Tee Pee Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Rubber Co.

268 F. 250, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 2300
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 1920
DocketNo. 3419
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 268 F. 250 (Tee Pee Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tee Pee Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Rubber Co., 268 F. 250, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 2300 (6th Cir. 1920).

Opinions

DENISON, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order for preliminary injunction against infringement ■ o.f the Tufford reissued patent No. 14,049, dated January 11, 1916, for rubber heel. This is the fourth branch of the litigation on this patent which has reached this court. In Fetzer v. I. T. S. Co., 260 Fed. 939, 171 C. C. A. 581, and in U. S. Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Co., 260 Fed. 947, 171 C. C. A. 589, we construed various claims of the patent and held that they were valid and infringed. In Elyria Co. v. I. T. S. Co. (C. C. A.) 263 Fed. 979, we decided that the form of heel there involved did not infringe. Reference to these opinions will make it unnecessary to repeat here the general situation.

[1] We have thought that the presence in most of the claims of the phrase “concavo-convex on every line of cross section” imported into them a requirement that the upper surface of the heel be “saucer-shaped” rather than “scoop-shapéd,” and the present case presents, for its first problem, a question of the application of these definitions. It is quite clear to us that the lift of the present defendant, the “T. P.” heel, must, unlike that of the United States Rubber Company, be classified with that of the older patent to Nerger, rather than with Tufford. [251]*251Every test suggested in our former opinions and every theoretical principle of operation requires this conclusion. Because there has been misunderstanding of the principle upon which we intended to distinguish, and for a clearer presentation of the matters to be considered, we here insert drawings indicating the longitudinal cross section and the transverse arch at the breast, each coincident with the upper surface, of the four varying forms of lifts so far involved in the litigation.1

a — a Line of under surface of leather heel.

b~b Line of central attachment point.

c — c Middle of longitudinal center.

d — d Center of rear upper edge.

e — e Upper breast corners of transverse arch.

f — f Center of breast edge.

In order that these lines should truly represent their,relative situation, they are shown in each case as they will be when the upper edge of the lift is horizontal; i. e., when the lift is placed up against the horizontal bottom of the heel (indicated by the dotted line a a) ready for attachment, hut before applying any distorting pressure. As we pointed out in the Fetzer Case, 260 Fed. 940, 171 C. C. A. 581, some such common basis for positioning of the various lifts must be adopted, or there can be no intelligent comparison of the different forms. If the lifts are merely rested loosely upon the flat surface of a counter or desk, and are allowed to position themselves, it is obvious that whether the upper surface will hold water like a saucer, or allow the water to run out like a scoop, will be dependent, not at all upon the form of that surface, but rather upon how the weight of rubber may happen to be distributed, so as to fix the center of gravity, or upon such irregularities as there may be on the under surface. On this rather natural, but deceptive, test, the T. P. will rock rearwardly into such a position that the top seems to be saucer-shaped; but when the test is corrected, to bring it to the common standard, the above drawings make it clear that on the longitudinal cross section, the lowest spot is at the breast, and is not centrally disposed.

Not only is this theoretically true, but inspection and careful measurement of the numerous exhibits now presented show that every one of the I. T. S. and the U. S. Co.’s lifts has a low spot centrally disposed, [252]*252while in every one of the T. P. lifts the distance from the top plane to the longitudinal center of the upper surface constantly increases as the breast is approached, and is greatest at that point. Applying the. practical test of whether liquid is retained in this cavity when the top edges are made horizontal, we find that there is no such retention; it all runs out, except that minute quantity which will not flow over a relatively dry surface. The affidavits which state the contrary result must be based upon an abnormal positioning of the lift, unless water has lost its inherent tendency to run down hill.

We do not overlook that Nerger’s upper central longitudinal line, from center to breast, is horizontal, while the T. P. is a curve; but this is immaterial, as it is a downward curve — not upward — and so is even further away from Tufford than Nerger is. If Nerger is to be distinguished, because horizontal, the T. P. is yet more to be distinguished, because more than horizontal.' There is no escape from thp conclusion that the T. P. lifts do not infringe those claims of the patent which call expressly for the concavo-convex form on every line of cross section.

It 'is said that claims 7 and 9 do not contain this limitation, and that therefore a broader question is presented. Claims 5, 6, and 8 have, for one element, “a body portion of concavo-convex form on every line of cross section.” Claim 7 (and the same is true of claim 10) describes this element as “a body portion, the attaching face of which is concave and the tread face of which is convex on every line of cross section.” It is now urged that in claim 7 the descriptive restriction, “on every line of cross section,” applies only to the immediately preceding “convex” and not at all to the more remote “concave.” This is to say that these claims contemplate a structure which, upon its lower or tread surface, should be convex on every possible cross section, but on the upper surface need not be of corresponding fohn, but might be of any shape which would generally respond to the word “concave.” Grammatically, this construction is possible, but we think it unnatural. No such variant is suggested in the specification or the file wrapper proceedings, and, as indicated hereafter, we should regard that construction as a departure from the principle of Tufford’s invention, as that principle is imported into claim 7 by the. later requirement in that claim that there must be uniform pressure upon the edge all around when the central portion is forced up into position. We think the form, of this phrase used in claims 5, 6, and 8, and the form used in 7 and 10, as above quoted, are intended to express precisely the same thought.'

[2] Claim 9, as it is found in the patent, is quoted in the margin.2 So far as concerns the particular phrase so far treated, this claim re■quires only that the attaching face should be concave and the tread con[253]*253vex. If these words could have the broad quality or meaning to which they would often be entitled, the T. P. lift would in this respect respond, in the common sense of the words, and perhaps in the technical sense. It would, not be impossible to speak of the scooped-out upper surface of the T. P. lift as “concave.” It is said that the presence of the steel reinforcing plate in Nerger prevented the suction effect which this claim calls for, and hence that this claim is rightly to be distinguished from Nerger in that particular, and would be infringed, by a.lift, even though it were in Nerger’s exact form, without the reinforcing plate. For the purpose of this opinion we may assume, without intending thereby to decide, that the mere omission of this plate from Nerger would be invention, if the lift then would accomplish a useful new result.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
268 F. 250, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 2300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tee-pee-rubber-co-v-i-t-s-rubber-co-ca6-1920.