Wheelock v. Eyl

223 N.W.2d 276, 393 Mich. 74, 1974 Mich. LEXIS 214

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: November 21, 1974
• Docket: 8 March Term 1974, Docket No. 54,654
• Status: Published

Opinions

T. G. Kavanagh, J.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the granting of a motion for new trial in an automobile negligence case. Defendants-appellants raise the evidentiary question of whether the bare payment of a traffic ticket fine for a violation involving conduct subsequently at issue in a civil case may be admitted as evidence of negligence in that case. We reverse the trial court’s grant of a new trial and hold that neither bare payments of fines nor guilty pleas may be admitted as evidence in a civil trial for the purpose of showing that substantially the same wrongful conduct at issue in the civil trial has been admitted in a prior criminal trial.

I. THE FACTS

On November 21, 1968, the automobile driven by plaintiff Myrtle Wheelock collided with the automobile driven by defendant, Joanne Eyl (now Joanne Eyl Reynolds who at that time was married to defendant Michael B. Eyl, the owner of the vehicle she was driving). A police officer arrived at the scene of the accident and issued a ticket to Joanne Eyl for failure to yield right of way. The ticket was paid without a court appearance.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in Macomb County Circuit Court on May 1, 1970, alleging damages caused by Joanne Eyl’s negligence.

A jury trial was held on January 27, 1972.

On cross-examination counsel for plaintiff was permitted over objection of defense counsel to ask Joanne Eyl if she had received the aforementioned traffic ticket and paid the fine. She replied in the affirmative.

The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the prior traffic offenses of a witness only as they affected the credibility of that person as a witness, but could not consider the issuance of the traffic ticket to Joanne Eyl as substantive evidence of negligence.

The jury found no cause of action.

Plaintiff moved for and was granted a new trial on the basis that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the payment of a traffic ticket fine could be considered as evidence of negligence based on this Court’s holding in Diamond v Holstein, 373 Mich 74, 77; 127 NW2d 896 (1964).

The Court of Appeals denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

Diamond v Holstein, supra, was an auto negligence case. Defendant had pled guilty to a charge of unsafe driving in connection with the accident that was the subject of the suit. The jury found no cause of action. On appeal the Court held that the guilty plea could be considered as evidence of negligence, but it did not entitle plaintiff to a directed verdict or an instruction that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, citing Anders v Clover, 198 Mich 763; 165 NW 640 (1917).

In Anders plaintiff sued for assault and battery. Defendant had pled guilty to criminal assault and battery on plaintiff. In the civil trial defendant presented evidence that he had acted in self-defense. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. The Court, on review, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the guilty plea was conclusive against defendant’s contention of self-defense. The instruction was proper that the guilty plea should be given as much weight as the jury believed it to be entitled.

In Nielsen v Eiler, 248 Mich 545; 227 NW 688 (1929), an assault case, the jury brought in a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant alleged on appeal that it was error to receive in evidence his guilty plea to a criminal charge arising out of the same fact situation at issue in the suit. The Court held the allegation to be without merit.¹

In Kloosterman v Kalamazoo City Lines, Inc, 386 Mich 430; 192 NW2d 258 (1971), the Court acknowledged that three other cases all involving guilty pleas and/or payment of fines for traffic violations support the rule that prior judicial admissions are admissible as substantive evidence in civil suits arising out of the same factual situations.² In Zimmerman v Goldberg, 277 Mich 134; 268 NW 837 (1936) defendant had pled guilty. In Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528; 21 NW2d 841 (1946), defendant appeared before a justice of the peace and paid á fine. In Cebulak v Lewis, 320 Mich 710; 32 NW2d 21; 5 ALR2d 186 (1948), defendant’s father had paid two traffic ticket fines for her.

III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Without disputing the logic supporting the rule we are persuaded our jurisprudence is no longer served well by it.

Civil suits, by and large, are contested claims among individuals. Criminal cases involve a charged offense against the whole people of the state. While the same conduct often affronts society and gives rise to claim in an individual on account of it, the considerations and purposes of the separate procedures for redressing the respective wrongs are disparate and both procedures are diminished by ignoring the differences.

A litigant should not be burdened in adjudicating his civil rights according to how or whether he has satisfied the claim against him by society.

Likewise the speedy determinations of society’s claims against individuals should not be influenced by a rule of civil procedure which puts a premium on the mode of response to society’s charge.

In addition, the successive changes in the General Court Rules, the statutes, and decisions whereby the plea of nolo contendere has achieved acceptability seriously weaken the underpinnings of reason supporting the old rule and we are convinced our practice will be better served by no longer following it. GCR 1963 111.2; GCR 1963, 785.7 eff June 1, 1973; MCLA 767.37; MSA 28.977 as amended by 1969 PA 334; People v Tomlinson, 50 Mich App 655; 213 NW2d 803 (1973); People v Curry, 48 Mich App 545; 210 NW2d 791 (1973). Compare People v Franchi, 3 Mich App 511; 142 NW2d 881 (1966).

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that a criminal conviction after trial, or plea, or payment of a fine is not admissible as substantive evidence of conduct at issue in a civil case arising out of the same occurrence.

Reversed. Costs to defendants.

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, Levin, and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.

1 In Powell v King, 33 Mich App 41; 189 NW2d 746 (1971), Justice Levin’s concurring opinion analyzes the rationale of Diamond, Anders and Nielsen and sets forth persuasive reasons for changing the rule.

2 Heretofore prior judicial admissions of guilt in criminal cases were admissible as quasi-admissions in civil suits. See 4 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourne Rev), § 1059, p 27.