UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Inosencio Baez Samora
v. Case No. 21-cv-0596-PB Opinion No. 2021 DNH 169 UPS-SCS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Inosencio Baez Samora is suing UPS Supply Chain Solutions,
his employer until October 2016, for workplace discrimination
and harassment in violation of New Hampshire and federal law.
UPS now moves to dismiss Samora’s complaint for failing to state
a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons
detailed below, I agree that his complaint must be dismissed.
Samora brings his case pro se. I hold pro se complaints
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Mindful
of this standard, I will liberally interpret Samora’s pleadings
in his favor, ensuring that he can receive fair and meaningful
consideration. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997); see also Eveland v. Dir. of CIA, 843 F.2d 46, 49
(1st Cir. 1988). As with any motion to dismiss a complaint
under 12(b)(6), I will construe all well-pleaded facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, “accepting their truth
and drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” See Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat, 767 F.3d 103, 108 (1st
Cir. 2014).
Samora was employed by UPS as an Auto-Bagger Operator. He
quit in October 2016 after his managers and co-workers
repeatedly harassed and discriminated against him. Compl., Doc.
No. 3 at 2, 4, 18. In response, Samora claims to have
“contacted [the] NH labor department by e-mail” and “visit[ed]
the office of the NH Commissioner . . . in Concord [to] file a
case against UPS . . . [but] nothing happened.” Id. Samora
details further personal issues since leaving his job and
expresses a belief that he was forced to quit due to the
difficulties he was having at work. See id. at 3-4. Samora
also attached records from NH Employment Security to his
complaint detailing his unsuccessful attempt to obtain
unemployment benefits. Id. at 6-17.
In its motion to dismiss, UPS construes Samora’s complaint
as bringing a federal anti-discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a hostile work environment
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and an additional anti-
discrimination and harassment claim under the New Hampshire Law
Against Discrimination (NHLAD). Samora did not disagree with
UPS’s read of his complaint in his response to its motion.
Thus, I will proceed on the assumption that those are his causes
of action.
2 After examining Samora’s three claims, accepting his
factual allegations as true, and construing all reasonable
inferences in his favor I conclude that he has not set forth a
plausible claim on which relief may be granted. Samora needed
to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII and the
NHLAD; he did not. Further, while § 1981 does not have an
administrative exhaustion requirement, Samora’s claim is barred
by its statute of limitations. I will address the claims in
turn.
Before bringing a Title VII discrimination and harassment
claim in federal court, a plaintiff must file an administrative
charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
or a parallel state agency. Thornton v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009); Franceschi v. U.S. Dep’t
of Veterans Affs., 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). The charge
must be filed “within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” or within 300
days if “the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with [an authorized] State or local agency.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). “[I]f the EEOC dismisses the
administrative charge, or if it does not bring civil suit or
enter into a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the
filing of the administrative charge,” the plaintiff may bring
his case to court. Franceschi, 514 F.3d at 85 (citing 42 U.S.C.
3 § 2000e–5(f)(1)). To effectuate that right, the EEOC will send
the employee a “right-to-sue letter,” and after receiving the
letter, the plaintiff has ninety days to sue. Id. Failing to
timely bring a claim “bars the courthouse door,” unless the
court can identify a rarely granted “equitable exception[].”
Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st
Cir. 1999).
Here, any Title VII claim is foreclosed because Samora does
not allege that he first brought the claim before the EEOC or a
parallel state agency. Samora’s complaint also does not present
any “circumstances effectively beyond [his] control” that would
excuse a delay in filing a charge. Id. at 279.
Similarly, before bringing a NHLAD claim in court, a
plaintiff “must first timely file a complaint, or charge of
discrimination, with the [New Hampshire Commission for Human
Rights].” Barrows v. State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H., 2020 DNH
012, 2020 WL 419597, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 27, 2020). The charge
must be filed within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory
act. Id. (citing Eldridge v. Rolling Green At Whip-Poor-Will
Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 168 N.H. 87, 91 (2015)). NHLAD claims
are, therefore, time-barred unless timely filed. Id. (citing
Eldridge, 168 N.H. at 93).
Samora admits that he did not successfully file a complaint
or charge of discrimination with the state’s Commission for
4 Human Rights. Instead, he alleges that he “contacted [the] NH
labor department” and “visit[ed] the office of the NH
Commissioner” but, “nothing happened.” Compl., Doc. No. 3 at
18. In his response to UPS’s motion to dismiss, he claims to
have visited the Commission for Human Rights twice, but he does
not say that he filed a complaint with it. Pl’s Mot. in Opp’n,
Doc. No. 6 at 2. Samora does say that he sent a complaint “via
mail and e-mail to the NH Labor department,” but, again, he does
not say that he filed a claim with the Commission for Human
Rights. Id. Because Samora does not allege that he filed his
claim with the Commission, a prerequisite for bringing this
suit, his complaint must be dismissed. 1 See Barrows, 2020 WL
419597, at *2.
Even if Samora successfully filed a complaint with the
Commission, his current lawsuit -- which was filed in January
2021 -- would be precluded by the applicable statute of
limitations. After submitting a complaint to the Commission, a
potential plaintiff has a maximum of three years “after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred” to “bring a civil action for
damages . . .
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Inosencio Baez Samora
v. Case No. 21-cv-0596-PB Opinion No. 2021 DNH 169 UPS-SCS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Inosencio Baez Samora is suing UPS Supply Chain Solutions,
his employer until October 2016, for workplace discrimination
and harassment in violation of New Hampshire and federal law.
UPS now moves to dismiss Samora’s complaint for failing to state
a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons
detailed below, I agree that his complaint must be dismissed.
Samora brings his case pro se. I hold pro se complaints
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Mindful
of this standard, I will liberally interpret Samora’s pleadings
in his favor, ensuring that he can receive fair and meaningful
consideration. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997); see also Eveland v. Dir. of CIA, 843 F.2d 46, 49
(1st Cir. 1988). As with any motion to dismiss a complaint
under 12(b)(6), I will construe all well-pleaded facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, “accepting their truth
and drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” See Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat, 767 F.3d 103, 108 (1st
Cir. 2014).
Samora was employed by UPS as an Auto-Bagger Operator. He
quit in October 2016 after his managers and co-workers
repeatedly harassed and discriminated against him. Compl., Doc.
No. 3 at 2, 4, 18. In response, Samora claims to have
“contacted [the] NH labor department by e-mail” and “visit[ed]
the office of the NH Commissioner . . . in Concord [to] file a
case against UPS . . . [but] nothing happened.” Id. Samora
details further personal issues since leaving his job and
expresses a belief that he was forced to quit due to the
difficulties he was having at work. See id. at 3-4. Samora
also attached records from NH Employment Security to his
complaint detailing his unsuccessful attempt to obtain
unemployment benefits. Id. at 6-17.
In its motion to dismiss, UPS construes Samora’s complaint
as bringing a federal anti-discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a hostile work environment
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and an additional anti-
discrimination and harassment claim under the New Hampshire Law
Against Discrimination (NHLAD). Samora did not disagree with
UPS’s read of his complaint in his response to its motion.
Thus, I will proceed on the assumption that those are his causes
of action.
2 After examining Samora’s three claims, accepting his
factual allegations as true, and construing all reasonable
inferences in his favor I conclude that he has not set forth a
plausible claim on which relief may be granted. Samora needed
to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII and the
NHLAD; he did not. Further, while § 1981 does not have an
administrative exhaustion requirement, Samora’s claim is barred
by its statute of limitations. I will address the claims in
turn.
Before bringing a Title VII discrimination and harassment
claim in federal court, a plaintiff must file an administrative
charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
or a parallel state agency. Thornton v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009); Franceschi v. U.S. Dep’t
of Veterans Affs., 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). The charge
must be filed “within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” or within 300
days if “the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with [an authorized] State or local agency.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). “[I]f the EEOC dismisses the
administrative charge, or if it does not bring civil suit or
enter into a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the
filing of the administrative charge,” the plaintiff may bring
his case to court. Franceschi, 514 F.3d at 85 (citing 42 U.S.C.
3 § 2000e–5(f)(1)). To effectuate that right, the EEOC will send
the employee a “right-to-sue letter,” and after receiving the
letter, the plaintiff has ninety days to sue. Id. Failing to
timely bring a claim “bars the courthouse door,” unless the
court can identify a rarely granted “equitable exception[].”
Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st
Cir. 1999).
Here, any Title VII claim is foreclosed because Samora does
not allege that he first brought the claim before the EEOC or a
parallel state agency. Samora’s complaint also does not present
any “circumstances effectively beyond [his] control” that would
excuse a delay in filing a charge. Id. at 279.
Similarly, before bringing a NHLAD claim in court, a
plaintiff “must first timely file a complaint, or charge of
discrimination, with the [New Hampshire Commission for Human
Rights].” Barrows v. State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H., 2020 DNH
012, 2020 WL 419597, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 27, 2020). The charge
must be filed within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory
act. Id. (citing Eldridge v. Rolling Green At Whip-Poor-Will
Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 168 N.H. 87, 91 (2015)). NHLAD claims
are, therefore, time-barred unless timely filed. Id. (citing
Eldridge, 168 N.H. at 93).
Samora admits that he did not successfully file a complaint
or charge of discrimination with the state’s Commission for
4 Human Rights. Instead, he alleges that he “contacted [the] NH
labor department” and “visit[ed] the office of the NH
Commissioner” but, “nothing happened.” Compl., Doc. No. 3 at
18. In his response to UPS’s motion to dismiss, he claims to
have visited the Commission for Human Rights twice, but he does
not say that he filed a complaint with it. Pl’s Mot. in Opp’n,
Doc. No. 6 at 2. Samora does say that he sent a complaint “via
mail and e-mail to the NH Labor department,” but, again, he does
not say that he filed a claim with the Commission for Human
Rights. Id. Because Samora does not allege that he filed his
claim with the Commission, a prerequisite for bringing this
suit, his complaint must be dismissed. 1 See Barrows, 2020 WL
419597, at *2.
Even if Samora successfully filed a complaint with the
Commission, his current lawsuit -- which was filed in January
2021 -- would be precluded by the applicable statute of
limitations. After submitting a complaint to the Commission, a
potential plaintiff has a maximum of three years “after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred” to “bring a civil action for
damages . . . in [New Hampshire] superior court.” N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21-a(I). If Samora had timely filed his
1 Samora “last worked for [UPS] on October 20, 2016,” see Notice of Removal Ex., Doc. No. 1-1 at 14, 15, 26, which means his ability to file a complaint with the Commission expired 180 days later, in April 2017. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21(III).
5 NHLAD claim, his right to bring it in court would have expired
on October 20, 2019 -- three years after quitting his job at UPS
and about a year before he filed his complaint.
Finally, § 1981 “hostile work environment” claims “are
subject to a four-year statute of limitations.” Garmon v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d 307, 318 n.8 (1st Cir. 2016).
These claims accrue “when the alleged unlawful act ‘has a
crystallized and tangible effect on [an employee] and [he] has
notice of both the act and its invidious etiology.’” Id.
(quoting Buntin v. City of Bos., 813 F.3d 401, 405 (1st Cir.
2015)). Samora’s § 1981 claim -- which, again, was filed in
January 2021 --is untimely: he last worked for UPS on October
20, 2016, so the statute of limitations expired on October 20,
2020. Seeing no applicable “equitable exception” and bearing in
mind the First Circuit’s guidance that “time limitations are
important in discrimination cases,” see Bonilla, 194 F.3d at
278-79, I must dismiss this claim too.
Because each of the complaint’s conceivable allegations is
precluded, I grant UPS’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 4).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge
October 25, 2021
6 cc: Inosencio Baez Samora, pro se John W. Dennehy, Esq.