Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co.

6 F.2d 376, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2303
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 19, 1924
DocketNo. 3386
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 6 F.2d 376 (Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co., 6 F.2d 376, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2303 (7th Cir. 1924).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Upon the trial of this suit in the District Court,, thé District Judge filed a written opinion, which is printed below. Our study of the same questions upon appeal has led us to the same conclusion. We have concluded to adopt the opinion. The decree is affirmed.

The complaint avers that the plaintiff General Electric Company is the owner of the Abbott patent, No. 1,367,341, issued February 1, 1921; that the coplaintiff Edison Electric Appliance Company is its exclusive licensee; and that defendant infringes such-patent. The plaintiffs also aver that the defendant holds the patent issued to Lightfoot,. No. 1,359,400, November 16, 1920; that the latter is an interfering patent; and plaintiffs pray for relief as upon infringement of the patent, and also for an adjudication under-section 4918 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 9463) for the avoidance of said Light-foot interfering patent.

The defendant by answer put in issue the-allegations of the complaint, viz. the validity and alleged-infringement of plaintiff’s patent, and denied the interfering character of the Lightfoot patent and the jurisdiction of' the court to determine such issue. By counterclaim it further set up the Lightfoot patent and charged the plaintiff with infringement thereof; set up the Schneider patent,. No. 1,263,351, April 16, 1918, and charged plaintiff with infringement thereof. The-[377]*377plaintiff, in reply, took issue upon each of the counterclaims. After the commencement of the suit the defendant filed in the Patent Office a disclaimer of much in the Light-foot patent, upon the trial withdrew its counterclaim thereof, and the case was tried upon the complaint, the answer, the counterclaim, •and reply thereto, upon the Schneider patent.

GEIGER, District Judge.

Certain preliminary observations respecting the parties and their relationship to the art involved may be made. Plaintiff General Electric Company and defendant are prominent in the electrical appliance art, large manufacturers (I assume they rank as or with the largest); each devotes itself extensively and aggressively to keeping abreast with the scientific side of electrical development, and to that end seeks to maintain, and doubtless maintains, a staff committed, not to mere ■artisanship, but to high explorative and inventive endeavor. Abbott and Lightfoot, in their labors, in their representations, which led up to and are embodied as claims in the patents issued to them, were and are the parties hereto, General Electric Company and the Cutler-Hammer Manufacturing Company. These observations, though not based upon evidence directed to their establishment, are yet founded upon the record and upon concessions made in the trial of the case.

When this much is premised, then, in the absence of a countervailing record, courts should certainly ascribe to each of these representatives of the parties, not only the high professional skill and abilities which his labors prima facie exhibit, but also good faith and good conscience back of his assertions that in fact he exerted skill and endeavor of the dignity of invention in an art wherein he professes to be a master. In other words, courts should recognize that each of the par - ties here in good faith represented upon the applications for patents that something had been invented — something useful, theretofore unknown, and which, upon the promptings of superlative effort, became known as contributions to the art. In this situation, the plaintiff, averring its patent as embodying the inventive accomplishment of Abbott, charges in its bill that defendant has a patent covering identical subject-matter, granted by the government to Lightfoot, but without right, because of Abbott’s priority, and section 4918 of the United States Statutes grants the remedy sought by plaintiff as upon “interfering” patents. Upon this fundamental aspect of the plaintiff’s ease, it was observed by the court at the close of the testimony :

“Broadly speaking * * * dealing with the evidence of the prior art, I have gained the impression that, regardless of what must be held, the plaintiff and defendant here, speaking through Abbott and Lightfoot, as late as 1918 and in 1920, certainly thought there was an inventive field wherein endeavors might be exerted as both Abbott and Lightfoot exhibited them in the claims of their patents. Speaking offhand, these two patents, Lightfoot’s and Abbott’s, had the question- been raised in the Patent Office, would unhesitatingly have been held to be interfering patents. That being true, it would hardly be probable that each side, conceding the interference, would none the less claim that the other’s patent was void [for want of novelty].”

Counsel for the respective parties doubtless recognized the predominance of view entertained by courts respecting the more liberal interpretation to be given to section 4918; that, though conceived by some courts to afford a remedy wherein the narrow issue of priority alone is to be determined, it has been later and more generally held to open the door for consideration of any issue tendered by either party respecting the validity of either or both of the patents. The difficulties attending either interpretation are well pointed out in the cases dealing therewith. Dittgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co. (C. C.) 181 F. 394; Palmer Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Lozier, 90 F. 733, 33 C. C. A. 255; Contra: Pentlarge v. Pentlarge (C. C.) 19 F. 817; Lockwood v. Cleveland (C. C.) 20 F. 164. And counsel probably have proceeded upon the later view found in General Chemical Co. v. Blackmore (C. C.) 156 F. 968, and Nikola Tesla Co. v. Marconi (D. C.) 227 F. 903, rejecting the earlier doctrine of the Pentlarge Case in the same court.

. Conceding, as suggested in the Lozier Case, that courts should not be compelled to pursue an “unprofitable inquest” to determine priority between two patents, neither of which may be valid, there is yet good ground for treating the adversaries, each of whom has received a grant from the government, as estopped by the reception of the grant from avowing want of patentable novelty. So, when from November, 1918, to November, 1923, the parties hereto and their respective “inventors,” Lightfoot and Abbott, solemnly and persistently asserted that patentable subject-matter resulted from their efforts, and when in court, almost to the day [378]*378of trial, like insistence is made, there are persuasive reasons why the jurisdiction should be limited, to the end that the parties be bound by their previous attitude in the issue of patentable novelty. Neither should be heard to gainsay his original purpose, and in lieu thereof seek merely to protect his subsequently developed pecuniary interest which has been founded, so he insists, upon his monopoly; nor should he be permitted to assume too great solicitude for the rights of the “public.” I feel that there is much in support of a limitation of the jurisdiction to the single issue, thereby estopping the holders of interfering grants from asserting that both were “pretenders.” Pentlarge v. Pent-large, supra. The considerations for such estoppel are no less cogent or less wholesome than those which in other situations preclude denial of patentable novelty or validity of a patent.

But, accepting the ease as properly tendering the issues which the parties have litigated upon the evidence, the observations just made must, in any event, recur to the court in considering what evidence bears pertinently and persuasively upon resolving the issne of Abbott’s invention now tendered by the defendant’s answer, and by its counterclaim on the Schneider patent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Brown v. Chapman
E.D. Michigan, 2020
State v. Desperados, Inc.
638 S.E.2d 4 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2006)
James Heddon's Sons v. American Fork & Hoe Co.
148 F.2d 230 (Sixth Circuit, 1945)
W. F. & John Barnes Co. v. International Harvester Co.
51 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Illinois, 1943)
Wiegand v. W. Bingham Co.
106 F.2d 546 (Sixth Circuit, 1939)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 F.2d 376, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2303, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cutler-hammer-mfg-co-v-general-electric-co-ca7-1924.