Wiegand v. W. Bingham Co.

106 F.2d 546, 43 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 18, 1939
DocketNos. 7892, 7893
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 106 F.2d 546 (Wiegand v. W. Bingham Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wiegand v. W. Bingham Co., 106 F.2d 546, 43 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035 (6th Cir. 1939).

Opinion

SIMONS, Circuit Judge.

The suit which led to the decree assailed by appeal and cross-appeal was for infringement of two patents granted to Wiegand for electrical heating elements, the first numbered 1,614,330, granted January 11, 1927, and the second, No. 1,614,-938, granted January 18, 1927, upon a divisional application for a heating element of the strip type. The plaintiffs were the inventor and his exclusive licensee. The suit was brought against a jobber in Cleveland, Ohio, but the manufacturer of the alleged infringing heater intervened and counter-claimed for infringement of Light-foot patent No. 1,699,898. The District Court held the first Wiegand patent (330) valid but not infringed, the second Wiegand patent (938) invalid because of lack of patentable distinction between it and the first, and the Lightfoot patent invalid.

Each of the patents admittedly relates to improvement in an old art, in the utilization of heat generated by the passing of electric current through resisting wire. While space heaters are involved, the patents relate primarily to structures designed for application to things to be heated and so requiring that the resistor be not bare but sheathed, and electrically insulated from the casing by an insulating medium that serves efficiently as a thermal conductor, affording minimum opposition to the transfer of heat from the resistor.

The essential parts of such heating elements are the resistor, the insulation, the casing, and terminals for feeding current to the resistor. The conventional insulation of the prior art was mica, which is low duty insulation dehydrating at approximately 830 degrees F. The introduction of Nichrome wire of nickel chromium iron alloy, patented by Marsh, No. 811,859, made possible the operation of metallic resistors without fusing at temperatures as high as 2,000 degrees F. The Marsh invention broadened the scope for electrical heating, but necessitated insulating material capable of higher duty than mica. The art turned to media such as magnesium oxid, quartz, soapstone or talc. Lightfoot in 1920, patent 1,359,400, and Abbott in 1921, patent 1,367,341, the latter sustained in Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co., 7 Cir., 6 F.2d 376, taught the use of granular magnesium oxid in tubular heating elements, the dry powdered insulation being funneled into the tubular casing after insertion of the resistor through an end temporarily left open for that purpose, and compacted about the resistor by swaging the tubular jacket after sealing so as to reduce its diameter. Braun, patent No. 1,324,582, 1919, taught the use of cement as insulation, and Wiegand achieved marked success in the manufacture of flatirons between 1912 and 1919 employing cementitious refractory insulation, being awarded a number of patents upon processes (1,136,076, 1915; 1,398,410, 1921).

Of Wiegand’s fourteen claims in the 330 patent, validity and infringement of claims 1 to 12 were in issue. Since entry of the decree below claims 1, 3, 5, 8, 9 and 12 were held invalid by the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the case of Edwin L. Wiegand Co. et al. v. Howell E. Trent Co., 39 U.S., P.Q., 158. As a consequence of this holding Wiegand amended claims 1, 3, 5 and 12 by disclaimer. It is now contended by the appellants on the one hand that the amended claims never having been adjudicated are out of the case on appeal, and by appellees on the other that the amended claims are not pat[548]*548entably distinguishable from claims not disclaimed and so all are -void under the holding in Maytag Co. v. Hurley Machine Co., 59 S.Ct. 857, 83 L.Ed. 1264, decided May 22, 1939. In view of our conclusion upon the issue of infringement, we see no necessity of passing upon either contention, for conceding validity to all claims in suit as originally granted or as subsequently amended, they are not infringed.

Each of the claims includes as an element in the patented combination “granular refractory electrical insulating material.” It is the contention of the appellees that the claims must be read as drawn to an insulating material which is plastic in course of heater manufacture and becomes hardened cement in the finished product, and that only if the term “granular” is considered as referring to cementitious material can the claims be found to comprehend anything that is new. The master concluded that the patent upon its face required construction of the term “granular” since the specification refers to the insulating medium variously as “a hard and compact mass of cement-like refractory material,” “the refractory mass,” “a compact mass of refractory material,” and “the plastic refractory material.” So concluding, he analyzed the history of the .art, the file wrapper narrative, and the evidence, and found all pointing to a concept which included cementitious insulation and excluded the pourable, dry, non-cohering granular insulation employed by the defendant. Upon this construction alone could the claims be held valid over the prior art. With, this the court below agreed.

We are aware that in some jurisdictions reference to file wrapper history to . ascertain the. meaning of claims is looked upon with disfavor except insofar as it covers the question of estoppel through rejected claims. Spalding & Bros, v. Wanamaker, 2 Cir., 256 F. 530. This is on the ground that it involves lookingZparties’ intentions. We have not so tightly closed the door to inquiry upon the precise concept of the inventor measured by his own representations. Scaife & Sons v. Falls City Woolen Mills, 6 Cir., 209 F. 210; Tee Pee Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Rubber Co., 6 Cir., 268 F. 250; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Unit ed States Rubber Co., 6 Cir., 79 F.2d 948; Wood v. Peerless Motor Car Corp., 6 Cir., 75 F.2d 554; Cf. Bishop & Babcock Mfg. Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 6 Cir., 105 F.2d 886, decided June 28, 1939. We have noted expanding judicial view in construing private contracts so as best to effectuate the clear intention of the parties-Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Cist, 6 Cir., 105 F.2d 282, decided June 28, 1939, for as said by Professor Williston, 3 Contracts, 1780, “The question the court is. seeking to answer is the meaning of the-writing at the time and place where the contract was made.” Conceding that extrinsic aid to construction must be accepted with caution, yet where in the difficult art of claim draftmanship terms employed in effort to avoid prior art are susceptible-of construction transcending the clear limits of the inventive concept, there should be no more reluctance to search for precise meaning than in a private contract.

Wiegand experienced more than the usual difficulty in satisfying the examiner that his application disclosed novelty having the quality of invention. In his original claims the term “granular” nowhere appears. Wiegand at first thought it enough to recite that his insulating material was receptive- and refractory, and sought to convince the examiner that this distinguished it from mica. It was not enough.

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Bluebook (online)
106 F.2d 546, 43 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wiegand-v-w-bingham-co-ca6-1939.