Top-Scor Products, Inc. v. H. C. Fisher Co.

257 F. Supp. 775, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10404
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 11, 1966
DocketCiv. A. No. C 64-388
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 257 F. Supp. 775 (Top-Scor Products, Inc. v. H. C. Fisher Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Top-Scor Products, Inc. v. H. C. Fisher Co., 257 F. Supp. 775, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10404 (N.D. Ohio 1966).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

GREEN, District Judge:

This action was brought by plaintiff to recover for alleged infringement of United States Patent No. 2,508,393, issued to Edward B. Jaeger on May 23, 1950 for a “Shortening.” 1 As stated in the patent specifications:

This invention relates to an improved shortening for use in the production of bread dough, cake batter, and the like; and in extension contemplates not only a shortening per se, but doughs, batters, and the like, including the novel shortening and the method for their production and the baked products produced therewith.

Defendants are charged with infringing the said patent by the manufacture and sale of compositions known as Fisher’s Fresh’ner or Fisher’s Special Fresh’-ner or Fisher’s Super Fresh’ner. These compositions are designed for use by bakers in a bread dough system.

Defendants moved the Court for a summary judgment, on the basis that the accused compositions do not infringe plaintiff’s patent. The motion was set for oral argument, at which time defendants’ counsel placed sole reliance on one alleged distinguishing feature between defendants’ products and plaintiff’s patent.

In ruling on this motion the Court has therefore determined to consider only that ground urged at the oral hearing, and has not considered the other matters set forth in plaintiff’s original written motion.

The crux of this matter revolves around the issue of the “thermal stability” of the patented compositions and defendants’ products. The term thermal stability, as used herein, relates to the propensity of the compositions not to separate into different phases when heated.

Defendants contend that their products are thermally unstable — that is, that they separate into different phases under heat [777]*777—and that the patent covers only a thermally stable compound, one that will not so separate under heating and in the temperature range normally encountered in the baking process. It is on this basis that defendants contend that their products cannot be held to infringe plaintiff’s patent.

There is adequate evidence before the Court to establish that defendants’ products separate on heating at 130 to 140 degrees Fahrenheit into a water phase and a solid organic phase which immediately melts to a liquid organic phase. The sole question is whether plaintiff’s patent reaches such a composition.

The claims of plaintiff’s patent simply describe the formulation of the shortenings claimed thereunder, and have no reference to the thermal stability of the said compositions. Defendants contend, however, that in the presentation of the patent to the Patent Office the inventor and his solicitor argued that the claimed compositions were inherently thermally stable, and thus an express recital in the claims of thermal stability is not necessary to impress such a limitation upon the scope of the claims. Plaintiff denies that any such limitation can be read into the claims, based upon the proceeding before the Patent Office.

This matter of the weight to be accorded to representations made to the Patent Office, and the effect thereof upon the issued patent, is the principal point in controversy herein.

The rule in this Circuit appears to be well established that reference may be had to the history of the patent before the Patent Office to assist in determining the scope thereof. A patent should be construed in the light of its history in the Patent Office. Nickerson v. Bearfoot Sole Company, 311 F.2d 858, 862 (CA 6, 1962). The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has stated:

It was vigorously contended below that patent office arguments are merely preliminary negotiations and that file wrapper history to ascertain the meaning of claims is looked upon with disfavor. In Wiegand v. W. Bingham Company, 6 Cir., 106 F.2d 546, 548, we fully explained that we have not so tightly closed the door to inquiry upon the precise concept of the inventor, measured by his own representations, with citation of precedents. Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. v. Turchan, 208 F.2d 222, 227 (CA 6, 1953).

See also, Thabet Mfg. Co. v. Kool Vent Metal Awning Corp., 226 F.2d 207, 210 (CA 6, 1955); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 79 F.2d 948, 955 (CA 6, 1935); Sturgis v. Franklin Oil Heating, 26 F.Supp. 628, 631-632 (D.C.S.D.Ohio, 1939).

While in most instances the foregoing rule has been applied in cases involving construction of claims which had been amended to meet prior Patent Office rejection, the rationale of the rule is equally valid when the question before the Court is in what manner the applicant distinguished his invention over the prior art, and the novelty which he ascribed to it, in order to secure allowance of the patent claims.

The history of this patent before the Patent Office does reflect some claim amendment, but the meaning of the precise language of the amended claims is not the principal issue. It is the general inventive concept of the claimed compositions which is the prime issue, and in that respect the file history is informative.

The exhibits before the Court reflect that all of the patent claims, as amended, were rejected by the Patent Examiner as unpatentable over the prior art. The decision of the Examiner was reversed by the Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the patent allowed. The decision of the Board of Appeals will be considered hereinafter.

In the specifications of plaintiff’s patent the following statements are found:

Whatever the order of addition of the ingredients and however the ingredients are mixed, batters and doughs as heretofore produced have heretofore [778]*778contained free fat and more or less free moisture which cannot unite in baking. Free fat under baking temperature will be reduced to oil, which will over-saturate the batter or dough ingredients, thereby retarding the baking so that the baking cannot be efficiently concluded before the expansion action of the carbon dioxide gas released by the leavening agent, such as the baking powder, has diminished to such an extent as to be ineffective. * * *
* * * * *
Now in accordance with this invention, it has been found that if the fat used as shortening in a batter or dough be incorporated with a glycerol or a propylene glycol monoester of an edible fatty acid with a substantial amount of moisture, through the medium of an emulsifying agent, to form a shortening, a modification of the other ingredients of the mix, including any added moisture, and especially of the fat and moisture,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
257 F. Supp. 775, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10404, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/top-scor-products-inc-v-h-c-fisher-co-ohnd-1966.