ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
West Valley City appeals from a district court order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake County. The trial court’s ruling permitted the County’s municipal-type service district to retain 1988 ad valorem property taxes collected from the owners of property that was annexed to and served by West Valley during 1988. We reverse the district court and direct entry of judgment for West Valley.
The material facts are not in dispute. On March 31, 1988, West Valley annexed approximately 4600 acres of unincorporated real property from the County.1 Prior to annexation, the property had been part of Salt Lake County’s Municipal-type Service District No. 1. See Utah Code Ann. [1002]*1002§§ 17-34-1, -2.2 Following annexation, West Valley assumed responsibility for providing municipal services to the annexed area. Despite this fact, the service district levied ad valorem taxes on the annexed property for the entire year.3 See id. § 17-34-3.4 The county treasurer then collected and distributed those taxes to the service district. West Valley requested a remittance of those taxes, but the County denied the request.
West Valley then brought this action in district court.5 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and on September 10, 1990, the court denied West Valley’s motion and granted the County’s, finding that West Valley was not entitled to the taxes because it had failed to notify the state tax commission of the March 31, 1988, annexation on or before December 31, 1987, as required by section 11-12-3 of the Code. See id. § 11-12-3. West Valley appeals.
When no facts are in dispute, a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). We accord no deference to a trial court’s legal conclusions but review them for correctness. Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112.
This case turns on the interpretation to be given section 11-12-3 of the Code, which provides:
Property annexed to any existing taxing entity or property in any new taxing entity shall carry any tax rate imposed by that taxing entity if notification, as required by Section 11-12-1, is made to the State Tax Commission not later than December 31 of the previous year.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-12-3.6 The County argues that because West Valley did not [1003]*1003notify the state tax commission of the annexation before December 31, 1987, some three months before it occurred, the property in the annexed area must carry the County’s tax rate for all of 1988 and the County is entitled to all the taxes that rate generated. On the other hand, West Valley claims that .section 11-12-3 specifies only the tax rate to be applied to annexed or newly incorporated property and is of no consequence in determining which entity is entitled to the revenues generated by that rate.
In deciding a statute’s meaning, we first consider its terms. Only if the statute is ambiguous need we look further. Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112. Here, there is no ambiguity. The statute states that when property is annexed, it “shall carry any tax rate” of the annexing entity the state tax commission is notified of the annexation and the relevant tax rate by December 31st of the previous year. Utah Code Ann. § 11-12-3. The statute does not purport to speak to the question of which entity is entitled to the tax revenue. Here, because West Valley did not notify the state tax commission of the annexation by December 31, 1987, the statute requires that the tax rate applicable to this property for 1988 be that of the County.
Because section 11-12-3 does not address the question of who receives the resulting tax revenue, we look to other sources. In Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Utah 1974), we held that the date of assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity’s power for the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting taxes on the property. See also Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 380 P.2d 924, 925-26 (Utah 1963);
Gillmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932, 934 (1907). Huntington leads us to conclude that although the date for fixing the tax rate may be December 31, 1987, and the lien date may be January 1, 1988, the levy date of June 22, 1988, is the relevant point for determining whether West Valley or the County should receive the ad valo-rem taxes for the entire 1988 tax year.7 See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-912. In essence, the entity within which the property lies on the date the levy for the taxable year occurs is entitled to receive the taxes for the entire year. Because annexation of the property was complete as of March 31, 1988, we hold that West Valley is entitled to the taxes for the 1988 tax year.
The County claims that such a holding violates article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution, which, the County contends, require that all property within a municipality be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. The County argues that if West Valley is allowed to recover the ad valorem taxes, it will have effectively imposed two different tax rates on property within its boundaries during 1988, in violation of the constitution. On the other hand, West Valley argues that to rule against it would violate article XIII, section 10 of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
All corporations or persons in this State, or doing business herein, shall be subject to taxation for State, County, School, Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal property owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 10. West Valley contends that this provision requires that all owners of property within its boundaries are subject to paying it taxes, something the trial court’s ruling would bar.
[1004]*1004If both constitutional arguments were accepted, a decision in favor of either party would necessarily create a constitutional violation. We think, however, that both parties read more into these constitutional provisions than is appropriate. These provisions mean exactly what they say, but none seems to have been drafted in contemplation of the problems that can arise when property is shifted from one taxing jurisdiction to another, much less if such a shift occurred in the midst of the process of determining rates and fixing liability for taxes. Each provision states a principle that seems to speak to different times during the tax year.
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
West Valley City appeals from a district court order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake County. The trial court’s ruling permitted the County’s municipal-type service district to retain 1988 ad valorem property taxes collected from the owners of property that was annexed to and served by West Valley during 1988. We reverse the district court and direct entry of judgment for West Valley.
The material facts are not in dispute. On March 31, 1988, West Valley annexed approximately 4600 acres of unincorporated real property from the County.1 Prior to annexation, the property had been part of Salt Lake County’s Municipal-type Service District No. 1. See Utah Code Ann. [1002]*1002§§ 17-34-1, -2.2 Following annexation, West Valley assumed responsibility for providing municipal services to the annexed area. Despite this fact, the service district levied ad valorem taxes on the annexed property for the entire year.3 See id. § 17-34-3.4 The county treasurer then collected and distributed those taxes to the service district. West Valley requested a remittance of those taxes, but the County denied the request.
West Valley then brought this action in district court.5 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and on September 10, 1990, the court denied West Valley’s motion and granted the County’s, finding that West Valley was not entitled to the taxes because it had failed to notify the state tax commission of the March 31, 1988, annexation on or before December 31, 1987, as required by section 11-12-3 of the Code. See id. § 11-12-3. West Valley appeals.
When no facts are in dispute, a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). We accord no deference to a trial court’s legal conclusions but review them for correctness. Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112.
This case turns on the interpretation to be given section 11-12-3 of the Code, which provides:
Property annexed to any existing taxing entity or property in any new taxing entity shall carry any tax rate imposed by that taxing entity if notification, as required by Section 11-12-1, is made to the State Tax Commission not later than December 31 of the previous year.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-12-3.6 The County argues that because West Valley did not [1003]*1003notify the state tax commission of the annexation before December 31, 1987, some three months before it occurred, the property in the annexed area must carry the County’s tax rate for all of 1988 and the County is entitled to all the taxes that rate generated. On the other hand, West Valley claims that .section 11-12-3 specifies only the tax rate to be applied to annexed or newly incorporated property and is of no consequence in determining which entity is entitled to the revenues generated by that rate.
In deciding a statute’s meaning, we first consider its terms. Only if the statute is ambiguous need we look further. Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112. Here, there is no ambiguity. The statute states that when property is annexed, it “shall carry any tax rate” of the annexing entity the state tax commission is notified of the annexation and the relevant tax rate by December 31st of the previous year. Utah Code Ann. § 11-12-3. The statute does not purport to speak to the question of which entity is entitled to the tax revenue. Here, because West Valley did not notify the state tax commission of the annexation by December 31, 1987, the statute requires that the tax rate applicable to this property for 1988 be that of the County.
Because section 11-12-3 does not address the question of who receives the resulting tax revenue, we look to other sources. In Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Utah 1974), we held that the date of assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity’s power for the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting taxes on the property. See also Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 380 P.2d 924, 925-26 (Utah 1963);
Gillmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932, 934 (1907). Huntington leads us to conclude that although the date for fixing the tax rate may be December 31, 1987, and the lien date may be January 1, 1988, the levy date of June 22, 1988, is the relevant point for determining whether West Valley or the County should receive the ad valo-rem taxes for the entire 1988 tax year.7 See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-912. In essence, the entity within which the property lies on the date the levy for the taxable year occurs is entitled to receive the taxes for the entire year. Because annexation of the property was complete as of March 31, 1988, we hold that West Valley is entitled to the taxes for the 1988 tax year.
The County claims that such a holding violates article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution, which, the County contends, require that all property within a municipality be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. The County argues that if West Valley is allowed to recover the ad valorem taxes, it will have effectively imposed two different tax rates on property within its boundaries during 1988, in violation of the constitution. On the other hand, West Valley argues that to rule against it would violate article XIII, section 10 of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
All corporations or persons in this State, or doing business herein, shall be subject to taxation for State, County, School, Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal property owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 10. West Valley contends that this provision requires that all owners of property within its boundaries are subject to paying it taxes, something the trial court’s ruling would bar.
[1004]*1004If both constitutional arguments were accepted, a decision in favor of either party would necessarily create a constitutional violation. We think, however, that both parties read more into these constitutional provisions than is appropriate. These provisions mean exactly what they say, but none seems to have been drafted in contemplation of the problems that can arise when property is shifted from one taxing jurisdiction to another, much less if such a shift occurred in the midst of the process of determining rates and fixing liability for taxes. Each provision states a principle that seems to speak to different times during the tax year. All are silent as to how to deal with a situation such as the present one.
Sections 2 and 3 of article XIII, relied on by the County, refer to the tax rate imposed. Section 2(1) provides:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1). Section 3(1) provides in part:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1). Taken together, these provisions articulate the principle that uniform rates of taxation are to be employed but confer on the legislature the power to implement that principle. Cf Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 190-91 (Utah 1974). As noted above, these provisions do not fix the point during the year when their principles are to be satisfied. The legislature has filled this lacuna by setting a uniform date of lien, January 1st. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103. We conclude that the requirement of uniform and equal rates of assessment is to be judged as of that date. Because the actual tax rates imposed were uniform and equal as of January 1, 1988, we find no constitutional violation.
As for West Valley’s reliance on article XIII, section 10, it too states a principle that can be tested sensibly only at a given point each year. The movement of property from one legal entity to another during the year necessarily precludes the provision from being satisfied at all times. However, because this constitutional provision refers to levying taxes, we think that the date of levy, not the statutory lien date, is the appropriate date at which to look in determining whether the provision has been met. Section 10 requires that the entity within which the property is located as of the levy date receive the taxes for that year. Here, the property was not within the County’s boundaries on June 22, 1988, by virtue of its annexation to West Valley on March 31st, and therefore, the County was not entitled to the revenues collected for the 1988 tax year. See Huntington City, 518 P.2d at 1248-49. By awarding the taxes to West Valley, all property could be taxed by the entity within which it lay, thus satisfying article XIII, section 10, even though the rates used might include rates fixed by another entity as of January 1st.
We note that both West Valley and the County have raised policy arguments to support their respective positions. Each claims that if we decide for the other, administrative and fiscal hardships will be imposed upon them. We recognize that under our decision today, anomalous results are possible. For example, if annexation occurs after the June 22nd levy date, the acquiring entity would receive no ad valorem tax dollars from that property for the entire year despite the fact that that entity would be required to provide services immediately upon annexation. On the other hand, if the annexation occurs on or before June 22nd, the entity from which the property was annexed would be denied any tax revenues for the year despite the fact it had provided services for some period of time during the year.
These apparent inequities flow from the fact that the time when levy occurs, like [1005]*1005the time for fixing the applicable tax rate, has no necessary relationship to the date on which an annexation or incorporation becomes final. Certainly, it is within the power of the legislature to adjust the operation of these various statutes and their interplay with annexations and incorpo-rations so as to ameliorate these problems. But the fact that this interplay has not been rationalized at present does not argue against the disposition we have made of this appeal; it argues only for legislative attention to the matter.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment for West Valley.
HALL, C.J., STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.