Washington v. Interscope Records

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 6, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-08910·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MALCOLM WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-8910 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND INTERSCOPE RECORDS, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se, invoking the Court’s federal question and diversity jurisdiction. By order dated October 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendant Interscope Records, which he states is a citizen of California. He asserts that he is bringing federal claims for “identity theft” and violations of

“the privacy act.” (ECF 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges the following: People began saying my name alongside my social media exploit. I didn’t have anywhere to go I had to say my name was Worldpeace Meta. I know she loves me. I didn’t know her manager would go a deferent route. Her talent scout agreed we should be together. Interscope should accept responsibility. They said she was done. I didn’t agree. They allowed society to hold her against her will. I’m Hollywood. She’s Hollywood. We both grew up in the 90’s. I knew about her. Michael Jackson found out about her. She knows how I feel. I thought she would sell more albums than anyone. (Id. at 5.)1 These are the only factual allegations in the complaint. In response to a question about the injuries that Plaintiff has suffered as a result of these actions, he states: “meds, surgery, rehab, exam; mental, physical, and dental, eye.” (Id. at 6.) In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks “reputation, credibility.” (Id.) DISCUSSION Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

1 All spelling and punctuation in quoted material is from the original. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), but it need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual

allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”’ Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 F. App’x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Rule 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged,” but it does require, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed. See

Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (dismissing a complaint because it was convoluted, repetitive and difficult to understand); Anduze v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-519, 2021 WL 795472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (dismissing a complaint because “the [c]ourt is unable to properly evaluate the full nature and extent of [the] [p]laintiff's claims”). Here, even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, Plaintiff’s complaint does not provide information about what Defendant Interscope Records did or failed to do that violated Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff does not include facts about what happened or why he is entitled to the relief that he seeks. Plaintiff’s complaint thus fails to comply with Rule 8 and does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.

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Related

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369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Mendes Da Costa v. Marcucilli
675 F. App'x 15 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Atuahene v. City of Hartford
10 F. App'x 33 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Strunk v. United States House of Representatives
68 F. App'x 233 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)