Ward v. Chemerinski

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 28, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-06410·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTOINETTE WARD, Plaintiff, 23-CV-6410 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH DR. CHEMERINSKI; DR. NADIA NORD; LEAVE TO REPLEAD LISAHIA HORTON; DR. LEE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. By order dated August 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Antoinette Ward, a resident of Bronx County, filed this complaint against four employees of the Veteran’s Administration Medical Center (“VA”) on Kingsbridge Road in the Bronx: (1) Dr. Chemerinski, “OPD Mental Health”; (2) Dr. Nadia Nord, “Primary”’ (3) Lisahia Horton, “Practice Manager”; and (4) Dr. Lee, a thoracic surgeon. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to “notify the medical proxy holders,” presumably her and other family members, “prior to major surgery on [her] mother as prescribed by law.” (ECF 1 ¶ II.) Plaintiff’s mother underwent surgery on May 1, 2021, and passed away on July 26, 2021. (Id. at III.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ “fail[ure] to practice due diligence” caused her “undue stress” and pain, and she seeks money damages and declaratory relief. (Id. ¶¶ IV, V.) Attached to the complaint are 8 pages of documents relating to Plaintiff’s mother’s medical care. (Id. at 8-16.) DISCUSSION A. Constitutional claim Plaintiff brings this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege

facts that plausibly show that: (1) the challenged action was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law, and (2) such conduct deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389). Bivens provides only for money damages; injunctive or declaratory relief is not available under Bivens. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The only remedy available in a Bivens action is an award for monetary damages from defendants in their individual capacities.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that VA employees failed to notify her, in her capacity as her mother’s health care proxy, about her mother’s surgery before it was done. These allegations

cannot be considered viable claims under Bivens. The Supreme Court has recognized implied causes of action under Bivens in only three contexts: (1) unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) employment discrimination under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and (3) inadequate medical treatment of a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has “made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017); see also Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (2022) (holding in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim under Bivens that “superficial similarities are not enough to support the judicial creation of a cause of action”). Plaintiff’s claims do not fall into one of these categories and would constitute an expansion of the Bivens doctrine. The Court need not reach the issue of whether a Bivens claim for money damages may lie against federal officials based on Plaintiff’s allegations at this stage, however, because Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would state such a claim.1

B. Tort claim Plaintiff’s allegations may be construed as asserting a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for claims for damages arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680.

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