Washington v. Interscope Records

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 4, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-08910·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MALCOLM WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-8910 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND INTERSCOPE RECORDS, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. By order dated October 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendant Interscope Records, which he identifies as a

citizen of California. In his original complaint, Plaintiff invoked the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and identified his federal claims as “identity theft” and violations of “the privacy act.” (ECF 1 at 2.) The only factual allegations in the complaint were the following: People began saying my name alongside my social media exploit. I didn’t have anywhere to go I had to say my name was Worldpeace Meta. I know she loves me. I didn’t know her manager would go a deferent route. Her talent scout agreed we should be together. Interscope should accept responsibility. They said she was done. I didn’t agree. They allowed society to hold her against her will. I’m Hollywood. She’s Hollywood. We both grew up in the 90’s. I knew about her. Michael Jackson found out about her. She knows how I feel. I thought she would sell more albums than anyone. (Id. at 5.)1 By order dated November 6, 2023, the Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and permitted Plaintiff to replead his claims. The Court directed Plaintiff to provide a short and plain statement of his claims, including facts about what occurred, in order to give Defendant Interscope Records notice of what it was alleged to have done or failed to do. On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction and alleges that he is a citizen of New York and that Defendant Interscope Records is a citizen of California. He seeks $100 million in

1 All spelling and punctuation in quoted material is from the original. damages. Plaintiff’s sole factual allegation is the following sentence: “FBI investigations concluded that Interscope Records was at fault.” (ECF 1 at 5.) DISCUSSION A. Pleading Standards As set forth in the Court’s prior order, Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), but it need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”’ Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 F. App’x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Rule 8 requires, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed. See Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (dismissing a complaint because it was convoluted, repetitive and difficult to understand); Anduze v. City of New York, No. 21- CV-519 (LLS), 2021 WL 795472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (dismissing a complaint because “the [c]ourt is unable to properly evaluate the full nature and extent of [the] [p]laintiff's claims”). Here, even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not provide Defendant Interscope Records with

information about what it is alleged to have done or failed to do, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Although Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant is responsible for some wrongdoing, Plaintiff does not include facts about what happened or why he is entitled to the relief that he seeks. Plaintiff’s amended complaint thus fails to comply with Rule 8 and does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. B. Leave to Amend District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend and has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because it is unclear if the defects in Plaintiff’s amended complaint can be cured with a further

amendment, the Court grants Plaintiff another opportunity to amend. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed, he must file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

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Related

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ruotolo v. City of New York
514 F.3d 184 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Mendes Da Costa v. Marcucilli
675 F. App'x 15 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Atuahene v. City of Hartford
10 F. App'x 33 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Strunk v. United States House of Representatives
68 F. App'x 233 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)