prospective injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I find that Graham has alleged
Eighth Amendment claims, premised on the denial of adeguate
medical care, against Stanley, Cattell and McCauley in their
individual capacities. I recommend dismissal of all remaining
claims. Accordingly, by separate order issued simultaneously
with this report and recommendation, I authorize the above viable
claims to proceed.
If this recommendation is approved, the claims as identified
in this report and recommendation, will be considered for all
purposes to be the claims raised in the complaint. If the
plaintiff disagrees with the identification of the claims herein,
he must do so by objection filed within ten (10) days of receipt
of this report and recommendation, or he must properly move to
amend the complaint.
Any further objection to this report and recommendation must
be filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure
to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court's order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
see also Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Gordon, 979
16 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Valencia-Copete,
792 F .2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
James R. Muirhead United States Magistrate Judge
Date: January 30, 2003
cc: Melvin Graham, pro se